THE WORLD TODAY

THE WORLD TODAY, *founded in 1945, is issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and published monthly by the Oxford University Press*

Annual subscription *Vol. 40 (1984)*	**Single copies**
(post free)	(post free)
UK £15	*UK £1.50*
US $40	*US $4.25*
Elsewhere £20	*Elsewhere £2.25*

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Oxford University Press, Journals Department, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Tel. 0865 56767

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is precluded by the terms of its Royal Charter from expressing an opinion of its own on any aspect of international affairs. Any views expressed in this publication are, therefore the responsibility of the contributors.

CHATHAM HOUSE

ISSN 0043-913

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

January 1984 Vol. 40 No. 1

CONTENTS

...uscripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, ...al Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London ...1Y 4LE.

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

February 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 2**

CONTENTS

...scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, ...Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London ...4LE.

THE WORLD TODAY
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

March 1984 Vol. 40 No. 3

CONTENTS

[illegible]scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, [illegible] Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London [illegible]

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORLD TODAY

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

April 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 4**

CONTENTS

uscripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, l Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London Y 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORLD TODAY

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

May 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 5**

CONTENTS

scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London ' 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

Journal of International Studies
London School of Economics

Published three times a year
April, August and December

Volume 13, Number 1 *Spring 1984*

Volume 13, Number 2: Special Issue on Central America

Including articles by Richard Fagen on US policy in Central America, Wolf Grabendorff on West European attitudes towards the Central American crisis, and George Irvin on Nicaragua.

Other upcoming articles in MILLENNIUM will be on such topics as Angolan-Soviet relations, the decision-making process of the Argentine military régime during the Malvinas/Falklands crisis, and the theory of political realism.

Subscriptions *Volume 13, 1984*

Individuals	£11.00 (Overseas £13.25, US $22.90, Canada $28.20)
Institutions	£22.75 (Overseas £27.25, US $50.00, Canada $61.25)
Students	£5.00 (Overseas £6.25)

Index Volumes 1-11
£1.00 (Overseas £1.50, US $2.50, Canada $3.00)

Rates include postage.

Please make cheque or international money order payable to
MILLENNIUM: Journal of International Studies and send to

Business Manager
MILLENNIUM: Journal of International Studies
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

THE WORLD TODAY

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

June 1984 Vol. 40 No. 6

CONTENTS

scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London ' 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: LUCY SETON-WATSON

July 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 7**

CONTENTS

ipts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, stitute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORLD TODAY

EDITOR: CH[illegible] CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETAR[illegible] SETON-[illegible]

August–September 1984

CONTENTS

cripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, nstitute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORLD TODAY

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: DIANE WEBER

October 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 10**

CONTENTS

[Manu]scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, [Royal] Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London [SW1Y] 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

'HE
VORLD
'ODAY

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: DIANE WEBER

November 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 11**

CONTENTS

scripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London ' 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

THE WORLD TODAY

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CVIIC
EDITORIAL SECRETARY: DIANE WEBER

December 1984 **Vol. 40 No. 12**

CONTENTS

Manuscripts and correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE. Unsolicited manuscripts will be returned only on request.

Note of the month

TURKEY AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION

TURKEY'S general election—the first for over six years—was held on 6 November 1983. Two features of the election gave encouragement to those who had been hoping that Turkey might be able to progress from military rule towards a more stable style of democracy than that which had brought the country to the brink of collapse in the late 1970s. First was the fact that the election had been held at all, and second that it produced an overall majority for a single party—the liberal-conservative Motherland Party led by the economist Turgut Özal.[1]

With 211 of the 400 seats in Parliament, Mr Özal's party won a clear majority over its two rivals, the Populist and Nationalist Democracy Parties. The Populists occupy the moderate left slot in the political spectrum and had been initially regarded as the Generals' preference for a loyal opposition. Ideologically, the stance of the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) was centre-right, but electorally more important was the fact that it was popularly identified as the favourite of the military. The fact that the Populists finished in second place, with over 30 per cent of the popular votes and 117 seats in Parliament, came as something of a surprise and indicated that the party could be establishing itself as an important force in Turkish politics. For some, a greater shock was the serious defeat of the NDP, which was beaten into third place with only 23 per cent of the poll and 71 parliamentary seats. In an ill-judged address, broadcast on the evening of 4 November, the President, ex-General Kenan Evren, had issued a discreet appeal to the voters to support the NDP and a veiled attack on Turgut Özal. The result was thus seen as a sharp rebuff to Evren and the more hard-line military chiefs.

The idea that the voters were merely giving a thumbs-down to the military seems an inadequate explanation of Özal's victory. Evren still has widespread popular support; had he made the Presidential election of November 1982 an open one, he would probably still have won a clear majority of the popular vote. Once the outcome of the general election had become clear, the President welcomed the result and wished Özal and his party every success.

A major cause of Özal's victory was the fact that he came across to the voters as easily the most effective and skilled politician of the three potential premiers. With his experience as chief economic adviser to Süleyman Demirel's last civilian government of 1979–80, and as Deputy Prime Minister under the military until June 1982, Özal clearly outshone his rivals in TV debates, demonstrating an especially strong grasp of Turkey's economic problems. The NDP leader, the retired General Turgut Sunalp, paled by com-

[1] For details on political developments between 1980 and 1983, see Andrew Mango's two articles in *The World Today*, 'The Third Turkish Republic', January 1983, and 'Turkey: democracy under military tutelage', November 1983.

parison and his party must have lost many votes from his weakness and evident inexperience as a campaigner.

On the credit side, Evren could derive some comfort from the high turnout at the election. The voters seem to have paid no heed to the call to boycott the polls which was unofficially issued by the pre-1980 political leaders, Demirel and Ecevit. Faced with the prospect of a fine of around £7 for failure to vote, 92·3 per cent of the electorate went to the polls. Only 4·8 per cent of those voting spoiled their ballot papers—around the average for previous elections.

Apart from the success of the Motherland Party, the regional distribution of votes between the three contenders also provided some interesting pointers to mass political trends. In particular, the Populist Party scored well above its national average share of the poll in Turkey's four main cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana), suggesting that it had captured a substantial proportion of the urban working class and intellectual vote which had swung over to Bülent Ecevit's former Republican People's Party during the 1970s. On the other hand, the Nationalist Democracy Party performed far more strongly in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia than in the country as a whole. Although it came a poor third nationally, the NDP actually headed the poll in four eastern provinces. This was, perhaps, a predictable phenomenon; small parties have traditionally been stronger in eastern Anatolia, whose remoteness and relative underdevelopment has tended to isolate the region from national electoral trends. The more traditional and hierarchical structure of society in eastern Turkey may also have inclined voters there to support the party which was assumed to have military blessing.

After the election, the outgoing Premier, Bülent Ulusu, proudly announced that 'we are about to achieve the transition to a normal democratic system'. How well justified was his claim, and what were the problems the new government was likely to encounter?

Critics of the regime, both inside and outside Turkey, could point to several features of the new Constitution and recent legislative and judicial decisions, which may undermine the view that Turkey is now a 'normal' democracy. The Constitution, for example, places some severe restrictions on freedom of the press, and these were strengthened by a new Press Law enacted by the military government just before Parliament assembled. At about the same time, on 15 November, the Istanbul Martial Law Court passed sentences of five to eight years on eighteen members of the Turkish Peace Association, a pro-disarmament pressure group of intellectuals set up in 1977. The Peace Association members were convicted under Article 141 of the Penal Code, which is frequently used to restrict freedom of speech, particularly on the left. Trades union legislation introduced by the military government is also a good deal more restrictive than that of most Western democracies. In support of such restrictions, it is argued that unfettered liberalism provided insufficient checks to the slide towards political and economic anarchy during the late 1970s. The problem is that bodies such as the Council of Europe (of which Turkey's con-

tinued membership is currently in doubt) are likely to use absolute rather than relative standards to define democracy and to decide whether countries such as Turkey fit their definition.

Another serious criticism of the election is that two potentially important parties, the Correct Path Party, and the Social Democracy Party (Sodep) were prevented from running candidates. (Apart from this, 719 candidates—mostly Independents—were separately vetoed.) Nevertheless, both parties continue to exist as perfectly legal organizations, and it has recently been confirmed that both will be permitted to contest the local elections, due to be held in 1984. Their fortunes are likely to be shaped by their relations with the two main parties currently represented in Parliament. If, for instance, Sodep could negotiate either a merger or some sort of electoral pact with the Populists, then a re-united moderate Left could well win majorities in the big cities. Such an agreement will not be easy to attain, as the Populist leader, Necdet Calp, has spoken somewhat disparagingly of Sodep, while other prominent Social Democrat personalities have discounted the idea of a merger. For his part, Özal is not likely to view the Correct Path Party with favour, since it is his main competitor for the loyalty of right-of-centre voters. The powers and functions of Turkish local authorities are very limited, so it is probable that both Sodep and the Correct Path Party would use the municipalities primarily as a launching pad into national politics. If they are successful in 1984, Turkey could be faced with a potentially dangerous contest between local and national governments.

Needless to say, this is not the only problem which Özal is likely to confront. In the industrial sphere, real wages have undoubtedly fallen over the past five years. The new Prime Minister is committed to continuing the battle against inflation, so the promised return to free collective bargaining and the right to strike could herald a fierce struggle between government and the unions in 1984. There is also some fear that the elected civilian government will find it difficult to work with the army, which still retains a good deal of political authority. This anxiety may prove exaggerated. Özal has worked with the Generals in the past; he appears to be a cautious man, and is unlikely to provoke a showdown with them. In all probability, the armed forces will continue to play the major role in determining defence and security policy, but Özal does not seem to have any serious differences of opinion with them in these fields. With luck, and good sense on their part, the civilians should be able to ease themselves back into real power over the next few years.

WILLIAM HALE*

*Dr Hale is Senior Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics at Durham University and the author of *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

Western economic summits: can they do better?

NICHOLAS BAYNE

MULTILATERAL meetings of heads of state and government are as old as history and a fruitful field for investigation. Consider, for example, the Acre summit of 1148, which decided the strategy for the Second Crusade; or the Bath summit of 973, where King Edgar of the West Saxons was rowed up the River Avon by the four other participating monarchs; or even the Bethlehem summit, very early in the Christian era, of three oriental heads of state bearing gifts. The subject of this article, however, is a much more recent series of summits: the meetings of the leaders of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada, plus the President of the European Commission, which have been held every year from Rambouillet in 1975 down to Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1983 to consider mainly economic subjects. The tenth in the series will be held next summer in London.

These summits began in 1975 for at least three reasons, each of a different kind. One reason derives from the management of economic interdependence. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Western economies expanded very rapidly. International activity grew faster than domestic, whether it was trade, investment or financial flows. So governments found that the price of rising prosperity was a loss of national autonomy in domestic decision-making, which now depended far more on what others were doing. This was acceptable as long as things went well. But in the early 1970s, things began to go badly, with confusion on the monetary scene, the first oil crisis and the recession which followed. Now there was tension between economic interdependence and national sovereignty, which only heads of government seemed likely to resolve.

A second reason flows from shifts in relative power between the United States, Europe and Japan. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was so much stronger than all other countries that it could provide, on its own, leadership for the international economic system. But Japan and the European countries were growing faster than the United States. The accession of Britain made the European Community into a unit comparable to the United States in terms of GNP, with a far larger share of world trade. So, by the early 1970s, the Americans became neither able nor willing to exercise sole leadership. Some new arrangements were needed which would associate the Euro-

---

The author, a member of the British Diplomatic Service, has been attached for a year to Chatham House and is the co-author, with Professor Robert D. Putnam of Harvard University, of *Hanging Together: the Seven-Power Summit* (London: Heinemann/Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, to be published in April 1984). The opinions he expresses are entirely personal and should not be taken as reflecting official views. This article appears simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

peans and Japan with the United States to undertake together the role which hitherto the Americans had played alone.

A third reason stems simply from the personal inclinations of a new set of Western leaders, particularly President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt. They were both Finance Ministers in the early 1970s and, with their US and British colleagues, George Shultz and Anthony Barber, they created what was originally called the Library Group and later, when Japan joined, the Group of Five. They met in a very informal and relaxed way on the fringes of wider international meetings and relished their direct exchanges in the small group by contrast with the formal proceedings in the larger conferences. Thus, when Giscard and Schmidt gained supreme office, they were attracted by this format for exchanges at their own level. When President Giscard launched the idea of a limited economic summit in 1975, he had solid backing from Chancellor Schmidt and encouragement from Shultz and Henry Kissinger (then US Secretary of State), who together persuaded President Ford to join in.

The essential feature of these summits was that they should be small, select and personal. They should bring together those directly responsible for policy in a context where they could talk together frankly and without inhibitions. They should be prepared by personal representatives, later to be called 'sherpas', whose links with the head of government were more important than their place in the hierarchy. Chancellor Schmidt said: 'We want a private, informal meeting of those who really matter in the world.' Giscard originally envisaged only four participants, or five at the most, and he resisted for a long time the summit's enlargement to include Italy, then Canada, then the European Community. But even thus extended, the summits are the only series of heads of government meetings to be both selective and free-standing, in the sense that they are detached from any other organization at lower levels. All other recurrent summits, whether of the Commonwealth, the non-aligned movement, Nato or the European Council for the Community, bring together the leaders of all participating countries, as the apex of an institutional pyramid.

Giscard, Schmidt and the others were convinced that heads of government could bring a unique and essential contribution beyond the capacities of officials and other ministers. This unique contribution can be broken down into three components. First, the heads of government can integrate policies normally treated separately by ministers or departments with specific responsibilities. Second, they are best placed to reconcile the various demands of foreign policy and domestic policy and to work out lines of action where domestic and external considerations can reinforce each other rather than conflict. Third, they carry an authority which other ministers do not have. This authority is constrained in various ways in the different countries—less in France than elsewhere—but it is still real. After the first summit, Andrew Shonfield, then Director of Chatham House, commended the 'Rambouillet effect' which enabled international bargaining 'to be prodded forward at intervals by political decisions taken at a high level'.[1]

[1] 'Can the Western economic system stand the strain?', *The World Today*, May 1976, p. 172.

The early summits: 1975–8

When the leaders first met in November 1975, the recession induced by the first oil crisis had already passed its trough. The concern of the Rambouillet summit and its three successors—Puerto Rico in 1976, London in 1977, Bonn in 1978—was to sustain recovery. The summits became the focus of the 'locomotive' controversy, on whether the United States, Germany and Japan could properly stimulate their strong economies to encourage recovery in the weaker ones. The leaders moved from simple statements of intent at first to set growth targets at London and to make commitments on policy measures at Bonn—a progression much encouraged by the arrival of President Carter, who favoured a highly organized summit process in which meticulous preparation would enable the leaders, when they assembled, to make specific commitments.

Three lessons emerge clearly from the way this quartet of early summits tackled macro-economic policy. The first lesson was that if all the summit countries adopted the same sort of policies together, the cumulative effect was far stronger than each component country intended. When all decided, at the 1976 summit, to adopt restrictive policies, there was a pause in the recovery which none of them had wanted. Second, it became clear that no single country could successfully maintain a policy against the trend of the others. Even the United States in 1977/8 saw its attempts to act as a locomotive, unsupported by Germany and Japan, frustrated by a widening deficit, a falling dollar and mounting inflation.

Co-ordination of economic policy thus required the participants concerned to act in harmony, but with different countries doing different things according to their situation and capacities. But even this would not work if the other policies of the participants, e.g. on energy or trade, were inconsistent; this was the third lesson. On the one hand, therefore, the summits from the start helped the participating governments to resist the pressure for inward-looking policies. On the other hand, they gave powerful impulses to wider international negotiations. Rambouillet in 1975 produced the breakthrough which enabled the negotiations on reform of the international monetary system to be completed. London and Bonn in 1977 and 1978 exerted crucial pressure on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) in GATT, to bring these to a substantial conclusion.[2]

The Bonn summit of July 1978 knit together many different strands and used the full potential of the summit process. There was a package of commitments which balanced one field against another: economic stimulus by Germany and Japan; energy saving measures by the United States; forward movement in the MTNs by all, but especially France; and supporting undertakings by the other participants to complete the pattern. But when the leaders met at Tokyo one year later, the environment, and their own attitudes, had fundamentally changed. The onset of the second oil crisis meant that the next

[2] For background to these negotiations, see Mario A. Kakabadse, 'The Tokyo Round and after', *ibid.*, July–August 1981.

quartet of summits would take place in much more difficult conditions. Tokyo in 1979, Venice in 1980, Ottawa in 1981 and Versailles in 1982, instead of promoting recovery, had to concentrate on coping with the immediate oil crisis and bringing inflation under control.

Changing direction: 1979–83

In retrospect, it appeared that the earlier summits had not done enough to keep inflation in check. This became the first priority of all or nearly all the summit governments. At the same time, a reaction set in against the meticulous preparation and specific commitments favoured by President Carter, on the grounds that these made the summit process too bureaucratic and stifled the personal contributions of the leaders. This reaction gathered strength once Carter had left office, though it proved very hard to reverse the trend.

Because of all this, the treatment of macro-economic policy at these later summits changed.[3] The conclusions were simpler and the prescriptions—on checking monetary growth and reducing budget deficits—became more uniform; and this was not all. The first four summits had looked for ways in which the actions of some participants would promote recovery not only for themselves but for others, as growth in domestic demand in the strong economies might encourage export-led growth in the weaker ones. However, the control of inflation required painful measures which each country must take for itself. It was helpful for governments to point to other countries making the same sacrifice; but the actions of others to check inflation could not substitute for the decisions each government must take at home. At times, indeed, others could make these decisions more difficult; if one country drove up interest rates or its exchange rate so as to check inflation, others had to follow suit or they would suffer by comparison. This accounts for the persistent dispute over American interest rates at Ottawa, Versailles and Williamsburg.

The lessons of the first quartet of summits, however, still held good in the second. First, the French tried to go it alone in economic policy in 1981, suffered the same consequences as the United States had earlier and had to go into reverse. Second, the simultaneous pursuit of restrictive policies to check inflation, calculated in each country on domestic criteria to produce a certain impact, generated a much stronger effect than all put together, so that the recession lasted much longer than anyone had envisaged. Third, the macro-economic strategy and the policies pursued in other areas still needed to be compatible with each other. The oil import targets and other energy measures adopted at Tokyo in 1979 and Venice in 1980 assumed an early recovery, which would mean steady pressure on oil supplies and prices throughout the 1980s. In fact, the prolonged recession upset these calculations so that the energy commitments had a good short-term effect, but proved inappropriate over the longer term.

[3] See Andrew Shonfield, 'The politics of the mixed economy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No 1 (1980), p. 11, for a critical comment on this change.

The early set of summits had done well in giving impulses which brought existing international negotiations to their conclusion, but they did not launch any new ones to take their place. The later summits faced the problem of keeping the international system in good order in much less favourable conditions, without any negotiations already in progress which could serve as the antidote to economic nationalism. The leaders feared that any new process of negotiation, if launched in such conditions, would not get into orbit. They preferred instead to promote single events, like the ministerial meeting of GATT or the Cancún summit on North–South issues. As a sort of surrogate for wider negotiations, the summits began to set up their own groups of officials or ministers on particular issues, such as monitoring energy commitments, exchange market intervention or technology. But this tended to clutter up the summit process and to worry non-participating countries and established institutions like the OECD.

Meanwhile, the summits began to give far more attention to non-economic, foreign policy issues, which hitherto they had only discussed on the side. There were two reasons for this. First, the international political context took a sharp turn for the worse in 1979, with the troubles in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Second, there was the reaction of the countries not invited to the four-power political summit at Guadeloupe in January of that year. Japan, Italy and Canada now had an interest in seeing the seven-power summits used for foreign policy exchanges so as to forestall any repetition of Guadeloupe. The Japanese, originally very reluctant to discuss political issues in any formal way, became much keener and only the French continued to resist the idea. The Venice summit of June 1980 provided an obvious and welcome opportunity for the US and its allies to close ranks over Afghanistan. For the first time, the summit issued a substantial foreign policy declaration, prepared shortly in advance by a special group of officials. The process was repeated in Ottawa in 1981, but the French continued to oppose formal sessions on foreign policy issues; there were none at Versailles in 1982, though East–West economic relations—essentially a political subject—dominated much of the proceedings.[4] At Williamsburg in 1983, French reluctance and American preference for minimal advance preparation meant that most of the important discussion on missiles was unscripted. The summit produced a successful joint assertion of the indivisibility of Western security interests, achieved largely thanks to the robust attitude of Japan's Prime Minister, Mr Nakasone. The political outcome of Williamsburg was thus more significant than the economic. But this improvised handling of such a sensitive subject could have gone seriously wrong.

Looking to the future

It is naturally easier to describe what the summits have been than what they are likely to become, and how they might produce the best results in the

[4] See Stephen Woolcock, 'The Versailles summit and East–West trade', *The World Today*, July–August 1982.

future. But there are some clues which indicate how future summits may resemble or differ from past ones.

One factor making for continuity with the immediate past is the likely persistence in office of the major participants. Chancellor Kohl should be there for the next three summits and President Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher for the next four. It has been suggested that Mr Nakasone could well break the cycle whereby Japanese Prime Ministers last only two years at a time. For the United States, the picture is more uncertain; but clearly a Reagan re-election is a possible hypothesis, and that would mean President Reagan still being there in 1988.

As for the economic conditions confronting the summits of the next few years, they should resemble much more closely those which faced the earliest meetings, not the most recent ones. The Rambouillet summit of 1975 took place just as recovery began from the recession following the first oil crisis, with the United States well ahead of Europe. This year's Williamsburg summit was held at the corresponding point in the cycle following the second oil crisis. Future summits, like the early ones, may be able once again to concentrate on assuring economic recovery and giving impulses in trade and monetary matters, rather than on the austere policies necessary in the early 1980s.

But a striking contrast with those earlier meetings is the disappearance of former Finance Ministers. In 1977 and 1978, six out of the eight leaders present—Giscard, Schmidt, Callaghan, Fukuda, Andreotti and Jenkins—had previously served as Finance Ministers; it almost looked like a conspiracy. Now there are no former Finance Ministers among the leaders and none, apparently, waiting in the wings. The present generation of leaders bring political experience, judgement and authority to economic discussions. but they are more likely to look to their fellow ministers and advisers for technical expertise or originality.

What about economic issues for future summits? These are the hardest to predict, without giving way to wishful thinking. An early return to co-ordinated economic stimulus seems unlikely, since the British, German and Japanese governments regard this as an 'intellectual trap', to quote Sir Geoffrey Howe.[3] On the other hand, discussion of money supply, interest rates and budgetary policy has become rather unrewarding at summit level, because of the unresolved difference with the United States. It might be better to shift this into the more technical and less public discussions among Finance Ministers, plus the Managing Director of the IMF, which were set up at Versailles in 1982. The summit itself might turn instead to considering the structural changes needed to sustain economic recovery, looking, for example, at obstacles to competition, the shape of the labour market or the pattern of investment. The issues in this field are difficult technically and sensitive politically; but this is often because they mix up the domestic and the external in a way which only heads of government can unravel.

The early summits played a key role in invigorating international trade and

[3] *The Guardian*, 19 April 1983.

monetary negotiations. They could and should return to this role. In the trade field, they could stimulate further rounds in GATT, to pick up where the Tokyo Round left off. The Americans seem ready for this, as they know it is the best way of counteracting protectionist pressures at home. But it needs a little less caution on the European side. Summit intervention on the monetary scene is harder to judge. Progress here needs a fundamental change of heart by the Americans, which is not yet visible, so that the summons from President Mitterrand and others to a new Bretton Woods has come too early. But even if US views should start to evolve, powerful pressure from the very top would be essential to make headway against the desperate technical problems in this field, as Giscard and Schmidt demonstrated over the European Monetary System.

Lastly, on the economic side, the summit leaders in future need to come to grips with relations with developing countries, since only heads of government can reconcile the political, economic and humanitarian factors involved. This subject has been on the agenda for every summit so far, but the results have been disappointing and attempts to invigorate institutions like the World Bank have been frustrated, often by the US Congress. Perhaps an approach is needed which allows for more visible personal involvement by the leaders. At one future summit, for example, the Western heads of government might invite a group of their peers from developing countries to join them in working out a programme together.

On the future of foreign policy discussion, it is possible to be a little more confident. Both the state of the world and the inclinations of the leaders should mean that foreign policy issues are regularly discussed at future summits, with conclusions reached and made public. Japanese reluctance has all but disappeared and French resistance is not likely to be maintained *à l'outrance*. East–West relations will certainly require recurrent summit attention in the future, in the context of arms control, stationing of missiles and other aspects. Policy in the Middle East likewise merits attention by the leaders, to forestall the differences between the allies which have broken out in the past and could easily appear again. Hitherto, summits have tended to treat economic and foreign policy matters in separate compartments. They could do more in future to combine the two—to consider, for example, whether political unrest in the Middle East may again threaten oil supplies—even if this approach may lead them into some awkward exchanges on how far reciprocal security interests should influence economic policy actions.

Finally, some thoughts about future summit format. The present set of leaders have reacted strongly against the format favoured by President Carter, as making the summits congested, bureaucratic and impersonal. They seek to lighten the preparation and to get back to the direct, spontaneous exchanges of the original aspiration. However, there is a risk that the pendulum may swing back too far. There is no substitute for direct personal exchanges. But they have their drawbacks too: they can be inconclusive, transitory and open to misinterpretation. The leaders may understand each other better but they

still may not agree, and the mutual influence quickly wears off. One needs a format which combines the maximum scope for informal exchange with the incentive to move towards consensus and the means of recording and making public whatever is agreed. The four suggestions for change described below are precisely designed to promote this.

First, future summits should aspire to visible commitments, but only on a strictly limited number of subjects, with preparations focused accordingly. Past experience shows that each summit can normally digest only one major issue, or at the most two. Other issues would of course be discussed informally but without the intention of reaching public understandings. Second, the summits should renounce the practice of setting up their own special groups. All such groups should either be disbanded or plugged into international bodies like the OECD or the IMF. Follow-up work from the summits should in future be entrusted to these organizations; the summit process would be less cluttered and the existing organizations would be encouraged. Third, preparation for political issues should become much more systematic, matching more closely the economic work of the 'sherpas'. Complex and sensitive subjects like arms control need to be carefully thought out in advance; it is highly risky to try to produce conclusions on them without advance preparation. Fourth and last, as a purely practical suggestion, the summits could be extended by a further twenty-four hours with great advantage and without any real strain on the timetable of the participants. The leaders might gather, say, on Friday afternoon, spend two full days of discussion on Saturday and Sunday, partly on their own and partly with their supporting ministers, and then break up at noon on Monday after a short final morning on the text of their declaration. This would allow them, for example, to spend one day on economic issues and one on foreign policy, or to invite heads of government from developing countries for the second day. It would also provide more time for the bilateral meetings which are an essential accompaniment to the multilateral summit.

The summits have had some bad patches, especially around Versailles in 1982. They would benefit from some changes to offset the law of diminishing returns. But when considered against the three original reasons for inventing them, they are still fully justified. Their selective and personal character, as originally envisaged, survives after ten years to a surprising degree and this gives them a flexibility which other more formal bodies cannot have. The adaptation to shifts of relative power has been uneven. But the summits serve as a regular reminder of common interests in transatlantic relations which transcend specific differences; they offer a channel at the highest level between the European Community and the United States; and they help to guard against a return to the mistrust and the frustration which marked Dr Kissinger's abortive Year of Europe a decade ago.[6] Furthermore, they have assisted the emergence of Japan, by slow stages, as a full participant in Western discussions of political as well as economic issues, so that it now makes sense to use the

[6] See Andrew Pierre, 'What happened to the Year of Europe?', *The World Today*, March 1974.

seven-power summits for foreign policy discussions in a way that it did not back in 1975. The management of economic interdependence has proved much more difficult than anyone expected. The second oil crisis and the ensuing recession have tested the system severely. Sometimes the summits made mistakes and sometimes the participants did not live up to their commitments. But their purpose has always been to turn governments away from inward-looking policies and to give impulses to wider international co-operation in very difficult times. It would be a great set-back if this practice of high-level consultation were to lapse or fail to achieve its full potential. There are certain areas of policy where only the heads of government can generate progress, by virtue of their authority and their comprehensive responsiblities, domestic as well as external.

Party government in the new Iberian democracies

GEOFFREY PRIDHAM

THE newly established democracies in Southern Europe have shown a surprising resilience in the face of many basic difficulties and serious challenges. Since their regime transition began in 1974–5, they have encountered inevitable problems due to their lack of experience in democratic politics, the side-effects of social and economic modernization, the difficulties peculiar to each country (such as terrorism in Spain) and, above all, their vulnerability in the unfavourable economic environment of the recession. They have undoubtedly suffered from governmental 'overload' at the same time as struggling to establish the legitimacy of their new democratic systems.

Is the survival of these fledgeling Mediterranean democracies against many odds simply a result of good luck or chance (one thinks immediately of Spain's close escape at the time of the military coup in February 1981), or has it been helped by the existence of stable liberal democracies elsewhere in Western Europe—not to mention the influences and pressures of the European Community? Alternatively, should one not look for more intrinsic, deeper reasons? If so, attention has to focus on these countries' party systems, not merely because political parties are usually seen as the paramount agents of political

---

Dr Pridham, Reader in European Politics at Bristol University, is the editor of *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Régime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal*, to be published by Frank Cass in 1984, and the author of *Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy: an interpretative study*, to be published by Croom Helm in 1985.

communication in parliamentary systems, but also because their actual performance reflects the quality and stability of liberal democracies.

One of the widely acknowledged signs of democratic maturity is the ability to manage a change of power between rival political élites without serious disruption. On this count, the new Mediterranean democracies have performed surprisingly well: Greece in 1981, and Spain the following year, experienced a complete change of power from conservative rule to the Left, while in Portugal a new centre-right government was elected with an absolute majority in 1979, and a Socialist-led government was formed in 1983—albeit as a result of coalitional change rather than outright electoral victory.[1] In other more settled democracies in Western Europe, such an outright change of power has often been less easy: in the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, it came only after two decades of Christian Democrat rule and then somewhat traumatically; in the French Fifth Republic, a Socialist government was elected after twenty-three years of conservative rule; and in Italy, there has been no real change of power at all—the appointment of a Socialist Prime Minister for the first time in 1983 was little more than a new variation on the old theme of almost four decades of Christian Democrat dominance in government.[2]

But is this evidence of successful alternation in power in the new Southern European democracies supported by the performance of their party systems in other respects? Looking at the nature and role of their political parties in a broader sense—and therefore, as argued, at the quality and stability of these polities—involves considering them as cases of 'party government', i.e. their functioning as parliamentary systems in which political parties play the central role in formulating and deciding policy, as well as in mobilizing popular support for their proposals and actions and, thereby, implicity or explicity, for the new democratic systems. Given the parties' crucial role as legitimizing agents, they must be judged as both institutional and socio-political forces. It is, therefore, proposed to examine the new Iberian democracies comparatively under three aspects: the parties' relationship with the state, the relationships they have developed between themselves and their relationship with society.

The parties and the state

In assessing the role of the parties in the new political structures, the essential question must be whether or how far they are system-supportive: that is, not only whether they have participated in the parliamentary system (as distinct from boycotting it or even mobilizing support against it from outside) through elections and sharing in power, but also if they have done this with conviction, by genuinely supporting the values of democratic politics. This may sometimes be difficult to identify, as some parties might disguise their real or

[1] For background, see Richard Clogg, 'Greece: the year of the Green Sun', *The World Today*, November 1981; Jonathan Marcus, 'The Socialist victory in Spain', *ibid.*, December 1982; Robert Harvey, 'Portugal: democracy's balance-sheet', *ibid.*, January 1979; and Tom Gallagher 'The growing pains of Portuguese democracy', *ibid.*, March 1981.

[2] John Eisenhammer, 'The Italian general election', *ibid.*, September 1983.

ultimate intentions to conform tactically with a general atmosphere favourin a parliamentary system; an added complication is that there might legitima tely be different ways of interpreting the form of democracy that should b established. Indeed, the very state of flux that often characterizes the earl stage of regime transition might well reveal the intentions of political élite because of the opportunities which exist to mould the future system.

An examination of this question usefully begins with the conventional yard stick of the ideological spectrum from Left to Right. In liberal democracie parties located around the centre—stretching from centre-Left to centre Right—are almost certainly system-supportive, because they tend not to offe radical policies and their electoral bases are invariably moderate in outlook; i this group may be included also parties more clearly identified with either Lef or Right, but which for electoral or coalitional reasons are open to centrist posi tions.

Spain offers interesting versions of centrist politics. The formative transitio phase took place under the aegis of the centre-right UCD (Union of the Demo cratic Centre), which, among other elements, included ex-Francoists of pragmatic or liberal inclination (notably Adolfo Suárez, Prime Minister fror 1976 to 1981). This fact helped to accustom the political Right as a whole t the new democratic game. The UCD's disintegration in the early 1980s an its eventual demise soon after its decisive defeat in the 1982 election posed th problem that the polarization of the electorate might eventually favour government of the more radical Right; as it happened, the Popular Allianc (AP) of Fraga Iribarne, which in the later 1970s had adopted positions incline towards the extreme Right, now, as the main opposition party, moved toward the centre to fill much of the space vacated by the UCD, hitherto its mai rival. Whether the AP's representation of the centre-Right is simply tactical c results in accommodating the whole political Right through the successfu practice of democratic politics (including the possibility of the acquisition c power) remains open. It is, however, significant that the Socialist Party (PSOE under González's leadership moved consciously towards the centre, both t acquire office and to stabilize the new Spanish democracy. The pull of Spain' party politics has thus been distinctly towards the centre, with the consequen tial bonus that tactical democrats might well be converted into committe ones.

Portugal presents a more complicated picture in this respect: there, th party system has been more fragmented and marked by that country's embark ing on its transition through a revolution.[3] The latter factor meant that th axis of Portuguese politics initially was slanted strongly towards the Left, wit the centre-Right being temporarily not legitimate. At first, the pivotal role wa played by the moderate-left Socialist Party (PS), but its failure to co-operat with other parties for coalitional purposes and its ineffectiveness in offic (1976–8) created an uncertainty if not instability in the broad centre, eve

[3] For background, see Thomas C. Bruneau, 'The Portuguese coup: causes and probable cons quences', *ibid.*, July 1974.

though in the elections of both 1975 and 1976 the voters had shown a clear preference for moderate parties.[4] In 1979, an overall majority was given to the new Democratic Alliance (AD), a grouping of three centre-right parties under Sá Carneiro, but this new government sought to change the Socialist-inspired Constitution of 1976 and hence the model of democracy it embodied. The re-election of a Socialist-led government in 1983 (the PS formed a coalition with one of the three centre-Right parties after the AD fell apart) tended to suggest that, in Portugal's ideological spectrum, the space from centre-Left to centre-Right was basically dominant, though the pull towards it was much less straightforward than in Spain. It should be noted, in any case, that there was a marked fluidity in ideological positions in both countries. This was hardly surprising, as their new party systems replaced long periods devoid of democratic politics.

Some mention should obviously be made of the political extremes, since fundamental opposition to the new democracies would be most likely to reside here. The extreme Right was the more easily discredited, because the advent of democracy in both Spain and Portugal involved the rejection of the Francoist and Salazarist models. Coupled with the fact that the centre-Right forces absorbed some elements that otherwise would probably have adhered to the extreme Right, the latter was reduced at both activist and electoral levels to a fringe group of largely nostalgic elements—a tendency reinforced by the complete lack of respectability of Fascism as a movement in Western Europe.

The extreme Left was more difficult to categorize, not least because the two Communist parties of Spain (PCE) and Portugal (PCP) presented different if not contrasting strategies. The PCE proclaimed its democratic credentials in the context of its Eurocommunist strategy and, judging by its willingness to compromise over major policies and co-operate with other parties, and in the light of its bitter lessons from the Civil War and Franco periods, it emerged as a strong supporter of the new democracy. In Portugal, the PCP has offered a radical alternative to liberal democracy; unlike the PCE, it would be identified clearly as extreme Left: in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 revolution, it pressed for a Soviet-style model of 'democracy', was associated with the abortive coup of 1975 and has continued since to spurn Eurocommunism, even though in recent years it has stressed its participation in the competitive game of democratic politics. For the moment at least, it should be regarded as a tactical rather than convinced participant in democratic politics. As such, it provides the one major exception to the fact that the main political forces in the two countries are system-supportive.

Several lessons may be drawn from this brief survey of the party-political scene in Spain and Portugal. While it may be impossible to disentangle tactical motives from genuine democratic conviction, the overriding emphasis of the major parties on democratic stability and solving the economic crisis—objectives to which the two Socialist parties give priority over social and economic change—must none the less be very significant. Their enhanced credibility in

[4] Antonio de Figueiredo, 'Portugal's free choice', *ibid.*, August 1976.

the eyes of their voters on these grounds and their intention to hold power in the state strengthens this commitment. One can even say that the acceptance of party-political pluralism and competition, including the ability to accommodate polarization, has become widespread among political élites in both countries, though with more difficulty in Portugal than in Spain. In Portugal, it was complicated by disagreement over the rules of the democratic game (i.e. the Constitution) as well as over the socio-economic model to be favoured after the revolution. This disagreement seems to have subsided, however, not least because the constitutional change in 1982 abolishing the Revolutionary Council, and with it the direct policy role of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), removed what had been a principal cause of dispute.

One major qualification has to be made about the parties' role if one is to determine the chances of Spain and Portugal developing as parliamentary democracies: this concerns the existence of important agencies of power other than the political parties, whether formally included in the institutional arrangements or not. For instance, in the transition period, both the President in Portugal and the King in Spain provided, along with their Prime Ministers, crucial political leadership in a kind of dual executive. The powers of the Portuguese President (e.g. the right to dismiss as well as appoint the Prime Minister and his own direct election by the people) are such that the system may be called semi-presidential, with the consequence that the party-political leadership (i.e. Prime Minister and Cabinet) may not be fully in control of policy-making. The very presence of the presidency as a source of institutional stability (reinforced by Ramalho Eanes's own eminent democratic credentials) has tempted party leaders in office to rely on this rather than on difficult coalitional arrangements with other parties (e.g. the Mario Soares government during 1976–8, followed by the three 'independent' governments during 1978–9). In Spain, this problem was less pronounced: while the King acted as a powerful stabilizing force during the early transition period in both backing up the Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, and conditioning important sectors of the ex-Francoist establishment to the new democracy, his role was reduced to that of a constitutional monarch by the 1978 Constitution.

More seriously, the challenge to 'party government' has come from non-institutional agencies of power—above all, the military. It is a normal condition of liberal democracies that the military remain ultimately under civilian control, and that they confine themselves to their professional activity. This has not been the case in either Spain's or Portugal's new democracy, although in the latter, the situation was different in that the MFA—the radical Left movement in the Army that had acted as the spearhead of the 1974 revolution—was accorded a form of institutional status in the 1976 Constitution through the Revolutionary Council (though, as noted, abolished in 1982). At one time, the MFA increased its efforts to strengthen its links with the public, but this presented no real threat to the established party system. Only in Spain has the Army—essentially the same body that existed under Franco—continued to present a potentially, and in the 1981 coup actually, dangerous

threat to party government. Significantly, it intervened in February 1981 at the time of the change of Prime Minister from Suárez to Calvo Sotelo, at the head of the same UCD government, because it was apparently unnerved, among other things, by growing divisions and instability within the governing party.

If the political and economic situation in either Spain or Portugal were to worsen dramatically, one could not discount totally the possibility of military intervention, or a rise in popular support for the political extremes. However, developments in the last year or two have tended to favour the stabilization of party government, as borne out, in Spain, by popular disapproval of the 1981 coup and the change of power in 1982; and, in Portugal, by the constitutional change of 1982 and less reluctance by party élites to form coalitions in Portugal.

Inter-party relationships

While a general discussion of the ideological positions and system-supportiveness of parties provides an outline of their relationship with the state, a more specific indicator of their commitment to the new democracies must be the nature of their relationships with each other, as these throw much light on the nature of political competition, the ability to manage political conflict, the readiness to agree or compromise on political issues and the willingness to carry responsibility in the state.

In Spain, the centrist tendencies of the main parties have been reflected in their convergence on issues relating to the stability of the post-Franco democracy. This was most evident during the constituent phase until 1978, both in the formulation of the Constitution and in the 1977 Moncloa Pacts on an economic austerity programme. Thereafter, there was intermittent de facto co-operation between government and opposition called *concertación*, which was most pronounced when the state seemed threatened by terrorism and the 1981 coup (which was followed by the PSOE's offer to the UCD government of a grand coalition). This consensus was common to all the main parties but particularly significant in the case of the Communist Party, which aspired to legitimacy and public credit for being a 'responsible' political force. As to formal coalitions, there have been none at the national level since the UCD governments of Suárez and Calvo Sotelo, while having no overall majority, formed loose alliances, usually with regionalist parties. After that, the Socialist government was elected in 1982 with an absolute majority. In local and regional politics (Spain established a form of federal system during the transition), the various main parties have acquired or shared power—for example, the PCE in coalition with the PSOE in many city administrations, the right-wing AP in Galicia and the regionalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque country. As to political competition, the habit of system-supportive convergence has not excluded normal inter-party rivalry, most obviously in the open competition during election campaigns. A further sign of legitimate party-political conflict (open, but at the same time system-supportive, rivalry) has been the style of opposition. Typical of this was PSOE's offer of a 'critical,

not destructive opposition' after its defeat in the 1979 election and its acceptance of remaining out of office for the forthcoming legislature.

In Portugal, a different pattern obtained: during the constituent and post-constituent phase, relations between the parties were characterized by fragmentation rather than convergence, thus making the formation of alliances or coalitions difficult, if not impossible. As well as disagreement over the fate of the revolution, this reflected also more deeply rooted divisions between the parties, both within the political camps of Left and Right as well as between them. In the most notable case of the unbridgeable gulf between the Socialists and Communists, the antagonism derived basically from the conflicting international allegiances of the two parties, i.e. the PCP's pro-Soviet line, in contrast to the PS's strong system-supportiveness and anti-Communism. In general, the PCP was not regarded by the other parties as a legitimate alliance partner. An illustration of this inability to bridge inter-party divisions was the Socialist minority government formed in 1976, when a coalition with the centre-Right would have provoked the left wing of the military, a coalition with the PCP would have cast doubt immediately on the Socialists' credibility, while the Socialist Party could not go into opposition because of its pivotal position.

These strong inter-party divisions and conflicting ideological positions had much to do with the social cleavages in post-revolutionary Portugal. On the other hand, the country has not suffered from the powerful regionalist pressures and terrorist violence (particularly Basque) which have marked post-Franco Spain, leading there to party-political fragmentation at the regional level. Furthermore, signs of a decreasing reluctance to recognize the necessity of governmental coalitions were confirmed by the formation, in July 1979, of the Democratic Alliance (AD) of three centre-right parties, which campaigned together for the December elections and emerged with a decisive overall majority. The Democratic Alliance's internal cohesion depended much on the strong leadership of Sá Carneiro, so that after his sudden death in 1980, subsequent AD governments were plagued by dissension. After the 1983 election, Soares was able to form a coalition with the centre-right Social Democrats, following an internal Socialist party referendum on this particular coalition choice (previously different alliance possibilities had caused divisions inside the PS, paralleling the internal problems of AD governments).

The parties and society

The relationship between the parties and society is an all-important reflexion of the new democracies' real stability rather than merely of support for the system. Political leaderships may be system-supportive, but can they carry their followers with them? It is their role as channels of political communication, and hence their capacity to mobilize popular support, which provide a decisive test of the 'depth' of commitment to the new regimes in the transitional phase.

An obvious starting point for assessing this function of parties is the nature

of electoral behaviour. Both Spain and Portugal, from the mid-1970s, have clearly had their full share of this basic democratic experience: Portugal has had five national elections, two presidential elections and also local elections; while in Spain there have been three national parliamentary elections, two national referenda including that on the new Constitution in 1978, and referenda and assembly elections in the various regions, not to mention two rounds of local elections. It is, in fact, this saturation of voting that has led to a certain decline in turnout which observers have seen as an expression of *desencanto* ('disenchantment') with the new democracies. In so far as this phenomenon has resulted from the failure to meet unreasonably high popular expectations about social and economic change following the advent of democracy, not least because of the compromises political élites have had to make, it might cause concern about the future of the new democracies. Whether *desencanto* is only a passing phenomenon, suggesting that the newly liberated electorates have not yet adjusted to the imperfections of democratic politics, or whether it develops into a basic rejection, depends to a significant degree on the 'educative' role of the parties.

Voting behaviour has demonstrated a high degree of volatility in both countries. While the first elections exhibited a surprising consistency in party support (e.g. the vote for the Portuguese Socialists in 1975 and 1976, and for the Spanish Democratic Centre Union in 1977 and 1979, to take the then leading parties), other evidence has underlined the instability of the electorates, as in the high proportion of the undecided voters during campaigns and the low level of party identification (according to one survey in 1982, 54 per cent of Spaniards did not identify with any party).[5] This volatility principally explains the dramatic turns in the fortunes of some of the parties. For instance, the UCD, the party of the Suárez government which had emerged as the strongest force in the Spanish elections of 1977 and 1979, dwindled into insignificance in 1982. Similarly, the victory of PSOE in the last election was largely due to a big reserve of floating voters in the centre; this, in turn, must be a warning that its electoral prospects depend heavily on its performance in government and in mobilizing support for its policies. Vulnerability to electoral volatility cannot be explained without reference to the harsh economic environment that has accompanied the birth of the new democracies, but it derives also from the high risks of the catch-all strategy of the two main Spanish parties in particular. In the case of Portugal, there was relatively more electoral stability, because the parties were more regionally based and more expressive of the various (and stronger) social cleavages there; but even there, a regular shift in voting preferences was observable.[6] For instance, the PS—the Portuguese party most widely represented throughout the country—suffered a major setback in 1979 after its disappointing performance in office, although this was less dramatic than the Spanish UCD's eclipse. Of course, this electoral vola-

[5] *Panorama* (Milan), 1 March 1982.

[6] Beate Kohler, *Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal* (London: Butterworth, 1982), pp. 195–6.

tility was related to the ideological fluidity already identified in both party systems.

This, in turn, raises the question of party identities, traditions and structural roots. A useful distinction has been made between cultural and organizational continuity in party development,[7] which is especially applicable to new parliamentary states set up after a long interruption of democratic politics. A clear cultural difference emerged between the political Left (the Socialist and Communist parties in both Spain and Portugal) and the political Right. While the former had a recognizable historical tradition, reinforced by a sense of party pride in opposition—either in the underground or in exile—to the right-wing authoritarian regimes of Franco and Salazar, the Spanish and Portuguese Right have suffered from their lack of clear ideological differentiation from the preceding regimes and their loosely defined identity. Both the Spanish UCD and the Portuguese Democratic Alliance (AD) in their bid for broad centre-right support attempted to merge Christian Democrat, conservative and liberal elements; but this admixture broke down under the strain of pressures in office and lack of experience.

Organizational continuity is important to consider because the structural roots of parties give them stability and effectiveness as socio-political forces. Predictably, the two Communist parties were best organized on the ground when the transition to democracy began, while the other parties had to catch up at an accelerated pace. However, this delay in their organizational development—for despite late liberalization, the Franco and Salazar regimes had not permitted open party activity—meant that, generally, party structures did not have time to set down firm roots. For instance, this problem confronted the Portuguese Socialist Party, which had been founded only shortly before the revolution—in West Germany in 1973—and was politically too weak to be able to back up Soares's policies in government. More seriously, the temptation to rely on the state machinery as a more readily available alternative to party organization was strong for those in power. This proved to be both to the initial advantage of the Spanish UCD and, eventually, a major cause of its swift collapse. Fragmentation bedevilled the parties in both new democracies. It derived in part from lack of practice in democratic politics on the part of activists (in many cases, their habits of mind were still wedded to clandestine methods), and also from internal disputes over the precise ideological identity of the recently emancipated parties. This applied to the PCE and its divisions over the Eurocommunist strategy as well as—fatally—to the UCD. Another factor was that the party leaders, intent on working under pressure of time to establish the new democracies as well as their own roles in power, paid little attention in these formative years to questions of internal party democracy.

However, the limited capacity of the parties in Spain and Portugal as agents of popular mobilization need not lead to pessimistic conclusions about the

[7] See Juan Linz, 'Il sistema partitico spagnolo' in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, No. 3, 1978.

future of the new democracies. It should not be forgotten that much of their weakness in this respect has to do with the newness of their party systems. Moreover, some of the problems identified in the Spanish and Portuguese cases—for instance, electoral volatility—were present in other, far more established, West European democracies. One might add that in the same period most other West European democracies have also encountered severe problems in coping with the recession, so that the difficulties of system performance have not been unique to Spain and Portugal.

The key question is whether the two new Iberian party systems merely need time to strike deeper roots, or whether they suffer from inherent weaknessess that must sound a note of caution about their future as 'reborn' democracies. This article eschews predictions, except to say that, on balance, the growth of 'party government' within a decade or less (in Spain's case) has shown substantial progress. Party development has been rather lopsided in that the individual parties have evolved more as institutional than as socio-political forces, as guardians of the democratic process more than as foot-soldiers of democracy. But that is no surprise considering the overriding concern for democratic stability shared by almost all these parties. Now that the pattern of party-political competition has become fairly well established, it is likely that the parties—notably through their alternation in office—will stimulate each other to strengthen their organizational roots. In doing so, they may well continue to benefit from the advice and the financial as well as moral backing they have received from fraternal parties in other West European countries in the past. Finally, it should be stressed that the lack of any credible alternative political model to liberal democracy in both states ultimately favours the further development of 'party government'.

Mozambique's widening foreign policy

NORMAN MACQUEEN

PARADOXICALLY, in a period when so much Western policy towards the Third World appears to be formulated on a model of simple ideological polarity, Mozambique, originally a neo-conservative *bête rouge* of the deepest hue, has been developing an increasingly broad and pragmatic network of foreign relations. Despite a continuing declaratory commitment to the Soviet bloc in the main issue areas of East-West confrontation, President Samora Machel and his Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano, have shown an evident interest in moving the avowedly Marxist-Leninist Frelimo[1] government towards closer political and economic relations with the West. This has extended even to the military sphere with Portugal, a Nato member, undertaking wide commitments in the training and equipping of the Mozambican army. The tour of West European capitals undertaken by Machel, Chissano and other Politburo members in October 1983, has most recently confirmed this reorientation.

The reasons for this *rapprochement* with the West are various. The East European model for development originally applied by Frelimo has proved inappropriate to the country's post-independence circumstances and needs. In consequence, the enthusiasm for undifferentiated Marxist economics has declined in recent years. Also, Soviet bloc military aid, constrained as it is by broad considerations of East-West relations in the region, has not been adequate to meet either the direct threat posed by the South African Defence Forces on the border or the Pretoria-orchestrated campaign of internal destabilization by the anti-Frelimo National Resistance Movement (MRN). Additionally, the process leading to the independence of Zimbabwe and subsequent developments in southern African regional co-operation have brought Mozambique into contact with such non-Soviet international entities as the Commonwealth and the European Community. All this has caused not precisely a westward move in Mozambique's diplomatic orientation—certainly not one comparable with, say, that of Somalia further to the north—but a clear widening of its foreign policy perspective. The early post-independence impression of Mozambique as a kind of African Albania closed to all but her ideological mentors has, despite the prevailing tone of super-power relations, gradually been dispelled in the past three years.

[1] *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo). For background, see Robert D'A Henderson, 'Principles and practice in Mozambique's foreign policy', *The World Today*, July 1978.

Dr MacQueen, formerly at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies of the University of Glasgow, is now Lecturer in Politics at the Hatfield Polytechnic. Previously he spent two years (1977-9) working for the Ministry of Education and Culture in Maputo. A German version of this article is appearing in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

The Soviet–US perspective

Frelimo's strong identification with the Soviet bloc after independence in 1975 was the inevitable outcome of a protracted war of liberation fought with Communist weapons against a Nato power. A considerable Chinese influence present during the early period of the armed struggle in the mid-1960s had been eclipsed by that of the Soviet Union by the early 1970s. After independence, Frelimo's Third Congress, held in February 1977, produced an outline for political and economic development in the ensuing five years based on a classical, non-Maoist Marxism involving a rapidly expanding urban industrial sector served by a secondary agricultural base. An especially warm relationship was developed with East Germany—the exemplary industrial phoenix risen from the ashes of war. The inapplicability of this model soon became evident, however. Lacking trained manpower after the flight of some 250,000 whites after independence, and encumbered with a transport and communications infrastructure adjusted to the servicing of neighbouring territories rather than internal development, the industrial miracle failed to take place. At the same time, the agricultural sector as well as suffering the demoralization of its subservient role in national development, was debilitated, first, by alternating flood and drought and, then, from about mid-1978, by the increasingly effective terrorism of the dissident MRN. This initial lack of success was instrumental in the frustration of Machel's ambition for full membership of Comecon. Talks on the issue in Moscow in November 1980 produced only a 'coincidence', as opposed, in Kremlin code, to the necessary 'identity' of views between the Mozambican delegation and its hosts.[2]

In the sphere of military co-operation, too, the initial post-independence predominance of the Soviet Union and East Germany in weapons supply and training has been significantly lessened since the end of 1981. At the beginning of that year, immediately following a South African attack on what were claimed to be African National Council installations on the western outskirts of Maputo, two Soviet warships arrived in the capital's harbours to show the flag of solidarity in the wake of what President Machel described as 'an attack against the socialist camp of which we are a part'.[3] Yet, in June 1982, General Alexei Yepishev was despatched to Maputo to express Soviet concern at Mozambique's rapidly developing military relationship with Portugal. Significantly, the intervening period had been one of escalating MRN activity, which government forces equipped and trained by the Soviet bloc had been incapable of quelling and which would hardly be deterred by the Soviet Navy in Maputo harbour.

The lessening of military dependence on the Soviet Union must obviously be greeted with satisfaction in Washington—particularly in the context of con-

[2] For an account of the general economic circumstances of Mozambique in the immediate post-independence years, see Nicos Zafiris, 'The People's Republic of Mozambique: Pragmatic Socialism', in Peter Wiles (ed.), *The New Communist Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

[3] *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 18, No. 2, 15 March 1981, p. 5957.

tinuing (albeit recently overshadowed) strategic concern with the Indian Ocean region. In reality, the Reagan Administration's attitude to Mozambique has not been as hostile as its general ideological predisposition might suggest. Prior to the mid-1970s, the United States had shown little interest in southern Africa and its current concerns in the continent would appear to be almost exclusively with the radius of Libyan influence in the centre and north and with Angola and Namibia.[4] The Reagan State Department's early flirtation with Pretoria drew a sharp response from Maputo when four American diplomats were expelled amidst something of a spy fever following the South African raid of January 1981. Subsequently, the American approach to Mozambique has been more circumspect. A State Department delegation in December 1982, while warning against the 'internationalization' of the confrontation with South Africa, nevertheless acknowledged Mozambique's right to self-defence and indicated that regional African military assistance would be acceptable to Washington.[5] The possible 'internationalization' which so concerns the American Administration, of course, would be the involvement of Cuban forces. The Cuban presence in Mozambique, while extensive, would appear to be entirely civilian. These *'cooperantes'* are particularly noticeable in education, medicine and agriculture. Moscow has so far shown no inclination to prevail upon Cuba to act in any more muscular capacity.

Such movement as there has been in Mozambican-Soviet relations should not be overstated. The removal of the veteran Frelimo leader and poet of the revolution, Marcelino dos Santos, from the government in April 1980, for example, was not, as was suggested in the West at the time, a move against a particular pro-Soviet faction within the party. In contrast to Angola's MPLA, such factionalism has not been a characteristic of Frelimo and the reasons for the reshuffle (and frequent subsequent ones) were to do with personal abilities and governmental morale rather than ideological alignments. Despite the closing of the Comecon door on Mozambique in 1980, extensive economic and trade agreements have since been entered into. In the military sphere, although the Soviet Union's presence is evidently being reduced and its continued role as the major supplier of arms is in question, it will obviously continue to occupy a central position in relation to the Mozambican army—and more particularly the MiG equipped airforce—in the foreseeable future. This centrality however, in both the economic and defence spheres, looks as if it will be shared more and more with others in coming years.

Portugal and the European Community

The leading contender to date for such a position would appear to be Portugal. Post-independence relations with successive Lisbon governments were not good. While Angola moved relatively quickly to a friendly accommodation with the ex-colonial power, Mozambique remained unheeding of the peri-

[4] See Christopher Coker, 'Reagan and Africa', *The World Today*, April 1982, *passim*.

[5] *The Guardian*, 11 January 1983. Both Tanzania and Zimbabwe have troops inside Mozambique supporting anti-MRN operations.

odic overtures from Portugal. Indeed, a high-level trade delegation to Maputo engaged in a somewhat one-sided attempt to establish a degree of economic co-operation in early 1979 left abruptly and in some confusion as a number of Portuguese nationals were executed with no prior announcement for alleged anti-Frelimo guerrilla activities. After the South African attack and the subsequent expulsion of the American diplomats at the beginning of 1981, however, the danger of a general isolation from the West seems to have impressed itself on the leadership. An approach to Portugal which had already shown an interest in normalization of relations was one obvious means of avoiding this. At the end of March 1981, Chissano made an initial fence-mending visit to Lisbon. This was followed in November by a state visit to Maputo by President Eanes and the relationship has developed from there at a dizzy pace. In the first half of 1982, a number of bilateral economic agreements were signed and political relations were further consolidated by the visit of the then Portuguese Prime Minister, Pinto Balsemão, in June of that year.

Most significant, though, were the extensive arrangements for military aid undertaken in 1981 and 1982. After the Eanes visit of November 1981, a joint communiqué was issued which referred to but did not detail plans for military co-operation. It was reported, however, that General Lopes Alves, the Portuguese Deputy Chief of Staff, had stayed behind after the departure of the delegation to make initial arrangements for counter-insurgency training for units of the Mozambican army.[6] Four months later, in April 1982, a formal protocol was signed by the two governments under which Mozambican military instructors would be trained in Portugal; at the same time, the possibility was held out of Portuguese instructors being attached to training camps in Mozambique. Plans were also put in train for large-scale purchases of Portuguese arms by Mozambique.[7] It was this level of co-operation with a Western, indeed a Nato, state—unthinkable two years previously—which brought the worried General Yepishev to Maputo in June 1982.

The impending accession of Portugal to the European Community will bring a greater symmetry to Mozambique's relations with Western Europe. The relationship with Lisbon will then be linked to the parallel one currently being developed with the Community. In the years immediately following independence, co-operation was maintained with individual EEC members —most notably France and Italy. The process leading to the independence of Zimbabwe and Machel's participation in it, however, brought Mozambique into greater prominence in Western Europe as a whole—and into unexpected favour with the Conservative government in Britain. But the main obstacle to its full participation in the European Community's aid programme remained. This reflected the diplomatic conditions under which Mozambican foreign policy was formulated in the years after independence. Because of the relationship with the Soviet bloc and particularly with East Germany, the government felt unable to meet a precondition of adherence

[6] *The Times*, 7 December 1981.
[7] *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (PSCS), 15 May 1982, p. 6439.

to the Lomé Convention: recognition of West Berlin as a *Land* of the Federal Republic. A protracted search for a compromise on the issue proved unavailing. However, during 1982, a year of considerable activity in relations with Europe, the difficulties preventing Mozambique from benefiting fully from the European Development Fund (EDF) appear to have been resolved.

The approach to Western Europe in that year began inauspiciously. In June, Machel cancelled a tour of Britain, France and the Netherlands planned for the following month. This was because, it was announced, of a deteriorating security situation within the country and on the border. The cancellation itself served a certain diplomatic purpose, of course, by highlighting the degree to which South Africa's strategy of continuing destabilization could sabotage the routine processes of foreign policy as well as economic and defence capacity. Clearly, European governments ought to be concerned when it seemed that a westward road tentatively embarked on by a supposed Soviet client could so easily be obstructed by South Africa. On the Mozambican side, the proposed tour represented a further stage in the search—which had begun the previous year in Lisbon—for the maximum diplomatic support against South Africa. It was against this background that the Berlin *impasse* was resolved by what amounted to a capitulation by Maputo. In the face of considerable East German opposition, the *Land* designation for West Berlin was accepted by Mozambique in the wording of two relatively minor agreements with the Federal Republic (concerning industrial and food aid) in June and July 1982. The diplomatic logjam having been discreetly cleared in this way, the relationship with both Bonn and the EEC as an institution developed rapidly. Further agreements were signed with the Federal Republic in the following months and, most importantly, the way was now open for adherence to the Lomé Convention.[8] In October 1982, Mozambique's intention to join the negotiations for the 1986–90 Convention was announced by the Commission of the European Communities.

The 'lost' European tour of the summer of 1982 eventually took place in October 1983. The Mozambican delegation, according to its own initial public statements, sought military training and supply agreements with both Britain and France on this occasion. However, no clear indication of the nature or even existence of such arrangements emerged following the talks with Mrs Thatcher and President Mitterrand. Presumably, both the British and French would be more reticent than the Portuguese about any undertaking which might involve national military personnel in what at times appears to be incipient border war with South Africa. Clearly, though, it was in the interests of Mozambique to maximize publicly the level, actual or potential, of military co-operation with the West for the very reason that, under certain circumstances, such an involvement might indeed occur. The consequence of this divergence of immediate interests was a certain confusion around the issue. Beyond the question of military assistance, though, the visit was undoubtedly a political success. From Britain, for example, which currently spends less on overseas

[8] *The Guardian*, 10 August 1982.

development than for several years, Machel won both further aid pledges and the write-off of an existing sterling debt.

The diplomatic move towards Western Europe received the ratification of Frelimo in March 1983; at the eleventh session of the Central Committee, a resolution noted 'with pleasure the improvement of relations with a number of Western countries', which demonstrated on their part 'a very fair appreciation of the nature of the conflict in our region'. It would appear to be the threat from South Africa referred to implicitly here that has determined policy in this area as much as considerations of economic development. The future of relations with Western Europe will depend to a great degree on the latter's position (both individually and collectively through the Community) on South Africa's activities in the region. Mozambique may have moved with some speed in its approach to Western Europe over the last two years but, unlike many of its neighbours in southern Africa, it remains far from close diplomatic identification with it and so its scrutiny of European relations with Pretoria will probably be of greater significance to its foreign policy than that of other capitals in the region.

The regional dimension

A further impetus towards a wider—and by implication more Western-directed—foreign policy has undoubtedly come from the developing regional structures in southern Africa. The prevailing currents of sub-Saharan relations are marked on different charts from those in circulation in the northern hemisphere and Mozambique has since independence maintained generally cordial relations with its (black) neighbours, regardless of their broader international leanings. Some unlikely diplomatic connexions have been made by, for example, inclusion in the front-line grouping, the membership of which represents a broad spectrum of international orientations beyond the region itself. Since 1980, a particular set of connecting relations has emerged from the formal structure of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC).

Formally established at a summit in Lusaka in April 1980, the SADCC comprises Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The long-term objective of the Conference is to end the region's economic dependence on South Africa. Its strategy towards this end lies in the development and appropriate restructuring of transport and communications. In this, of course, Mozambique with a 2500 km coastline and its rail-served port facilities will play a central part.[9] At a SADCC meeting in Maputo in December 1980, projects costed at two billion dollars were presented to potential donors of which about 40 per cent would be invested in Mozambique. At that time, concern was expressed in the European Community (potentially a principal donor) at the fact that Mozambique, which re-

[9] This was acknowledged at the Lusaka meeting by the creation of the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission, to be permanently based in Maputo under Mozambican chairmanship.

mained outside the Lomé agreements, might receive such an amount of EDF aid.[10] Some Community governments reportedly took the position that signature of the Lomé Convention by Mozambique should be the prerequisite for EDF participation in SADCC schemes. A relationship with the Community at one remove was not deemed a sufficient commitment by these members. This, of course, added a considerable economic impetus to the security concerns which led Maputo some eighteen months later to its diplomatic accommodation with Bonn.

The SADCC has developed into the major structure for attracting and analizing multilateral development aid for the region. The donors of this aid (with the exception of some OPEC involvement) are exclusively Western. Clearly, Mozambique's position as the leading national recipient of this investment capital will move it some considerable distance from the degree of dependency on the Soviet bloc suggested by the development strategy first embarked upon after the Third Congress in 1977. The political and diplomatic implications of this move have yet to be fully delineated but, assuming successful accession to the Lomé Convention and a continuing 'fair appreciation' by Western Europe of the conflict with Pretoria, they may well be far reaching.

Conclusion

The recent direction of Mozambique's foreign relations has been determined by considerations of both national security and economic development. The effect of South Africa's policy of destabilization, ironically, has not been to push the government further 'into the arms of the Kremlin' as conventional wisdom might have it. Rather, it has been to create an awareness of the value of the widest possible range on international relations. On the economic side, a viable development programme for Mozambique inevitably must include a major regional aspect. In the light of the political disposition of its southern African neighbours, this involves a primary dependence on Western aid donors and a degree of political identification with these donors through such structures as Lomé. It would be quite wrong, though, to speak in terms of a move to the West in Mozambique's foreign policy if this is taken to imply a move away from the East. The process has been one of expansion rather than drastic redirection. Political relations with the Soviet bloc will remain close and the extension of Maputo's *rapprochement* with the West to include any greater cordiality with the United States would seem highly unlikely at this time. This must be especially so after the Grenada affair—an issue which impinges on the fundamental commitment on the part of Frelimo to solidarity with other radical Third World regimes. Nevertheless, the closer relationship with Western Europe seems set to continue and to become increasingly established as the various military and development agreements are embodied in ever more solid diplomatic structures.

[10] *The Economist*, 29 November 1980.

Vietnam's ASEAN diplomacy: incentives for change

LESZEK BUSZYNSKI

VIETNAM'S diplomacy towards the Association of South-East Asian Nations in relation to the Kampuchean conflict has sought ASEAN's recognition of Vietnamese control of Cambodia (Kampuchea) and its endorsement of the Heng Samrin regime. To the Vietnamese, the ASEAN countries' position over the Kampuchean issue is pivotal for two reasons: first, world attention is focused upon Vietnam's continuing occupation of Kampuchea largely because of ASEAN's ability to keep the issue alive in the United Nations General Assembly, in the non-aligned conferences and the bilateral meetings with representatives of the United States and other Western powers. ASEAN functions as the voice of the aggrieved region, reminding the United States and Western Europe of a change in the balance of power in South-East Asia in favour of Vietnam's super-power protector, the Soviet Union. If nothing else, ASEAN has the power to confer or to deny legitimacy to the Vietnamese-sponsored regime in Kampuchea; and it is this legitimacy that Vietnam courts. In the second place, the Vietnamese regard ASEAN as the least committed of all their opponents to a policy of prolonged hostility towards their country. The Kampuchean issue, as the Vietnamese see it, is an outgrowth of the historical Chinese-Vietnamese conflict which need not impinge upon ASEAN interests. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 was intended to eliminate the threat to a united Vietnam that the alignment between China and Pol Pot was perceived to represent. In the Vietnamese view, ASEAN's interests can hardly be affected by a move that was fundamentally limited to Kampuchea. Vietnam's leaders would like to convince the ASEAN countries that their aims are restricted to Indochina and that ASEAN has an interest in joining Vietnam to counter what is described as a Chinese threat to the region.

The ASEAN countries, none the less, have reacted with varying degrees of alarm to Vietnam's intrusion into Kampuchea. For ASEAN, acceptance of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea would establish an ominous precedent for Vietnam's future dealings with the ASEAN countries. To a greater or lesser degree, the members of ASEAN have concurred with the international pressure that China and the United States have brought to bear against Vietnam to compel its withdrawal from Kampuchea.[1] Beyond this, however, the

[1] ASEAN's position over Kampuchea was defined during the international conference on the issue held in New York, 13–17 July 1981. The conference declaration called for a series of measures including the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the establishment of a neutral non-aligned Kampuchea.

Dr Buszynski is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore; author of *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (Singapore University Press, 1983).

ASEAN countries differ as to the intensity of the pressure that should be applied to Vietnam, the extent to which Vietnam actually represents a threat to the region and the advisability of protracted reliance upon great-power support to induce a change in Vietnamese policy. Such differences within ASEAN over the implementation of policy towards Vietnam are a function of divergent perceptions of threat to the region which the ASEAN countries have held since the United States withdrew from Indochina. Thailand, traditionally in conflict with Vietnam, and Singapore, the most vulnerable of the ASEAN states, regard the Vietnamese–Soviet combination as the region's greatest threat. Both countries have advocated the exercise of strong pressure against Vietnam so that their policies are closer to the strategy adopted by China in seeking a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Malaysia and Indonesia, however, view China as the region's long-term threat in a way which considerably diminishes the significance of the Soviet presence in South-East Asia. Their representatives have generally expressed greater sympathy for Vietnam's plight and have had difficulty reconciling their desire to retain Vietnam as an ally against China with the reality of its invasion of Kampuchea. The Philippines is an ASEAN country least affected by events in Indochina; its policy has fluctuated between extremes according to the perceived need to maintain ASEAN unity and to extend influence within the organization.

ASEAN as a group has evolved a policy towards the Kampuchean conflict based on the desirability of a political compromise in recognition that defeat for Vietnam would result in China's domination of continental South-East Asia. Vietnamese diplomacy, however, has the aim of transforming ASEAN's search for a compromise solution into a realization that maintenance of Vietnam as a counter against future reassertion of Chinese influence would require acceptance of Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea. Vietnamese diplomacy has held out the promise of negotiations over a political solution that would not alter Vietnam's basic position over Kampuchea. The appearance of willingness to negotiate has alternated with emphatic assertions that Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea is 'irreversible'. These frequent vacillations have been attributable less to any factional conflict within the Vietnamese leadership than to a deliberate diplomatic strategy that seeks to establish some basis for common cause with ASEAN, or its more sympathetic members, against China. As a Radio Hanoi broadcast stated on 13 April 1983, confrontation [between ASEAN and Indochina] 'only benefits the Chinese hegemonists'.[2] In this context, Vietnam's diplomacy towards ASEAN has attempted to aggravate internal divisions within the organization over the Kampuchean issue in the expectation that long-term fear of China would eventually undermine ASEAN unity. The Laotian Deputy Foreign Minister, Soubanh Srithirath, expressed this view when he claimed that ASEAN would either collapse politically over the Kampuchean issue or would accept a fait accompli.[3]

[2] *BBC Summaries of World Broadcasts* (henceforth *BBC SWB*), (FE/7308/A3/1), 15 April 1983.
[3] Nayan Chanda, 'Candour and confidence', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (henceforth *FEER*), 18 August 1983.

In the past year, it has become possible to identify several factors which may erode Vietnam's confidence in its ability to overcome ASEAN hostility by sheer persistence. Vietnamese pertinacity, manifest during the struggle against France and the United States, was based upon the confident expectation of consistent support from allies and the political advantage of fighting a war of national reunification. The kind of unstinting support earlier drawn from Communist allies cannot be expected; in some areas Vietnamese and Soviet purposes clash and this imposes a limit on Soviet aid. Further, Vietnam's experience in Kampuchea, in the absence of the sustaining advantage of operating within a familiar ethnic and cultural environment, may yet demonstrate the futility of basing the attainment of political goals upon the use of military force alone. This is not to say that Vietnam's position will collapse, as extreme proponents of the strategy of attrition within the ASEAN countries have maintained. It means that the Vietnamese may be compelled to realize that the goals they have set themselves in Kampuchea are incapable of fulfilment and that the leadership may have to consider less than complete domination of that country or all parts of it.

Vietnam's security interests, as the leadership has perceived them, prevent abandonment of Kampuchea in the way expected by the Chinese or some spokesmen within ASEAN. Those interests, however, could be served by retention of some degree of control over Kampuchea, which could meet the demands of the ASEAN countries for a political settlement. Here lies an area of possible future negotiation. No doubt, the present Vietnamese leadership would be psychologically and politically ill-prepared for any modification of policy. Vietnam, however, will soon face the problem of a generational transfer of power, as the Comintern-schooled triad (Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh) cannot continue to govern much longer. For a new Vietnamese leadership, expected to be more pragmatic in outlook, the problem of Kampuchea may call for political measures in a departure from the old leadership's conditioned resort to military force in the pursuit of policy aims.

The first factor to be considered is Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union, which has made strategic gains in South-East Asia through its support of Vietnam. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has had access to naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay; reconnaissance aircraft (TU-95 'Bears') have operated from Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay where the Soviet Union has also constructed intelligence facilities. Vietnam's isolation, however, has severely limited opportunities for Soviet policy in the region in a situation where wider Soviet interests, beyond the maintenance of existing gains, require some effort towards the reduction of Western, and in particular US, influence over ASEAN. Soviet goals in the region, which also include containment of China, can hardly be achieved while ASEAN and Vietnam are in conflict. It has been consistent Soviet policy to induce the ASEAN countries to acquiesce in Vietnam's domination of Indochina—a policy notable for its failure. The Soviet concern for a reconciliation between ASEAN and Indochina which would exclude the United States and China calls for pressure on Vietnam to accede to some ASEAN

demands. The Malaysian Foreign Minister, Ghazali Shafie, in a seminar in Kuala Lumpur on 24 February 1983, remarked that under Yuri Andropov the Soviet Union had shown some interest in a compromise solution in Kampuchea.[4] It was also reported that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Kapitsa, advised the Thais, during his visit to Bangkok in the same month, that Andropov was interested in negotiations and that the Soviet Union wanted to restrain the Vietnamese in their relations with Thailand.[5] The Thais were unimpressed, as Kapitsa's visit came at a time when Vietnam was launching its dry season offensive against the Khmer resistance within Kampuchea which Thai leaders regarded as a threatening development.

The Soviet Union would like greater flexibility from Vietnam over the Kampuchean question to entice ASEAN into accepting the Soviet position in the region. To that extent, Soviet leaders may be willing to apply leverage against the Vietnamese in the hope that ASEAN's intransigence over Kampuchea would eventually dissipate if it were successfully embroiled in negotiations. The holding of such negotiations would require some stimulus on Vietnam's part and this is probably one area where Soviet and Vietnamese policy may differ over tactics. Despite their military and economic dependence upon the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese leaders have apparently displayed considerable resistance to Soviet demands in this and other areas. Managing the Vietnamese is made difficult for the Soviet leaders by the fact that Vietnam can bargain with its obvious value to Soviet strategy against China and the United States. For this reason, the Soviet Union has had recourse to a convenient device (though not its primary purpose) which can remind the Vietnamese of their own vulnerability and suggest to them that the Soviet Union has possible alternative options to pursue. Soviet-Chinese negotiations (held in Peking in October 1982 and October 1983, and in Moscow in March 1983) have been a means by which the Soviet Union has signalled to the Vietnamese that it need not be bound by all their expectations and objectives. The Vietnamese, whose survival depends upon continuing Sino-Soviet hostility, were compelled to observe and approve.[6]

The second and more significant factor that may influence Vietnamese policy towards ASEAN is the situation in Kampuchea. The prospects for Vietnam establishing uncontested control over Kampuchea are likely to diminish steadily over the years. Vietnam may not be able to eliminate the Khmer resistance forces, which are able to retreat to sanctuaries in Thailand and benefit from arms and supplies transported across Thai territory, but neither can Vietnamese forces be ejected from the country, as Sihanouk has ad-

[4] *Straits Times*, 25 February 1983.

[5] *Bangkok Post*, 9 February 1983.

[6] The primary Soviet purpose of these negotiations was to weaken China's relationship with the United States. The effect upon Vietnam, however, also serves Soviet purposes. Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, on 31 October 1982, when asked about the possibility of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, thought it could be 'a positive factor for the cause of peace'; *BBC SWB* (FE/7172/A3/5), 2 November 1982. The peace, however, would probably be at Vietnam's expense.

mitted.[7] Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea (estimates of their strength vary from 160,000 to 180,000) have been able to establish a foundation of security for the Heng Samrin regime in the population centres and areas of the countryside; in this sense, the military threat that the resistance groups represent to Phnom Penh may be considered marginal. The Vietnamese, however, perceive clearly that since the formation of a coalition of resistance groups (which brought together the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk's Moulinaka and Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front in a loose arrangement formed under ASEAN auspices on 22 June 1982), the threat to their position in Kampuchea has been defined not in military but in political terms. The Vietnamese presence is required to buttress the Heng Samrin regime; this, in turn, stimulates the development of Khmer nationalism which may, in time, find expression in greater support for the non-Communist resistance groups. The dilemma for the Vietnamese is that the formation of a government which could muster popular support against the Khmer Rouge and which could satisfy ASEAN and international demands for legitimacy would require a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. Without a Vietnamese presence, however, there is no safeguard against the kind of Khmer nationalism directed against Vietnam and no guarantee that the Khmer Rouge could be prevented from returning to power.

Vietnam's dilemma in Kampuchea arises from the effort to guide the evolution of a new regime in accordance with Vietnamese security interests. The Vietnamese have resorted to three responses in managing this evolution, which seem either to be ineffective or to have exacerbated the dilemma of their continuing presence in the country. First, in a military response, Vietnam launched its heaviest dry season offensive since the invasion of Kampuchea against the resistance forces beginning in January 1983. The scale of the operation was an obvious indication of the significance the Vietnamese attached to the aim of destroying the coalition as an obstacle to world-wide acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime and as a threat to its domestic consolidation. The offensive developed in two phases; the first began on 31 January with attacks upon KPNLF forces in the Nong Chan area, northern part of the Thai-Kampuchean border; the second phase opened with assaults along the central area of the Thai-Kampuchean border against refugee-holding areas and continued with attacks against Sihanoukist forces in Oddar Meanchey Preah province. The offensive spawned the greatest movement of refugees into Thailand since the dry-season attacks of 1979, but, like its predecessors, failed to dislodge the resistance groups from their territorial bases. Reports indicate that the resistance forces are better organized than previously and that their use of Thai territory as a sanctuary has endowed them with a tactical manoeuvrability that is an asset in avoiding encirclement. The Vietnamese are condemned to annual dry-season offensives that may assist in containing the resistance forces to the Thai-Kampuchean border, but which so far have failed in their central purpose.

[7] Sihanouk said: 'We are fighting to oblige the Vietnamese to talk, not to win the war, because that is impossible'; *Bangkok Post*, 23 June 1983.

Vietnam's second response has been the attempt to establish a Kampuchean army that would be able to participate on a larger scale in operations against the resistance forces. The question that comes to the mind of many an observer is that, if the Kampuchean population were glad to be rid of the Khmer Rouge, which is undeniable, why is it that the Vietnamese have found it difficult to form a viable army in Phnom Penh? The Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, stated that it was Vietnam's intention to devolve greater responsibility upon indigenous Khmer forces in joint action against the resistance, adding that an army 'cannot be trained and formed within three or five years. It must be many years'.[8] The problem of the Vietnamese is that an army identified with them is hardly a nationalist alternative to the non-Communist resistance groups. The Heng Samrin army has a current strength of 20,000 to 30,000 based on conscription, relying upon the Vietnamese for artillery and air support. Problems of low morale and desertion have been reported while the army's main force units are apparently regarded as unreliable by the Vietnamese.[9] Heng Samrin units have, it seems, collaborated with KPNLF forces and reports indicate that the 286th division (or parts of it) refused to go into action against Sihanoukist troops and was subsequently disarmed by the Vietnamese.[10]

Vietnam's third and most portentous response was to initiate ethnic Vietnamese emigration into Kampuchea. This has been described by the Thais as a long-term policy of colonization designed to solve the problem of the questionable loyalty of sections of the indigenous population by the creation of Vietnamese-dominated areas in the country. For the moment, the aims of the programme are stated to be limited to the need to develop Kampuchea's economy, as indicated in two circulars issued by the Heng Samrin regime (on 13 September and 9 October 1982), and smuggled into Thailand.[11] The future significance of the move, however, is particularly disturbing for the Khmer nationalist leaders. While in Washington, Son Sann claimed that 600,000 Vietnamese settlers had been introduced into the country, adding rather dramatically that intermarriage was being forced upon the population.[12] The Heng Samrin news agency (SPK) confirmed on 27 September 1983 that a policy of emigration was being implemented, but gave a figure of 60,000 Vietnamese who had already settled in the country; most of these settlers had been resident in Kampuchea before being ejected by the Pol Pot regime.[13] The true figure is probably somewhere between these two extremes. The perceptible effect within Kampuchea was predictable: it was reported that tension between

[8] *FEER*, 14 April 1983.

[9] Statement by John C. Monjo, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, *USIS* File, 15 September 1983.

[10] *Bangkok Post*, 17 June 1983. Other reports state that only one of the division's four battalions was involved; *FEER*, 7 July 1983.

[11] *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April 1983.

[12] Son Sann also maintained that 'in a few years we won't be able to distinguish who is a Vietnamese and who is a Kampuchean'; *Bangkok Post*, 9 September 1983.

[13] *ibid.*, 28 September 1982.

the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin regime had increased. A purge against Heng Samrin officials in some provinces was unleashed on 25 May. This was basically a move against local resistance to Vietnamese settlement; 300 officials were arrested in Siem Reap province including the governor, Chan Sien, and the military commander, Nou Seng.[14]

The external and internal factors analysed above are inducements for a beleaguered Vietnamese leadership to espouse a policy that would entice ASEAN into accepting a solution to the Kampuchean problem in accordance with salient Vietnamese interests. The incentive for Vietnam is to uncouple the current conflict with ASEAN from the conflict with China in the hope that a modified ASEAN attitude would reopen channels of economic aid from the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Since a change of attitude by ASEAN would require more than cosmetic changes to the reality of Vietnamese occupation, it is possible that Vietnam may agree to one of two solutions more acceptable to ASEAN; the first is the partition of Kampuchea involving an understanding with Thailand, the second is the formation of a government of national reconciliation in Phnom Penh involving Sihanouk and excluding the Khmer Rouge. However, Vietnam cannot avoid demonstrating vulnerability to China by offering concessions to ASEAN, assuming its leadership were so inclined at present. Hence its diplomacy in the past year has shown greater insistence upon the idea of a dialogue with ASEAN designed to persuade it to make the first moves in a process that would save the Vietnamese from humiliation before China.

In January 1983, reports indicated that the Vietnamese had requested the assistance of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, for an approach to Sihanouk.[15] Mr Tindemans visited Vietnam and conferred with Thai leaders in Bangkok, but denied that he had ever been approached by the Vietnamese for this purpose.[16] Though both the Vietnamese and Sihanouk issued similar disclaimers, there seems to have been some undercover diplomatic activity between Thailand and Vietnam, involving French and Rumanian representatives as well. Sihanouk would be the obvious candidate to head an extended government in Phnom Penh in a political compromise that the ASEAN countries have been seeking. Sihanouk has expressed his approval of a coalition with both the Khmer Rouge and the Heng Samrin regime, adding that 'it would be a lot more realistic to include Heng Samrin in the future of Kampuchea'.[17] In the same speech, Sihanouk called for an international conference which would result in the neutralization of Kampuchea with international guarantees, a position which came close to a view expressed by Nguyen Co Thach.[18] Should the Vietnamese be pressed into examining a serious alternative to their present policy in Kampuchea, that option would probably involve Sihanouk. Though at present Sihanouk asserts 'I will never have a

[14] *Straits Times*, 4 August 1983. [15] *Bangkok Post*, 11 January 1983.
[16] *FEER*, 27 January 1983. [17] *Bangkok Post*, 5 October 1983.
[18] *ibid.*, 3 July 1983. Later, however, Nguyen Co Thach stated that international guarantees 'will not do because no one can guarantee for China'; *Straits Times*, 15 August 1983.

reconciliation with Vietnam',[19] neither this nor the Heng Samrin regime's rejection of Sihanouk can be considered permanent.

An incident during the seventh Non-Aligned Conference in New Delhi (7–11 March 1983) demonstrated Vietnam's willingness to enter into a dialogue with ASEAN, but without the concessions demanded by the latter. Ghazali Shafie proposed to Nguyen Co Thach on 8 March that ASEAN and Indochina agree to negotiations on the basis of a 5:2 formula that would circumvent the contentious issue of Kampuchean representation, as five ASEAN countries would negotiate with two from Indochina—Vietnam and Laos. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister's agreement was endorsed on 12 April 1983 by an extraordinary conference of Indochinese Foreign Ministers held in Phnom Penh. Ghazali Shafie called the move a 'breakthrough' and Singapore's second Deputy Prime Minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, thought that the proposal 'opens a door which otherwise remains closed indefinitely'.[20] However, Rajaratnam's airing of the proposal in an interview with the BBC on 10 March was a move that caused the Vietnamese position to harden; Nguyen Co Thach asserted that in any negotiation with ASEAN the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the presence of American bases in the Philippines would be included in the agenda. Clearly the Vietnamese were attempting to use situations within ASEAN analagous to their own to strike a bargain with ASEAN countries over the negotiations and force them to drop their preconditions. ASEAN, however, subsequently rejected the proposal.

In the light of these events, it is possible to take at least two views of Vietnam's diplomacy towards ASEAN. In the first, Kampuchea is so important to Vietnam and is so intimately fused with the Sino-Vietnamese conflict that the Vietnamese consider that no compromise is possible. Vietnam's ASEAN diplomacy in this context presumes a position of strength in assuming that ASEAN would, in time, accept a fait accompli in Kampuchea. The difficulty with this view, given recent events, is that Vietnam is unlikely to dominate all of Kampuchea. The emergence of reactive Khmer nationalism, mainly in the provinces bordering Thailand, may entail escalation of the political and military costs of prolonged occupation to the point where the Vietnamese leadership would consider another option. In this context, the second view becomes relevant which sees the Vietnamese as seeking an alternative to their present predicament based on some understanding with ASEAN. Time will show how far a new Vietnamese leadership will be prepared to go in this direction and it may be that the Vietnamese, like the ASEAN countries, are divided over the issue. At present, however, Vietnam seems to be seeking unilateral concessions from ASEAN—a policy hardly conducive to the level of interaction desired by both sides.

[19] *FEER*, 16 June 1983.
[20] *Straits Times*, 15 March 1983 and 12 March 1983 respectively.

1997: Peking's strategy for Hong Kong

T. L. TSIM

THE fifth round of Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong, led on the British side by Sir Percy Cradock, the British Ambassador to Peking, and on the Chinese side by the Vice-Foreign Minister, Yao Guang, concluded on 20 October with a communiqué referring to a 'useful and constructive' exchange of views.[1] The British Foreign Office is understood to have viewed the outcome as a breakthrough in the talks. There was speculation that the deadlock had been broken by a personal letter of Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, the existence of which was not denied. Conjecture centred on the possibility that in this letter Britain might have conceded ground on the issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong.

Whatever the substance of such rumours, the fact is that after 20 October Chinese pronouncements on the future of Hong Kong became less vituperative and the atmosphere of confrontation following the fourth round subsided. The people in Hong Kong, starved of good news ever since Mrs Thatcher's Peking visit of September 1982, have chosen to interpret this development in a positive light: the gloom prevailing in Hong Kong during the last few months, when the exchange rate of the local currency fell to an all-time low against a basket of foreign currencies, seems to have been dispelled for the time being. The Hong Kong dollar which was under tremendous selling pressure has held steady, interest rates have come down and the Hong Kong stock market has revived from its nadir of September.

Despite Mrs Thatcher's public assurances that there had been no basic change in Britain's stance during the fifth round of the bilateral talks, informed political observers believe that there was a significant shift in the British negotiating position. In a technical sense, Mrs Thatcher might be right in saying that there has been no fundamental change: Britain could still be negotiating with China on the basis of the original brief—to try and maintain the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, there are grounds for believing that Britain's negotiating position has shifted on the question of sovereignty which, the Chinese claimed, had been in the centre of argument in all previous talks between the two sides. In September 1983, China's Foreign Minister, Mr Wu Xueqian, said that, basically, Britain had been reluctant to concede sovereignty. This no longer appears to be the case. Many people believe that the improvement in the atmosphere after the fifth round of the

[1] Previous rounds of talks were held on 12–13 July, 25–26 July, 2–3 August and 22–23 September 1983; the sixth round took place on 14–15 November and the seventh round on 7–8 December. The talks are to resume on 25 January 1984.

The author is Administrator of Part-time Degree Programmes at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and concurrently Director of the Chinese University Press. A slightly abridged version of this article appears simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

talks could not have been achieved if Britain had not signalled its intention to give up sovereignty over Hong Kong.

Whereas before the fifth round, the British side had stressed the need for a 'British presence' in Hong Kong after 1997 as a condition for stability and prosperity, Mrs Thatcher herself is speaking now only in terms of a 'British link'—suggesting a much more limited role for Britain. Chinese spokesmen, briefing the international press about Peking's position, let it be known that, in the fourth round, the talks had broken down because, in pressing for a 'British presence' after 1997, Britain was seeking a continuation of its rule over Hong Kong and thereby the *de facto* renewal of the 'unequal treaties' that are anathema to China. Therefore, Mr Wu's pronouncement notwithstanding, sovereignty does not seem to have been the most contentious issue, although the Chinese side acted as though it was. The real arguments were over who should govern Hong Kong after 1997. The British were prepared to concede sovereignty in exchange for the right to govern. They have argued that Britain should be allowed to run Hong Kong because the territory's stability and prosperity depend on the continuation of a British administration. The Chinese, on the other hand, certainly want British rule to end—although in almost the same breath they say that China is prepared to stay away, too, so that the people of Hong Kong can govern themselves.

Thus, the question as to who should govern Hong Kong after 1997 is central to the talks. Its corollary is *how* Hong Kong will be governed. Mrs Thatcher's deliberate use of the words 'British link' instead of 'British presence' suggests that, as well as conceding sovereignty, Britain probably also signalled its willingness to play a reduced role in Hong Kong if it could secure conditions ensuring the colony's stability and prosperity under a system of government yet to be determined.

Britain's modified position

There were a number of reasons why, in the end, the British government had to concede ground on both the issue of sovereignty and, quite possibly, the issue of administration. First, there was a growing realization that the Chinese leaders are completely inflexible and intransigent on the question of sovereignty and on the matter of the three 'unequal treaties' which gave birth to Hong Kong.[2] Nationalistic sentiments are very strong in a country which lost many wars, a lot of land and a great deal of face in the last two hundred years. The history of China throughout these two centuries has been the history of its people struggling to regain their strength. Many members of the current Chinese Communist Party leadership joined the Party in the 1930s and 1940s to realize this objective. This is why, when Mao Tsetung mounted the steps to the Gate of Heavenly Peace on 1 October 1949, one of the first sentences he addressed to the nation was: 'The people of China have stood up on their feet.' The essence of Chinese politics is the perception that the people want a strong

[2] While the lease on the New Territories and North Kowloon runs out in 1997, Hong Kong island and the Kowloon peninsula were ceded to Britain in perpetuity.

leader. The politician who wants to stay in power must not only be strong but also be seen to be strong. Any Chinese leader who signs a piece of paper to extend an 'unequal treaty' with a foreign power in the realities of the 1980s risks more than his own and his nation's loss of face; he will also lose prestige in the armed forces and his grip on power. Even now, there is some doubt whether Deng Xiaoping's control of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is strong enough to enable him to carry through the recently launched Rectification Campaign and ensure the survival of his supporters in the next crisis of succession. The fact that the Rectification Campaign aimed at purging the Party of its leftist elements and followers of the Gang of Four has been eclipsed by a campaign against 'pollution of the mind', directed at intellectuals with humanistic tendencies, suggests that the Deng Xiaoping faction is not having everything its own way.

Moreover, the treaties relating to Hong Kong are by no means the only 'unequal treaties' which the Manchu rulers were obliged to sign in the last century. The chief beneficiary was the Soviet Union, whose unresolved border disputes with China are said to involve territories covering over one million square kilometres to the north-east of Manchuria, including the important port of Vladivostok. China's concern that concessions over Hong Kong might set a precedent for the other unequal treaties, and its nationalistic attitude—it would really go against the grain of the current Chinese leaders to accept British rule over what to them is part of China—have restricted its room for manoeuvre. In the final analysis, the economic advantages to China of the *status quo* in Hong Kong are not enough to overcome the Chinese leaders' political considerations and their own natural inclinations. Only a supremely pragmatic Communist leadership could see the sense of allowing Hong Kong to continue under its present dispensation. And only a leader who was totally in control would be able to push such a decision through the Party's Central Committee and Politburo.

If Mrs Thatcher did not fully appreciate the significance of Chinese constraints when she first discussed this issue with China's leaders in September 1982, she quickly made up for it in the months that followed. What really persuaded the British government to change its negotiating position was the realization, in the dark days of September 1983, that if the crisis of confidence rocking Hong Kong continued any longer, the city would face the real possibility of collapse—not in thirteen years' time but in a matter of months or even days. At some stage, the Foreign Office came to the view that immediate survival must take precedence over long-term prospects. Paradoxically, it was precisely the lack of a long-term future for Hong Kong which had triggered the crisis of confidence and its attendant manifestations. But the downward slide of the Hong Kong dollar, the outflow of funds, the winding-down of investments by Hong Kong entrepreneurs and the beginning of a wave of emigration by professional people—the most mobile group in Hong Kong—convinced both the Hong Kong and British governments that anything to defuse the panic and stabilize the situation was better than no action

it all. After the Hong Kong dollar's precipitous fall, Hong Kong's Governor and Executive Councillors went to London for a meeting with the Prime Minister on 5 October. It was there, no doubt, that the shift in negotiating strategy was discussed and agreement to the change secured, thus leading to Britain's concessions over sovereignty and the role of the Hong Kong-British administration.

The people of Hong Kong

The onus for the success of the talks and the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong is now on the Chinese government. The Chinese will have to devise ways and means of allaying the fears of the Hong Kong people against a Communist takeover by 1997. So far, it has not been difficult to get the British government to concede ground in the negotiations. Britain will have to leave the New Territories in any case when the lease for that part of Hong Kong runs out in thirteen years. Most people agree that Hong Kong Island is not viable without its hinterland where the airport, the reservoirs, the farms and all the major industries are situated. Nor can they be administered separately because there is no effective border—the three parts of Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories have merged into one another. The Chinese, by simply insisting—as they are entitled to—on their legal rights under the conditions of the lease, will resume sovereignty and governance over a large part of Hong Kong. When that happens, British rule over the small bit that is left would not be viable if China chose to be hostile and belligerent.

Britain's real concern is to secure the best deal for the people of Hong Kong, rather than to maintain its rule over the territory. Originally, its perception of the best deal for Hong Kong did include the continuation of 'a British presence.' But the latter is not sought as an objective in itself. In the face of China's violent objections to a 'British presence' after 1997, British perceptions of the best deal for Hong Kong had to change. The British government is now committed only to maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong—hence its emphasis only on 'a link'. Whether the people of Hong Kong will be satisfied with no more than a link and will have sufficient confidence in Chinese guarantees of non-intervention to want to stay on rather than leave in such numbers as to lead to a collapse of stability and prosperity, remains to be seen.

Indeed, the Chinese leaders may be more successful in securing British agreement to their terms than in getting the people who matter in Hong Kong to accept those terms as workable. The stability and prosperity of Hong Kong depend on its entrepreneurs, industrialists, bankers and other professionals, both local and foreign. While the British and Hong Kong governments, which are committed to holding the fort and finding a responsible long-term solution, are operating under a number of constraints, the Hong Kong businessmen and the professionals are not bound by any such commitment and will have no qualms about departing if the final terms fall short of their expectations. For many of them, their stay in Hong Kong after 1997 is

contingent upon a continued British presence. To them, the crucial issue is not Chinese sovereignty—which is not in dispute—but governance: who will run Hong Kong? In their representations to the Hong Kong and British governments through the Executive and Legislative Councils, they have emphasized the need for a continued British presence to give them confidence to continue living, working and investing in Hong Kong.

Such guarantees as China will be able to give will not be enough to allay the fears of many in Hong Kong of an eventual Communist takeover. Apprehensions are based, in the first place, on the immense difference between the standard of living in China and the standard of living in Hong Kong. Even more important than purely materialistic considerations is the fact that Peking has never given any indication that it would abandon the Communist system of government and its totalitarian controls. All that the Chinese government wants to provide for its people is more material goods, not greater freedom; and what it expects from them is more productivity, not new political ideas. The present Chinese leaders may be less doctrinaire than their more orthodox Marxist predecessors. In their domestic policies they may have made certain concessions to such capitalist practices as material incentives and the profit motive (the slogan 'to each according to his performance' has displaced the classic Marxist dogma of 'to each according to his needs'). But it does not follow that they are prepared to liberalize further than they have done and to embrace more fully the Western ways and capitalist practices prevalent in Hong Kong. While most people looking at Hong Kong see its tremendous economic activity, phenomenal growth rate, energy, efficiency and productivity, the Chinese leaders see in Hong Kong vestiges of colonialism, the excesses of capitalism, uncontrolled speculation and unfair distribution of income. To their minds, Communism is vastly superior and still the best political and economic system in the world. And they would want to change things in Hong Kong.

The people of Hong Kong know that. They are well versed in the affairs of Communist China and do not see its track record as one inspiring confidence. The older generation remembers the fate of Shanghai, its business community after the Communist takeover, and the successive campaigns to drive out private enterprise and humiliate businessmen in public. Younger people remember the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, when day by day battered and bound corpses used to float down the Pearl River into the harbour of Hong Kong. They know that the Chinese Constitution has been changed five times and that the 'Four Modernizations' are nothing new. The same slogans were used and the same concerns expressed in a similar campaign almost 100 years ago, when it was called the Self-Strengthening Movement. But not much progress has been made. In fact, it might even be argued that the technology gap between China and the West has widened.

There are inherent reasons for the antipathy of the local people towards Communism. For almost thirty-five years, Hong Kong held out an alternative to the Communist system of government in China and [illegible] its [illegible]

over two million refugees from across the border. Indeed, the majority of the people living in Hong Kong today are either refugees or children of refugees. They or their parents have eschewed the rule of Communism by choice. What their parents taught them at home and what they themselves have seen of China have convinced them that Hong Kong under British administration is a better place to live in. They have a deep-seated bias against Communism and are keen to have the British stay. Given their background, how can anyone expect them to feel otherwise?

If these people are told that a Communist takeover is imminent, those that can go will leave, and those who cannot yet do so will start preparing for it. Their reaction is typical of people whose investments and professional skills have contributed most to the prosperity of Hong Kong and who will have most to lose under a Communist system of government. Therefore, China's hopes that its guarantees will be sufficient to convince Hong Kong entrepreneurs and professionals to stay on after the British have left are likely to remain forlorn hopes.

Peking's strategy

There are indications that the Chinese leaders are aware of this problem. This is why they have refrained from making political or propaganda capital out of Britain's important concessions on the question of sovereignty. For the first time since negotiations started, the confidentiality of the talks is being respected by the Chinese side. This is also why Peking has announced that the talks will continue after September 1984—the Chinese-imposed deadline—until an agreed settlement is reached. Peking has a vested interest in stabilizing the situation in Hong Kong while it works out its plans for the transition.

Most people who have spoken to the Chinese leaders at length have come to the conclusion that they do not understand Hong Kong and the conditions which have given rise to its emergence as one of the world's top twenty trading territories and the world's third financial centre. Imbued by Marxist doctrines and limited by their own experiences, Chinese leaders see Hong Kong in a different light from that of the people who live there. Lack of first-hand knowledge and an undue reliance on briefings from subordinates have made it difficult for them to appreciate the complexities of the problems involved in a change-over to Chinese administration. They fail to understand that probably the only thing China can take over without upsetting the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong is sovereignty. Anything more than that will set in motion certain destructive forces that may not be reversible. The Chinese leaders do not trust the honesty of British intentions. Nor do they believe that stability and prosperity will disappear with the British: they think that this is a British ploy. They do not believe that the people of Hong Kong cannot govern themselves, nor that this fear of Communist rule is such that those who have the political acumen, sophistication and credentials to govern Hong Kong will not be there to see China conduct its great experiment of 'one country, two political systems'. But Peking does understand one thing: that a collapse of

business confidence in Hong Kong—a massive outflow of money and people all at once—will lead to a collapse of stability and prosperity. And its whole strategy vis-à-vis Hong Kong is calculated to forestall this.

Evidence suggesting that as long ago as the Spring of 1981 the Chinese leaders were already thinking in terms of an eventual takeover of Hong Kong is not lacking. While the Hong Kong property boom was still in full swing, Mr Liao Chengzhi, then a member of the Politburo and concurrently Head of the Hong Kong and Macao Office, was telling his business friends in Hong Kong to get out of property and invest instead in Hong Kong's industry. Mr Liao, who had overall responsibility for China's policy towards Hong Kong, realized that when China's ultimate intention became known, property prices in Hong Kong could not hold, but that such a disclosure would not have any serious adverse effect on Hong Kong's industry in the short to medium term. That is indeed what has happened.

The appointment of Mr Xu Jiatun to be the new director of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong—China's unofficial representative in the territory—is also significant. Almost at the last minute, Mr Xu was preferred to Mr Ke Hua, the former Chinese Ambassador to Britain, because of his wide-ranging experience in the takeover of Foochow after 1949, then the second most important port on the China coast after Canton. From 1949 to 1955 Mr Xu was First Party Secretary of the Foochow Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party—effectively the Political Commissar of Foochow, the provincial capital of Fuchien Province. During those six crucial years in Foochow after the Communist takeover, when the survival of Communist rule in China was under threat after the start of the Korean War, he pushed through land reform in the countryside, directed the 'three Antis and five Antis' drive in the city which finally brought the business community to heel, and launched many political campaigns which destroyed the influence of foreign missionaries, triad societies and residual Kuomintang functionaries. Credited with building up the Communist Party's authority in Foochow in the face of a rival regime just across the water in Taiwan, the secret of his success in Foochow was the fact that he managed to convince the people that the Communist Party was there to stay and that they had better adjust to that reality. Even more relevant in the context of today's problems is that Mr Xu Jiatun had worked with Hu Yaobang in 1959, when both were members of the Presidium of the National Conference of Outstanding Groups and Workers in Industry, Communications and Transport, Capital Construction, Finance and Trade. And Hu Yaobang has been identified as the one member of the Deng–Hu–Zhao triumvirate who is most adamant on the recovery of Hong Kong.

The indications are that the decision to recover Hong Kong has been taken by Peking; what follows is merely a matter of strategy. It should be stressed that a fundamental belief of the Chinese leaders is that it is possible to maintain the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong without the presence of the British administration, provided that the businessmen and professional people in Hong

Kong initially stay on in large enough numbers to ensure continuity while the mainland Chinese learn the ropes. Therefore, a cornerstone of Peking's strategy vis-à-vis Hong Kong is to convince as many people as possible that they should stay in Hong Kong despite the change-over to Chinese sovereignty. Peking has taken pains to reassure foreign investors in Hong Kong that the actual, practical changes would be minimal and that their continued investments would be welcomed by China after the change-over. For their part, Japanese and American investors have never been too worried about the political situation in Hong Kong. If anything, their investments in the territory have increased in spite of the current difficulties. China's diplomatic offensive directed at allaying the fears of foreign governments and foreign investors has apparently been quite successful and has drawn polite and favourable responses from the representatives of governments of such countries as the United States, Japan, members of the European Community, Australia and New Zealand.

Peking realizes, of course, that it is the Hong Kong Chinese businessmen and industrialists who need convincing more than anybody else because, as compatriots, they stand to lose everything once Hong Kong becomes part of China. While the interests of foreign investors will be protected and represented by their respective governments, Hong Kong Chinese businessmen will have no one to turn to after 1997 in case of grievances against their own government. This is why, in contrast with increasing American and Japanese investments in Hong Kong, local entrepreneurs and industrialists have not been putting more money into their Hong Kong businesses. In fact, they have started to wind down their enterprises and investments, taking their money out of Hong Kong, out of harm's reach.

To reassure this group, which provides the employment and the prosperity enjoyed by Hong Kong today, Peking has emphasized that China will not take over the running of Hong Kong after 1997, that existing conditions will continue over a long period of time, and that the people of Hong Kong will be allowed to govern themselves. The head of the Hong Kong and Macao office has signalled that there will be a period of five years after 1997 during which the Hong Kong people will run their own affairs. To allay the doubts of a Hong Kong public wary of Chinese pronouncements and guarantees, Peking's tactic is to point out that China will be using Hong Kong as an example to Taiwan, demonstrating to the Taiwanese that they have nothing to fear from a Communist takeover.

For those who remain incredulous—and there are many—Peking's strategy is to drive a wedge through the opposition by the efforts of the United Front Department, the Chinese Communist Party's public relations arm. Peking has already appointed some prominent members of the Hong Kong community to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and is entertaining different quasi-political groupings in Hong Kong and in Peking every week in an attempt to reassure them about China's genuine intentions and win them over to its side.

While many Peking leaders do not really understand the importance of Hong Kong's role as a financial centre, those who do, realize that this role could not be played under Chinese management. In the Chinese Communist scheme of priorities, Hong Kong's industrial and technological base is of paramount importance. Fearing above all disruption in the wake of a mass exodus of Hong Kong's industrialists, Peking has set up several companies in Hong Kong whose sole purpose is to buy into Hong Kong industry and maintain the running of factories and trading houses if and when current owners want to sell their businesses and emigrate. One of these Peking-backed companies is headed by the brother-in-law of Liu Shaochi, China's former Head of State.

The signs are, therefore, that Peking has every intention of using the next thirteen years as a transition period during which British rule and influence in Hong Kong will wane and the Chinese presence and involvement will increase. By 1997, British authority will be completely eclipsed. In Peking's strategy vis-à-vis Hong Kong, the first step is to get the British to agree to leave Hong Kong. The second step is to convince the Hong Kong business community, both Chinese and expatriates, to stay after the departure of the British. This may not be quite so easy as the Chinese imagine. Whether or not the Hong Kong Chinese industrialists and entrepreneurs will stay in Hong Kong in the next thirteen years depends on whether they believe that there is a future for them after 1997 if the British pull out completely. So far, the Chinese have been more successful in reassuring foreign investors than their own compatriots.

Looking ahead

The true significance of the Sino-British talks for the future of Hong Kong seems to have escaped many people in Hong Kong. Over the months, political commentators and even business people have attached too much importance to the atmosphere before and after the talks and have tended to regard the lack of agreement as bad news. It was insufficiently appreciated that the easiest way to relax tensions and secure an agreement was to accede to Chinese demands. Yet, such agreement could jeopardize the *raison d'être* of the talks if it is achieved by sacrificing the conditions vital to the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.

For many people in Hong Kong, the ideal solution would have been for China to regain sovereignty and for Britain to make a commitment to hand over power to the people of Hong Kong, but without specifying a time limit for the transfer. Peking's refusal to accept the flexibility of this plan and Chinese insistence on British withdrawal by 1997 mean that the ideal solution will no longer be available. In so far as the October talks, by improving the atmosphere for future negotiations, stabilized political and economic conditions in Hong Kong—at least for the time being, until major disagreements resurface—they could be regarded as a success. But if that respite was secured at the expense of a major concession over Britain's presence after 1997, it must be viewed with a degree of apprehension.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD. WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Notes of the month

THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE GENERALS IN ARGENTINA

THE declared purpose of Argentina's new President, Mr Raul Alfonsin, is to place his country's armed forces in such a position that they cannot seize power again. It is a virtually impossible task. A half-dozen well armed contingents of troops based in the main garrisons and well coordinated from Buenos Aires will always be able to take over the country. But Mr Alfonsin, seizing every opportunity at the start of his presidency, is making another coup increasingly unlikely. He is cutting down the armed forces' size, prestige and power.

Tradition is against the fifty-seven year old lawyer. In the past thirty-one years, no elected President has served out a full six-year term. And the man who did complete his term before that was Argentina's strong man, Juan Domingo Peron, a former general. Four Presidents have been ousted by military coups since then: Peron himself, Arturo Frondizi, Arturo Illia and Mrs Maria Estela Peron.

Ever since 1930, when an elected President, Hipolito Yrigoyen, was ousted by a general, the armed forces have played a central role in Argentine politics. They have not only jockeyed for a chance at the presidency: countless 'jobs for the boys' have been handed out each time the military have taken power. Officers have served as state governors and mayors, bank presidents and airline chiefs.

When out of power, the generals have traditionally conspired with the discontented civilian opposition. Sometimes the civilians have approached the generals for help. Coups have become so certain that the only question has been one of timing. On occasion, coups have been welcomed by many Argentines (the 1976 coup against Mrs Peron was one example).

Generals have wielded considerable influence outside the strictly military field. The head of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy, busily creating an entire nuclear fuel cycle in Argentina, is an admiral. The biggest company in the country is Fabricaciones Militares, Argentina's own military-industrial complex.

As he tries to dislodge the well entrenched military establishment, President Alfonsin has some automatic advantages: he won a freely contested election on 30 October with a clear majority. After his inauguration on 10 December, he was able to benefit from a wave of national euphoria at the end of an era of rule by four consecutive military juntas. The main opposition party, the Peronists, had fielded a weak candidate, Mr Italo Luder, and were divided and discontented.

The armed forces were at their weakest. They had presided over an economic shambles of runaway inflation, rising foreign debt and an industrial slump. The military chiefs were unmistakably to blame for the failure in the

Falklands and were squabbling among themselves over who bore the responsibility.[1]

The armed forces had also been weakened by a sea-change in Argentine politics. Until the October election, there had only been one party with mass appeal in this century. Up to the 1930 coup, it was the populist President Yrigoyen's Radicals. After the Second World War, the Peronists took over leadership of the masses and the Radicals shrank to become standard bearers for the middle class. The army presents itself to the establishment and the middle class as the only serious alternative to Yrigoyen and to the political gangsterism of the Peronists.

In the December election, however, the Peronists were beaten by a revived Radical party which won mass appeal yet kept its support among the middle class by reaffirming its strong support for the rule of law. There are now two mass parties. Argentine politics is no longer lopsided: nobody needs to go to the generals for protection against an overbearing or incompetent government.

The moment could not be much more propitious and Mr Alfonsin has seized it. His first action was to announce that the 'self-amnesty' decreed by the armed forces, covering both sides in the 'dirty war' against terrorism in the 1970s, would be cancelled. He said the heads of three military juntas (three generals, admirals and air force brigadiers) and seven alleged terrorists would be tried for murder, torture and illegal detention. Mr Alfonsin made a point of being even-handed: he is just as opposed to the left-wing extremists who started the dirty war in a wave of nearly uncontrollable terrorism as to the military men who are said to have tortured and killed at least 6,000 suspects.

Mr Alfonsin did not mention the last junta chief, General Bignone, who guided the country back to elective democracy with considerable skill. But General Bignone has a past: he is to face a trial initiated by a civil court over the disappearance of two conscripts, both Communists, from the national military college when he was its director.

President Alfonsin's next act was to clear out the upper ranks of the army by appointing relatively junior staff officers to top jobs. In keeping with military tradition, more senior men who were passed over retired. This reduced the number of generals on active service from sixty to eighteen. The navy had a similar purge. The President appointed a commission to probe into what happened during the dirty war but left prosecutions up to civil courts and the petitions of people whose relatives had 'disappeared'. Civilian judges, appointed by the junta and anxious to keep their jobs, showed some spirit and turned against their former benefactors. They began to check into some 7,000 cases of habeas corpus.

Mr Alfonsin tried to draw a distinction between those who 'planned and supervised' the killings and 'those who merely carried out orders . . . often under the pressure of intense and constant propaganda which often induced them to believe their orders were legitimate'. Sensing the new atmosphere, a

[1] See Focus on the Falklands, *The World Today*, April 1983.

navy corporal began to talk about his personal knowledge of torture, murder and clandestine burials linked to the navy mechanics school in Buenos Aires. At the same time, hundreds of bodies were dug up—some shot in the head and with their hands cut off to prevent identification by fingerprint.

While the trials are being held, and more ugly revelations are made, the purged high command will be in no position to retaliate against its new civilian rulers. President Alfonsin can be expected to continue with his plans. Among them are an end to conscription, which should cut the army's size by at least a half, and a reduction of the military budget, said to absorb one-third of government expenditure.

The President is also likely to dismantle Fabricaciones Militares, a chain of companies which makes armaments ranging from rifles to aircraft, tanks and ships and has expanded into timber, petrochemicals and construction. It is said to have a turnover of $2·2 billion and to make vast secret losses known only to the army high command. Mr Alfonsin will want to cut these losses and bring Fabricaciones under civilian control.

Drastic changes like these can only be justified to the generals and to the public if Mr Alfonsin can claim that Argentina has no foreign disputes and that the possibility of conflict is negligible. He has two foreign disputes and is trying hard to settle them. As this article went to press, the dispute with Chile over three islands in the Beagle channel and maritime waters to the south was reported to be nearing settlement with the help of Vatican mediators. The second dispute, with Britain over the Falklands, is more intractable.

ROLAND DALLAS*

*Mr Dallas, a former Reuters correspondent in Buenos Aires, is Editor of *The Economist*'s *Foreign Report*. He was in Argentina for the October 1983 election.

NIGERIA'S GENERALS MAKE THEIR COMEBACK

AFRICA'S largest experiment in democracy did not fail. It was simply snuffed out amid indifference. There was no significant opposition to the New Year coup by which a military junta removed the recently re-elected Nigerian government of President Shehu Shagari. Nigeria has a free—some would say an unbridled—press. The same papers that one week had rained praise on the elected President turned at once to eulogies of his supplanter, Major-General Mohammed Buhari.

Military men ruled Nigeria from 1966, through the agony of the Biafra war and on into the peace and well oiled prosperity of the 1970s. The last junta handed back authority to elected civilians in 1979 because its chief, the solid and commonsensical General Obasanjo, knew his officers were making a mess of governing. They were not very bright, they lacked the flexibility to allow

for the vast ethnic and regional differences among Nigeria's 100 million (or so, nobody knows) people. And they were deeply corrupt. The main shared characteristic of Nigeria's diverse communities is a deep commitment to making money.

The departing soldiers handed over to a constitution carefully modelled upon that of the United States, with much power devolved to the nineteen states, and to the hundreds of local government units within them. The aim of this structure was to allow each 'tribal' group to express its own personality. From the 1979 elections the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by Mr Shagari, emerged victorious by a whisker and on a technicality. The President then devoted most of his energies to winning the 1983 elections, at the head of a party transformed from its original base among the Moslem Hausa-Fulani people of the north into a truly nation-wide organization.

The federal government, whose revenues from the oil industry made up over 90 per cent both of total government income and of the nation's foreign exchange earnings, consciously spread its patronage far and wide. The scope for corruption was vast, and eagerly grasped at every level of society. Meanwhile the world oil glut, plus some production failures caused by domestic incompetence, relentlessly forced government revenue down.

At the 1983 elections some results were grotesquely fiddled, notably in the south-western states where the Yoruba-speaking people have a majority. But Shagari's NPN was the clear winner. The President—apparently untainted by corruption in his own person, and disqualified by the constitution from seeking a third term for himself or for any other northerner—settled down to install a new and clean administration at federal level. It was that new team that the soldiers sent packing on 31 December.

The coup had clearly been prepared for several weeks. But it happened two days after President Shagari had announced a tough austerity package, cutting almost 30 per cent off the gravy train of government capital spending, raising many consumer prices, and making a timid attempt to change some of the rules for allocation of foreign exchange that gave greatest scope for corruption.

The soldiers claimed to be fighting corruption, which was exactly what President Shagari was trying to do; and to be resisting price rises and government economies, which were unavoidable. Nigerians also noted that the new junta is dominated by officers from the Hausa-speaking Islamic north—far more so than was the Shagari Cabinet.

Rumour suggests that the generals took over to forestall a coup being prepared by more junior officers. This cannot be confirmed. But the timing of the coup must have been influenced by the progress of the Shagari government' negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund fo loans to tide them over their external payments difficulties. Nigeria, unlik Brazil or Mexico, has no great problem of long-term debt. But it desperatel needs funds to pay its recent trading debts. Foreign suppliers of goods and ser vices of all kinds have foolishly spent the past few years selling Nigerians good they cannot possibly pay for (and often bribing Nigerians to place orders the

never had a real intention of paying for). The foreigners have grown thin on a diet of IOUs, and have in many cases cut off supplies and ceased work on contracts except where they are paid cash in hand.

The World Bank group wanted the big cuts in government spending that the Shagari government had announced. They were also (several years too late) insisting on a stiff devaluation of the national currency, the naira. This last the Shagari government could not swallow. The soldiers spent their first days in office making contradictory statements about both policies. The exchange rate is obviously decisive.

The overblown currency makes all imports artificially cheap in Nigerian terms. This had three main evil effects. It penalized Nigerian farmers, whose production was made artificially dear on home markets. It made necessary a Byzantine system of licences and permits for all imports, giving politicians and officials a stiff incentive to demand bribes for their allocation. And it created an immense smuggling business, surrounded by bribery and gangsterism.

Farming was wrecked. The urban middle class did well, provided it had government connections. This new middle class, which has emerged on the back of the oil boom and the system of government patronage it made inevitable, includes the new generation of army officers, and their wives, uncles and second cousins' second wives' brothers. If Shagari's anti-corruption drive had been combined with a devaluation, they would all have been ruined.

The soldiers' cries for clean government should therefore be taken with as heavy a pinch of salt as everyone rightly applied to Mr Shagari's. The comparison may be quite close. General Buhari is an apparently sincere man with a clean record, as far as is known. But he was Commissioner (military minister) for Oil in General Obasanjo's military regime. Some time around then the Nigerian National Oil Corporation lost (literally lost: a later commission of inquiry was completely baffled by the books) something like US$100 million. A clean man in charge of a dirty administration would be regular Nigerian form.

Maybe Nigeria is big enough and potentially rich enough to survive corruption. What would destroy it is renewed ethnic quarrelling, if it came once more to violence. Now that the federal government has run out of spare cash, the ethnically based states can no longer be pacified by federal hand-outs. They can pretty certainly not be coerced into national unity by a Hausa-based military regime. And the possiblity of orderly change of government, the main virtue of the now defunct and admittedly ragged Nigerian democratic constitution, has been swept away. Nigeria's greedy foreign suppliers will be anxious to get the money owing to them before it all blows up—unless the army somehow brings off a miracle.

NICHOLAS HARMAN*

*Mr Harman writes on African affairs, and other subjects, for *The Economist*. He is the author of *The Economist*'s survey of Nigeria in January 1982.

EEC agriculture after Athens

NICK BUTLER

FOR a brief moment at the beginning of December it looked as if the European Community had finally found the political will to solve the problems which have blocked its progress since the turn of the decade.[1] After six months of detailed negotiations, involving eleven meetings of the foreign and finance ministers, France had tabled a proposal which it seemed could resolve at least one of the problems. A strengthening of budget discipline designed to set limits to spending and incorporating provision for economies on expenditure offered the chance that a logjam of reforms could be broken. With Community spending brought under control, an increase in the resources provided by every member-state might be agreed. With such an increase could come a new method of calculating contributions and hope for an end to years of squabbling and insistent demands for rebates.

The outcome of the Athens summit was a cruel disappointment for all European optimists. The ten EEC government leaders assembled in Athens failed to agree even on the sequence of reform, let alone the much more critical issues of substance. For the moment, the forward march of the Community is halted by the failure of the Athens summit. Talks on the third enlargement, to bring in Spain and Portugal, will make no progress. Discussions on new common policies, including the projected (and potentially crucial) common industrial research and development policy, will take place only in the shadows and the corridors. The campaign for the second set of direct elections to the Euro pean Parliament in June will begin without any clear vision of where Europ is going. But for the agricultural sector, which depends for its income on Euro pean decisions, the crisis is more immediate. Agricultural spending, whic accounts for sixty per cent of the EEC's budget, has been the root cause of th EEC's problems and was central to the disputes over contributions and re sources at Athens. Not surprisingly, the Community's common agricultur policy (CAP) will take the brunt of the consequences which diplomatic fai ure will impose.

In the short term, the Community's financial position is clear. The budg signed just before Christmas by the President of the European Parliament, Pi Dankert, allows for total expenditure of just over 25 billion ecu (some £1 billion). The balance of income to sustain that expenditure will come from t levy on VAT revenues in member-states. The budget itself is probably underestimation of the Community's outgoings. In 1983, spending on ag

[1] For background, see Martin Haworth, 'EEC farm prices: growing problems', *The Wo Today*, July–August 1983.

Nick Butler is a former Research Fellow of Chatham House, currently completing a stud international agricultural trade relations.

culture rose by 28 per cent. In the Parliament's 1984 budget, it is scheduled to rise by no more than 4 per cent, more a fond hope than a realistic assessment. World market conditions for the two key sectors—dairy and grain—are set to worsen in 1984. The American 'payment in kind' scheme, which took land out of production in 1983, cost the US Treasury over $20 bn. The scheme for 1984 will be slimmer, and less effective. Any rise in American grain output will depress prices, and add to the burden of export restitutions which account for almost half of the EEC's farm spending. In a highly competitive environment, a cut in the restitutions which compensate the farmer for the difference between guaranteed Community price levels and the much lower world market prices would leave European grain in the silos. In the dairy sector prospects are no better. In 1983 production in the Community grew by 3½ per cent while consumption remained flat. Total stocks of butter alone are now at the level of six months' consumption, an overhang which clouds the whole world market.

With costs rising inexorably towards the ceiling, first, of the agreed budget and then, very quickly, to the real ceiling of available resources, the outlook in the first few months of the year is for a series of ad hoc measures to limit costs. On the dairy side, proposals to impose a super-levy on milk production, to tax consumption of all oils and fats except butter in order to shift the pattern of demand, and to suspend intervention buying of skimmed milk have all been floated by the Commission. On grain, the proposals have centred on the limitation of imports of cereal substitutes. Tapioca and cereal brans have already been subjected to volume limits. Proposed restraints on citrus pellets and corn gluten feed would in theory re-open additional domestic markets to home-produced grain as animal feed.

These ad hoc measures would still fall a long way short of the changes necessary to avert a financial crisis. In practice, they are very unlikely to be implemented in full, and certainly not in a time period as short as six months. The strength of particular lobbies will delay, if not defeat, even the best laid plans. A super-levy would limit the cost to the budget of additional milk production but would do nothing to relieve the burden of current output or the costs of disposing of current stocks. A thorough system with quotas for individual producers would impose a considerable cost on the bureaucracy. The suspension of intervention purchasing, which buys all unsold output from the producer, would be more effective. So would a straight cut in guaranteed prices. But the political pressures on farm ministers and their governments to maintain income are so strong that no effective system is even within sight. In the grain market, cereal substitutes are a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. The high cost of European-produced grain has led farmers and feed suppliers to switch into substitutes, the range of which is potentially so considerable that quotas on one particular product would simply lead to consumption of another. Only large general levies, which would upset trade relations with the major supplier, the United States, would have a real effect. The Community would then find itself forcing up meat prices, because of the high cost of cereal feed inputs, alienating both the livestock sector

and the consumer. Dealing with the symptom in this way does nothing to alter the underlying problem caused by high cereal prices as set by the CAP.

The assumption must be that these or similar measures will be tried over the next few months, and will be found wanting, both because of the weaknesses described and the fact that they fail to make a significant impact on costs. Even a decision to freeze support prices will not avert the day of reckoning since the impetus of technological progress and productivity advance is still pushing production upwards into ever greater surplus. The state of the world market will determine the cost of export restitutions or storage for that surplus, but the chances of market conditions saving the Community from the financial crunch look slim indeed. The near inevitability of the crunch has encouraged many British observers who desire a fundamental reform of both the CAP and the Community's budgetary mechanisms actually to look forward to the cathartic effect of crisis. Reform, though, is not the only possible outcome, nor even the most likely.

The first response to an exhaustion of the Community's funds could be a reassumption of national responsibility for agricultural support. The CAP as it stands would continue to be applied in principle as far as funds allow, but its workings would be subject to national control and modification. National aids to agriculture are already considerable and, though no European government is yet prepared to discuss its contingency plans, a number of possible developments are easily discerned. Green currency rates may be fixed by national or bilateral decision, rather than common agreement. Particular producers may benefit from additional national support. Some governments might see a corresponding advantage (or political logic) in subsidizing consumers as well. Indirect support mechanisms for the agricultural sector through marketing boards and tax concessions might be extended in those countries where the agricultural lobby is most effective. Though the degree of enthusiasm will certainly vary, it is difficult to imagine any European government abandoning responsibility for its farm sector while neighbouring farmers are given additional protection and subsidy.

Perhaps the most dramatic effect of even a gradual renationalization of agricultural support would be on trade. Within the Community, non-tariff barriers such as health and hygiene regulations could be more stringently enforced by governments determined to protect national farm sectors at minimum financial cost. Extra subsidies and the restriction of internal trade would add to the surpluses and place on national governments the onus to support exports. Direct subsidies both to solve immediate problems and to secure trade markets before future negotiations would be highly likely. Equally likely would be schemes more extensive than anything currently planned by the Community to encourage the use of home-grown crops such as cereals and to exclude substitutes.

The second possibility, unjustifiably discounted by commentators since Athens, is that agreement will be reached on an increase in the Community's resources. Such an agreement does not of course require any change in the

CAP. Acceptance of a higher level of contributions could be achieved if a formula were found to ensure that Britain, the main obstacle to the necessary consensus, did not find itself a major net contributor to a Community in which several countries are significantly wealthier. A variety of schemes, from the European Commission in Brussels and from Britain, have been advanced. All have their weaknesses, and to the extent that they are deliberately discriminatory between member-states by intent they run counter to the Treaty of Rome.[2] In extremis, though, a formula could undoubtedly be found, even if it is no more than an entrenched, guaranteed version of the annual rebate accorded to Britain in the last three years. An increase in available resources would relieve the financial pressure on the Community for at least the rest of the decade.

Neither creeping renationalization, nor an increase in resources would lead to a reform of the common agricultural policy. On the contrary, both could entrench still further many of the worst aspects of the CAP as it now exists. The economic inadequacies of the policy scarcely need to be spelt out here. They have become familiar reading in the twenty-five years since the policy was inaugurated. By its system of price supports and the levels at which those supports are set, the Community encourages production regardless of demand. For products covered by the CAP, this has meant a trend running beyond self-sufficiency into chronic surplus. Much of the cost of the CAP goes to pay for the disposal of that surplus—an excess of supply over demand which is neither transitory nor yet stable.

Though the CAP unquestionably assists the rural areas of Europe, its distributional efforts are negative and regressive. The greatest benefits of a guaranteed price system go to the most efficient producers who are usually the largest-scale. As the Low Pay Unit has shown in detailed research work, farm workers as opposed to owners have fared badly and farm wages are still at the bottom of the income scale in Britain and most other European countries.[3] In economic terms, the CAP represents a serious misallocation of resources. Food costs are higher than they need to be and capital is devoted to the production of goods for which there is no demand. A number of major products covered by the CAP can be produced more cheaply in regions outside the EEC, and it is the producers in the developing countries as well as the traditional suppliers such as Canada, Australia and the United States which suffer. The developing countries which are net importers of commodities such as grain benefit from the depressant effect on the world market price of subsidized European production, but the disincentive to the modernization of the Third World's own agricultural sector is probably a greater net cost in the long run.[4]

[2] Ostrom Moller, 'Financing the European Economic Community', *National Westminister Bank Quarterly Review*, November 1983.

[3] Steve Winyard, *Poor harvest: farmworkers and the Common Market* (London: Low Pay Unit, 1980).

[4] T. E. Josling, 'The European Common Agricultural Policy and the interests of the developing countries', *ODI Review*, 1979.

It is also becoming increasingly obvious that there is a political cost to be counted in with the economic cost. As the CAP has shifted a number of key products into surplus, the consequences of Community policy have spread from the internal to the external environment. Non-European producers who have seen their trade with the EEC decline as European self-sufficiency ratios advanced are now finding their trade with third markets jeopardized. The CAP's system of export restitutions, which compensates producers for the gap between prices on the world market and prices as guaranteed by the Community, offers a degree of open-ended trade subsidy which few other countries can match. The prospect of a subsidy war, the ultimate in economic futility, has soured US-European relations and only the American decision to take farmland out of production during the last year has forestalled an open outbreak of hostilities.[5] The EEC finds itself in dispute now with almost every other exporter of agricultural produce.

To cope with these problems the CAP needs not only to avoid the adverse consequences of renationalization or an uncontrolled increase in resources but also to go beyond the present series of cost-cutting measures. Two new principles must be established as the basis of the CAP for the future. First, agricultural policies and in particular prices must be related to the interaction of supply and demand. High support prices exist to raise farm incomes, but as a means of supporting earnings the price regime is a clumsy and ineffective tool. The incomes of farmers, and of the rural community as a whole, would be much more efficiently protected by a system of direct income supplements. The choice of the price mechanism as the key instrument of the CAP reflected a conscious desire, evident in national policies well before the formal construction of a common regime, to stimulate production as well as to redistribute resources. The target of self-sufficiency and security of supply, which became enshrined at that stage, is now outdated and should be the object of the second shift of principle.

The world market, whether in grains or dairy products, no longer provides any justification for the fears of shortage which contributed to the original aim of self-sufficiency. With consumption levels high (and therefore susceptible to reduction or modification without trauma in times of particular shortage), complete self-sufficiency is not justified if world production costs are lower than those in the EEC, and if world supply is as consistently secure as it has been in the last decade. A limited reserve stock, or participation in a wider international stock-holding scheme is a more efficient means of ensuring security of supply than the present policy. The single most effective means of implementing such a shift of policy would be the modification or removal of the system of variable levies insulating the Community from the world market.

The effect of a shift in current policies on self-sufficiency and pricing would be considerable. Burdens of storage, export restitutions and direct payments would be lifted from the Community budget. To the extent that production

[5] Nicholas Butler, 'The ploughshares war between Europe and America', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983.

; fell, world market prices might rise, and a number of the most acri-
ious trade disputes would evaporate. Agriculture would still be a well-
:cted sector, and if as part of a second phase of reform national aids to
ers were brought under Community jurisdiction, a more genuinely com-
policy would have been established. Will the reformers prevail?
far, there is no reason for optimism. First, all the proposals offered by
Community so far have been ameliorative rather than substantive and,
plemented, would leave the basic structure of the common agricultural
y unchanged. Fundamental reform of the principles of the policy has as
ceived no support from Brussels or from any national government, Britain
ded. Second, the farm lobby remains strong in enough regions and coun-
to make the necessary unity for reform look unattainable. Up to now,
rength of the lobby coupled with the conclusion of politicians and diplo-
that European harmony and cooperation is worth the cost of the CAP—
ounts after all for barely 1 per cent of the EEC's gross domestic pro-
(gdp)—has kept the unreformed agriculture in being.
addition to those factors, there is the dynamic impetus of the policy itself
tional agricultural circumstances. Britain is, perhaps, the most appropri-
:ample. Ten years ago one might reasonably have predicted that Britain,
its very distinct agricultural history, and very different system of
ıltural support to that in continental Europe (based on payments to meet
iencies in income rather than on a guaranteed price regardless of output),
d have forced a radical change in the CAP. As a large-scale importer, with
ficient but limited domestic agricultural sector, Britain appeared to be
ly at odds with the protectionist-minded continentals.
perience has given the lie to those expectations. Britain has to an extent
seduced by the CAP. High guaranteed prices have stimulated produc-
Britain is now 76 per cent self-sufficient in products grown here. As
tly as 1970, self-sufficiency was no more than 60 per cent.[6] Some of the
'ening budget imbalance has been offset by a series of special rebates.
ears on, British farming is still efficient but its level and pattern of output
ncome reflect integration with the CAP on Europe's terms. Farming on
ısis of output, profits and property values is one of the country's most suc-
il economic sectors, making a growing contribution to the balance of
ents. The recent establishment of new institutions to assist the export of
products suggests that the Ministry of Agriculture has no plans for a rever-
o a pre-1973 regime. The CAP, it seems, has come to stay.
orm is far from being the automatic consequence of the current crisis,
ıough the coming months may witness successive budget crises and exer-
n brinkmanship, the odds are that when the dust has settled the CAP will
survived, shaken but not stirred.

nual Review of Agriculture 1983 (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 8804).

Poland's economy under military management

GEORGE BLAZYCA

IN the late 1970s, it was hard to fit Poland into any of the categories describing economic systems. Central planning would have been the appropriate description in the 1950s and 1960s, but whatever was going on in the following decade was certainly not that. Nor, obviously enough, was Poland a market or a mixed economy, as the terms are understood in the West. It was simply an economy out of control. Wlodzimierz Brus, then Professor of Economics at Warsaw University, said at the time that the economy appeared increasingly to be 'drifting under the influence of anarchic processes, controlled neither by market nor plan'.[1] In 1979, for the first time in post-war history, Polish net material product fell by 2·3 per cent.[2]

In the social and political turmoil of the early 1980s, the economic chaos deepened. Output fell by a further 6 per cent in 1980 and by a catastrophic 12·1 per cent in 1981. The Polish authorities, together with some Western experts, have been content to use the trade union opposition movement, Solidarity, to explain economic disaster. The official Warsaw view, in particular, is that the Polish economy snapped in 1981 under the strain of the 'unreasonable' demands of Solidarity; martial law had been the 'inevitable' response to trade union 'irresponsibility'. The truth of the matter is that the Polish economy began its downward spiral as early as the mid-1970s. Indeed, Solidarity itself was the child of economic decline. True there were enormous wage increases in the period of Solidarity's ascendancy. But they remained a mirage in terms of the goods and services available, and only helped further to disorganize an already chaotic economy.

The military programme for both society and economy was about restoring 'order'. The Generals believed that martial law would secure political order, but what about economic order? Two quite different policy instruments were embraced: the authorities adopted a 'command' approach to economic problems through the militarization of key enterprises but, at the same time, they espoused the substantially different values of 'economic reform'. So, while mines and major factories were placed under direct military rule and discipline from 14 December, the rest of the state-run economy supposedly be-

[1] W. Brus, *Aneks*, London, No. 20, 1979.

[2] Unless otherwise stated, all data in the text are taken from the following Polish sources: *Rocznik Statystyczny 1982*, *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 1982*, both published in Warsaw by GUS, and *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 4, 23 January 1983, No. 8, 20 February 1983 and No. 34, 21 August 1983.

Dr Blazyca is Lecturer in Economics at Thames Polytechnic and the author of 'The degeneration of central planning in Poland', in Jean Woodall (ed.), *Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure and Crisis* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982).

came subject to the financial discipline of market-style economic reforms.

It was apparent well before 1980 that Polish central planning had collapsed.[3] Throughout 1980 and 1981, a heated and wide-ranging discussion about reform took place. The vision of the new planning which emerged in due course was adventurous. Enterprises would be independent (free of the dictates of the old-style central plan), self-financing (subject to new disciplines) and self-managing (workers' self-management would play a critical part in decision-making). In his martial law pronouncement on 13 December 1981, General Jaruzelski placed particular emphasis on the economic reform, pledging that it would be carried out as an important aspect of 'socialist renewal'. Thus, while most of the state-owned economy was placed under direct military rule, the remainder found itself working, from 1 January 1982, according to the principles of a supposedly sweeping economic reform in which central direction was to play no part.

In fact, throughout 1982, the economic reform barely functioned. With the country's largest enterprises subject to the dictates of military commissars, and key materials and other inputs allocated administratively by the central supply system, there was little room for self-financing, self-managing and independent enterprises. Instead, the Polish economy had many of the attributes of a war economy, with highly centralized planning as its main feature.

Not surprisingly, the economy was slow to respond to this treatment. The *only sector—albeit an extremely important one—to 'benefit' from the martial* approach to economic problems was coal. Over the first five months of 1982, coal output was some 16 per cent higher than in the same period of 1981. Almost everywhere else the slump deepened. In the steelworks, where opposition to martial law was intense, output fell by 24 per cent in the first five months of 1982. In large manufacturing enterprises, a combination of worker resentment, lack of imports (down 41·6 per cent in value over the first five months of 1982) and the chronic disorganization of internal supplies had devastating effects. Motor car production was 33·5 per cent lower in the January–May period than in the first five months of 1981. Production of television sets fell by 34·2 per cent, cotton fabric output by 16·3 per cent and footwear production by 15·8 per cent, due mainly to lack of imported cotton and rubber, but also to a labour shortage accidentally caused by an early retirement scheme introduced by the authorities to parry the risk of unemployment.

Coal was Jaruzelski's undoubted success story. With production in 1982 up by 16 per cent taking output to 190 million tons the authorities saw it as the key to economic success. In the autumn of 1981, the Planning Commission had also given priority to coal in its projections for the year ahead. Three scenarios were produced, each linking a different coal output with performance in the economy as a whole.[4] A 'disaster' variant assumed that only 155 m.t.

[3] See this author's 'The degeneration of central planning in Poland' in Jean Woodall (ed.), *Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform. Failure and Crisis* (Frances Pinter, 1982).

[4] *Quarterly Economic Review of Poland 3/82* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd), hereafter *QERP*, p. 4.

would be mined, leading to a 10·6 per cent fall in industrial output in 1982. A 'middle' variant linked coal output of 168 m.t. with a more modest drop of 3·4 per cent in industrial output. The most optimistic version was for coal output of 175 m.t.which, it was thought, would lead to a recovery in industrial production with 5 per cent growth. The mechanism for this recovery was thought to be the link between expanded coal exports and more imports for supply-starved manufacturing. Although these were plan scenarios prepared before martial law and therefore under 'normal' social and political assumptions, the Generals appear simply to have taken over the most optimistic plan with its major emphasis on the coalmines. As it turned out, coal output in 1982 exceeded the planners' wildest hopes: 190 m.t. instead of the planned 175 m.t.

But what about industrial production? According to the plan, it should have increased by well over 5 per cent; in fact, gross output fell by a further 2 per cent over 1981 while net output, due to a disproportionate rise in costs, fell by 6 per cent. The Generals had overlooked the important part that social and political factors play in realizing economic progress. In Poland in 1982, society was paralysed and, in these circumstances, there could be no recovery.

As mentioned above, during 1980 and 1981, the authorities had criticized the wage settlements won by Solidarity. In industry, average monthly wages had increased by 25 per cent in 1980 and by 26·6 per cent in 1981. Given a decline in industrial output of 4 per cent and 16 per cent in each year respectively, a combination of inflation and rationing would be the only way to make the economic arithmetic add up. Retail prices rose by 8·5 per cent in 1980 and by 18·4 per cent in 1981. The shops became emptier still and the queues correspondingly longer. Thus, despite the wage increases, living standards declined.

Martial law, however, was incapable of generating the one thing Jaruzelski desperately needed—an incomes policy. In 1982, industrial wages rose by 55 per cent, retail prices by around 113 per cent—suggesting that living standards, crudely measured, fell by 27 per cent. In January 1983, the Minister responsible for prices, Zbigniew Krasinski, complained that it was as if the enterprises and the social security system 'had just turned on the money taps and left [him] in the middle trying to mop up the mess with a tiny cloth and a miniature bucket'. He went on; 'unfortunately we do not have any correct, central incomes policy. In this situation prices policy is a policy of mending holes. . . All the action taken by the Prices Office today is only taken in adapting to the whims and inefficiency of the instruments of other policies.'[5] Policy coordination under martial law left, it seemed, much to be desired. The authorities must have been bitterly disappointed that the coal success did not prompt a wider economic recovery, and that incomes policy remained beyond their reach.

The international factor

A characteristic feature of General Jaruzelski's policy is the belief that 'Poles

[5] *QERP 2/83*, p. 20.

must do it themselves'—any economic recovery is expected to come about through the use of internal resources rather than through large injections of foreign capital. This message has been put across relentlessly. As General Jaruzelski has been heard to put it, if only the pace at which Warsaw was rebuilt from the ashes in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War could be rediscovered, all would be well.

Finding internal routes to recovery is, for the time being at least, a necessity for Poland. The country no longer has any access to Western resources to speak of ($300 m. in the first half of 1983 compared with $1·4 bn in 1982 and $4·5 bn in 1981), and the largesse of Eastern friends and neighbours is strictly limited. At the end of 1982, Polish debt to the West was put officially at $24·8 bn, that to Soviet Bloc countries at R3·7 bn.[6] The declaration of martial law had untidy consequences for international economic and financial relationships. President Reagan made the running on the Western side and the US government suspended discussion with Warsaw on the lending for which it was ultimately responsible. In a rare show of unity, other Nato countries followed suit. The Western banks did as their governments and stopped talking to the Poles about commercial debt repayment. Exactly which side suffered most from these moves has never been very clear.

However, some aspects of the US-inspired sanctions policy were clearly harmful to Poland. The Western position on debt meant that any chance of finding new trade credits had disappeared completely. The US also blocked any further consideration of Poland's application to join the International Monetary Fund. Meanwhile, Poland had been trading with the West on a 'cash-on-delivery-if-not-sooner' basis, with dire effects on production. Imports from the West fell, in volume, by 31·5 per cent in 1981, industrial production by 16 per cent. Martial law meant more of the same. In 1982, Western imports fell by another 23 per cent, industrial output by 6 per cent. Sometimes production schedules would be disrupted throughout industry simply because material or a component worth a few tens of thousands of pounds was not available.

Poland also found itself suddenly denied access to US grain. The 1970s had been a period when livestock and poultry production had been substantially increased, largely on the basis of easily available imported feedstuffs. Grain imports crept up over the decade from 2·4 m.t. in 1970 to 7·5 m.t. in 1980, with only a slight reduction to 7·1 m.t. in 1981. But disaster struck in 1982, as lack of credits and sanctions played havoc with grain imports. Initial estimates suggest that as little as 3·8 m.t. of grain were imported in 1982.[7] The major element in the reduction was maize. In 1981, 2·5 m.t. of maize had been imported, almost all from the US. In 1982, access to that grain was denied. The immediate result was the destruction of the Polish poultry industry.

Poland's foreign trade performance during martial law makes interesting and somewhat surprising reading. The statistics clearly show that speeding up exports to other Soviet Bloc countries has been a priority task: their volume in

[6] *ibid.*, p. 21. [7] *QERP 1/83*, p. 12.

1982 increased by 13·7 per cent compared with 5·7 per cent in trade with the West.[8] In 1981, exports to both markets had slumped badly, to the West down by 22 per cent and to Comecon countries down by 17 per cent. The slump in Polish imports from Soviet Bloc countries in 1982 (down 8 per cent in volume) showed that there was little willingness or ability to increase 'comradely' aid to Poland.[9] None the less Poland ended the year with a trade deficit with Comecon (in fact, exclusively with the USSR). It is surprising, though, that a larger and more significant aid package was not put together to bolster the Jaruzelski regime in these first months of martial law.

Returning to the attitude of the West to Poland, it was inevitable that the initial unity of countries and banks with an interest in Poland would be hard to maintain. The commercial banks were the first to break ranks and soon met Polish officials at complex negotiations to reschedule the debt. By the autumn of 1982, the private banks were being pretty easy on Poland, judging by the formula adopted for rescheduling. Only 5 per cent of the $2·3 bn principal due had to be paid; the remaining 95 per cent would be deferred to beyond 1986. But the novelty in the agreement related to interest payments. For the first time since the Polish debt crisis broke, the banks agreed to recycle 50 per cent of the $1·1 bn of interest owed in 1982 to Poland to finance Western imports. Putting together 5 per cent of $2·3 bn and 50 per cent of $1·1 bn meant that, in fact, Poland had only to find $665 m. to finance its debt in 1982.[10] It is hard to see how the banks could have been easier on Poland without becoming charities. Their governments, on the other hand, were still refusing to discuss the official portion of the debt. All the same, some were refusing harder than others. Most European governments even then would have liked to sit round the table with the Polish Finance Minister. Since the Western position was more than slightly absurd, with private banks doing one thing and their governments the complete opposite, it comes as no suprise that those governments are in the process of revising their position on Poland's debts.

The Poles have scrupulously honoured the agreements made for the 1982 debt. In the negotiations that have taken place between banks and the Polish government on the 1983 debt, the Polish side—like all large debtors—has had considerable leverage. Nor have the Poles been slow to propose arrangements better suited to them. In 1983, they suggested to the banks that the year-to-year rescheduling practice of the past should be replaced by a formula which would cover debt during the 1983–5 period. Some of the banks ridiculed the idea at first, wondering why they should give up the right of calling the Poles to account every year. But now a different view seems to prevail in the banking community—one based on acceptance of the hard fact that the banks have never been in a position to exercise much real pressure on Poland, and that the Poles are making every effort to regain creditworthiness. The result is that the banks seem prepared at least to talk in three-year terms.

What the Poles would like most from the banks is a rescheduling package which would spread the debt over a twenty-year period with eight years grace. How the banks will respond remains to be seen, but there is every indication

[8] *ibid.*, p. 18. [9] *ibid.* [10] *QERP 4/82*, p. 27.

that they would like the reduced uncertainty and administrative convenience of longer-term rescheduling. Since the banks would have found it difficult to conclude very long-term rescheduling agreements in the absence of some settlement on official debt, Western governments are likely to have come under greater pressure to revise their position. The lifting of martial law makes this easier.

Another factor which may help governments to alter their attitude to Polish debt is the remarkable swiftness of the change in the trade balance. From a deficit of $750 m. in 1981, Polish trade with the West, for the first time since 1971, went into a surplus of around $358 m. in 1982.[11] This was due much more to import cuts than to export boom, Poland being only the most dramatic example within Comecon which, as a group, raised its hard-currency trade balance from $400 m. in 1981 to $5·1 bn in 1982.[12] Throughout the region, an abrupt economic adjustment of enormous proportions had taken place. A mixture of hard-currency shortage and deliberate austerity measures held imports down. Of course living standards fell. Yet making austerity stick must be deemed one of the success stories of the Jaruzelski regime. So far at any rate. But the government's hasty postponement, even if only by a month, of food price increases scheduled for 1 January 1984 after a strong public outcry must put a question mark over that success.

The Polish authorities have been intent on demonstrating to the international financial community that they understand, and can deliver, financial sobriety. The Foreign Trade Minister, Tadeusz Nestorowicz, questioned by the Polish weekly *Polityka* (in its issue of 5 February 1983) on the 'modest' size of the trade surplus, explained that the effort had been worthwhile because the trade surplus was an important weapon in negotiations: 'the IMF always looks to debtor countries to limit consumption and increase exports', he said. In general, the government has been at pains to show that its anti-inflation and austerity programmes are compatible with Western recommendations and a proof of its creditworthiness.

Obstacles to reform

Martial law has cleared away some of the things said to have been 'cluttering up' Polish society and an attempt has been made to set up new social institutions. There are new trade unions to replace the old, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (a 'school for dialogue and accord' as Jaruzelski has called it) and economic reform. Fielding questions on the slow results of the latter, a government spokesman claimed that the legislation was in place and in order, and the machine was 'on'. The difficulty was personnel. He asked his audience to imagine how different things would be in Poland if, suddenly, Hungarian managers (the most entrepreneurial in Eastern Europe) were installed in the independent, self-financing and self-managing enterprises created by the Polish reform. The lesson of the tale seems to be that it is not enough to wipe the slate

[11] *Polish Foreign Trade Performance in 1982*, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Washington, 29 April 1983, p. 14.

[12] *Financial Times*, 9 May 1983.

clean; it is much harder to start afresh and make a reality of 'renewed socialism'.

When Jaruzelski said there would be no turning back to pre-August 1980 styles of government, most people dismissed the statement as mere rhetoric. But the regime, or at least Jaruzelski, appears to have learnt two lessons from the 1970s: first that Gierek fell because he lost touch with the workers and, second, that he failed to modernize the management of the economy. Unfortunately, these lessons have been learnt only imperfectly. Jaruzelski's interest in reforming the economy may be genuine enough, but he exhibits a naïve misunderstanding of Poland's long history of unsuccessful economic reform, and of the powerful forces that have blocked previous economic experiments. Forcing managers and administrators to take examinations in the principles of reform (as is happening now with a disappointing pass rate) is unlikely to be enough to change attitudes. Both General Jaruzelski and Professor Wladyslaw Baka, who heads the reform, seem to think that it is the public's poor economic education that is the greatest impediment to progress. Apart from underestimating the vested interests that block reform, Jaruzelski showed little concern that the atmosphere created first by militarized planning and then by continued central distribution of important materials made it difficult for many people to take reform seriously. A more serious defect of the current reform is that, like the coal plan, it was designed in circumstances very different from those in which it was introduced. Workers' self-management was its crucial feature, setting it apart from the Hungarian model and holding out the promise of a widening of Polish democracy. But the scope for workers' self-management is strictly limited in Jaruzelski's Poland. Thus, on 1 January 1982, when the reform was inaugurated, an essential element of the design was lacking.

Despite Jaruzelski's doubtful commitment to workers' self-management and worker participation in economic decision-making, there has been an exceptional amount of discussion on economic issues compared with the Gierek years, mainly, admittedly, among the professionals who read the trade journals and the quality press. After the Planning Commission's announcement, last year, of three variants of the plan to 1985 and then to 1990, there was a long public discussion of the issue before the Sejm finally picked its favoured version. The discussion seemed to have some impact. The plan initially contained the proposal that prices should grow by 25 per cent in 1983, but after 'social protest' this was reduced to 15 per cent and, in January 1984, to 10 per cent. Nor should one overlook the kind of meetings organized in May this year to bring economic policy issues to the attention of workers; though, predictably enough, neither the so-called Workers' Conference on the Economy nor other similar officially staged events have yet succeeded in winning for the authorities the popular support they need to speed up economic recovery. Jaruzelski's greatest difficulty remains that of finding ways to make Poles go back to work with some enthusiasm. How to win over the people is of course not a new problem for Polish leaderships, but for the Generals, who declared war on society, it is going to be a particularly intractable one.

Hawke in office: towards bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy?

CORAL BELL

ANYONE who, on the morrow of the Labor victory of March 1983 in Australia, hoped that the first few months of the new Labor government would resemble the first few months of the Whitlam government ten years earlier, suffered a prompt disappointment. Mr Whitlam's first six months saw a very sharp downturn in Canberra's relations with Washington, and the circumstances of his final dismissal were such as to engender in many Australian minds (not all of them paranoid) the suspicion that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a hand in the events that brought him down. It is, of course, not possible to be categorical about the overall style of the Hawke government in foreign policy on the strength of the ten months we have so far seen, but the 'atmospherics' of policy to date have been more reminiscent of those in the years of the departed Liberal Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, than those in the early or late months of Mr Whitlam.

So considerable is the sense of continuity with the Fraser years,[1] in fact, that it seems legitimate to surmise the prospective emergence in Australian foreign policy of a considerable measure of bipartisanship. That is to say, the points of difference between this government and the last (or prospective next) in substantive policy look like rather small molehills to the non-party observer, though the official spokesmen of both parties would, of course, still represent them as mountains, practically on a par with Everest. The similarity of 'atmospherics' between the two Administrations has been enhanced by reactions to the Soviet destruction of the Korean airliner. Even before then, the Royal Commission on the Ivanov-Combe affair (see below) had already had the effect of keeping minds on what Moscow had been up to (an apparent bid for covert influence among the decision-makers of the new Cabinet) rather than what Washington might be up to. The latter question, of course, has been the preferred preoccupation of the Left.

Independent of those two episodes, the international context and the personalities involved could have been judged likely to rule out any parallel with the early Whitlam months, ten years ago. Then the central drama of international politics was provided by the final spasm of American bombing in Viet-

[1] See Coral Bell, 'Mr Fraser and Australian foreign policy', *The World Today*, October 1979; also Don Aitkin, 'Australia; another twenty-three years of Liberal rule', *ibid.*, June 19[illegible]

Dr Coral Bell, formerly Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, is now Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University and editor of the Series *Canberra Studies in World Affairs*.

nam, and Dr Kissinger's efforts to secure a peace treaty to smooth the way for American exit. The Australian Left is normally rather a mild and lukewarm segment of the international Left, but the memory of the previous Australian involvement (though the troops had been brought out more than a year before Mr Whitlam came to office) was still recent enough to fire widespread anger and resentments, well beyond the ranks of the Labor Party. And the Left had then an articulate, influential spokesman in Dr J. C. Cairns, Deputy Prime Minister and a long-time Vietnam activist. So, though the chief decision-makers in the Whitlam government, including the Prime Minister himself, came mostly from the centre of the party, the Left seemed powerful and vociferous. The Prime Minister not only had no means of reducing his more anti-American colleagues to silence but was obliged to show himself as no less critical about US policy in Vietnam than they.

Mr Hawke's situation is instructively different. American policy in the Caribbean and Central America provides a similar sort of focus for left-wing feeling, but in a much lower-powered way. It is, after all, a very distant place, and no Australians have ever been involved there. Still more important, in the party as a whole the strength of the Left is somewhat diminished. It has found a spokesman on foreign policy in Mr Brian Howe, the Minister for Defence Support. But he does not command anything like the same prestige or influence as the anti-Vietnam activists did ten years ago, and Mr Hawke has enjoined his colleagues to stick to their own briefs in public comment (which means Mr Howe has had to keep quiet about Central America) and so far he seems to be managing to secure compliance. A Minister who could not 'go along' on uranium policy has had to leave the Cabinet.

If, in fact, the Prime Minister is entirely successful in this tough-minded attitude, it will mean that foreign policy comment will come only from himself and from Mr Hayden, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, though, of course, the extra-parliamentary Left will continue to grumble away about the many points on which they see Mr Hawke as departing from the party platform, such as Sinai, uranium sales, East Timor and aid to Hanoi. Before we look at those issues, however, it may be useful to sketch the relationship between the two personalities at the top of the decision-making process, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

Bill Hayden would need to be more than human to feel no chagrin at the events of the past year. Until the very eve of the election campaign, he was party leader, and Bob Hawke was a brash parliamentary newcomer, who had never been in a Cabinet and had built his own political career on trade union authority and media skills. At almost the very moment of the previous Prime Minister's announcement of the elections, the Labor Party displaced Hayden in favour of Hawke in the leadership, on the assumption that Hawke's undoubted personal charisma might be essential for party success. But the size of the swing made it clear that, as Hayden said, a drover's dog could have led the party to victory at that particular moment. So with Hawke now as Prime Minister and Hayden with only the consolation prize of the Foreign Ministry, it

would be surprising if there were no tensions in the policy-making relationship. And one can, in fact, see a basic pattern for those tensions in the reports back from the overseas tours both have undertaken.

This is especially so with regard to Washington, which Hawke visited in mid-June, and Hayden in mid-July last year. Hawke's visit was in the nature of a 'familiarization' tour, as the bureaucrats say, and seems to have gone over very well, except with the Left back in Australia. He is an easy, extrovert personality whom one can readily imagine swapping funny stories with Mr Reagan. He also knows Mr Shultz from the days when both men were regular visitors to the International Labour Organization (ILO), Hawke as a trade union representative and Shultz as a professor of industrial relations.

Hawke's speeches and press conferences in the United States riled his left-wing party colleagues considerably. In their hearts, the Left aspire wistfully towards a non-aligned status for Australia: the dismantling of the American facilities and the abandonment of Anzus.[2] Hawke said bluntly, 'Australia is not and cannot be a non-aligned nation. We are neutral neither in thought nor action.' He also said that Soviet expansionism was a reality, and that 'you can only deal with the Soviet Union from a position initially of strength'.[3] These, of course, are entirely Mr Reagan's sentiments. In a long talk to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Hawke stressed the financial orthodoxy, from an American point of view, of his government's policies, and the importance he attached to the contribution that foreign capital can make to the development of Australian industries and resources.

On one major world issue, Hawke is indeed considerably less radical than his conservative predecessor, Malcolm Fraser. Mr Fraser had made himself an earnest advocate of the southern position in the 'North–South dialogue' and, from Washington's point of view, was tiresomely insistent on Third World causes like global negotiations for a New International Economic Order. Worthy though those causes are, it is readily apparent that Mr Reagan's aides heaved a sigh of relief that Hawke showed no sign of emulating his predecessor's fervour in pressing their merits on Washington. Nor, indeed, did he say anything discomforting to the Americans on human rights in Central America, or to the Indonesians (whom he also visited) on human rights in East Timor. Hawke is a pragmatist, a fact he made almost tactlessly clear to the party faithful while he was in Washington, saying that the Labor Party was 'about winning'. That level of candour may well have identified him as a fellow-spirit to Mr Reagan's aides, but it shocked a good many of those back in Canberra who had made the choice between him and Hayden, and who might change their minds about the leadership in certain circumstances.

Before coming to that possibility, let us look at Hayden's diplomatic journeyings. On the faint diplomatic signals so far to be detected, mostly between

[2] For background to the tripartite Australia–New Zealand–United States regional defence alliance, see William T. Tow, 'ANZUS: a strategic role in the Indian Ocean?', *ibid.*, October 1978.

[3] *The Age*, Melbourne, 17 June 1983.

the lines of what the American policy-makers say in private, his policies went down a good deal less well in Washington than Hawke's personality. The issues most likely to produce frictions between Canberra and Washington are Canberra's bid for a mediating role between Hanoi and other capitals, Hayden's frank repudiation of the notion of a serious military build-up for Japan, and especially what seems to be emerging as a somewhat surprising new Australian interpretation of Anzus.

A mediating Australian role?

The first of these—aspiration for a mediatory role between Hanoi and the Asean capitals, or even between Hanoi and Washington or Peking—is a legacy of Labor's anti-Washington activism of the late 1960s. The very reasonable proposition that the Vietnam war was either a mistake or a crime has led to a more dubious assumption that the policy-makers in Hanoi want nothing more than independence and non-alignment for Vietnam: thus, if Washington could be talked into placatory policies, if China could be weaned from its hostility, if the Asean policy-makers could be induced to regard Hanoi with less suspicion, then all would be harmony in South-East Asia. And obviously there is a role there waiting for a diplomatic hero, preferably Australian. The Vietnamese, if sufficiently reassured, would (it is implied) give up any aspirations to turn Cambodia and Laos into satellites, and perhaps even give up their alliance with the Soviet Union.

All those assumptions are, unfortunately, unrealistic. The Soviet Union is not an accidental ally for Vietnam but an indispensable one, in Hanoi's eyes, since no other power is likely to back it against China. Suspicion of Chinese intentions is not likely to vanish: it is soundly rooted in more than two thousand years of history. The Vietnamese Communist Party has since its inception always had close links with the Soviet Party, and its ambitions from early on have extended to Indochina as a whole, not merely to Vietnam.[4] In fact, when it was founded in 1919 (well before the Chinese Communist Party) Indochina was essentially one entity within the French colonial system. Ho Chi Minh himself soon afterwards was an envoy of the Comintern to China.

So the Labor Party assumptions behind the notion of a mediatory role for Australia are mostly based on illusions, and exaggerations of the importance to Hanoi of Australia's diplomatic influence and its tiny aid programme. Nevertheless, those illusions are tenaciously maintained on the ex-Vietnam-activist Left, and if Hayden wanted to remain in good standing with that wing of the Party (as he had reason for doing) he had to make a serious bid towards the mediatory role. This he did during his talks in Hanoi.

His efforts were received with a noticeable absence of enthusiasm in Washington, Peking and the Asean capitals. Suspicion of Hanoi is about the only sentiment which Reagan's aides share with Deng Xiaoping's, and most of Asean's decision-makers. Suspicion that Hanoi remains determined to con-

[4] See Dennis J. Duncanson, 'The conquest of Indochina', *The World Today*, June 1975, and 'The conquest of Indochina—a postscript', *ibid.*, August 1975.

trol the whole of the old Indochina (or even perhaps more) and that Soviet ambitions in future may prove to be based on its useful ally in the South China Sea, entails for these powers adherence to the distasteful strategy of continued support of the Khmer Rouge claim to be the government of Cambodia. The Australian decision to 'de-recognize' that abominably murderous regime was taken by A. S. Peacock as Foreign Minister, but at the time he was under pressure from Hayden, as then Leader of the Opposition. To the Asean capitals, and to Washington and Peking, it tended to be interpreted as deserting the anti-Hanoi line-up. The aspiration to play a mediatory role is seen as compounding this error, and some of the reactions of the policy-makers in Peking and the Asean capitals have not been marked by excessive diplomatic politeness.

Resistance to Japanese rearmament

On the other hand, the question of the limits of Japanese rearmament is one on which Australian policy-makers could expect to find considerable support among Asean capitals, and on which they could quite possibly emerge as leaders of a démarche against American policy, though only at the price of considerable irritation in Washington. Asean's leaders remember quite vividly the events of the Japanese occupation of South-East Asia in the Second World War. Even in Indonesia, which did less badly out of it than the others (in the sense that the Japanese demolition of Dutch authority produced conditions that allowed Djakarta to secure independence within five years), the Japanese are not popular. During Mr Tanaka's visit as Prime Minister, there were considerable riots. American pressure on Japan to take on more of the burden of defence is, therefore, viewed askance, or at least ambivalently, throughout the area. This seems to apply even to China. Despite Peking's preoccupation with the Soviet threat, it has not forgotten the depredations of Japanese militarism during the 1930s. When the Japanese education authorities proposed a textbook propounding a 'revised' version of those events for Japanese school children, the reaction from China was so sharp that the Japanese government had hastily to abandon the proposal.

Thus, if Mr Hayden is looking for a cause in which Australia can carry a banner that will be popular in South-East Asia and China, resistance to any further development of Japanese military potential is the obvious one. (The official statistics at present put Japanese expenditure on armed forces at only 1 per cent of gnp, which sounds harmless and minimal enough. But actually, if costs are reckoned on the same basis as in Nato countries, they come to 1·5 per cent, and with a gnp as enormous as Japan's, even an additional 1 per cent would buy a formidable amount of extra capability.) A firm stand against American pressure for Japanese armament would also be popular with the Party faithful at home: it would make them feel that the Labor government was behaving as a Labor government should, taking up at least one of the traditional causes. That would somewhat offset the present feeling on the Left that the Prime Minister is blithely disregarding all the foreign policy objectives in the Party platform, as well as many of the domestic ones.

The left-wing critics who say that do have a case. They would like Australian troops pulled out of the Multinational Force (MFO) in Sinai: Mr Hawke has made it clear just how little urgency he attaches to that aspiration. They would like a serious effort put into securing self-determination for the East Timorese, now incorporated into Indonesia.[5] They will get very little on that: the Hawke government may even vote with Indonesia if the matter comes up again at the UN General Assembly. They would like Australia to opt out of the uranium producing and exporting business,[6] but last November Hawke pushed through caucus (55 votes to 46) a policy which makes it probable that at least one uranium source, Roxby Downs, will be developed. The battle is not over, but so far Hawke is winning on points.

They would also like, of course, a less close relationship with Washington. Are they likely to get anything there? On the basis of Hawke's visit last June one would say no, but the reports concerning Hayden's visit last July might, on the other hand, incline one to feel ambivalent. The question revolves round the meaning of an apparent redefinition of Anzus during the Hayden visit. Ever since the treaty was extorted in 1951 by Australian policy-makers from a rather reluctant set of US policy-makers (chiefly Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles), the Australian line has been to seek what might be called 'maximalist' interpretations of the treaty. Sir Percy Spender, who negotiated it, tried in the earliest stages to turn it into a sort of mini-version of Nato in the Pacific. Sir Garfield Barwick, a later Minister for External Affairs, strove to secure an interpretation which would guarantee Australia in the event of hostilities in Papua New Guinea with Indonesia. Malcolm Fraser, the last Prime Minister, got an understanding that stretched its geographic scope to the Indian Ocean and even the Arabian Sea, though the text speaks only of the Pacific.

By contrast, Mr Hayden apparently sought a rather 'minimalist' interpretation of Anzus, reportedly arguing that it should be defined as a 'regional' not a 'global' treaty. There was also some reaffirmation of the 'Guam Doctrine' of Mr Nixon's time.[7] A new Australian emphasis on that doctrine would indeed be quite a radical move, because, if taken *au pied de la lettre,* it implies that American obligations might be restricted to the very improbable case of nuclear attack on Australia. It is possible that Hayden (and some of his aides) want Anzus described as regional in order to make it clear that it carries no obligation with regard to the Persian Gulf or the Rapid Deployment Force. He and the Defence Minister (Gordon Scholes, who went along on the same trip) might just possibly also want a definition of Anzus which emphasizes its limitations, because that might help them persuade their Cabinet colleagues that adequate funds should be allocated to defence. An argument along these lines is one a Labor Cabinet will not welcome at a time when unemployment is high and will probably worsen before the world economic upturn reaches

[5] See Michael Leifer, 'Indonesia and the incorporation of East Timor', *ibid.*, September 1976.
[6] On this issue, see Keith D. Suter, 'The uranium debate in Australia', *ibid.*, June 1978.
[7] See J. L. S. Girling, 'The Guam doctrine', *International Affairs,* January 1970.

Australia. But it might become more acceptable on the Left if seen as part of the process of 'distancing' Australia a little from the United States, and allowing it to take a more independent line.

At first sight, there might appear nothing in all that to worry Washington policy-makers. But in fact a 'de-emphasis' on the centrality of Anzus in Australian foreign policy, the moving of the treaty to a more peripheral role, important only in the unlikely contingency of general war, or even only in the still more unlikely contingency of direct nuclear threat, can be seen as the thin end of a wedge, which might in time be used (by a more left-wing Labor government) to prise Australia away from the American alliance system in the general direction of neutralism.

Of course, Australia is not very 'visible' on the Washington horizon: the detailed analysis of Australian policies and politics is a matter only for a handful of middle-level bureaucrats in the State Department and the intelligence community. So, reflections of this sort are not exactly widespread. But they are there, and they constitute a reason for American preference for Hawke over Hayden as a definer of Australian foreign policy.

Normally, of course, one would assume that if there is any tension between Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the definition of foreign policy, all the cards would be in the hand of the Prime Minister, unless his political position vis-à-vis Cabinet colleagues was rather weak (as for instance in Gorton's case in 1971). Perhaps, however, the fact that Hayden is a potential alternative leader of the Party might make a difference here, as might the outcome of the Royal Commission on the Combe–Ivanov affair.[8] It was so much the Prime Minister's own baby (he set it up before consulting the Cabinet) that if in the upshot it can be construed as having damaged some good Labor men without good cause, it may perhaps also damage the Prime Minister's personal standing with his Cabinet colleagues, and thus strengthen Hayden's position.

Since foreign policy is practically never an election issue in Australia, it is unlikely to enter into the arguments between the prospective alternative Prime Ministers (assuming they are Hawke and Peacock) at the election of 1984 or 1985. But even without that traditional absence of interest on the part of the electorate, it is difficult to see on what point Peacock (as against Fraser) would differ from the present line of policy.

Fraser made a number of personal ideological additions to Australian policy: a tough-minded cold-warrior stance vis-à-vis the Russians, a serious personal interest in global geopolitics and a personal moral orientation towards Third World causes. One does not see those characteristics (as yet) in Hawke, but then they are not particularly apparent in Peacock either. So the emerging bipartisanship for which I would argue is more plausible if one thinks of a possible Hawke–Peacock succession than the Fraser–Hawke succes-

[8] This Royal Commission was precipitated by the activities of a KGB agent under diplomatic cover, Valeriy Ivanov, who appeared to be working almost ostentatiously hard at the 'entrapment' of a former Labor Party National Secretary, David Combe, as a means of cultivating indirect influence with Labor Cabinet members.

sion. The one nuance of difference that might remain would be a rather more 'regionalist' emphasis when Labor is in office, and a slightly more 'globalist' set of preoccupations when the Liberals are in office.

During the Grenada crisis, the Australian government position was rather closer to the British than to the American, though Hawke was much less blunt than Mrs Thatcher in reproaching President Reagan, who actually rang him during the crisis and was put through to the Prime Minister in a suburban shopping-centre where he happened to be addressing the voters at the time. Hawke has a nice sense of political occasion, as is amply illustrated just about every day in press and TV pictures of him celebrating the victory of Australia II or batting in a Canberra cricket match. It is a major source of Party strength to him: at the moment, he is the most popular as well as the most presidential Prime Minister Australia has ever had, and there could be no immediate challenge to him.

CORRIGENDA

In the article 'Vietnam's ASEAN diplomacy: incentives for change' *(The World Today,* January 1984), on p. 33, line 35, for 'Oddar Meanchey Preah province' read 'Oddar Meanchey province'.

In the article '1997: Peking's strategy for Hong Kong' *(ibid.),* on p. 44, line 32, for 'five years' read 'fifty years'.

Cyprus: a failure in Western diplomacy

NANCY CRAWSHAW

ON 15 November 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state. The event came as the climax to twenty years of intercommunal strife. Couched in conciliatory tones the proclamation offered peace and friendship to the Greek Cypriot people. Taken at face value, it left the door wide open to the eventual formation of a federation with the Greek Cypriot sector and for the continuation of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. It remains to be seen whether Pérez de Cuéllar can reactivate the intercommunal talks in these drastically changed circumstances.

Pérez de Cuéllar served for two years in Cyprus as the UN Special Representative. He returned to the island briefly in 1980 on an abortive mission to break one of the numerous deadlocks which have beset the intercommunal talks since they first started in June 1968. His latest initiative, first mooted last spring, was complicated from the outset by the sharp deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations since Andreas Papandreou's socialist PASOK came to power in Greece in October 1981.[1] Papandreou contends that Turkey, not the Soviet Bloc, is the real enemy of Greece; his obsessive hostility towards the Turks has put the clock back to the pre-Venizelist era. The Cyprus issue is again priority in Greek foreign policy and a stick with which to beat the Turks. Openly sceptical, with reason, about the usefulness of the intercommunal talks, Papandreou advocates the mobilization of world opinion against Turkey with the object of securing the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Cyprus prior to a negotiated settlement. The Papandreou line has been welcomed by part of the Cypriot leadership. And the Kyprianou government's internationalization campaign, already well under way, gathered momentum after Papandreou's historic visit to Cyprus in February 1982.

Point 6 of the Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 between Kyprianou and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Rauf Denktash, precludes activities likely to jeopardize the intercommunal talks.[2] Acrimonious debate in New York inevitably undermines the search for a settlement through quiet diplomacy in Cyprus. But the Cyprus government argues that Point 6 applies solely to the local factor, and does not affect their right to pursue the struggle at interna-

[1] See Richard Clogg, 'PASOK in power: rendezvous with history or with reality?', *The World Today*, November 1983.

[2] For the text of the agreement, see 'Cyprus Problem' (Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1981), p. 40.

Nancy Crawshaw, a frequent visitor to Cyprus, is the author of *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

tional level. Nevertheless, it was dissuaded from raising the Cyprus question at the UN General Assembly during the first two years of the current round of talks. Much ground was in fact covered under the skilled and patient guidance of the UN Special Representative, Mr Hugo Gobbi. But on the vital issues of territory and constitution, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots remained as far apart as ever. Despite warnings that recourse to the UN could be harmful, the Cyprus government launched a new appeal to the UN General Assembly last May.

UN resolution 37/253 (13 May 1983)

As in the past, the Greek Cypriots were strongly supported by the Non-Aligned Movement. The necessary preparations were finalized during the non-aligned summit conference held in Delhi last March. A draft resolution was sponsored by Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. This included the perennial demand for the immediate withdrawal of all the occupation forces and the voluntary return of the refugees in safety to their former homes. More recent proposals for an international conference on Cyprus and the demilitarization of the whole island were renewed, thereby reflecting the aims of the Soviet Union, and some of the Arab states. It was again suggested that the Security Council should examine within a set time-limit the question of the implementation of various UN resolutions on Cyprus and, if necessary, take any practical measures to bring this about. The Turkish Cypriots were especially concerned by paragraph 2 which called upon all States 'to support and help the government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise its right to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources'.

The text was also potentially explosive for other reasons. It set conditions for the renewal of the intercommunal talks which lay outside the framework agreed by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Rauf Denktash, with the late Archbishop Makarios in 1977 and his successor, President Kyprianou, two years later. This framework was in itself essentially fragile. Any attempt to re-orientate[3] the intercommunal talks, which the Cyprus representative said was the purpose of the resolution, risked the collapse of its entire structure.

The British delegate reaffirmed Britain's support for the intercommunal talks, and urged the Assembly to avoid propaganda points which soured the atmosphere. Canada's delegate indicated the need for strict impartiality when it came to the vote by the countries which maintain troops in the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Malaysia's delegate dismissed the draft resolution as 'lopsided and partial'. Nevertheless the motion was adopted without amendment by 105 votes to four against, with twenty abstentions. Most of the Nato powers and four Arab states (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) abstained. Votes against the motion were cast by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey. More than two-thirds of the nations which voted in favour of the resolution were members of either the

[3] UN Doc. A/37/PV 116, Para. 12

Soviet Bloc or the Non-Aligned Movement. Voting in the General Assembly tends to be influenced by considerations of expediency rather than the merits of any given dispute. In the case of Cyprus, the effect was to encourage false hopes among the Greek Cypriots and to cause a hardening of attitudes among the Turks.

Turkish reaction

After the debate Mr Denktash threatened to declare the north an independent state and withdrew from the intercommunal talks. In the past the Greeks did not take these threats seriously. But this time the Turkish Cypriot leader announced a three-point programme in preparation for independence. The first stage—the adoption by 33 votes to 6 of a motion affirming the right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination—took place in the Legislative Assembly on 17 June. The dates for the next two stages—a referendum and the implementation of its results—were left open.

The dust needed to settle after the General Assembly debate. The Pérez de Cuéllar 'soundings' were not sent to the two Cypriot leaders until 8 August. According to leaks in the press, he tentatively suggested three crucial subjects as the basis for negotiations: the reduction of the territory held by the Turks (to maximum 30 per cent, minimum 23 per cent of the island); concessions by the Greeks on the type of federal constitution; and the establishment of a bicameral legislature, in which the two communities would be represented in equal numbers in the upper house and in proportion to their population ratio in the lower.

These ideas had for years been considered indispensable to meaningful negotiations. The Foreign Minister, Mr Nikos Rolandis, the Communist party AKEL, with whose support President Kyprianou had been elected, and the main opposition party, headed by Mr Glavcos Clerides, advocated prompt, unconditional acceptance of the Secretary-General's plan. Protracted vacillation by the Cyprus President caused Mr Rolandis to resign on 20 September.[4] Bereft of its able and widely respected Foreign Minister, the Cyprus government was now embarrassed by appearing to have torpedoed the Pérez de Cuéllar initiative. President Kyprianou left for further talks with Mr Papandreou, and then for New York, where he saw Pérez de Cuéllar for the second time in two weeks. On 19 September, the President said: 'We accept the UN Secretary-General's personal effort and his method of approach.'[5] It was clear, however, that agreement had still not been reached on the substance of the proposals. Mr Denktash, who had remained silent on the first initiative, rejected the Secretary-General's modified offer outright. The Turkish Cypriot leader wanted assurances that the talks, if resumed, would be on the basis of the original terms and that the General Assembly resolution 37/253 would be disregarded. He also sought a public commitment from the President that he

[4] See Nikos Rolandis, 'Politike aoristias akolouthoun pleon Athina-Levkosia', *Kathimerini* (Athens), 6/7 November 1983.

[5] Press Releases, 20 September and 3 October 1983, Cyprus High Commission, London.

still intended to work for a bi-zonal federal state, and a meeting with him on an 'equal footing'.

The Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence

Throughout the summer the Turkish Cypriots kept up the enthusiasm for the idea of early independence. An important exception was Mr Alpay Duduran, the former leader of the main opposition party, the Communal Liberation Party. Mr Duduran favoured the continuation of the intercommunal talks, a stance which lost his party two of its thirteen deputies. Apart from other considerations he had misgivings, in common with foreign observers, about the economic consequences of a premature declaration. Sixty per cent of the Turkish Cypriot budget had to be financed by Turkey. An unfavourable international reaction might well increase their economic problems.

The Turkish Cypriots could not declare independence without the green light from Turkey. The formal establishment of a separate state in the north was bound to complicate Turkey's efforts to improve relations with the West. There was the risk of a renewed embargo on arms and economic aid from the USA as the result of pressure from the powerful Greek lobby and, in the long term, the possibility of an explosive frontier in Cyprus manned by Greek troops in the place of the present cease-fire line. On 19 October the Turkish Defence Minister, Mr Bayulken, while acknowledging the right of Turkish Cypriots to ultimate self-determination, as previous Ministers had done, emphasized that the Turkish government's present policy was to work for the success of the intercommunal talks.[6]

The Turkish Cypriots hoped to avoid compromising the newly elected government in Turkey. The interim period before it took up office provided an opportunity which might not recur for years. From the international standpoint the Declaration was ill-timed. The Pérez de Cuéllar initiative had not yet petered out. On the contrary, Mr Gobbi had just arrived in Cyprus to try and arrange the meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash which the latter had requested. International opinion was heavily weighted in favour of the Greek Cypriots. The European Community, in which Greece occupied the presidency, and the Commonwealth were due to hold summit conferences. It was a foregone conclusion that the non-aligned states would dominate the latter on the Cyprus question. In Britain, no more than a handful of politicians had shown a serious interest in the Turkish position. So successful had the Greeks been in the presentation of their case that Mrs Thatcher was left with the impression that prior to the Turkish military intervention in 1974 Cyprus was a united island:

> '. . . we are against the separation of the northern part of Cyprus, and wish Cyprus to continue in a state of unity as it did nine years ago before it was rudely upset. . . '[7]

[6] See *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* Middle East/7470/C/2, 21 October 1983.

[7] House of Commons Debates, No. 1285, Vol 46, col 1046 O.A.

This time the Western powers joined the non-aligned states and the Soviet Bloc in an outright condemnation of the Turks. Britain requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and submitted a draft resolution which deplored the Turkish Cypriot declaration, demanded its immediate withdrawal, and called upon all members not to recognize any Cyprus state other than the Republic of Cyprus. This was adopted by 13 votes.[8] Pakistan voted against the motion; Jordan abstained. The European Community and the Commonwealth also denounced the Turkish Cypriot action. Turkey alone recognized the new State.

From time to time it is suggested that the British government could play a more active role in resolving the dispute. The fact is the Greek and Turkish Cypriots both feel that Britain has let them down by failing to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect their respective communities against the attacks of the other. The Turkish Cypriots also argue that Britain's stand on recognition over the past nineteen years has favoured the Greeks when, as the former ruler and a guarantor, she had a moral and legal obligation to safeguard the constitution for the benefit of all Cypriots—Greek, Turkish, Maronite and Armenian.[9] Today, as in the past, expectations of the British are sharply at variance with each other. The Greek Cypriots hope for British cooperation in their attempts to get sanctions enforced against Turkey and North Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots ask for impartiality from the British government in its dealings with the two communities.

All the parties to the Treaty of Guarantee have been held in breach of its provisions at some time or other. Britain has been criticized for inactivity when the constitution started breaking down early in 1963. Greece was responsible for a series of major transgressions. It was the democratically elected Centre Union government of George Papandreou which, according to his son Andreas, sent 20,000 Greek troops clandestinely to Cyprus in 1964,[10] thereby paving the way for the Greek Junta's coup d'état against Makarios ten years later. Public censure has, however, been directed mainly against Turkey. Turkey's initial landing after the Greek coup in July 1974 has been accepted as reasonable by some international lawyers. The Turks subsequently weakened their case by the continued occupation of 37 per cent of the island—an area which exceeds the total assets of the Turkish Cypriots and their needs under normal conditions, and is disproportionate to their population ratio of 18 per cent.

The outlook is bleak. The Turkish Cypriots do not believe that the Greek Cypriots intend forming a federal state. But the matter cannot be put to the test until the Turks make a reasonable offer over territory. This would entail giving up the rich Morphou area, and the resettlement of 15,000 Turkish

[8] Security Council resolution 541 (1983).

[9] See Professor Gillian M. White, 'The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus: a lawyer's view', *The World Today*, April 1981.

[10] See Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front*, Penguin Books, 1973, p 134.

Cypriots, some of whom have already moved two or three times. The return of the Morphou area, with the Buffer Zone and Varosha, would enable about 80,000 or more Greek refugees to go back to their villages under Greek administration. The Greek Cypriots cannot reasonably be expected to accept less. They in exchange would have to tolerate a federal constitution which gave the Turkish Cypriots a share in sovereignty and some control over their own security and economic development. The politicians on both sides may well feel the price is too high.

On 2 January Mr Denktash announced a series of goodwill measures. These included plans for the early return of Varosha to the Greeks on the lines of the 1979 Ten-Point Agreement, and the re-opening of Nicosia airport. Both projects would be administered for the time-being by the UN. On the 6th the Cyprus government dismissed the Turkish Cypriot leader's overtures as propaganda aimed at misleading international opinion. Five days later President Kyprianou presented Pérez de Cuéllar in New York with a new framework for a settlement. Hopes have been raised by reports that the Greek Cypriots are now ready to consider a loose federation. However President Kyprianou insists that Security Council resolution 541 must first be complied with 'in all its aspects'[11] before he can meet Mr Denktash. This condition does not augur well for ending the deadlock since the resolution calls for the withdrawal of the declaration of independence. The Turks remain adamant that this can only take place if, and when, a federal solution is reached.

The Western powers must bear some responsibility for the consolidation of partition. Had they treated the Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations as integral components of one state, in the spirit of the bi-communal provisions of the 1959 Zurich Agreements, the trend towards separatism could have been contained and the chances of a settlement based on eventual reunification facilitated. Instead they followed the procedure adopted by the UN in 1964 in recognizing the Greek Cypriot administration as the only government representing Cyprus.[12] Thus isolated, the Turkish Cypriots were forced into increasing dependence on Turkey. As the only alternative to total assimilation by the mainland, a de facto separate state evolved inevitably with the passage of time. Today a new generation is growing up which, to quote one of them, 'cannot imagine what Cyprus was like when it was one place'.

It is not surprising that the Greek Cypriots should be reluctant to exchange the monopoly of sovereignty, with its huge advantages, for a constitution which involves sharing power with the Turkish Cypriots. Hope for the future must, therefore, rest with the men of moderation on both sides who recognize that reunification is in the best interests of all the Cyprus people; that sanctions and recriminations can only intensify the conflict.

[11] For details see official press releases of 6 and 12 January 1984, issued by the Cyprus High Commission, London.

[12] See Gillian M. White, *op. cit.*

Jersey's micro-miracle

WARD RUTHERFORD

IN May 1945 Jersey, the largest of the Channel Islands, and its sister islands, were liberated after five years of German occupation. As the first delirious joy evaporated, there came the realization of the many serious problems to be faced, especially in the economy. Of the two principal contributors to it, one, agriculture, had been devoted exclusively to trying to feed the population, with no opportunity to earn external revenue by exporting its produce. The other, tourism, had been in almost total abeyance, with many hotels taken over and badly damaged by the occupiers. The magnificent coastline had been defaced by the building of a system of concrete fortifications and a number of capital projects needed urgent implementation if the island was once more to became self-supporting. To assist with reconstruction, in March 1946 the British government gave Jersey £4,200,000 as an outright gift.

Rarely can the British taxpayers' money have been spent to better effect. Today, thirty-seven years on, this six-mile by twelve-mile island of 76,000 souls presents an image of confident prosperity, in dramatic contrast to many depressed economies in Europe.[1]

The capital, St Helier, bustles with activity and purpose. Outside the Jersey Aero Club, private aircraft are drawn up in rank upon rank as if for an international rally. Nor is this prosperity limited to a wealthy few, as is sometimes implied. The islanders as a whole enjoy an enviably high standard of living. Eighty-four per cent of households have telephones, compared with just over 50 per cent in mainland Britain, while an astonishing 55 per cent of the population own cars, compared with approximately 27·2 per cent.[2]

The gross national product (gnp) has risen at a comfortable 3·5 per cent per annum over the past ten years (the British figure for the same period is 1·2 per cent) and, had no brake been put on its momentum, would have risen still higher. There is more business eager to come to the island than it can accommodate. As Senator Ralph Vibert, President of the Finance and Economic Committee, comments, 'There's no other place in the world . . . with a law intended to damp down business activity.'[3]

[1] Although the economies of all four of the major Channel Islands—Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark—are in many respects similar, being based on financial activity (taking advantage of their low taxation), tourism, agriculture and fishing, Jersey has been chosen for this study as the biggest and most populous.

[2] British figures by courtesy of British Telecom, the Automobile Association and the Confederation of British Industry. Jersey statistics throughout from the Office of the States' Economic Adviser, the Committee of Tourism, the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and from personal interviews.

[3] Interview with the author.

Mr Rutherford is an author, historian and journalist. His books include *The Ally: the Russian Army in World War I* (London/New York: Gordon Cremonese, 1975).

Even at the current rate of expansion, unemployment figures are among the lowest in Europe, with a mid-winter maximum of no more than 2 per cent (UK figure: 13·3 per cent), while in summer as many as eight to ten thousand people are brought in to work in agriculture or the tourist industry. In those cases where the world recession has led to lay-offs in local industries, most of the redundant have been quickly reabsorbed. In the autumn of 1983, after an American electronics company and a bank both drastically reduced their labour forces, the press was able to report that work had been found for most of those made unemployed.[4] The island has a number of ambitious projects in hand, including the extensive redevelopment of the General Hospital and, in a place where land is at a premium, a reclamation scheme, part of which, to the east of St Helier Harbour, is almost complete providing an extra harbour for oil-tankers, a storage area for tanks themselves, a jetty and a yacht basin.

The reason why

How has this small economic miracle been achieved? Britons unfamiliar with Jersey and its people reply that it is due to its position as an 'offshore tax haven' and that it is able to maintain this because it is spared a heavy call on its revenue for defence.

Islanders regard such criticism as over-simplified and ill-informed, failing to give due weight to the island's other advantages or to the skill, flexibility and dynamism with which, all through its history, its affairs have been managed, fresh opportunities being sought whenever one line of activity seemed about to become exhausted. Tilted towards the sun and protected by the surrounding Bay of St Malo, Jersey is warmed by the Gulf Stream and possesses a soil of exceptional fertility. Corn, sheep and knitted goods—hence the word 'jersey' to describe knitted fabric—as well as its famous breed of cattle, have successively formed the basis of a thriving agriculture. Later the island farmer exploited its mild winters and protracted summers with sunshine averages among the highest in the British Isles to get his produce to market between two and three weeks earlier than his mainland counterparts. Now these climatic advantages benefit a hugely successful tourist industry which each year sees some seventeen visitors to the island for every man, woman and child of its local population.

There is, of course, no disguising the fact of low taxes. Income tax was raised to 20p in the pound in 1945, an increase regarded by most Jerseymen, accustomed to paying 2p in the pound and before 1928 no income tax at all, as extortionate. It has not been raised since. Other taxes include a corporation tax of £300 a year imposed on companies registered in Jersey but controlled outside it, a property tax assessed as half the rental value of the premises and a so-called Occupier's Rate, the rough equivalent of local authority rates, but between a third and half those paid by most British householders. Duties are levied on alcohol, petrol and tobacco goods, though these are low. A bottle of whisky costs about £3·90 of which £1·66 is duty (against £4·25 duty in the UK); a gallon of petrol costing about £1·25 bears a tax of 16p (74·1p in the

[4] See *The Jersey Evening Post*, 4 October 1983.

UK), while cigarettes cost about half as much as in Britain. There are no death or estate duties.

Although taxes represent only about 18 per cent of gnp against 39·5 per cent in Great Britain, the sums spent on housing, education and health are proportionate. Jersey's surprisingly comprehensive welfare system is based on the British model and the health service provides assistance with doctors' and drugs' bills. Hospital treatment is free. Pensions and the equivalent of supplementary benefit are 10 to 15 per cent higher and tax allowances more generous. A single person does not start paying tax until his or her income reaches £3,250 a year (in the UK he or she would be paying about £505), while for a married couple with two children the tax threshold is £6,500.

The value of its low-tax regime to the island economy is admitted to be considerable, though Colin Powell, the Jersey government's economic adviser, points out that the financial sector, whose growth is directly attributable to it, still represents only about half the gnp, the rest being made up by tourism, agriculture and light industry. In any case, Jerseymen argue, they did not deliberately make their island a tax-haven. Their present rights are the reward for centuries of loyalty to the Crown, the only link with Britain, recognized by Royal Charters and ratified by Parliaments. Only fourteen miles from the nearest point on the French coast, the islanders defended themselves with such fierce tenacity during five centuries of war with France that even Napoleon baulked at the idea of attempting to invade them.

These rights include that of self-government through an elected fifty-three-man legislative assembly, the Jersey States, a privilege jealously guarded by the islanders who have opposed Britain whenever they felt it threatened. This happened as recently as in the 1960s when Britain was negotiating for membership of the European Community and proposed to include the Channel Islands under Article 227(4) of the Treaty of Rome, major countries are regarded as responsible for all offshore territories). The island governments quickly made clear they were unwilling to tolerate this and actually succeeded in persuading the EC that they were a special case.

Far from seeking to seduce the hard-pressed British taxpayers, Jersey has, on occasion, passed laws to keep their money out. This happened in the early 1960s when a loophole in British tax law made it possible to invest in the island for mortgage purposes as a way of avoiding death duty. The resulting flow of millions of pounds into local coffers was dammed by Senator Cyril Le Marquand, Senator Vibert's predecessor as Finance President and one of the architects of Jersey's present prosperity and stability.

In any case, of total deposits of some £15 billion held by the international banks and investment institutions of St Helier, about £12 bn is in foreign currencies, though much of it is destined for investment in Britain, thus benefiting its economy. If Jersey did not offer its facilities so near the City of London, others would certainly fill the gap. Against this background, the islanders see nothing wrong in enjoying the fruits of their own thrift, hard work and prudence. It is the last, more than anything else, which has kept taxes down. While it is acknowledged by local economists that the island is fortunate in not

having to contribute to defence (it does not, because in conditions of modern war—as was shown in 1940—it is indefensible), even if it did so on a scale equivalent to Britain, taxes would still not reach the UK level.

The major cost of the British Exchequer comes from servicing the public debt and this Jersey has stubbornly avoided incurring. Borrowing for capital expenditure has rarely been resorted to except when the anticipated profits of the completed project were likely to be sufficient to repay capital and interest. In other cases, capitalization has come from income. This policy, scrupulously maintained by Senator Cyril Le Marquand, has at times led to the postponement of cherished plans, but has, nevertheless, saved the island interest charges which would now amount to something like £10 million a year, equal to the sum taken in duties on petrol and liquor.

Some problems

Glib criticism of the island is also resented because it ignores the severe constraints which make management of its economy an obstacle course of great intricacy. With the exception of some locally grown foodstuffs, virtually everything has to be imported; and though there is no Value Added Tax—the Channel Islands are linked with the European Community only as associate members—transport can add at least 15 per cent to costs. At the same time, the size of population limits the retail market, making it impossible for shopkeepers to place the large orders which would entitle then to substantial discounts.

Even low taxes generate problems. An increase in the standard rate could discourage financial activity, as well as leading to an exodus of those wealthy settlers whose influx has helped to raise taxable investment income from £21 m. in 1970 to £121 m. in 1980. There is only slightly more room for manoeuvre with indirect taxes: cheap drinks, petrol and cigarettes are one of the lures to holiday-makers.

On the other hand, each sector has to be controlled. The unchecked growth of finance, of the number of immigrants—no matter how wealthy—or even of tourism would put pressure on the local pool of labour which it could only meet by importation. This, in turn, would make demands on resources of housing, building land and utility services, as well as on the construction industry. Equally important, there is the need to avoid damage to the landscape by the proliferation of housing estates.

Population has risen steeply. From 50,000 in the second decade of this century, it is now up to its present 76,000, much of the increase being due to immigration, especially in the 1970s. To keep it down to a planned 80,000 by the year 2000, some of the strictest immigration laws in the world have been introduced. Even before renting accommodation, the permission of the States' Housing Department must be sought and is granted only if the applicant can prove he is taking up essential work which cannot be done by a native. Consent to purchase is given on two grounds: essential employment, in which case the local employer must buy the property and it must cost not less than £60,000; or

because the applicant is regarded as being of 'economic or social benefit'. Those in the latter category are expected to acquire a property costing £200,000 and so beyond the pocket of local buyers. In addition, they should have an income in excess of £50,000 a year, bringing about £10,000 to the local treasury.

But control must not stifle or there will be insufficient growth. Accordingly, ome fifteen new settlers are allowed in each year under the economic and ocial benefit rule and, despite restraints on businesses, several new ones are egistered each year, including, recently, an American company.

No less stringent rules are placed on tourism. Anxious to prevent what has happened in parts of Spain and Portugal being repeated on their own shores, the States have decided that there should be no increase in the island's 25,000 hotel and guest-house beds. Tourism has had to look in other directions for increased revenue, extending the season and attracting more conferences. It has been successful in both. After a peak year in 1979 with 1,427,000 arrivals, here was a worrying drop to 1,198,000 in 1981, but a recovery of about 5 per ent in the following year, while 1983 figures are estimated to be near the 1980 total of 1,340,000. Tourism has maintained its position as a major contributor to island income at something like £150 m. a year, more than making good a deficit in visible trade of about £140 m.

Of the two smallest sectors of the economy—light industry and agriculture —the first represents about 5 per cent of gnp and employs between 700 and 800 people. Recession has brought a reduction in exports which were estimated for 1981 at about £26 m. Although there is no price support, the government makes available £25,000 for assistance in overseas promotions of ocal products.

The island's traditional industry—agriculture—has been in decline for decades and from around 50 per cent in the 1930s is now down to 7 per cent of gnp (the UK figure is 2·2 per cent).[5] None the less, the survival of agriculture is vital for three reasons. First, because agricultural produce is a visible export, valued in 1982 at nearly £22 m. and, second, because it provides the picturesque landscape of open fields, lanes, granite farm-houses and grazing cattle which are a tourist attraction.

The third reason for keeping the agricultural sector alive is the Jerseyman's characteristic anxiety to distribute his economic eggs among as many baskets as possible. This has also led to the revival of another declining activity, fishing. The fleet of some sixty vessels includes twelve of between 30 and 40 gross registered tons. Their catch is largely crab and lobster. Another product of the sea for which Jersey was once famous has been revived with the re-laying of oyster beds which have already yielded harvests of high quality.

Instead of price support mechanisms, the government assists the farmer in a number of other ways, such as through grants to encourage co-operative marketing and a substantial publicity budget to help popularize island produce, the total annual sum being about £1 m. There has also been encourage-

[5] Figure by courtesy of National Farmers' Union.

ment to widen the types of crop grown beyond the established potatoes and tomatoes; the Jersey Royal potato retains its premier position in the British market, but cauliflower, courgettes, calabrese and parsley as well as a wide range of flowers are now exported.

The forms in which the less financially valuable components of the economy are supported demonstrate the skill of its managers in applying relatively small sums at the point where they will have most effect. It also demonstrates the determination to maintain balance.

For all this, the Economic Adviser's Report to the States warns of several incipient threats, among them the decline in profitability in most spheres and the drop in interest rates. The high rates of recent years have naturally helped to increase tax-yields from the investments which are such a significant factor in island income. Hence, he warns of the need for severe expenditure restraint if tax increases are to be avoided.

Like all communities the island has its problems, though they are, perhaps, more social than economic. For example, there is a shortage of housing, making prices so high that many young people have to save for years before they can buy a house of their own. Increasing population has put pressure on services like gas, electricity and water and to meet demand for the last, the Jersey New Waterworks Company proposes flooding an unspoilt valley in the east of the island, a plan which has aroused much hostility. The growth of bureaurcracy, too, is something which the highly individualistic Jerseyman resents and there is also the feeling that the importance given to finance is breeding an uncharacteristic materialism of outlook.

However, in assessing the island's low-tax regime, one final observation needs to be made. Not only has low tax contributed to enabling an area with one of the highest population densities in Europe (1,694 persons per square mile) to provide full employment and high living standards for its people, it has also prevented it from becoming what it might easily have become—a depressed region and a burden to others.

The exact opposite is the case. Each year, the island provides proportionally large sums in overseas aid. In 1982, these amounted to £360,000 spent on various, carefully monitored schemes. Among beneficiaries have been India, Swaziland, Zaire, Kenya, South Korea, Ethiopia and Bangladesh. Under a scheme inaugurated by a member of the Jersey States, thirty local volunteers, including craftsmen, carry out single projects in specified countries. In 1982, the island gave £5 m. to the Falklands' Fund.

Obviously, it would be absurd to try to extrapolate from small economies like those of Jersey and the other islands to larger ones, if only because size produces its own problems. Yet there are lessons to be drawn. If a willingness to adapt quickly to changing world conditions, a reluctance to resort to borrowing unless a clear prospect of return exists and a recognition of the value of outside investment are signs of economic good sense, then Jersey—and in their own, individual ways the other islands—are models worthy of attention.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD WELWYN GARDEN CITY HERTFORDSHIRE

The crisis in Lebanon: a local historical perspective

P. J. VATIKIOTIS

THE Lebanon crisis is one of the most complex and tragic episodes of our time. What is taking place there is both the undoing of a state, and the disintegration of a putative nation, under conditions approximating Hobbes's 'state of nature', his ***bellum omnium contra omnes.***

This article will not consider in any detail the civil disturbances in Lebanon from 1975 to the present.[1] Nor will it presume to suggest what the Lebanese, the Arabs, the Israelis or the Americans should do about Lebanon. It will confine itself to three major considerations: first, what kind of place is Lebanon, and how has it come to be what it is now; second, why did it disintegrate; and third, what are the prospects for ending the civil disturbance and political turmoil there?

The burning issue for consideration now, especially by outsiders in the west, is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon. The implication is that such a withdrawal will help to resolve the problems of the country, bring peace, reunify and reconstruct the Lebanon. One of the more phantasmagoric assumptions is that the withdrawal of foreign troops will ease Israeli-Syrian tensions and reduce Soviet involvement. The fact remains that not all foreign troops are about to be withdrawn. Even if they were, the fundamental problems of Lebanon would remain unchanged and unresolved. Syria considers the control of the Bekaa and northern Lebanon essential for the maintenance of its influence in Lebanon and its control of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), as well as for its bargaining position in inter-Arab politics. Israel requires a security zone in the south, and insists on a new relationship with any Lebanese government; in short, it wants a tangible result as a justification of its 1982 invasion. Finally, no political or religious faction in Lebanon wants foreign troops to be withdrawn for the moment, not even the Lebanese government, because none of them is ready for another round of full-scale hostilities. So what is the real problem for Lebanon?

It is an historically endemic one, and so the presence of foreign military forces in Lebanon is a symptom, not a cause, of the country's disintegration. What then are the causes of Lebanon's collapse?

[1] For this background see Geoffrey Bowder, 'Lebanon's struggle for survival', *The World Today*, November 1983.

Professor Vatikiotis is Professor of Politics, with reference to the Near and Middle East, in the University of London. His most recent book is *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1984). This article is a slightly shortened version of a talk Professor Vatikiotis gave recently at Chatham House.

The background

When a country is composed of minorities, these invariably have conflicting interests, fears and aspirations. If these minorities are not successfully integrated into a national community defined by a law of the land and workable institutions that transcend minority boundaries, they are apt to lead to violent conflict. In Lebanon, the largest community among the Christians (the Maronites) numbers just under a million. Having suffered persecution by the Byzantines and Muslims between the fifth and eighth centuries, they fled from Syria to Mount Lebanon; they sought refuge in the fastnesses of the Mountain from the Matn in the south to Bsharri in the north. They established a type of feudal society that cultivated close relations with France. They were governed by Druze overlords, but in the seventeenth century they managed to wrest power from them. They entered into an official union with the Vatican in 1736. They co-existed peacefully with the Druzes in the Mountain (the Shuf at least) until early in the nineteenth century, but sectarian violence flared up between them in the 1840s and 1860s. Its settlement required the intervention of European powers, leading to the Ottoman *Règlement Organique* which set up a multi-sectarian Administrative Council. This marked the collapse of feudal arrangements between Maronites and Druzes. The fact remains that the Maronites retained political power and monopolised trade. Some Druzes emigrated to Syria at that time. In the meantime, the Maronites had further strengthened their client relationship with France, a Christian European power. The Druzes retained the control of their feudally based hierarchy over a tightly knit community under its paramount chiefs, and further nurtured their major preoccupation with security.

Other Christian communities are the 250,000 Greek Orthodox, concentrated in the Kura and Tripoli in the north, under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Antioch Patriarchate which, until 1899, was Greek, and subsequently became Arab. Another 200,000 Greek Catholics and Protestants, together with a more recent 170,000 Armenian immigrants who came via Alexandretta and Aleppo—also the product of persecution in Turkey—complete the Christian communities in the country. One could say that the presence of 1·4 million Christians in Lebanon is the product of hostile migrations: people fleeing persecution and seeking a refuge, or a safe haven.

The fact that under the Arab and Mamluk Islamic dominion and later under the Ottoman *millet* system the Christians were officially considered to be a distinct and separate community—i.e. not part of the body politic—strengthened the solidarity of its members. The identity of these was determined by religious belief, not by any other more integrative political or national criterion. Their limited rights, too, derived from their religion. The bonds of loyalty and the basis of allegiance among them remained quite primordial—familial, tribal, sectarian, or religious. Several centuries of exclusion from the mainstream of the political life of the Islamic and Ottoman states institutionalised and consecrated the confessional, or sectarian, basis of their political outlook. Alongside their traditional leaders among the semi-feudal

notables, leading families of landowners and merchants, the Christian communities also accepted the leadership of their church hierarchies. The strength of the Christian elite derived in part from its numerous kinship relationships in the villages of the Mountain, based on their large landholdings and their possession of capital for trade, commerce and agriculture.

When in 1920 the French created Greater Lebanon, they incorporated into the new state such territories as Beirut, Tripoli, the Bekaa, Sidon, Tyre and their hinterland, previously administered (unlike Mount Lebanon) directly by the Ottomans. They, moreover, brought into the new state two sizeable Muslim communities, the Sunnis in Beirut and the north, and the Shia in the south and the Bekaa. Under the Ottomans, the Sunnis at least were not only full members of the Islamic body politic, but the elite among them also formed part of the local governing class. They had been loyal to a Muslim Sultan-Caliph and had no bonds with either the Maronites or the Druzes of the Mountain. Some among them had begun to identify with the nascent Arab separatist movements at the turn of the century, and sympathised with the embryonic Arab national movement centred in Syria. In short, they and the Shia sympathised with their co-religionists in the wider Arab east. The Maronites, on the contrary, welcomed the French mandate, for they expected support for their continued political-economic ascendancy in the new state of Greater Lebanon, and proceeded to develop a Christian based and oriented Lebanese nationalism, in which the newly incorporated Muslim communities did not feature or share.

The establishment of Greater Lebanon brought in more Muslims, who were not part of the political tradition of the Mountain and whose allegiance to a wider Arab-Islamic community was at variance with that of their Christian fellow-Lebanese. In short, they came into the new state with diametrically opposed cultural and political perceptions. A constitutional Republic was set up in 1926, headed by a Greek Orthodox President, Charles Dabbas, a compromise figure. But by the early 1930s the communities had grouped into separate entities in a contest over power and the identity of Lebanon: whether it would be an Arab state or an Arabised Christian one with close ties to Christian Europe. Political parties emerged along sectarian lines together with paramilitary organisations, the Maronite Phalanges and the Sunni Najjada, in 1936.

The 1943 National Pact

A delicate formula for the balancing of sectarian interests was finally worked out in the form of the 1943 National Pact by the moderate Maronite leader Bishara el-Khouri, and the moderate Sunni leader Riad el-Sulh, and this was to serve as the unwritten constitution of the Lebanese political order, until it broke down partially and briefly in 1958 and completely in 1975. Inter-confessional political cooperation was enshrined in it. The allocation of power between the communities was determined on the one and only census of 1932 (52 per cent Christians and 48 per cent Muslims) on a six-Christians-to-five-

Muslims ratio, and provided for a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Ministe a Shia Speaker of the Chamber and a Greek Orthodox Deputy Speaker, as we as for the distribution of all other government posts. The Pact did not abolis sectarianism; it merely regularised and institutionalised it.

The Christians agreed to share power with the Muslims on condition th the latter eschewed their aspirations to become part of a larger Arab-Islam political entity and recognised the special link of Lebanon with the west. Th Christians, for their part, agreed to cooperate with any organisation of ir dependent Arab states, such as the Arab League. It was a great compromis but one based on shifting, shaky foundations. Whereas the major Christia (the Maronites) and Muslim (the Sunnis) sects recognised a common interest i an independent Lebanon, they continued to promote the separate interests c their respective communities, or constituencies.

What shifted and changed in the next thirty years was the demographi composition of the country. The rapid increase of the Muslim population (pa ticularly among the Shia) reduced the 1932 Christian majority to a minority Muslim communities now stood at over two million, compared to the Chris tian 1·4 million. Other components of the 1943 National Pact were unde mined, too. The booming postwar laissez-faire economy had benefited mainl the Christians and their Sunni Muslim partners who had together controlle the politics and dominated the economy of the Lebanon for over thirty years Central government had remained comfortably and necessarily weak, allow ing these two major communities to reap the benefits of a rapidly growin *entrepôt* financial, commercial and service economy. Between them the monopolised power-brokerage, influence-peddling and special interest pro motion.

The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, however, had serious social an economic consequences. There was a rapid urbanisation as a result of the inter nal migration of the destitute agrarian Shia from the south, Syrian and Kur dish slum dwellers and sundry Beirut harbour workers. The gap between ric and poor grew wider. In the absence of public services that could not be pro vided by a weak central government, these were supplied by the communi ties for their members. Clearly, the Christians and Sunni Muslims fared best i private education, health and employment.

The growing disaffection of the underprivileged Shia, which was pressin on the capital city, became explosive now that they surpassed the Sunni Mus lims in numbers (1·1 m. to 700,000). They were not simply unhappy abou Christian political domination, but also disillusioned with the traditional sec tarian Sunni leadership. In the meantime, they came under the influence o pan-Arab, Nasserist and Baathist ideological and political trends, as well as th later wave of militant religious Islamic movements. The arrival in Lebanon after 1970, of a large number of PLO members brought potential allies. Early in the 1970s the Shia acquired political organisation under the leadership o Imam Musa Sadr. All these influences radicalised this huge disaffected com munity and inspired it to demand a greater share of power and of the

country's wealth and, eventually, to challenge the authority and structure of the state.

The old consensus of the 1943 pact no longer reflected the real conditions in the country. The weak central government, and indeed the whole political edifice sanctioned by the National Pact, was being challenged by several contestants for more power and influence: the PLO, the Shia and the more radical elements among the Sunnis and the Druzes. As the crisis was building up, the communities searched frantically for outside patrons and protectors and at the same time armed themselves for the inevitable bloody showdown, which came in 1975. In short, the religious balance had been disturbed and overturned, and the political arrangements made thirty years before were no longer valid. The contest for power and the determination of Lebanon's identity were once again the basic issues of contention. The two distinct cultures and outlooks, one Christian and pro-western, the other Muslim and pro-Arab, confronted one another once again.

Greater Lebanon may have been economically viable, but politically it represented a conglomeration of religious and ethnic minorities which could not be made into a socially cohesive entity, let alone a national community, despite the dazzling economic success of the country and its modern veneer. The French in 1920 and the Christian and Sunni Lebanese in 1943 created a state, but not a nation. The obstacles to national solidarity were not only too great, but they had been incorporated into the political order.

So-called Lebanese and Arab nationalism, for instance, developed along sectarian lines, because religion remained the determinant of nationality. Islam went with Arabism, and Christianity with Lebanese nationalism. What Labib Zuwiyya Yamak called the 'iron law of confessionalism' (echoing Robert Michels's 'iron law of oligarchy') still prevails. The leading Sunni Beirut politician, Saab Slam, once dismissed political parties and ideologies out of hand: 'There are only Christians and Muslims in Lebanon.' The Maronites fear Islamic hegemony and domination and therefore seek a separate, distinct nation from the Arabs, and they look to the west for support.

It was the confessional system and the violence it generated which enabled the PLO, the Syrians and the Israelis to intervene with impunity. Lebanon was never a state before 1946; there was an autonomous Christian-ruled province of Mount Lebanon and, after 1920, a French mandate of Greater Lebanon, put together from disparate populations, most of them refugees at one time or another. The problem ever since has been one of who will control how much power and what national identity the state is to have. Juridically, the state of Lebanon since 1946 has been a legalistic shell.

The civil war in 1975–6 was not fought over ideology. The Lebanese themselves saw it as a struggle for power among the religious communities. The changed economic, social and political conditions encouraged the Muslims, once they became a majority, to try to wrest power from the Christians, who were determined to resist what they see as potential Muslim subjugation. This pattern had been established in 1958 when the use of force as a means of

applying political pressure was discovered, even though at that time it solved nothing (General Fuad Chehab's slogan, 'No victors and no vanquished'). Tragically, the arrangements of the 1943 National Pact remained inflexible, regardless of the changed power relations. Even the violence of 1975–6 failed to break the impasse in communal relations. A kind of pre-1920 situation emerged: the Maronites in control of Mount Lebanon (uneasily with the Druzes); the Sunnis in the Syrian-controlled north and east; and the renegade late Major Saad Haddad in the Israel-protected southern enclave. Beirut itself was split into Christian and Muslim zones, the latter dominated by the PLO and the Shia. The Israeli invasion of 1982 made a dent in the stalemate only in so far as it eliminated the PLO and occupied nearly a third of the country.

It is not far-fetched to argue that the Muslim communities backed the PLO's tactical manipulation of Lebanon against Israel in the 1970s because an anti-Israel Lebanon would attract wider Arab support and assist them in their pursuit of power. The Christians, fearing Israeli retribution and Arab-Islamic domination, resisted. Sectarian militias took over in a civil war which resulted in the virtual partition of Lebanon.

The present possibilities

One possibility is that Lebanon could transform the de facto partition of the civil war into a permanent one and create three mini-states: Christians; Sunni Muslim; and Shia and Druzes. The extreme Maronites favour this outcome. Each mini-state would have a population of roughly one million. Alternatively, there could be a federation of mini-cantonal states linked respectively to the west, Syria and Israel. The Druzes might oppose this scheme: boundaries would be difficult to demarcate clearly, and the problem of Beirut would be difficult to resolve. As clients of outside regional and international powers, such mini-states could become surrogates of the Arab–Israel or east-west conflict; the potential for violence would remain. It would also mean the Christians must renounce the state of Lebanon, and the Sunnis control by Syria, although it is clear that the Sunnis do not relish such a prospect.

Another possibility is for Lebanon to become a modern integral national state. Central authority would monopolise the access to and use of force, and would govern nationals as individual citizens, rather than as members of *religious communities. There would be, that is, a horizontal arrangement, not* a vertical one as in the past. But for this to come about would require either that every sect relinquish its authority to a central government; or that one sect impose its rule by force on all the others to form a national government. The civil war has shown that neither of these developments is yet possible, even with the support of external powers, as the presence of the multinational forces has so far made clear. The attempt to build up the Lebanese state army has not encouraged militias to disband, essentially because the communities do not trust its sectarian composition.

The final possibility is for the Lebanon to return to the status quo before 1975, that is, the National Pact, and try to produce an acceptable formula

for political cooperation between the communities; a confessionalism that recognises new conditions. But that may well require a new national pact. The 1943 pact barely survived in August and September 1982 for the Lebanese to elect a president, maintain a parliament of sorts and constitute a government, however limited its writ. The balance of political forces may have changed, but the legalistic framework of authority has yet to be abandoned. Can, then, this weak Lebanese government change the constitution in such a way as to incorporate the sectarian problem into a new political arrangement? This will require a redistribution of power to the satisfaction of the Muslims. Should the Christians settle for less power in favour of an end to civil war, even if they were to retain the top offices of state—the Presidency and the army command? Even if they were to do so, Lebanon's external relations would continue to entail difficulties: Syria's possible opposition to such schemes, the link with Israel and so on. Should the Americans concentrate on helping to resolve these kinds of political issues, rather than focusing their attention on military matters?

The present crisis was always inherently latent in the nature of the state of Lebanon. Outsiders have always had to intervene to impose a modicum of order in Lebanon: the European powers in the nineteenth century, the American marines in 1958, the Arab League (really Nasser) in 1969 and, most recently, Israel. But the entry of extraneous forces into this 'precarious republic' tore further at its tenuous fabric, eroded a consensus and eliminated compromise.

Conclusion

Finally, what is the crisis about? It is about the very existence of the state of Lebanon as it was constituted at the end of the Second World War. Its existence has been undermined by a ten-year-old civil war which has entailed a challenge to the authority of its governments, first by an armed Palestinian resistance movement aspiring to retrieve a country next door it lost nearly forty years ago; then by an occupying Syrian so-called peacekeeping force since 1976; finally, by Israel, intermittently in the 1970s, and massively in 1982, acting for its own political and strategic reasons. Lebanon fell victim to an imbalance of internal forces which led to the breakdown of a traditional, albeit precarious, pluralist confessional system of consensus (the 1943 National Pact), made worse by external regional developments—inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli—and by the attempted restructuring of the strategic power map in the Levant by two stronger neighbours, Syria and Israel.

The crisis, in short, is about the final distribution of power and disposition of sovereign authority between Christians and Muslims. It is about how to reach a new national consensus. It is also about the final disposition of foreign forces in the country: Syrian, Israeli and other. Will the continued presence of these forces, or their withdrawal, impose a de facto partition of the country, allowing Syrians and Israelis to attain, respectively, their irredentist claims and strategic objectives? But the crisis is also about the possibility of the

resumption of sectarian conflict, which is, in turn, closely dependent on the disposition of foreign forces. Will their removal leave behind a weak Lebanese government amidst a number of buffer statelets? Can the Lebanese 'Humpty Dumpty' be put back together again by the infusion of massive external force into the country? The answer is that it probably cannot. In contrast to the foreign interventions of 1841–5, 1860–1, 1941–3 and 1958, this time the country is occupied by two rivals for the strategic domination of the Levant: Israel and Syria, and each is a client of one or the other superpower.

The crisis in Lebanon is a manifestation of a wider, more general, political problem in the Middle East, where religion is a potent ideological force which challenges territorial rule. The religion-based identity of Middle Easterners has resisted the secular integration of nationalism, and politics itself has been understood and regarded as a variant of religion. What Carleton Coon called the religious and ethnic mosaic of the Middle East has tended to ignore—in certain cases, even reject—the national boundaries so recently imposed upon it. Movements of religious reform, imported ideas and institutions of nationalism and constitutionalism were used to reconcile the belief system, cultural perceptions and traditional institutions of an earlier age to the requirements of the modern western state system without much success. Unfortunately, there was no philosophical commitment to secularism and its values of scepticism, experimentation and tolerance, so essential to pluralistic politics. With one or two exceptions, states have arisen in the Middle East which are not nation-states. As a political concept, the nation-state is characterised by an authority that is territory-based, not by universalist, extra-territorial conceptions of it.

The term nation-state is, therefore, misleading when applied to the several countries in the Middle East, *because in most of them the nation is considered* in religious terms to encompass those beyond and across the territorial boundaries of the individual states. There is a constant clash between the exigencies of the modern territorial state, and the wider nation, or community of believers, which, until the recent past, was governed by reference to religious precepts, and what was believed to be God's revealed pattern for the universe.

Caught between the burden of tradition with its insistence upon the supremacy of the nation of Islam, and the requirements of the modern territorial secular state, temporal governments in the Middle East found themselves set on a dangerous course. Lebanon and Iran, two recent examples, foundered. Failing to construct regimes outside religion, one collapsed into chaos, the other succumbed to the tyranny of a near-medieval fundamentalism. In Lebanon, territorial gave way to sectarian jurisdiction and nationality. In Iran, the dominant Shia community of believers ignores territorial boundaries and seeks to extend its 'universal truth' among fellow-believers across boundaries. Such notions of power and authority based on religion and ideology suggest that throughout the Middle East the legitimisation of power is still widely contested and authority is tenuous. It can only mean more conflict in the future.

The olive branch brigades: peacekeeping in the Middle East

RAMESH THAKUR

INTERNATIONAL peacekeeping is one of the more interesting and, arguably, also one of the more important, developments in contemporary world affairs. The period since the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in June 1982 has provided an illustration of the need for international forces. Such forces are an indispensable instrument in the hands of the world community for tackling trouble spots in the existing international environment. Second, they are still an imperfect instrument, with major shortcomings and gaps. In short, they are necessary but incomplete, and need supplementary measures in order to realise their full potential.

Peacekeeping emerged in the grey zone between the two categories of pacific settlement (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and collective enforcement (Chapter VII of the Charter). It evolved in line with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's view of the role that the United Nations ought to play in a world polarised by the Cold War. The viability of the Hammarskjold approach was contingent on the continuing validity of its underlying assumptions. Specifically, the super-powers had to agree to being mutually excluded from regional conflicts, thereby forgoing manipulative opportunities; the major powers had to be agreeable to providing financial and logistical support; the local disputants had to consent to a UN presence; and small-to-middle powers needed to provide human and material resources.[1]

It was possible to introduce the United Nations Emergency Force (Unef-II) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) because the assumptions remained valid in the 1973–8 period. By the same token, extra-UN forces were needed in the Middle East in 1982 because most of the major conditions of UN peacekeeping no longer held.

The Sinai MFO

On 25 April 1982, Israel withdrew from the Sinai peninsula to its pre-1967 border with Egypt. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the goal of eliminating the military presence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on its northern borders. The creation and establishment of multinational peacekeeping forces were intimately linked to these two series of events.

The Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was in accordance with the timetable set out in the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 26 March 1979. The treaty also envisaged that UN forces and observers would be stationed in the designated

[1] See Brian E. Urquhart, 'United Nations peacekeeping in the Middle East', *The World Today*, March 1980.

Dr Thakur is a Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of Otago, New Zealand.

limited force zone to supervise the Israeli withdrawal from the El Arish–Ras Mohammad Line to the international boundary, and to prevent violations of the treaty's terms after Israel's withdrawal. Because the proposed force was locked into the Camp David agreements, however, it was resented and resisted by the Arab bloc and faced a Soviet veto at the United Nations. On 18 May 1981, the President of the Security Council reported that there was no consensus for establishing such a force.

President Jimmy Carter, anticipating such a situation from the very beginning, had written identical letters to the Egyptian and Israeli leaders on the day that the peace treaty was signed, confirming certain aspects of American obligations arising from the treaty. He wrote that, in the event of the UN failing to provide a force, the President of the United States would take the necessary steps 'to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.'[2] These steps led to the signing of a Protocol in August 1981 regarding the establishment of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.[3] The MFO came into existence on 25 April 1982. Approximately 2,500 strong, it is made up of contingents from Australia, Fiji and New Zealand in the South Pacific; Britain, France, Holland, Italy and Norway from Europe: Colombia and Uruguay from South America; and the United States. The Director-General in overall charge, a retired American diplomat, Leamon R. Hunt, appointed the Commander, General Frederick Bull-Hansen of Norway. On 15 February 1984, Mr Hunt was killed in a terrorist attack in Rome, where the MFO has its headquarters. The operating costs of around $100 million annually are divided equally between Egypt, Israel and the United States. The United States bore 60 per cent of the operation's initial cost. The mandate of the MFO is to monitor compliance with the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and to perform other specified confidence-retaining operations.

The Beirut MNF

With the MFO in place and functioning satisfactorily, Israel's southern front was stabilised. On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in strength in operation 'Peace for Galilee'. The long-range goal of the invasion was the creation of a PLO-free forty-kilometre zone in southern Lebanon and the signing of a peace treaty with an Israeli-influenced Lebanese government. The immediate aim was to crush the PLO as a Lebanon-based military threat. By mid-June, a large number of PLO forces were encircled in the Israeli siege of Beirut. Agreement was reached and implemented on their safe and orderly evacuation between August and September, under the supervision of a 2,100 strong Multinational Force (MNF) comprising American, French and Italian

[2] USA, Department of State, *Bulletin*, 81:2054 (September 1981), p. 50.

[3] For a full discussion of the difficulties encountered in efforts to secure a UN involvement, see Richard W. Nelson, 'Peacekeeping aspects of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and consequences for United Nations peacekeeping', *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, No. 10, Fall 1980.

contingents. The duration of the MNF was not to exceed thirty days. After its withdrawal in September, however, extremist militias wreaked murderous vengeance on the defenceless Palestinians in refugee camps in west Beirut. On 20 September 1982, the government of Lebanon formally requested that the MNF return to Beirut, which it did by the end of September. The hastily—and guiltily—recalled MNF was subsequently reinforced by a British contingent. The British force in Beirut was stationed not as a part of the MNF, but to carry out tasks consistent with the mandate of the multinational force.

The force was thus made up of a 2,200-strong Italian contingent, 1,600 American marines, a French contingent of 1,250 soldiers, and 110 British soldiers. Its mission was to provide an interposition force at agreed locations in Beirut: its mandate was to facilitate the restoration of the Lebanese government's sovereignty and authority. Combat responsibilities were expressly ruled out. There was, therefore, neither the intention nor the expectation that the MNF would become involved in hostilities, especially as assurances had been received from all armed elements in the area that they would refrain from hostilities against and interference with MNF activities. Nevertheless, the MNF units were equipped so as to be able to exercise the right of self-defence if necessary.

Why not UN peacekeeping?

The Sinai force was established outside the UN framework because of Soviet opposition in the Security Council. The Egypt–Israel peace treaty had called for UN forces and observers to operate check points, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along designated points in the temporary buffer zones during and following Israeli withdrawal. After April 1982, they were to verify the implementation of treaty provisions and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. Observers only were to have been permitted to operate on the Israeli side of the border. The UN forces and observers would have been allowed any necessary facilities, and would have enjoyed freedom of movement short of crossing the international boundary. Although the precise composition of units was to be determined later, permanent members of the Security Council were specifically excluded. The arrangements could have been reviewed at the request of either party; but could have been amended only by mutual agreement. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that UN personnel could be removed only with the consent of the Security Council, including the affirmative votes of the five permanent members. In other words, permanent members would have had the right to veto any termination of a UN operation once established.

Clearly, the agreement for UN forces and observers had been drafted after careful study of past peacekeeping ventures. Apparently, the Secretary-General of the UN had been excluded from any background briefing on Camp David, despite a UN role being intended.[4] Nevertheless it remains true that

[4] The claim is made by Anthony Verrier in *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 164.

the planned UN role was torpedoed by radical Arab and Soviet rejectionism. The Beirut force, by contrast, was set up because of Israeli preference for a non-UN force. After the Israeli invasion, the Security Council convened at the urgent request of Lebanon. On 1 August, the Council called for an immediate cease-fire and authorised UN observers, in accordance with Lebanon's request, to monitor it in Resolution 516 (1982). Although the Secretary-General was asked to report back on the Resolution's implementation within four hours, Israel did not take up the matter of UN observers for consideration until a Cabinet meeting on 5 August. Israel's considered response was to reject the proposal.

Israel's rejection of the planned deployment of UN observers in Beirut was based on four factors. First, Israel argued that the PLO (or 'the terrorist organisations') had violated the previous ten cease-fires in Lebanon since 4 June; Israel could not bind itself to cease-fires without mutuality. Second, Israel did not see how UN observers could monitor PLO activities in Beirut in a feasible and practicable way. The presence of such observers would, nevertheless, be a signal that the PLO was not obliged to leave Beirut and Lebanon. Finally, once the PLO had been expelled from Lebanon, the redeployment of the Israeli forces would 'be determined on the basis of the principle that all foreign forces will leave the sovereign territory of Lebanon'.[5]

In the aftermath of the invasion and the PLO expulsion from Beirut, the Israelis had no wish to see a UN operation maintained in Lebanon. The cost to the Israelis in casualties, domestic social cohesion and international opinion was too high for them to hand over the fruits of the invasion to a body deeply hostile to Israel. In conversation with President Ronald Reagan in late June, Israel's Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, dismissed Unifil disparagingly as the UN 'Insecurity' Force in Lebanon.[6] Moreover, the invasion had resulted in a major Soviet strategic retreat in the entire Middle East. It was not altogether difficult for Begin to convince the Reagan Administration of the folly of permitting a Soviet re-entry through the back door, with a Security Council veto.

Impact on UN system

In the circumstances, one can sympathise with the reasons for introducing non-UN forces to the Middle East in 1982. It would be churlish to blame Washington for its determination to overcome Soviet obstructionism in the Camp David peace process. It would be even more uncharitable to fault the Israeli preference for a non-UN force after the harsh and unrelenting but politically motivated hostility towards Israel in recent years. The organisation has only itself to blame for abandoning impartiality—a prerequisite of successful peacekeeping.

[5] *UN Chronicle* 19 (October 1982), pp. 8–9.

[6] For an evaluation of Unifil's work prior to the Israeli invasion, see Ramesh Thakur, 'International peacekeeping: The UN Interim Force in Lebanon', *Australian Outlook*, No. 35, August 1981.

The United Nations system has always encouraged non-UN action designed to assist in restoring peace in a troubled world. Nevertheless, there are at least three adverse consequences that may follow from the non-UN peacekeeping forces set up in the Middle East in 1982. First, we still need an authority such as the United Nations as the main instrument for maintaining international peace. No one denies that the UN has worked less than satisfactorily, and that it has failed to satisfy even expectations lowered to much more modest levels than the original hopes at its creation. Yet, it is also true that only an organisation such as the UN can offer any prospects of a functioning international system of collective security.

Second, the development harms the basic concept that responsibility for maintaining international peace and security belongs to the world community as a whole, acting in a politically impartial manner. For all its faults, the United Nations remains the one body that takes in the divided fragments of humanity. A properly functioning United Nations is still the most likely pathway towards the indispensable objective of a civilised world order. The short-term advantages of politically expedient measures can cut across the need to nurture the UN as the centre for harmonising national actions in the attainment of common goals.

Third, UN peacekeeping is still useful as a means of insulating a regional crisis from extra-regional conflicts. The establishment of the MFO in the Sinai and its smooth functioning was important to American interests in the Middle East. The MFO was the final step in implementing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which in turn was the curtain-raiser to the preferred American approach to a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But included in the 800-strong American contingent in the Sinai MFO are 600 combat paratroopers from the crack 82nd Airborne Division. Before its Sinai tour, the unit formed an integral part of the American Rapid Deployment Force, which was designed primarily to combat Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Moreover, the Beirut MNF was made up entirely of Nato countries. Understandably, this did nothing to diminish Soviet and radical Arab suspicions.

The United Nations has been displaced in Middle East peacekeeping because its efforts were regarded as either inadequate to the requirements or impossible in the political climate. Yet it is instructive to analyse the deficiencies of UN peacekeeping dispassionately in order to evaluate the prospects for non-UN peacekeeping.

The problems faced by UN units over the years include impaired military efficiency because of the political requirement of representative heterogeneity in composition; inadequate security because of the emphasis upon negotiation and a restrictive interpretation of self-defence; dangers of involvement in domestic power struggles when confronted with an authority vacuum in the host country; financial hiccups; non-cooperation from major powers or local belligerents; reluctance on the part of lesser powers to contribute contingents; and erosion of credibility as conflicts appear no nearer to political solution after years of peacekeeping.

Of the two non-UN operations in the Middle East, the MFO has contributed with distinction to peacekeeping's basic goal of assisting local disputants in maintaining a state of peaceful relations, primarily because both Egypt and Israel have actively willed success in the Sinai. Neither force should face financial difficulties, and the military efficiency of the bulk of both forces is beyond question. Yet, problems remain, some potential, others already evident. Both forces face Soviet non-cooperation and political hostility. The Beirut force has discovered the frustrations—familiar enough to UN units—of being asked to supervise peace where in fact a state of war exists. The Americans have also learned at first hand the lessons of the United Nations experience in the Congo, i.e. that it is painfully difficult to separate effective peacekeeping from escalating confrontation, intervention in domestic strife and the abdication of peacekeeping responsibilities.

The Beirut massacre

All the above difficulties were highlighted dramatically by the killing of 241 American and 82 French members of the peacekeeping force in Beirut on 23 October 1983. They were killed by terrorist lorry bombs. The massacre aroused anger, frustration and incomprehension in soldiers, politicians and public alike. A bewildered and shocked American public—the last military attack on US troops on a similar scale in one day went back to the Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968—groped for an understanding of what the marine presence was trying to achieve in Lebanon, and its chances of success. Few observers were prepared to accept the attack as an act of random terrorism or private vengeance. But opinion was divided as to whether it should be read as a brutal message from Syria to the United States and France. Radical Arabs suspect that the Israeli invasion of 1982 was launched only after Americans had been converted to the vision of a Middle East pacified and preserved for the west by Israeli might. This was consecrated in the Israel–Lebanon accord of May 1983, which conferred considerable political and strategic advantages in Lebanon on Israel at Syria's expense. Geographical location, however, backed by Soviet power and President Assad's cunning, ensured that the Syrian factor could not so easily be dismissed. Was the October massacre to be seen as a direct reminder of Syria's role?

If opinion was divided on assigning responsibility for the attack, it was even more sharply at variance over the appropriate response. Voices were raised calling for American withdrawal, on the ground that there was no peace to keep. The Vietnam analogy was recalled as a warning against obsessive concern with the political cost of extricating troops from an untenable position: the marines should not be allowed to become hostages to the Administration's political timidity. Ironically, the last argument found support among those who favoured the opposite course, that of retaliating against the Beirut slaughter. If the perpetrators of the crime were small bands of criminal-minded fanatics, however, they would be difficult to identify. Alternatively, if responsibility lay ultimately with Syria, or Iran, or both, then punishment would be difficult.

e MNF would have to be transformed from a modest peacekeeping unit into
ıajor combat force prepared for a full-scale war.

Not all Americans, however, seemed willing to give support to deeper
olvement in the region's political mess and a war that was not theirs. It be-
ne clear, too, that European members of the MNF were less than happy
American imperiousness', and alarmed at suggestions of armed reprisals
inst Syria. The European impulse was to recognise Syrian as well as Israeli
ırity concerns regionally, and to try to strike an equitable balance between
various Lebanese communities internally.

n the end, the United States refrained from hasty reprisals in response to
Beirut massacre. But it also rejected calls for withdrawal: the United States
ıld neither be intimidated by terrorism nor dishonour the memory of the
rines who had died in the cause of peace. President Reagan accordingly
ided to carry on the onerous duties in Lebanon. But in justifying a
tinued American presence, Reagan significantly altered the terms of US
olvement and thereby raised the stakes dramatically. America's contribu-
ı to the MNF, the President declared on 24 October, was essential to its
tence; the MNF was crucial to Lebanon's stability; and that stability was
tral to US credibility on a global scale. It would be disastrous for vital US
ional interests if an outside force took over the Middle East, as one was
sed to do. In other words, the presence of the marines was now important
erms of the worldwide east–west struggle, not just for restoring Lebanese
hority.

ressure on President Reagan to pull out of Lebanon increased with the year-
publication of the Pentagon commission's report on the Beirut massacre.
five-member panel of military notables called into question the argument
: the marine presence could by itself shore up the Gemayel government
inst its many enemies. Its conclusion that Administration policy was jointly
onsible, with poor security measures, for the marines' death was politically
damaging. Similarly, its advice that 'a more vigorous and demanding
roach to pursuing diplomatic alternatives' would help in attaining
erican objectives was underlined by Rev. Jesse Jackson's coup in securing
release of Lieutenant Robert Goodman. The Administration had not even
l to secure the captured pilot's release through diplomatic overtures to
a.

he two events highlighted how the domestic consensus on American policy
ebanon had dissipated by the end of 1983. The leading Democratic
idential challenger, Walter Mondale, changed his mind and demanded
immediate withdrawal of the marines, calling them targets rather than
ekeepers. Similarly, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas
p') O'Neill, who back in September had helped to draft a compromise on
War Powers Act allowing the marines to be kept in Beirut for 18 months,
ın to edge away from that compromise in the New Year. Even the
ublican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
rles Percy, joined the demand for withdrawing the marines. In short, by

1984, withdrawal from Beirut had assumed election year political urgency. The difficulty, however, was to withdraw with honour.

The heavy defeats inflicted on the Lebanese government forces in the Beirut area early in February, by the Syrian-backed Shiite and Druze militias, forced the pace of events. On 7 February, President Reagan announced that the American marine contigent in Beirut was to be pulled back to American warships off the Lebanese coast. Britain followed suit, and promptly withdrew its small force to a British naval auxiliary ship lying off-shore. The Italian government announced, on 15 February, that its contingent in Beirut would be withdrawn within two weeks, but that some soldiers were to stay on to man a hospital in the city. On 17 February, President Reagan gave formal orders for American troops to start transferring to American warships. The White House announced on the same day that most of the 1,600 marines would be withdrawn to the ships within thirty days.

France, which in January had decided to reintegrate into Unifil 482 soldiers which had been detached from it, at short notice, in September 1982, to help set up the MNF, adopted a different course. It maintained its reduced detachment in Beirut and, on 15 February, formally requested the UN Security Council to despatch a UN peacekeeping force to the Beirut area. France also proposed that once the UN force arrives, the French, Italian and American units should withdraw, 'as well as the ships which accompany it'. The Soviet Union, whose agreement is required before a UN force can be sent to Beirut, had, earlier, insisted on the withdrawal of the western fleets as a precondition for its assent. The United States immediately objected to the demand for the pull-back of the fleet, and called such a move 'impractical' in view of the instability in Lebanon.

The whole Beirut episode illustrates the danger of growing differences within the western alliance, as the years go by with no political solution to the Middle East conflict. American perceptions and interests in respect of the conflict diverge significantly from those of its European and allied fellow contributors. Relations between India and Canada were a major casualty of a comparable situation in the International Control Commission in Vietnam.[7] It is worth remembering that the Sinai force was established only after the differences between the United States, Israel and the European Community partners were papered over by some diplomatic double-talk and pressure.

Conclusion

The contribution of the two non-UN peacekeeping forces towards an overall Middle East peace settlement cannot be regarded as significantly greater than that of the various UN forces in the region over the years. But international peacekeeping clearly goes on. It has shown itself remarkably resilient. When the circumstances are right, it is both needed and desired. International forces, therefore, do have a modest role to play as a useful multilateral instrument of

[7] For a study of that exercise, see Ramesh Thakur, *Peacekeeping in Vietnam* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984).

de-escalation and conflict control. In the final analysis, the olive branch brigades are valuable stabilising elements in volatile environments. They cannot enforce the peace. But, given the intensity of conflicts and depths of distrust between local belligerents, peace would be even more tenuous in the absence of international forces. Moreover, they can help to contain sporadic incidents that are not meant to initiate a large-scale war. In other words, an important justification for peacekeeping is contemplating the alternatives—chaos or nuclear conflict. The deficiencies in the machinery of peacekeeping merely highlight the fact that such forces cannot be self-sustaining. Peace-making depends much more upon talks between the disputants and the great powers than upon international forces.

The Pakistan unrest and the Afghanistan problem

AMIN SAIKAL

PAKISTAN has lately been experiencing once again sporadic political unrest. This is very much reminiscent of similar developments earlier in the country's short but turbulent history. Political violence and group action, at times with a broad popular base, have become a common feature of Pakistani politics, playing a major role in determining the course of political change in the country. Although in the past the effects of such upheavals have been largely limited to Pakistan, the latest unrest, reflecting the growing discontent and frustration of various major political forces with the six-year-old martial law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, has been directed at securing changes which could have serious implications not only for Pakistan but also for the continuing Afghanistan crisis.

The background

Ever since its creation out of the Muslim-dominated parts of the former British colony of India in 1947, Pakistan has had a rather tenuous existence. Its nationhood has lacked a clear foundation and any well institutionalised process for the achievement of domestic change. At the start, Pakistan's founding Muslim League leadership under Mohammed Ali Jinnah expected Islam, the religion of an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis, and the threat from India, to serve as a solid base for building a united, stable and 'democratic' Islamic nation-state. There is no doubt that initially this helped Jinnah, who was acclaimed Qaid-i-Azam or great leader, to establish his Muslim League-based rule and create a political structure and some degree of national cohesion. In this, however, the founding fathers underestimated the effects of certain fundamental elements in the anatomy of Pakistan which would confound their expectations in the long run. These elements have ranged from the deepening national divisions along ethnic-linguistic, religious-sectarian, and economic and political lines, to Pakistan's sensitive strategic location, and growing border disputes with India and Afghanistan.

Pakistan's internal divisions involve the four major ethnic-linguistic groups: Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis. They are aggravated by the schism between Shia and Sunni Islam and by Pakistan's precarious economic position, and by increasing social and economic inequalities. Enduring tensions and conflicts in the country have made it vulnerable to outside pressures. In 1971, the Bengalis of former East Pakistan succeeded, with direct help from

---

Mr Saikal, who was born in Afghanistan, now lives in Australia. He is a Lecturer in Political Science at the Australian National University, and was a Rockefeller Fellow in International Relations, 1983–4.

India, in proclaiming their own independent state of Bangladesh. The Pathans and Baluchis of the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces are continuing, at times with active support from successive Afghan governments, to press their demands for autonomy. The Punjabis, who dominate the armed forces, and the Sindhis, who have a lesser share than the Punjabis in the government, have each persistently opposed political domination by the other. Intermingled with these divisions has been the emergence of opposing secularist and Islamic 'fundamentalist' forces, which have been fighting for power among themselves. These forces have found their collective strength in the development of several loose political organisations. The most important are: the centre-leftist Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and National Awami Party (NAP), and the conservative Jamiat-e-Islami (JI), the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Jamiat Ulamai Islam (JUI).

The external differences between Pakistan and its neighbours, India and Afghanistan, have persistently proved to be troublesome and costly for the country. They are rooted in the trauma of the partition of India in 1947, the Kashmir dispute, and India's growing interest in Pakistan's internal affairs (particularly in support of the Bengalis of former East Pakistan and as holder of a watching brief over the welfare of the Punjabis and Sindhis); in the artificiality of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the latter's periodic support for Pathan and Baluchi separatists in Pakistan; and most recently in the regional disruption caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Consequently, while providing successive Pakistani governments with the factor of 'outside threat' for domestic consumption, these differences have led Pakistan in the past into two major wars with India (the last of which resulted in an embarrassing defeat and the dismemberment of Pakistan) and into serious border clashes with Afghanistan. In the meantime, they have prompted hostile foreign forces to exploit Pakistan's internal divisions for their own benefit. While the internal and external factors have fed on each other, because of these and Pakistan's strategic position, the country has been continually vulnerable to great power rivalry, particularly between the United States, China and the Soviet Union. These powers have sought to influence Pakistani politics in one way or another in the context of changing regional and global balances of power.

All this has had three important implications for Pakistan's political development. First, successive leaderships, whether civilian or military, have found it beyond their capacity to achieve a necessary degree of broad consensus in favour of establishing a viable constitutional political system, which could both accommodate the national differences, and incorporate the diverse groups, and ensure an orderly process of change. Second, the armed forces, the most organised power group, which have been expanding in the context of both internal strife and external conflicts, have found it relatively easy since the early years of the republic to step to the forefront of national politics. The army has either held the balance of power, or filled the vacuum (caused largely by the failures of civilian governments) by taking charge as the only force

capable of governing without a popular mandate. Third, this domestic setting has not only led to a progressive personalisation and militarisation of politics, narrowing the power base of the political leaderships, but has also dictated the leaderships' foreign policy priorities and objectives. Pakistan's foreign policy has followed a somewhat haphazard course, in which a close relationship with one or more opposing great powers has been used as a device to neutralise domestic pressures and perceived foreign threats, although this relationship has, in turn, badly complicated the country's regional position.

In consequence, Pakistan has alternated between (largely personalised) authoritarian civilian and autocratic military rule, lacking stable domestic institutions or clearly defined foreign policy goals. The civilian and military rulers have alternatively used one another as scapegoats for failing to find effective solutions for pressing national problems. They have done this in various ways, largely through manipulating, shaping and reshaping the domestic settings and drawing on changing foreign policy issues. While helping them to strengthen their own personal power, this has provided little incentive for national reconciliation and the increased participation of various groups in politics. Both are clearly necessary for putting Pakistan on an appropriately stable course of change and development.

Consequently, political violence and group action have always proved to be the ultimate instrument of political change in Pakistan. Following Ali Jinnah's death in 1948, the largely Muslim League-backed civilian regimes (1948–58), the military rule of General Ayub Khan (1958–69) and of General Yahya Khan (1969–72), and the PPP's civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972–7), rose and fell in this way. Although these regimes differed from one another in their composition and their choice of policies in dealing with Pakistan's problems, all were ultimately unable, for the reasons outlined above, to create stability and ensure development on a long-term basis.

Challenges to Zia

It is evident that General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule is caught in the same quicksand. General Zia, who overthrew Bhutto's regime in 1977 and subsequently endorsed his execution on criminal charges in 1979, consolidated his power after Bhutto's unsuccessful attempt to rule with popular support. Bhutto had become increasingly authoritarian. He had a centre-leftist ideological approach to Pakistan's social and economic problems. In his quest to keep the political process under the tight control of himself and the PPP in defiance of growing national restlessness, he remained dependent on the army.

The failure of the civilian regime once again provided the conditions for the army to recover some of its past losses, particularly as a result of its humiliating defeat by India, and nation-wide opposition which forced it, after thirteen years of autocratic rule, to hand power back to the civilian opposition (headed by Bhutto). Thus far, General Zia has ruled Pakistan by drawing on the public discontent with Bhutto's regime; by enforcing tight military control over most

forces of change; by trying to institute strict Islamisation and to forge an alliance with the Jamiat-e-Islami and other conservative parties; by pressing for a modest process of mixed economic development (involving little structural change in the economy); by keeping the opposition forces in suspense through pledging periodically to return Pakistan to 'democracy', on the one hand, and promoting policies of distrust, apathy and favouritism, on the other; by militarising the bureaucracy and persisting with the traditional dominance in the armed forces of the Punjabis; by pursuing a delicate 'non-aligned' foreign policy, with a tilt towards the United States and China; and by drawing heavily on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and its consequences since late 1979.

The Afghanistan crisis brought Soviet troops to Pakistan's border and resulted in the exodus of more than three million Afghan refugees and in the establishment of the headquarters of the Afghan resistance forces (the Mujaheddin) in Pakistan. Afghanistan is the only foreign issue which in recent years has become highly sensitive, indeed critical, in Pakistani politics. While displacing the past Afghan-Pakistani border disputes, the crisis has provided General Zia with the factors of 'direct Soviet threat' and 'refugee burden', which he has used to justify both the continuation of his martial law rule and his foreign policy tilt towards the United States and China. Those countries, haunted by their fears of Soviet expansionism and of Soviet-Indian friendship, have found a convenient ally in General Zia's regime. They have consequently supplied him with large-scale economic and military assistance. This includes a US$3·2 billion aid commitment by Washington to strengthen Pakistan's economy and armed forces during 1981–6. At the same time, there lurks in all this the danger that the Afghanistan crisis may cease to be an asset for Zia's regime.

Given its continued determination to rule by force, reluctance to open the way for a civilian government, insistence on its own brand of Islamisation, and failure to resolve Pakistan's social and economic problems, the regime has become progressively isolated and therefore increasingly dogmatic and repressive. It draws support from three constituencies: the armed forces, the heavily militarised bureaucracy and some conservative political parties, although even the latter are no longer participants in the government. It is opposed by all major political groups, particularly the PPP and NAP which have been adversaries in the past but at present form an opposition alliance and have inspired the latest unrest. Both the PPP and NAP maintain close ties with the Soviet Union. While the NAP has considerable following in the North-West Frontier province, it is widely believed that the PPP, headed by the wife of executed Ali Bhutto, is the largest nation-wide party, with a capacity to poll very strongly in a general election if General Zia decides to hold one. Moscow regards both parties as possible avenues through which it could, if necessary, organise agitation against Zia's regime. It has already supported the establishment of the Zulfiqar Organisation, headed by Ali Bhutto's son, Murtaza, as the armed offshoot of the PPP, with its headquarters in northern

Kabul. Given this, the PPP's stance on the Afghanistan crisis runs, in certain ways, contrary to that of the Zia regime. It has proclaimed that in the event of coming to power, it would recognise the Soviet-installed government of Babrak Karmal in Kabul, prevent the Afghan Mujaheddin from operating from bases inside Pakistan, and return the Afghan refugees to Afghanistan as a way of resolving the crisis. In this context, the presence of the Afghan refugees and the Mujaheddin, which entails serious social and political consequences for Pakistan, and the support accepted by Zia, particularly from the United States, have become the targets of attack by many of Zia's PPP and NAP led opponents, who hope to focus upon him popular discontent at these policies of his regime. Meanwhile the American and Chinese aid to him has perturbed the government of India.

The political implications of Afghanistan

Thus, the Afghanistan crisis has the potential to be the source of instability as well as of legitimacy for Zia's regime, presenting it with a serious dilemma. As a result, the regime's attitude to the crisis has been characterised by its desire to work towards an outcome of the crisis which could ultimately prove to be beneficial to the regime's domestic position. It is in this light that the regime has approached the United Nations-sponsored Geneva indirect talks between Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the Karmal government since early 1982. Iran has refused to be a party to these talks, legitimately arguing that neither the Karmal regime nor the Soviets, but only the Mujaheddin, who enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the Afghan people, can speak for Afghanistan. But Pakistan has not insisted on the attendance of the Mujaheddin, since the Soviet Union, which is bogged down in Afghanistan by their successful resistance, labels them simply as 'bandits'. The Soviet Union has been using the Geneva talks to play down its military setbacks and the intensification of its military operations in the face of continued popular resistance in Afghanistan, to buy more time for the beleaguered Karmal government (which thus far has failed to build a credible administration and consolidate its control even over Kabul), to forestall any major increase in outside assistance to the Mujaheddin, and to reduce the international (especially Islamic and non-aligned countries') criticism of its invasion. Zia's regime has its own interest in seeing these talks continue. It seems to hope that by participating in the talks it can prevent an escalation of direct Soviet agitation in Pakistan, placate the domestic opposition to the regime, and keep open an avenue through which to dispose of the Afghan Mujaheddin and refugees if their presence in Pakistan becomes sufficiently unpopular to threaten the overthrow of the regime in favour of an opposition party or alliance.

It is clear that the talks have little chance of producing an acceptable political settlement as long as the Soviet Union insists on the legitimacy of the Karmal government to rule Afghanistan as a non-negotiable matter, and refuses to commit itself to an immediate unconditional withdrawal of its

troops, to accept the Mujaheddin as the major force representing the Afghan people in the negotiations, and to work not just with Pakistan but with the international community as a whole in order to create the necessary conditions for the Afghans to determine their own future.

It is true that the Mujaheddin are divided among themselves into several major groups for both ideological and practical reasons. But this has not kept them from pursuing an increasingly credible joint campaign against common enemies, the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Afghanistan; and in this their religion of Islam has proved to be, and may continue to serve as, the ideology of resistance. Given this, Moscow and Islamabad may gain nothing but time by excluding the Mujaheddin from negotiations, knowing that without them no resolution to the Afghanistan crisis can be found. Whatever regime rules Pakistan over the coming years, the impact of the Afghanistan crisis will continue to be a crucial element in Pakistani politics.

Problems of authority in the Soviet Union

DAVID WEDGWOOD BENN

LAST September, the Soviet Communist Party daily *Pravda* published a long, and in some ways unusual, account of a motor manslaughter case in a city in the Russian region of Tambov in November 1982. A factory manager and prominent member of the local Communist Party city committee had been driving under the influence of drink and caused an ultimately fatal accident. Immediately after the accident he had given a false name to the police. Apparently because of his close friendship with the local party First Secretary, strong pressure was brought to bear to stop him being prosecuted (although he was cordially disliked by his subordinates who described him unaffectionately as 'a little tsar'). In June 1983 he was, nevertheless, tried, convicted and given an unspecified prison sentence which was subsequently upheld on appeal. But—and this is what makes the case noteworthy—at the time of this *Pravda* article, the convicted man was not only not serving his sentence, but was actually back at work in his old factory. He had resigned, not been dismissed, from his job as manager but had immediately been given a new, specially created, post as 'engineer'; and he had been given a 48-day summer vacation.[1]

It is not uncommon for Soviet newspapers to expose local scandals; and this

[1] *Pravda*, 16 September 1983.

Mr Wedgwood Benn has made a special study of the Soviet media and has contributed to a number of journals including *Soviet Studies*.

particular offender was shortly afterwards sent to prison to begin his sentence. But what is revealing about the case is the light it throws on present-day Soviet attitudes, both official and unofficial, towards authority; and this is a topic which gets less attention than it deserves. According to one seemingly widespread impression, hardly anyone in the Soviet Union today will openly defy authority, except for a small, idealistic band of dissidents. The corruption and other forms of crime which exist are assumed to be something essentially surreptitious. But the striking feature of the example just quoted was the almost total absence of surreptitiousness. The law—a court verdict—was being flouted without any attempt at concealment whatever; and in a way which could not possibly have been sanctioned at the highest level in Moscow. Such occurrences are symptomatic. Open disregard for law, coupled with an apparent decline in the fear of authority, seems to have become a pervasive phenomenon during the Brezhnev years; and this remains true despite the ruthless treatment of certain minorities such as the dissidents. Soviet attitudes to authority repay study—because of the insight the subject offers not only into the recent Soviet political climate but also into some of the problems which so preoccupied Yuri Andropov during his brief spell in power.

Andropov's discipline campaign

Within days of becoming Communist Party leader after Brezhnev's death, Andropov began to launch his now famous campaign directed against 'breaches of party, state and labour discipline'.[2] Discipline, so he later added, applied to everyone 'beginning with ministers'.[3] This set the scene for a partly puritanical, partly illiberal policy which was to have widespread ramifications—involving among other things the appointment of the KGB Chairman as Minister of the Interior, no doubt to fight corruption;[4] an increased pressure on dissidents (as illustrated by the warning given in January 1983 to Roy Medvedev[5]); the use of primary and regional party elections to conduct a mini-purge of local party officials;[6] and, not least, the enactment of a new and much more stringent decree on labour discipline outlined in the Soviet press on 7 August 1983.

Given the obviously high rates of absenteeism in some factories, Andropov's measures to tighten up labour discipline may have been the most important thing he did. The last of Brezhnev's decrees on labour discipline (approved in December 1979) had laid the main emphasis on the giving or withholding of rewards (such as additional leave and higher pay) according to a worker's performance.[7] Andropov's decree, though it does mention incentives, lays a much heavier stress on sanctions—providing, among other things,

[2] *Pravda*, 23 November 1982. [3] *ibid.*, 1 February 1983.

[4] See *ibid.*, 18 December 1982, for the announcement of the appointment of the then KGB chief, General Vitalii Fedorchuk, as Minister of the Interior in place of Nikolai Shchelokov. Shchelokov was subsequently removed from the Communist Party Central Committee for 'mistakes' in his work: see *ibid.*, 16 June 1983.

[5] See the report by Mark Frankland in *The Observer*, 23 January 1983.

[6] See *The Economist*, 29 October 1983. [7] *Pravda*, 12 January 1980.

that damage caused by an employee at work can be deducted from pay; and that periods of absenteeism can be deducted from annual holidays. In the past, owing to the labour shortage, unsatisfactory workers could quite often evade penalties by simply resigning and getting a job elsewhere. From now on they may not find this quite so easy. Those who leave their jobs without an officially acceptable reason now have to give two months' (instead of the normal one month's) written notice. Furthermore, workers can be penalised by being temporarily demoted for up to three months; and during that time they cannot either resign or effectively work their notice. This restriction on the right to resign is a new and severe departure in the recent history of Soviet labour legislation.[8]

Androprov was cautious about hasty economic reform; and tried as a first step to concentrate on changing behaviour and attitudes. To quote him again: 'Although one cannot reduce everything to the question of discipline, it is precisely from there, comrades, that one has to start.'[9] Hence the relevance of looking more closely at current Soviet attitudes towards authority. What follows is mainly based on the smaller print of Soviet newspapers. The evidence suggests that the readiness to challenge authority can take a number of different forms; and by no means only in the field of industrial relations.

It is not just a matter of law-breaking or 'alienated' behaviour. Some members at least of the Soviet public appear to be in an assertive mood: ready to pursue the rights which they enjoy within the system and to voice their complaints. There was the case of the travellers who found themselves stranded at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport from 3 to 5 September 1979. A hundred of them sent a collective protest to *Pravda*, which briefly reported this three months later. Other complaints are more serious: the *Pravda* article quoted at the beginning of this article was apparently triggered off by a letter from the widow of the man who had been run over and killed by the party official. Not everyone, of course, is ready to speak out fearlessly. One symptom of the continuing reluctance to do do is the writing of anonymous letters, which the authorities have repeatedly deplored. Nevertheless, the number of people who are apparently willing to pursue their grievances is far from negligible. The Soviet Procuracy—one of the main law enforcement agencies—was recently reported to be handling some three million letters a year.[10]

Another way of gauging attitudes towards authority is to look at the way

[8] The essence of the new measures is to be found in the resolution approved by the Trade Unions and Council of Ministers of the USSR, 'On additional measures for the strengthening of labour discipline', published in *Pravda* on 7 August 1983. This lays it down, among other things, that absenteeism for more than three hours counts as absenteeism for a whole day; that periods of absenteeism can be deducted from annual holidays (subject to a minimum two weeks holiday entitlement); that up to one third of wages can be deducted to meet the cost of culpable damage caused at work (e.g. by producing shoddy goods); that damage caused by drunkenness is to be paid in full; that appearance at work when drunk is a ground for dismissal in itself; and that unsatisfactory workers who change jobs are liable to lose half their bonus entitlement at their new job for up to six months.

[9] *Pravda*, 1 February 1983. [10] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 February 1983.

people officially criticised in *Pravda* respond. In Stalin's time, criticism in the party organ could spell total personal disgrace. Even today, in most cases, those criticised will reply fairly promptly admitting their error. But this does not quite invariably happen. To return to the manslaughter case quoted at the beginning: the authorities in Tambov took nearly a month to examine the serious charges which *Pravda* had levelled against them; and then merely printed a brief report in the local paper admitting that the charges were 'basically' true. They replied to *Pravda* only after 'repeated reminders' (claiming that this was due to oversight), and their first answer was deemed by the paper to be unsatisfactory. Only after a delay of more than two months was the regional party First Secretary finally pressured into admitting the criticisms in full.[11]

Such cases of dilatoriness or passive resistance are not unique. One of the best-documented instances of local passive resistance to criticism occurred some years ago in the city of Lipetsk, where a number of officials were accused of illegally allocating flats to their friends and to members of their families. *Pravda* had first raised the matter in May 1979. In December of that same year, it reported that although the Mayor had been personally implicated and removed from his post, nevertheless not all the illegally installed occupants had been evicted. Six months later, in May 1980, *Pravda* returned to the subject yet again, complaining that it had not yet received a written reply to its article of the previous December; though it had been informed by word of mouth that the Lipetsk authorities considered the matter settled and intended to take no further action. In August 1980, the paper did publish a belated reply from the regional party First Secretary, admitting to what he called 'serious shortcomings' in the allocation of housing and saying that various culprits had been punished; but still not saying whether all the illegal occupants had been evicted. By November 1980 the regional party had officially condemned the abuses. Even so, *Pravda* remained less than totally satisfied and quoted a reader's letter from Lipetsk suggesting that efforts were still being made 'to shield guilty officials from just punishment'. Three years later, in December 1983, *Pravda* criticised the regional party First Secretary himself—for this and a whole number of other things. He has since been removed in the current local party elections.[12]

Limits of obedience

In all these instances, the issues were relatively minor. However, they do not quite fit in with the notion of an all-powerful central authority able to count on immediate and automatic obedience. Another piece of evidence which might indicate an erosion of respect for authority relates to Communist Party discipline. This, it seems, is not quite so strictly or universally enforced as it once was. Thus, in a case reported in 1979, a woman party member who

[11] *Pravda*, 13 and 26 November 1983. Nevertheless, the regional First Secretary, A. A. Khomyakov, retained his post in Tambov in the current elections; see *ibid.*, 17 January 1984.

[12] *ibid.*, 24 May and 27 December 1979; 29 May, 21 August and 22 November 1980; 11 December 1983; 15 January 1984.

belonged to the staff of a teacher training institute had been convicted of enrolling students in return for bribes. When faced in court with the evidence, she had merely exclaimed: 'Look what benefits I have conferred.' The party meeting at her institute simply declined to discuss her fitness for continued party membership.[13] In another case, also reported in 1979, a woman party member had fraudulently misappropriated nearly 2,000 roubles while she had been in charge of a kindergarten (she had repaid the money after being found out). But a meeting of her party branch decided to vote for nothing more than an off-the-record reprimand, arguing that she had not in reality committed any crime; merely 'a breach of financial discipline'. The only person present who had tried to censure her complained in a letter to *Pravda* that 'My speech provoked a stormy reaction. I was virtually isolated.' Rather surprisingly, the paper itself made very little direct comment but invited the views of its readers.[14] Even more startling than the two cases just mentioned was an episode reported in 1980 concerning a manager and party member who had been convicted of falsifying figures on a large scale and given a suspended prison sentence. But he was still allowed to stay in his job (until higher authority intervened). His local party committee did nothing more than give him a severe reprimand although, as *Pravda* pointed out, the Communist Party statutes lay it down that conviction on a criminal charge automatically carries the penalty of expulsion from party membership.[15]

It is hard to say how typical all the above examples are. They have been quoted not just because they occurred, but because they occurred openly and were openly reported at the time. Therefore when Mr Andropov launched his discipline campaign he was not telling people anything they had not been told before. Nor, in particular, was he revealing anything new about the problem most on his mind, the state of labour discipline. Thus, as far back as 1978, the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* had reported the findings of a sociological survey of over 2,000 workers in the Ukrainian centre of Dnepropetrovsk, from which it transpired that 42 per cent of respondents admitted that they sometimes violated labour discipline. Even more remarkable was the fact that only one-third of this sample of workers were convinced that appearing at work drunk would be punished.[16] A later survey conducted in ten cities and covering more than 9,000 employees revealed that only 49 per cent thought labour discipline was something which had to be observed everywhere and at all times, while 48 per cent thought it depended on circumstances.[17]

In none of the cases mentioned so far does there seem to have been much fear of sanctions. All this raises the question: how far is the flouting of authority tolerated, in practice, from above? Breaches of labour discipline un-

[13] *ibid.*, 23 October and 14 December 1979. [14] *ibid.*, 9 July 1979.

[15] *ibid.*, 2 June 1980; and 18 August 1980 (reporting the expulsion of the offender from the party).

[16] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 2 August 1978. Many respondents blamed their lateness for work on public transport and their over-long meal breaks on bad canteen facilities—complaints which were found to have substance.

[17] *ibid.*, 19 November 1980.

doubtedly have been officially tolerated. Yet another investigation revealed that the 1979 decree on labour discipline was fully enforced in only 18·5 per cent of enterprises; whilst nearly 40 per cent of enterprises did not enforce it at all.[18] For this state of affairs there seem to be several explanations.

One of the commonest reasons for failing to penalise bad workers had to do with the labour shortage and was explained some years ago by a factory manager as follows: 'Supposing I do punish someone. He'll take offence; he'll start looking for another job; and he'll find it. So who have I got to work for me?'[19] If this is a typical case, it means that Soviet workers do indeed have some industrial muscle-power; it remains to be seen whether the latest decree will change this. A slightly different reason for managerial tolerance was once given by a young Soviet manager who asked to remain anonymous when quoted. He explained that, when he first took up his post, he decided to 'look the truth in the face' and fully record all breaches of discipline by his workforce. But from the point of view of statistical appearances this produced a far from happy result; and his superiors soon began to voice disquiet. 'Finally', this manager recalled, 'I was summoned and "carpeted" by a Deputy Minister of the Republic. I was given a menacing hint as to my unsuitability as well as a very friendly piece of advice "to change my style". Reluctantly, I exchanged truth for falsehood. We began to concern ourselves more with what the reports looked like.'[20]

Coercion is not enough

Nevertheless, such purely cynical explanations do not give the whole picture. Soviet specialists in management have increasingly emphasised that purely coercive methods in relation to the workforce will not lead to an improved performance. Evidence was published some years ago showing that whereas encouragement led to an improvement of discipline in 87 per cent of cases, punitive measures produced an improvement in only 13 per cent of the sample.[21] One Soviet author writing in the mid-1970s stressed the need to create a positive motivation and noted that 'It is in practice impossible to achieve good results at work in a modern enterprise if the mass of workers do not want this.'[22] He laid part of the blame for the problem on what he described as 'autocratic' managers, by which he meant those who refuse to consult with their subordinates.[23]

In a sentence which might seem to express in a nutshell many of the problems facing the present Soviet leadership, this author remarked that 'The old methods no longer work. But new methods have not yet been fully developed.' However, in his very next sentence, he went on to draw a parallel with the climate of Soviet society as a whole; and to put part of the blame for bad labour discipline on the consequences of de-Stalinisation:

[18] *Literaturnya Gazeta*, 12 January 1983. [19] *ibid.*, 25 January 1978.
[20] *ibid.*, 27 September 1978. [21] *ibid.*, 27 September 1978.
[22] Viktor Mikheyev, *Sotsialno-psikhologicheskiye aspekty upravleniya* (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1975), p. 338.
[23] Mikheyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.

'It is worth giving consideration to the view that the critique of the cult of personality, despite all its progressive role, led to a decline in standards. The critique of the [Stalin] cult was at the same time a critique of the autocratic style of management. But the autocratic style of management was never a mere absurdity. It arose in response to certain historical conditions. . . Changed conditions have necessitated new methods of management; but the need for managers to uphold standards has become greater. Only to enforce them has become more complicated.'[24]

This passage may well reflect the thought processes of at least some of the Soviet leadership; and not just about industrial relations, but about society as a whole. So what kind of insight does it offer? And how does the evidence presented above fit in with the popular western image of Soviet society?

Soviet domestic politics under Brezhnev might fairly be summed up by two expressions which are not mutually incompatible: 'non-liberalisation' and 'de-terrorisation'. It is the former, non-liberalisation, which has been most closely associated in the public mind with Brezhnev's rule. This is hardly surprising. The leadership's determination to preserve the party's power base, and its sometimes vicious (although selective) repression of dissidents who challenged it on fundamentals, were very real features of the Brezhnev years. So, too, were the petty acts of persecution or injustice at local levels.

But it remains to look a little more closely at the other side of the Brezhnev coin: the de-terrorisation, the decline of the atmosphere of fear and of the indiscriminate coercion of the Stalin years, which, judging by all the evidence, no Soviet leader of today has either the wish or the ability to restore. This ties in with the examples quoted earlier. They are undramatic, no doubt; and it is hard to say how typical they are. But they do point to the conclusion that the flouting of authority in Russia today is—for some people at least—a much less risky business than it used to be. How else to explain the disregard of a court sentence, the snubs to *Pravda,* the open attempts to excuse corruption by party members and the widespread absenteeism in industry? The very fact that this has been so openly, even casually, mentioned in Soviet newspapers in recent years is yet another sign that the climate has, imperceptibly, been changing.

De-terrorisation, together with better education and a certain expansion of contacts with the outside world, combined during the Brezhnev years to produce a somewhat franker and more relaxed climate. They also seem to have contributed to a gradual erosion of fear of authority. This in turn contributed towards the growth of corruption and the weakening of labour discipline—matters of serious concern to the Soviet leadership, if only because of the damage to the economy and the fabric of society. It may well be, of course, that given the continuance of shortages and corruption, some members of the Soviet public might actually welcome the kind of 'strong hand' which Andropov provided. Nevertheless, the increasing readiness to challenge authority is something which his successor, Mr Konstantin Chernenko, or any other Soviet leader, may find hard to reverse.

[24] Mikheyev, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

The French Communist Party between government and opposition

JONATHAN MARCUS

THE French Communist Party (PCF) is facing its most serious crisis since the founding of the Fifth Republic. The crisis has electoral, organisational and strategic aspects. It is ironic that the party should find itself in this predicament just when, for the first time since 1936, it is a partner in a left-wing majority, and when Communist ministers sit at the cabinet table.[1] There is an added irony for it is those events that led to their sharing of power that have brought these new problems.

The French Communists shared briefly in the process of adjustment undertaken by many western Communist Parties during the 1970s.[2] The path to power in France was to be through a Union of the Left; in 1972 the Communist and Socialist Parties agreed upon a plan for government, the Common Programme, and in 1974, the PCF supported François Mitterrand's campaign for the presidency. There were some signs of a superficial relaxation in the rigid procedures that governed the PCF's internal life and the party became more critical of East European societies.

Yet, at the very time that the PCF was becoming seemingly more liberal and more critical of the Soviet Union, the party was rethinking its attachment to the Union of the Left. Under the leadership of François Mitterrand, the Socialist Party set itself the aim of capturing the ground already occupied by the Communists. A weakening of the PCF was to be a prerequisite for the victory of the left. In response to the growing dominance of the Socialist Party, the PCF precipitated the collapse of the Common Programme. The left was defeated at the 1978 legislative elections.

After the debacle of 1978, the PCF embarked upon a vigorous campaign against its erstwhile partners, persisting in their attacks until the eve of the second ballot of the presidential contest in 1981. The early 1980s also witnessed a growing rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The PCF's internal review of its position concluded that the party had pursued a policy of 'unity at the top' and had ignored its grass-roots, so that its popular support had fallen away. It now sought to favour greater 'unity at the base'. This was an attempt to throw the Socialists onto the defensive, 'unity at the base' effectively implying the rejection of cooperation.

[1] For background, see Byron Criddle and David S. Bell, 'The 1981 French elections: the victory of the Left', *The World Today*, July–August 1981.

[2] See Howard Machin (ed.), *National Communism in Western Europe: A Third Way for Socialism?* (London: Methuen, 1983).

Jonathan Marcus is a specialist in contemporary West European politics and has contributed articles to several journals, including *The World Today*. He is presently working as a researcher at the House of Commons.

Electoral misfortunes

For the Communist Party, 1981 was a year of electoral disasters. The Communist presidential candidate, the party's Secretary-General, Georges Marchais, had no chance of winning the contest. His purpose in running was to demonstrate the strength of the PCF's constituency and to prevent the field being left open to François Mitterrand. Indeed, Marchais's aggressive campaign was directed as much against the Socialist Party's former leader as it was against the candidates of the right.

Throughout the course of the Fifth Republic, the PCF's share of the popular vote has hovered around 21 per cent. In 1981 Marchais was hoping to improve upon this score, publicly suggesting a target of some 25 per cent. Therefore the outcome of the first ballot of the presidential contest represented a major setback.[3] The PCF was forced to tone down its criticism, and called upon its supporters to vote for Mitterrand at the second ballot. The PCF could take little comfort from the results of the subsequent legislative elections, obtaining a poor 16·2 per cent at the first ballot, the party's worst legislative result since 1945. Mitterrand's presidential victory led to a Socialist landslide, the PCF ending up with only 44 seats, compared with the 86 it had won in 1978. In these three years, the party had lost over a fifth of its voters.

Subsequent local elections have shown little evidence of a Communist recovery. Indeed, the 1982 cantonal contest saw an amplification of the PCF's 1981 defeat. Such elections have traditionally overestimated the PCF's level of national support, the results being some two percentage points higher than at legislative elections. Thus, the party's 1982 result of 15·9 per cent (down from 22·8 per cent in 1976) was an ominous sign of the Communists' further decline.

The municipal elections of last year represented, at best, a local reflection of the setbacks of 1981. Municipal elections since 1959 had seen steady progress for the PCF and municipal power provided the party with finance, influence and patronage. In 1983 the PCF lost control of numerous large towns, especially in its areas of traditional strength, notably in the 'red belt' and *grande couronne* surrounding Paris. These reverses mark a decline in *le communisme municipal*, one of the pillars of Communist strength.[4] In addition to the continued poor showing of the Communists, there is evidence of a growing volatility within the Socialists' own electorate. The inability of the Socialist Party to pick up all those voters who are deserting the PCF is compounded by the return of many centrist voters to the parties of the right.[5] This increased

[3] Marchais obtained 15·3 per cent of the poll, against Mitterrand's 25·8 per cent. This compares with a PCF first ballot score at the 1978 legislative elections of 20·6 per cent. In 1981, more than one million PCF voters supported Mitterrand, or abstained, at the first ballot.

[4] See Jérôme Jaffré, 'Les élections municipales de mars 1983: Les trois changements du paysage électoral', *Pouvoirs*, No. 27, 1983.

[5] The municipal by-election at Aulnay-sous-Bois, for example, indicated that a fringe of former PCF voters were moving to the extreme right-wing *Front national*, showing that a vote for the PCF may in certain cases represent a protest vote, capable of being switched to a more populist bidder.

volatility, together with the weakening of the Communist Party and the demobilisation of a part of its electorate, now poses serious problems for a future victory of the left as a whole.

Internal crisis

The internal life of the PCF is governed according to the sacrosanct formula of 'democratic centralism'. In practice, this involves firm hierarchic control and strong discipline, with co-option in place of election for party posts. Internal debate is tightly controlled and discussion generally boils down to an explanation of the party's current line. Care is taken to maintain an aura of infallibility around both the party and its leadership; such setbacks that are acknowledged are attributed to delays in the appreciation of particular historical situations. Thus, the party attempts to stress the continuity in its approach to political problems, hoping to mask from the faithful its frequent reversals of policy.

However, since the late 1970s, the PCF has been suffering from an organisational malaise, a decline in both party membership and the party's capacity to mobilise its supporters. The PCF's claimed membership stands at 710,138. Such statistics have an important political value for the PCF, particularly during a period of electoral decline. Thus, many commentators regard such exact claims with a certain degree of scepticism.[6] There has clearly been a considerable fall in membership, together with a lower level of activity from party workers. This decline has also been reflected in the falling circulation of the party's newspapers.

The reasons for this malaise are numerous. Although the PCF officially refuses to recognise the existence of factions, currents of opinion do exist inside the party. However, such views are difficult to express openly and have little impact upon the leadership; the only course open to many critics may be to leave the party. The defeat of the left in 1978 provoked many Communist intellectuals into open criticism of the party's line. Those who had hoped for a liberalisation like that in the Italian party, were dismayed as Marchais moved to contain the criticism and bolster the weight of the party machine.

It was in the party's Paris Federation that these problems surfaced most prominently. In May 1981, a group of dissident Communists, including Henri Fiszbin, the former First Secretary of the Paris Federation, launched a study group, *Rencontres communistes,* with the aim of maintaining democratic debate within the party. They saw this as the only way in which the PCF might overcome its crisis. The party leadership responded by branding their activities as divisive, and the thirty founder members of the group were deemed to have 'placed themselves outside the party'—effectively expelled.There has also been criticism of present policies from other quarters close to the party. Mme

[6] It has been suggested that the real membership is closer to 250,000, with a core of activists drawn from the party's 50,000 permanent officials. See Philippe Robrieux, *Histoire intérieure du parti communiste (1972-1982)*, volume III (Paris: Fayard, 1982).

Thorez-Vermeersch has condemned the PCF's participation in what she terms a *simple gestion social-démocrate*, and has spoken of profound discontent within the party.[7]

The party's 24th congress in February 1982 did little to clarify its problems. It attempted to give the appearance of continuity and offered no clear line. Georges Marchais tried to explain the party's electoral reverses, and to reconcile the attacks upon left-unity with the PCF's present role in government. The Communists' errors, such as they were, had all been in the past: a delay in developing the correct conclusion from Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech; a delay in adapting to the changing social structure. However, the PCF's real and immediate problem, its confusing and contradictory strategy pursued since 1977, was ignored.

A party of government

The Communist Party entered government in June 1981. Four Communist ministers were named in Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy's second cabinet.[8] This followed the outcome of the legislative elections and the conclusion of an agreement on common objectives between the Socialist Party and the PCF. The Socialists held a clear majority of seats in the National Assembly in their own right and were not obliged to give the Communists posts. However, the Socialists saw these appointments as an acknowledgement of the unitary aspirations of a large part of the Communist electorate. For his part, Marchais asserted that the supporters of the left had not voted for a specific party programme, but rather had simply voiced their desire for change. Since 1981, the PCF has continually stressed its commitment to the government. The party has sought to portray itself as the 'conscience' of the majority. The PCF's role is to prevent backsliding by the Socialists and to act as the pacemaker in social change.

However, the PCF has attempted to maintain a distinctive voice of its own, to prevent itself becoming submerged within the huge Socialist majority. Its attitude towards the government may be characterised as one of studied ambivalence, well summarised in the remark of Roland Leroy, a member of the *bureau politique*, in September 1981, that the PCF was 'a party in the government but not of the government'.

From the outset, defence and foreign policy have been two major areas of disagreement between the parties of the governing majority. Communist deputies refused to vote for the first clause of the new five-year Military Programme Law, which identified the Soviet Union as the major threat to French security. The PCF, whilst claiming that it supports the maintenance (and, im-

[7] Mme Thorez-Vermeersch could be said to represent the 'nostalgic Stalinists' within the party. See *Le Monde*, 19 and 26 April 1983.

[8] Charles Fiterman, Minister of State for Transport; Anicet Le Pors, Minister for Administrative Reform and the Civil Service; Marcel Rigout, Professional Education; and Jack Ralite, Employment. Since the cabinet reshuffle in March 1983, there have been only two Communist ministers (in a smaller cabinet), Fiterman and Rigout, both of whom have retained their portfolios.

plicitly, the modernisation) of the French nuclear deterrent, has adopted the Soviet argument that French and British nuclear forces should be taken into account at the Geneva talks. This option has been categorically rejected by President Mitterrand. The PCF's stance on Poland, particularly its attitude after the declaration of martial law in December 1981, and its refusal to support Solidarity, not only created friction between the Communists and Socialists, but proved unpopular among large sections of the Communist trade union, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT), and the party's ordinary members. The PCF has also sought to mark out its differences with respect to French policy in Chad and the Lebanon, in both cases expressing strong reservations about the role played by French troops. However, more recently Marchais has sought to play down such differences.

It is in the field of economic policy that the Communists' ambivalence has been most evident. The PCF has offered qualified support for government policy, whilst voicing its own economic objectives, and trying to distance itself from the harsher austerity measures. Thus, PCF deputies have publicly disagreed with the government on amendments that they claimed would water down a proposed wealth tax, and criticised proposals to change the financing of social security contributions. However, before the March 1983 municipal elections, such disagreements were relatively minor. Both Communists and Socialists were, of course, keenly aware of the need to maintain the cohesion of the left's electorate.

After these elections, the government introduced a major austerity package and proposed to speed up its passage through the National Assembly by recourse to a procedure that would prevent the usual vote on amendments. The Communists threatened to oppose this procedure unless some of their amendments were incorporated into the text. PCF deputies eventually supported the government, although the leader of the PCF group in the National Assembly, André Lajoinie, stressed that they were only partially satisfied by the concessions that had been made.

There have been growing difficulties between the majority partners over industrial policy. The government's decision to cut the coal industry's development programme led to the resignation of the coal board head and a member of the PCF Central Committee, Georges Valbon.[9] Government policy towards the ailing sectors of the French economy has also caused some friction. The Communists have emphasised the need to protect French industry; to win back domestic markets; and, above all, to maintain the purchasing power of workers. Such differences prompted a high-level meeting between Communist and Socialist leaders on 1 December 1983. This resulted in a decision to set up a joint working group to study economic and employment policy. However, the statement issued at the close of the meeting, whilst indicating some softening of PCF positions on Chad and the Lebanon, was sufficiently

[9] *Le Monde*, 15 and 16 November 1983. This episode illustrates the ambiguity of the PCF's position: despite Valbon's resignation, PCF deputies voted for the industry budget which contained the clauses that prompted Valbon's departure.

vague so as to enable both parties to seek their own interpretation of the text.[10]

Despite the participation of Communist ministers in the government, the PCF has continued to emphasise the importance of its activities at the grass-roots. Georges Marchais stated at the 24th congress that while accepting the demands of governmental solidarity, a revolutionary party such as the PCF must play its own original and independent role in the work-place and in the country at large. An important role has been assigned to Communist mass organisations, notably to the trade unions in the CGT and to a lesser extent to such bodies as the Communist-inspired *Mouvement de la Paix*. The role of the CGT is to act as the party's 'second iron in the fire', testing reaction to government policies at the grass-roots, and seeking to mobilise and channel any discontent. Thus, whilst remaining in government, the PCF can maintain its 'tribune role' as the articulator of grievances.

However, support for the CGT is gradually declining. The union dropped nearly 6 per cent in the 1982 works' committee elections. The most recent test of union strength, the social security council elections last October, marked a setback for left-wing trade unionism as a whole.[11] The decline of the CGT has paralleled that of the PCF and derives in large part from a similar failure to respond to the changing social structure of the working class. The recession has aggravated this difficulty, striking at the very heart of former bastions of union strength, the textile mills, the steel works and the mines. Furthermore, the close relationship between the CGT and the Communist Party, with the latter's return to pro-Sovietism and its unpopular stance on Poland, has increasingly harmed the Communist trade union. The CGT's former Secretary General, Georges Séguy, was clearly aware of this negative aspect of the relationship. However, his replacement by Henri Krasucki at CGT's 41st congress in June 1982, has led to greater discipline and a closer following of the party line. After the announcement in March 1983 of austerity measures the CGT has become increasingly vocal in its criticisms of government policy. There have been numerous strikes in the public service industries, with the CGT attempting to demonstrate that it is a muscular defender of the wage packet. In major disputes, such as those precipitated by the threatened closure of the paper mill at la Chapelle-Darblay, or the massive redundancies envisaged at the Talbot plant at Poissy, the CGT has achieved only qualified victories, obtaining some cuts in the numbers of jobs lost. In this last case, the CGT accepted the broad lines of a deal with the employers, negotiated with the help of the government and the Communist Minister for Employment, Jack Ralite. That agreement involved the sacking of nearly 2,000 immigrant workers, while protecting the jobs of the CGT's French members. The episode exposed the opportunism with which the CGT had earlier courted immigrant workers.

Recent years have witnessed a growing rapprochement between the French Communist Party and the Soviet Union. The PCF's criticism of the Soviet Union during the mid-1970s can now be seen as a temporary aberration. At its 23rd congress in 1979, the PCF described the balance sheet of the East Euro-

[10] *ibid.*, 3 December 1983. [11] *ibid.*, 22 October 1983.

pean societies as 'globally positive'. This was followed by Georges Marchais's visit to Moscow in January 1980, where the PCF leader appeared on television to justify the Soviet Union's recent invasion of Afghanistan. The PCF's world view has consistently contrasted the outlook of the 'progressive bloc' i.e.Eastern Europe, with that of 'imperialism', i.e. the west. On many international issues, such as the debate on cruise and Pershing missiles, the party has supported Soviet positions. The French Communists' stance on the Polish events—their failure to condemn the declaration of martial law and their denial of any Soviet involvement in Poland's internal problems—is markedly different from that of the Italian Communists. At its 24th congress, before a high-ranking Soviet delegation, the PCF asserted its faith in 'existing real socialism' and reaffirmed the party's position on Poland.

Between government and opposition

The immediate outlook for the French Communist Party appears bleak. The two main pillars of Communist strength, the party's trade union base and its municipal bastions, are slowly being eroded. The local elections of recent years have shown that the parties of the left no longer command the majority of support in the country. The unpopularity of the Communists, together with discontent at government policy, has produced a body of floating voters, *un électorat de déshérence,* whose support will be crucial for victory at any future electoral contest.[12] It is clear that the left faces a serious challenge at the legislative elections in 1986. The December 1983 meeting between Communist and Socialist leaders must be viewed in the context of the pressing need for the left to reconquer public opinion. But the two parties' objectives differed: the Socialists needed to extract the maximum degree of commitment from the PCF; the Communists wanted to retain two irons in the fire—participation in the government coupled with pressure from without. Both parties would be reluctant to be seen as precipitating a split. For the moment, the Communists are remaining in government. However, industrial policy will remain a major bone of contention.

The PCF's recent shift in emphasis and its attacks upon the government's economic and industrial policies raise the question of just how far such criticism can go, without necessitating a rupture. The party is in a difficulty. The unpopularity of present economic policies and the growth of discontent mean that if it tries to contain and channel criticism from the grass-roots, it runs the risk of being out-flanked by other forces. On the other hand, the Communist electorate displays a strong 'legitimist' tendency; opinion polls indicate considerable support for President Mitterrand.[13] Thus, the PCF might suffer losses in the short term, as a result of any rupture with the Socialists. Nevertheless, the party might still decide to return to the ghetto, renew its machine, and wait for 'the inevitable triumph of the forces of history'. This

[12] See Jérôme Jaffré, *Le Monde,* 12/13 June 1983.

[13] See Jérôme Jaffré, *ibid.,* 12/13 June 1983, together with recent opinion polls published in the provincial press and cited in *ibid.,* 1 December 1983.

may be a realistic option for the party. Unlike a 'bourgeois' party, it may rate organisational strength higher than purely electoral considerations. There is clearly a tension between the PCF's role as a party of struggle and an articulator of grievances on the one hand, and its broader aspiration to political power on the other. Yet its resilience should not be underestimated. It remains a formidable, albeit inert, organisation, with considerable power to survive.

Italy: a change but not a turning-point

HANSJAKOB STEHLE

IN 1976, two years before he was murdered, the Italian Christian Democrat, Aldo Moro, prophesied to his party that Italy's destiny was 'to some extent at least no longer in our hands'. Since then various attempts to control this destiny have succeeded each other: the years of 'national solidarity' (1976–9), during which the 'Communist question'—the constant problem of the post-war Italian republic—had been neutralised by involving the Communist Party in the responsibilities of government, were followed by years of lesser (though still far from 'historical') compromises and indecisions.[1] They did not, however, produce greater stability, merely a diminution in the interest taken in Italy's 'squabbles' by the rest of Europe and the world. Not until summer 1983 when, after its sixth Cabinet crisis in four years, Italy had resorted to early elections for the fourth time in eleven years, were all eyes suddenly focused in astonishment on a novelty: on 4 August 1983 a Socialist became head of the government for the first time—Bettino Craxi, heading the 43rd government of the post-war period.

This was made possible not by an election victory on the part of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), nor even by the shift to the left which had occurred—as in France—at the expense of the Communists. The PSI, with 11·4 per cent of the votes and only 1·6 per cent stronger than in 1979, was still only the third strongest party, far behind the Communists who, with 29·9 per cent

[1] For background see the author's 'The Italian experiment and the Communists', *The World Today*, January 1977; 'The Italian Communists on the parliamentary path to power', *ibid.*, May 1978; and 'Italy between compromise and paralysis', *ibid.*, December 1979. See also Tim Parks, 'The Italian paradox: individual prosperity, political bankruptcy', *ibid.*, July–August 1983; and John Eisenhammer, 'The Italian general election', *ibid.*, September 1983.

Dr Stehle is Italian Affairs correspondent of West German and North German Radio and a contributor to the weekly *Die Zeit*. This article is an abridged version of one which appears simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

(having lost only half of one per cent of votes as compared with 1979), held their ground better than they had dared to hope. But the fact that a Socialist was, nevertheless, able to take over the premiership, was thanks to the unexpectedly heavy election defeat suffered by Democrazia Cristiana (DC). But with 32·9 per cent of the votes, having lost 5·4 per cent, the DC still remained the strongest party—although with a lead of only 3 per cent, the narrowest in post-war history) over the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) which, with 29·9 per cent, remained the second strongest party.

This result highlights Italy's dissatisfaction with the thirty-eight years of Christian Democrat government, and shows just how far the fear of a Communist take-over has faded. This fear has always secured more votes than enthusiasm for the Christian Democrats.[2] For precisely that reason, however, the DC was confronted more starkly than ever, after the elections of June 1983, with something of a dilemma: whether to win back the PSI and the smaller 'lay' parties (Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals) for a viable five-party coalition government of the centre, even at the bitter cost of the post of Prime Minister; or to leave the way open for a coalition of the left under Communist leadership.

This second possibility has existed in theory since the Communists withdrew from the Christian Democrat embrace in 1979 and returned to opposition and then, at the end of 1980, abandoned their strategy of the 'historical compromise' with the DC to replace it with the goal of a 'democratic alternative'. Had such a left-wing alternative not been for a long time also the goal of the Socialists? Craxi, it is true, had never entirely disavowed it since assuming the leadership of the PSI in 1976, although he was much more concerned to give his party the image of an autonomous 'third force', free of Marxist ideology and nostalgia for the people's front. He attempted to push it into the social democratic centre ground which in Italy had always been occupied by others —from the right by left-wing Christian Democrats and from the left by reformist Communists. Between them, as the latest elections illustrate once again, they set strict limits to the growth of the PSI. By so doing, however, the two big parties restrict their own freedom of action: each of them, if it wants to remain (or become) capable of forming a government, is dependent on the PSI—a difficult partner, plagued with neuroses about its image.

After the 1979 elections, President Sandro Pertini attempted to place the PSI at the head of a coalition in order to neutralise the renewed confrontation between DC and PCI. He tried in vain at that time to persuade Bettino Craxi to undertake to form a government. In 1979 the DC was not, as four years later, shocked by an election defeat. The PCI, on the other hand, was: it had lost 4 per cent of the votes, although the Communists had not yet been affected by

[2] The simultaneous release, on 28 January 1981, of the American General, James Dozier, who had been kidnapped by terrorists, and the passing of a law on the same day which promised commuted sentences to repentant terrorists, represented a change in the battle against politically motivated terrorism. Between 1969 and 1980, 362 people had been murdered by terrorists. The equally murderous criminality of the Mafia and Camorra could not, however, be held in check.

the trauma of Afghanistan and Poland. As a result, a transitional government led by the left-wing Christian Democrat, Francesco Cossiga, was laboriously set up, which managed to survive for only seven months (from August 1979 until March 1980) thanks to the unwilling tolerance of the Socialists—with the support of Social Democrats and Republicans. In a period of high (22 per cent) inflation, Cossiga governed above all by emergency decrees. A second attempt at government on the part of Cossiga (from April to September 1980) was made possible only because Craxi's Socialists once again participated directly —for the first time in six years. In the meantime, the 14th party conference of the DC (at the beginning of March 1980) had cautiously signalled to the Socialists that the DC was now prepared to give them priority over the Communists as possible coalition partners.

Meanwhile, the next attempt at government undertaken by the Christian Democrat, Arnaldo Forlani, lasted scarcely seven months (from October 1980 until May 1981). It fell, not only because of the affair of the masonic lodge 'P2', one of the many scandals which complicated domestic politics, but also as a result of increasing competition between the most important coalition partners, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.

Bettino Craxi, confirmed as party leader at the congress of the PSI in Palermo in April 1981, now began to work quite openly for the highest price—the premiership. The regional elections in June 1980, in which the Socialists gained a small increase (12·7 instead of 10 per cent) did not improve the prospects for the 'third force'. Even so, two important new factors enabled Craxi to start playing a key role. They were the Communists' determination to enter into no more partial compromises with the Christian Democrats; and the DC's indecision as to whether they should maintain their position of leadership (*egemonia*) at the cost of ever greater concessions to their smaller coalition partners (above all to Craxi), or whether they should retreat into opposition and thus concede to the Communists the function of a democratic alternative. An interim solution was found in the attempt to cede the office of head of government to a non-Christian Democrat, for the first time since 1945: Giovanni Spadolini, who stepped up to lead a laboriously reunited coalition of five on 28 June 1981. Spadolini could not be a real danger to Christian Democrat pre-eminence because his political dynasty, the left-wing liberal Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI), had emerged from the 1979 elections with only a 3 per cent share in the votes.

During his thirteen months in office, Spadolini dealt hard blows to corruption and terrorism and put in train some of the most urgently needed reforms (such as that of social insurance). Yet even Spadolini failed to carry out the most important part of his economic programme—to keep inflation below 16 per cent and government deficit below 50 billion lire. At the beginning of August 1982, Craxi made use of a government defeat in a parliamentary vote to withdraw all seven Socialist ministers from Spadolini's cabinet and thus forced his resignation. Since, however, President Pertini refused even now to give in to Craxi's demand for new elections, Christian Democrats and

Socialists once more agreed to serve in a coalition under Spadolini's leadership; it lasted only 80 days and collapsed on 11 November 1982 as a result of a grotesque but significant quarrel between the Christian Democrat Treasury Minister and the Socialist Finance Minister.

A veteran, and in the view of most Italians, all too worn out Christian Democrat politician, Amintore Fanfani, was asked to form a government once again. Fanfani lacked both time and the solid support in the coalition which might have enabled him to govern effectively. In December 1982, the failure of Fanfani's government was beginning to become apparent. Ciriaco de Mita, who had been elected the Christian Democrat leader at the congress in May 1982, declared to the National Committee of the DC that a fear that the alternative course of action might lead to too much recognition for the PCI was 'unfounded'. He added that 'the DC and the PCI have taken up alternative positions in the administration of power, while mutually allowing each other scope for democratic competition.'[3]

Such an explicit democratic legitimation of the Italian Communists, articulated by the Christian Democrat party leader as if it were almost self-evident, had never been voiced in all the years of Communist support for the government majority. But even now the sensation caused was muted: de Mita had spoken in relation to a legislative which was already coming to an end, far removed from real prospects of a change in power, or the 'historical' compromise; and this was shortly before the PCI's party congress in March 1983, at which the party took stock of the past three years.

As the trail-blazers of a barely visible 'third way' between Soviet Communism and social democracy, Italy's Communists had remained 'in the middle of the ford',[4] between the river banks. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland had been giving them new incentives for reflection since 1980. These two crises were pointing the way, but at the same time they made the search for a separate, 'third', identity more difficult.

After the PCI leadership had condemned the intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a 'violation of the principles of independence and national sovereignty' on 4 January 1980, the leader of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer intensified this criticism in several speeches.[5] He spoke of 'the hardest blow to détente'; described the Red Army in Afghanistan as an 'army of occupation'; and asserted that in the Soviet Union itself democratic rights were 'in many respects trampled on and violated'. Soviet protests, which argued that the revolution in Afghanistan had needed rescuing, produced a riposte from the PCI party newspaper: 'Our terrorists also call themselves revolutionaries. The Soviet Union is paying a very high price in Afghanistan', wrote *Unità* on 25 April 1980, 'it is the discrediting—for how many generations?—of the idea of revolution as such.'

[3] See *Il Popolo,* 12 December 1983.

[4] *In mezzo al guado*—the title of a book by Giorgio Napolitano, a member of the PCI leadership, published in Rome in 1979.

[5] On 16 January 1980 in Strasbourg; 20 January in Terni; 25 January in Rome; 7 February on Italian television; and 17 February in Florence.

When, shortly afterwards, the crisis in Poland led to attempts to reform a system bearing the stamp of Soviet Communism, both the hopes and fears of the PCI strengthened. In the formation of the Solidarity trade union, the Italian party thought it recognised an example of socialist democracy in its own sense. The PCI and its associated trade union therefore expressed their support for the non-Communist Polish experiment just as unreservedly as they had done in 1968 in the case of Alexander Dubcek's Communist reforms. They were, accordingly, alarmed by the threatening gestures of the Soviet Union towards Poland. The declaration of martial law on 13 December led Berlinguer and his party to draw their own conclusions. On 30 December, the PCI leadership expressed its 'clear condemnation of the military take-over in Poland', and attributed to powerful Soviet pressure responsibility for the end of Solidarity; 'the success of which had been supported by millions of communist workers'. The model of socialism which the Soviet Union had passed on to Eastern Europe was 'unrepeatable and unacceptable'.

Did this mean the 'break' was complete? A series of indignant articles in the Soviet press suggested that conclusion, although Berlinguer had asserted, 'We are not seeking ruptures (*rotture*)'. However outrageous the standpoint of the PCI appeared to be to the Soviets, the Italian party resolutely refused to announce or accept a formal 'excommunication'. In contrast to the Soviet press, the PCI press published the full text of the other side's polemics, as well as the protests of Armando Cossutta, the only prominent opponent to Berlinguer inside the party. But the pro-Soviet backlash proved insignificant. The thesis that the 'political, governmental and ideological model which had been realised in the USSR had exhausted its driving force as the historical experience of Socialism' was elevated, at the party congress in March 1983, to a congress resolution, by a vote of 1,100 delegates—with only 7 votes against.

As a result, however, the PCI had obviously entered a phase of exhaustion as an 'alternative', or the 'third way'. The party remained just strong enough to be able to keep its second place in the 1983 elections. But the reverse the Democrazia Cristiana had sustained in these elections opened the way not only for Italo-Socialism as such, but also for the personal rise to power of Bettino Craxi, whose modest socialist ambitions now suited the changed Italian and international landscape of the 1980s.

As head of government, fenced in by predecessors whose downfall he himself had brought about (Forlani as his deputy, Spadolini as Defence Minister and Andreotti as Foreign Minister), Craxi has been trying since the autumn of 1983 (just as they did) to curb Italy's chronic economic crisis. But despite harsh budget cuts and extra taxes, the budget deficit rose from 90,000 billion lire to more than 100,000 bn by the end of 1983. There seemed little hope that Italy's 13 per cent inflation rate (more than four times higher than West Germany's) could this year be brought down to 10 per cent. The only hopeful developments were the restraint of the trade unions, and the behaviour of the PCI, which was becoming engrossed in an internal debate over the aims and methods of the party's role in opposition.

The Communists caused Craxi's government no trouble when it began to

become active in the field of foreign policy, which tends, in Rome, to be neglected. Italy became the first country to provide a base for the stationing of cruise missiles in 1981, in Comiso, Sicily, away from the mainland. Craxi defended the Nato decision, unworried by the peace movement, which is weak in Italy. The Italian parliament passed the decision after a low-key debate in a chamber which was only half full, by 351 votes to 219, on 16 November 1983. But at the same time, Craxi's Christian Democrat Foreign Minister, Andreotti, sent soothing signals to the Soviet Union, distancing ones to Washington, tried his hand as a Middle East mediator sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation Organisation and, as a result of all this, provoked public opposition from his left-wing and liberal cabinet colleagues.

It became clear from such paradoxical signs that the apparently static domestic political situation cannot be equated with stability. Craxi's ability to govern, just like his predecessors', depends upon the acquiescence of the coalition parties. Craxi is being helped by the political disenchantment which has become widespread in the country. In 1983 it led to the failure to vote, or the spoiling of ballot papers, by seven million Italians (14·7 per cent of the electorate)—more than ever before. But it also guarantees that the Communist opposition will not rock the boat, and allows the Christian Democrats, as jugglers in a process of 'permanent mediation', to continue to put themselves forward as an alternative to the Socialists.

Italy, that problematical democracy, may have been saved from catastrophe. It is unlikely that it will be spared rapid changes in governments and coalitions in the future, but it has as little grounds for fearing a real 'turning-point' as it has for hoping for one.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Notes of the month

ISRAEL UNDER SHAMIR

WHEN Yitzhak Shamir succeeded Menachem Begin as Israel's Prime Minister in October 1983, he presented his government as one of continuity. He endorsed with enthusiasm both the domestic and foreign policies of his famous predecessor. The state of the economy and the failure of Begin's 1982 invasion of Lebanon appeared to warrant a fundamental reappraisal and far-reaching changes in government policy, but the ideological commitment of the new leadership to laissez-faire economics and to Greater Israel worked to preserve a basic continuity.[1] With the general election coming up this year, it is in order to ask whether Mr Shamir has represented change or continuity in Israel's foreign policy, particularly towards the Arab world.

The most noticeable change has been one of personnel. For it was not only Mr Shamir who succeeded Mr Begin as the leader of the Likud bloc and Prime Minister; Moshe Arens replaced Ariel Sharon as Defence Minister, and Yigal Cohen-Orgad took over from Yoram Aridor as Finance Minister. The new leaders are much more pragmatic and work more harmoniously in a team than did their predecessors. Faced with a serious succession crisis, the Likud has managed to put forward a new leadership which has worked in a more competent and orderly manner than the previous one and has seemed intent on tackling the country's real problems.

For a number of reasons, however, the Shamir government has been much weaker than the Begin government and its hold on power has been more tenuous. In the first place, there is Shamir's own low-key style of leadership. Not possessing any of the charismatic qualities or oratorical skills that gave Mr Begin his towering pre-eminence on the Israeli political scene, Mr Shamir prefers to work quietly behind the scenes on a one-to-one basis. Contrary to his public image he is not a strong and decisive leader who imposes his own will on his colleagues but an indecisive man with a tendency to procrastinate and shirk difficult choices. A second and related problem is that Shamir has not established himself firmly as master in his own house, within the Likud bloc. David Levy, his popular deputy, and Ariel Sharon have challenged his authority on various occasions while the Liberal faction of the Likud continually discusses breaking away to set up an independent centre party. Third, Shamir has presided over a fragile coalition government with only 64 supporters in the 120-member Knesset. The partners in this coalition have not shown that they can either agree on a coherent economic strategy or carry through the drastic measures necessary for the sake of national recovery.

The Finance Minister, Mr Cohen-Orgad, did put forward a plan for an across-the-board 9 per cent cut in all government spending, including

[1] For background to the Lebanon invasion, see Sam Younger's Note, 'Israel and Lebanon', *The World Today*, July–August 1982.

defence, settlements and welfare. But each member of the Likud coalition resisted some of the proposed cuts. The small ultra-nationalist Tehiya party warned the Finance Minister that if there were any freeze, total or partial, on the building of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, it would secede from the government. The Tami party, also with three seats in the Knesset, threatened to topple the government if social services were cut. On 22 March the Tami party left the government coalition and supported a motion tabled by the opposition Labour Alignment for an early election. The party is led by the former Religious Affairs Minister, Aharon Abu-Hatzeira, who has recently served a prison sentence for corruption. The National Religious Party, exercising its customary stranglehold over all Israeli governments, threatened to withdraw its support if free secondary school education were abolished in favour of a graduated fees system.

Under the circumstances, Cohen-Orgad was unable to fulfil his statutory duty of presenting a budget to the Knesset 20 days before the beginning of the new financial year. Like his three Likud predecessors, he is in danger of getting overwhelmed by the welter of conflicting pressures and irreconcilable claims. The Shamir government has made no progress with economic reform. Unless it gains some control over the country's economic performance, the opposition Labour Alignment will intensify its attacks and the government's chances of re-election will be called increasingly into question.

In the foreign policy sphere, Shamir has not tried to introduce any fundamental changes. This is hardly surprising in view of his close personal involvement as Foreign Minister with the Likud's nationalistic and expansionist policy in the aftermath of its second victory at the polls in June 1981.[2] Within the Likud bloc, Shamir and his top ministers belong to Begin's Herut party which regards the West Bank as an inalienable part of the Jewish homeland. Shamir, Arens and Cohen-Orgad all belong to the uncompromising and hawkish school of thought in Israeli politics. All three were opposed to the Camp David accords. Arens and Cohen-Orgad actually voted against the ratification of the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, while Shamir abstained.[3]

The peace process between Israel and Egypt remains frozen. It was put to a severe test by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon which left the Egyptians bitter, humiliated and utterly disenchanted with their new Israeli partners. Begin's departure could be seen as an opportunity to salvage something from the wreckage, to arrest the deterioration in Egyptian-Israeli relations. But Shamir has never even visited Cairo. With his well-known reservations on the subject of the 1979 peace treaty, he is hardly the ideal candidate for performing this crucial task, nor does he possess the human qualities or the political commitment necessary for reactivating the peace process with Egypt.

Similarly, and for very much the same reasons, Shamir made no attempt to

[2] For background see Yehonathan Tommer's Note, 'Mr Begin carries on', *The World Today*, September 1981.

[3] See Patrick Seale, 'The Egypt–Israel Treaty and its implications', *ibid.*, May 1979.

deviate from the course charted by Begin in relation to the West Bank. True, Arens is decidedly more polite and civil in his handling of Arab mayors, but the thrust of official policy remains unchanged. The same Basic Guidelines of Government Policy endorsed by the Knesset in 1981 when Begin presented his second government remain valid and binding on all the parties in the coalition. These guidelines state that 'after the transition period laid down in the Camp David accords, Israel will reassert its claim and will act to realise its rights to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.'

No amount of semantic acrobatics can square these official guidelines with the Camp David agreement to leave the status of the territories to be determined during the transition period by negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the territories. In the meantime, Shamir's government continues to prejudice the final status of the territories and to give effect to its claim to Jewish sovereignty over the West Bank by pursuing the policy of creeping annexation.

Only over Lebanon has Shamir's accession to power been accompanied by a distinct policy change. This change does not stem from any dovish inclinations which Shamir might have nursed secretly. On the contrary, he was one of the four principal architects, alongside Begin, Sharon and the Chief of Staff, Rafael Eytan, of the 1982 operation 'Peace for the Galilee', to use the war's official misnomer. Rather, this change has been dictated by the collapse of their joint hope for a new political order in Lebanon and a peace treaty with Lebanon's Maronite rulers, which, like the earlier peace treaty with Egypt, would facilitate the incorporation of the West Bank into Greater Israel.

Shortly before their trip to Washington last November, Shamir and Arens were handed a paper prepared in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Planning Division. The content of this classified paper, as with so many Israeli state secrets, was leaked to the press. According to a report in the independent daily, *Haaretz*, on 2 December 1983, the document revealed the magnitude of the failure of the Israeli operation to achieve its objectives in Lebanon. The balance sheet drawn up by the defence planners was almost entirely negative. They saw no prospect of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in the short or medium term and estimated that deployment along the Awali river line would not give Israel sufficient leverage to change this Syrian stand. The paper's principal recommendation was for the earliest possible withdrawal of the Israeli army, accompanied by steps to prevent terrorist activities in the south, and to deny Syria strategic advantages that might threaten Israel.

Shamir and Arens could not altogether disregard the considered opinion of the defence establishment. One of the most urgent tasks of the new government was to liquidate the Lebanese adventure which was growing increasingly unpopular inside and outside the army and costing the country $1 million a day. On the other hand, unilateral Israeli withdrawal would have been tantamount to an admission of failure by the Likud. It also ran counter to a new and tougher trend that was manifesting itself in America's policy towards Syria. And so just as signs of willingness to compromise began to

appear from Jerusalem, Washington decided to stiffen its position and insist on a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces in accordance with the 17 May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese accord which the Secretary of State, George Shultz, had helped to negotiate in the face of strong resistance by Syria. By the time Shamir and Arens arrived in Washington, the Shultz school of thought which regards Israel as a strategic ally had triumphed over the rival school of thought led by the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who regards Israel as a strategic liability. This triumph, enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 111, led American officials to loosen the purse strings and embark on strategic cooperation talks with their Israeli visitors.

Within the new framework of strategic understanding worked out during the visit, Israel agreed to several clauses that would limit its freedom of decision and tie it more closely to American policy objectives. Israel agreed:

(1) Not to initiate another unilateral withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon, as long as American marines remained on Lebanese territory;
(2) Not to initiate a major act of war against Syria without prior consultation with Washington;
(3) The United States and Israel would, together, examine and decide upon the most appropriate ways of exerting 'constant, tactical and if necessary strategic pressure' on Syria, in order to make it agree to enter into negotiations with the Gemayel government on a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

As subsequent events in Beirut were soon to show, this policy of toughness vis-à-vis Syria had the opposite effect to that desired by its proponents. By insisting on the 17 May accord which gave special rights to Israel and ignored Syrian interests, the Reagan Administration inadvertently helped to isolate and weaken President Gemayel and to strengthen his Syrian, Druze and Shiite opponents. The much vaunted American-Israeli-Maronite front did not prove equal to the task of deterring Syria or keeping at bay the opposition to the Gemayel regime. When the embattled President Gemayel abrogated the May accord in order to appease his domestic opponents, Shamir indicated the new direction of Israeli policy by announcing that he would aim for security arrangements in south Lebanon independently of the Lebanese government and army. The precipitate withdrawal of the American marines from Beirut in February 1984 dealt a further blow to the hopes pinned by Israel on Gemayel. It forced Shamir and his colleagues to steel themselves for a Lebanon without Gemayel, and to begin to give serious consideration to further Israeli army withdrawals.

The short-lived and ill-fated American-Israeli axis in Lebanon could only temporarily obscure the fundamental differences between the two allies on the broader issues of Middle East peacemaking. The Reagan Administration is committed to a settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and some form of Palestinian self-rule in association with Jordan. The Shamir government, like its predecessor, is committed to asserting Jewish sovereignty over the whole 'Land of Israel'. The two programmes are anti-

thetical and mutually exclusive. Friction between the two governments is likely to intensify if the Reagan Administration becomes more active in its efforts to promote an Egyptian-Jordanian-Arafat alliance that might breathe new life into the Reagan plan of September 1982.

Paradoxically, there could be no greater threat to Shamir and his colleagues than the acceptance by the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat, of Israel's right to exist, and his expression of willingness to participate in the Middle East peacemaking process. This paradox disappears when one recalls the fundamental ideology that lies at the heart of the Likud's international behaviour. And it is this ideology, with its claim to Jewish sovereignty over Judea and Samaria and its uncompromising rejection of any Palestinian right to self-determination, that has also accounted for the remarkable continuity accompanying the transition from the Begin to the Shamir era in Israeli politics.

AVI SHLAIM*

*The author is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Reading. This article is based on a talk Dr Shlaim recently gave at Chatham House.

MUCH ADO IN THE BALKANS

COMING on top of the simmering dispute over Cyprus, the Saros Bay incident of 8 March, involving Greek and Turkish warships and the subsequent recall of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, was a reminder that in the Balkans, once labelled the 'powder keg of Europe', traditional enmities die hard. The Greek Foreign Ministry's charges that Turkey's 'provocation' had been the direct result of American aid to that country furthermore emphasised the international ramifications of the affair, particularly its effect on the Nato alliance.

However, while the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, seemed quite happy to stir up this particular wasps' nest for domestic political advantage, similar motives in the preceding months had led him to stake his prestige on the success of a Balkan initiative designed to highlight his dogged pursuit of peace in the region. A Greek-sponsored conference for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans opened in Athens on 16 January. Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria were represented by their ambassadors while Turkey attended only as an observer. The conference laboured against insurmountable obstacles in the shape of the participants' diverging interests. Conspicuous failure was avoided only by the decision to adjourn after two days for a month. By the time the second round took place—from 13 to 18 February—little remained of the original impetus. At the insistence of Turkey (and as the price of its participation), the explosive nuclear issue had been demoted to the bottom of the agenda, which now concentrated on non-controversial procedures for continuing dialogue on technical and economic cooperation issues.

Ever since coming to power in October 1981, the Papandreou government has promoted nuclear disarmament as a major aim of its foreign policy. Its pro-

posal last summer to include a moratorium on the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles on the agenda of European political cooperation, which was designed to improve its left-wing credentials at home and abroad, upset Greece's partners in the European Community. Even a Socialist sympathiser like Olof Palme[1] found the Papandreou government's blanket endorsement of the 'peace' movements in Europe lacking in balance (Athens hosted several 'peace' congresses, the last of which took place at the beginning of February with participants from both east and west). The Swedish Prime Minister pointed out that, in the Greek perspective, the missiles of the Soviet Union appeared to loom less large than those of the Nato allies.

Turkey, the only other country in the Balkans besides Greece known to have stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons on its soil as part of its Nato commitment, at first threatened to boycott the conference. It adroitly used Greece's desire to avoid the scuttling of its initiative to impose a revised agenda for the second round. Clearly perceiving regional neutralisation as a threat to its security, Ankara argued that the denuclearisation of the Balkans made no sense apart from general disarmament in Europe guaranteed by the super-powers.

These reservations were shared by Yugoslavia, despite its general support for a Balkan conference. Belgrade insisted that, to be effective, any Balkan disarmament agreement would need endorsement by the great powers. In addition, Yugoslav comment reflected specific national concerns. In stressing that all countries in the region must be drawn into the disarmament process, the Yugoslavs clearly had in mind Albania, which refused to attend the Athens conference and meanwhile pursues a relentless anti-Yugoslav campaign over the issue of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia's autonomous province of Kosovo.[2] The Yugoslav delegate at the Balkan conference argued that claims based on 'historic rights' represented a factor of instability in the region. This charge, repeated during the second round, was a transparent allusion to the long-standing feud with Bulgaria over Macedonia. Officially, Bulgaria has repeatedly renounced all territorial claims regarding Macedonia; but Bulgarian historians have been given the green light to write on the subject of Macedonia's place in Bulgarian history and letters, thus feeding Belgrade's suspicions that Sofia is keeping up the pressure with the blessing of Moscow.

In the past, Bulgaria has been reluctant to engage in multilateral regional negotiations. It has preferred to seek trade and general cooperation agreements with each neighbour separately. Nevertheless, Sofia had advocated the creation of a 'zone of peace' in the Balkans for over a decade. The celebrations of the 1,300-year jubilee of the birth of the Bulgarian state in 1981 provided yet another opportunity to relaunch the idea. In wresting the initiative from its original promoter, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, the Bulgarian party leader, Todor Zhivkov, was seen widely as a surrogate of

[1] In 1982, the Palme Commission proposed a 150-km nuclear-free zone on either side of the dividing line between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and Nato.

[2] See Patrick Artisien and R. A. Howells, 'Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo riots', *The World Today*, November 1981.

the Soviet Union in its attempts to neutralise Nato's southern flank. A recent commentary in the Zagreb daily, *Vjesnik*, speculated that Bulgaria may have been chosen now as one of the countries where new Soviet medium-range missiles would be sited in response to the deployment of the Pershings; the newspaper attempted to link the important leadership changes announced in Sofia at the beginning of January to possible dissensions between Bulgarian advocates and opponents of Soviet deployments. Similar suggestions in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that Bulgaria may have its own reasons for promoting a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans drew vehement protestations from Sofia that it was acting in perfect unison with other Communist countries. The Bulgarian party daily, *Rabotnichesko Delo* (12 January), quoted the communiqué of the Moscow conference of Soviet and east European central committee secretaries, published on 10 December, as proof of 'our unanimous and common stand' on this issue. And, in Athens, the Bulgarian Ambassador, Rayko Nikolov, emphasised the Soviet Union's 'positive attitude' to the Balkan enterprise.

The bland communiqué issued at the conclusion of the conference referred to the 'next meeting of experts', which is to examine the results achieved so far and Romania's proposal to hold the next stage of the conference in Bucharest in the course of this year.

While Turkey's participation made it possible for the Greek Prime Minister to claim that the Balkan conference had been a success, it also underlined its very limited scope for action. Ankara's stalling may not have been entirely unwelcome to Sofia, Bucharest and Belgrade because of the differences of their own approaches. All that can be said with certainty is that the Athens conference has not only failed to advance the objective of a Balkans free of nuclear weapons, but that it has also done little to resolve the old tensions in the region, despite its endorsement of the inviolability of frontiers proclaimed by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

Indeed, only three days after the conference closed, Andreas Papandreou again hit out at Turkey. In a speech delivered at the officers' club at Ioannina on 21 February, he said that the Ankara regime remained a military dictatorship despite the trappings of democracy 'presented in order to appease foreigners' and accused it of aiming at 'partition or co-sovereignty in the Aegean'. The Greek Premier also gave notice that Greece intended to take up the question of the human rights of Greeks in Albania. His emphasis on Greece's commitment to Hellenism, 'whether that is in Turkey, in Albania, or anywhere in the world', promised continuing dissensions in the Balkans, just as his warning to Nato allies 'who, due to strategic and short-term priorities, prefer not to displease Turkey' is bound to add to the alliance's problems.

LILIANA BRISBY*

*The author, a specialist on Balkan affairs, was the Editor of *The World Today* from 1975 to 1983.

The Soviet succession: from Andropov to Chernenko

ARCHIE BROWN

HAVING had two leaders in succession (Brezhnev and Andropov) who were for quite long periods too infirm to carry out their duties fully, the Soviet Union is now led by the 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko. He has made history by becoming the first General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party to be appointed to that office when already a septuagenarian. On the face of it, the Soviet 'selectorate' (the full and candidate members of the Politburo, together with Secretaries of the Central Committee, among whom only the Politburo's full members are able to vote, and the Central Committee, in plenary session, who have to ratify the Politburo's choice) made a strange decision. To succeed a man who had tried to breathe new life into the Soviet system but whose own health had taken a fateful (and ultimately fatal) downward turn within months of his coming to the General Secretaryship, they selected an even older man who has within the past year or so been less robustly healthy than he appeared to be in the 1970s and who was, furthermore, exceptionally closely identified with Leonid Brezhnev's style of rule, from which Yuri Andropov had been making an effort to depart.[1]

Yet the choice of Chernenko is by no means inexplicable. Each Soviet General Secretary has been able to establish himself in that post as part of a process of reaction against the leadership style of his predecessor. Nikita Khrushchev did not instantaneously emerge as the top leader following Stalin's death in March 1953, but he obtained and consolidated his position as First Secretary of the Central Committee (as the General Secretaryship was known from 1953 until 1966) by revitalising an almost moribund party and by openly challenging Stalin's style of rule—even if he could never wholly escape from its influence. As time went by, Khrushchev acted in an increasingly high-handed manner, bypassing his colleagues, and engaging in large-scale administrative reorganisations which were much resented by the institutions involved.

That Brezhnev was chosen by his Politburo colleagues to replace Khrushchev owed much to their assessment that he would be a far more cautious leader than Khrushchev, one who would rule to a much greater degree by consensus, and who would respect the interests of the various elements which make up the Soviet 'establishment'. In this assessment they were correct, but 'stability of cadres' rewarded longevity rather than ability to innovate. Refusal to contemplate significant economic reform was accom-

[1] See, for example, David Wedgwood Benn, 'Problems of authority in the Soviet Union', *The World Today*, March 1984.

The author is a Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford, and Lecturer in Soviet Institutions at Oxford University.

panied by declining growth rates (even though the Soviet standard of living remained well below that of western countries). There was also a widespread feeling in Soviet society that corruption and other forms of crimes were on the increase and that the country had lost its sense of direction.

Thus, when Brezhnev died in November 1982, there were clearly those in the Soviet leadership who felt that what was needed was not 'Brezhnevism without Brezhnev', but the smack of firm government. Brezhnev's consensus style may have seemed a virtue (in contrast with his predecessor's bold assertiveness), but in the last years of his life when there was little to show for the attempt in the 1970s to improve relations with the United States, for the vast investment in agriculture, or for the 'scientific and technological revolution' supposedly taking place in Soviet industry, a significant section of the Soviet political elite decided that the time had come for a bolder lead from the top.

Thus, Andropov came to power committed to stamping out complacency and corruption, determined to impose discipline, more receptive to ideas of economic reform than his predecessor, and conscious of the need for a rejuvenation of the party and state apparatus in which comparative youth and professional competence would count for more than long-standing acquaintanceship with the General Secretary.[2] As early as February 1983 Andropov's health began to fail.[3] The last time he was well enough to meet foreigners was in August of that year when he held discussions with a group of American senators. But he did push ahead with the implementation of these goals. During Andropov's 15 months of office, over a fifth of the Moscow-based members of the USSR Council of Ministers, more than a fifth of the regional party secretaries and over a third of the heads of department of the party's Central Committee were replaced. Most of the new appointees were younger men. (Under Brezhnev it was not at all uncommon for a young man to be replaced by one much older or for an old man to be replaced by one of similar age. Thus, in May 1977, the 49-year-old Konstantin Katushev had to make way as a Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of relations with Communist countries for the 68-year-old Konstantin Rusakov, and when the 76-year-old Aleksei Kosygin, already mortally ill, was forced to resign in October 1980 from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, his place was taken by Nikolai Tikhonov, then aged 75.)

Andropov's rejuvenation policy undoubtedly posed a threat to many members of the Soviet political elite, as did his campaign for stricter discipline and a crackdown on corruption. Andropov ended the political careers of two men who had been close to Brezhnev and Chernenko. Sergei Medunov was

[2] For elaboration of these points in an article written at the outset of Andropov's General Secretaryship, see Archie Brown, 'Andropov: Discipline *and* Reform?', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 32, No. 1, January–February 1983, pp. 18–31.

[3] Two days after Andropov's death on 9 February 1984, a medical bulletin signed by 11 leading Soviet doctors noted that the late General Secretary had suffered from diabetes, chronic kidney deficiency and, latterly, cardiovascular deficiency, and that as early as February 1983 he had begun to receive treatment on a kidney machine; this treatment had enabled him to continue to work until January of this year. See *Pravda*, 11 February 1984, p. 1.

removed from the regional party secretaryship of Krasnodar in August 1982 (that is, after Andropov had returned to the Secretariat of the Central Committee but before he became General Secretary), and Nikolai Shchelokov was sacked as Minister of Internal Affairs in December 1982. Both of them were expelled from the Central Committee in June 1983.[4] Many appointees of the Brezhnev era who, after all, constituted a substantial majority in both the Politburo and the Central Committee must have realised that Andropov would not adopt the 'Brezhnevist attitude to cadres' wished upon him by Chernenko in the latter's speech nominating Andropov for the General Secretaryship in November 1982.[5]

Thus, just as Andropov's selection for the General Secretaryship was, in part, a response to the mood—not of Chernenko and those closest to Brezhnev, but of others in the leadership—that it was time for a change of leadership style, so Chernenko's elevation to the highest political post can be seen as a yearning for the *status quo ante* and a reaction to the more abrasive approach of Andropov and the insecurity of tenure which the brisk start he made to his General Secretaryship seemed to betoken. The choice of Chernenko is all the more explicable if he lost the General Secretaryship to Andropov in November 1982 as narrowly as some accounts would suggest.

Though many different, and conflicting, rumours have circulated on the divisions within the leadership at the time of the succession to Brezhnev, perhaps the most intriguing version is the claim that the Politburo initially voted 6–5 for Chernenko. Of the 14-man Politburo elected at the 26th party congress in 1981, Suslov and Brezhnev had died, and Kirilenko had been dropped from the leadership in early October 1982. Thus only 11 voting members of the Politburo remained. According to the rumour which gave Chernenko a majority on the first vote, Chernenko, Grishin, Kunayev, Pelshe, Tikhonov and Shcherbitsky voted for Chernenko, while Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Gorbachev and Romanov voted for Andropov. It was argued in the Politburo, according to this account, that a 6–5 majority was too narrow a one on which to choose a General Secretary and after an adjournment the Politburo voted unanimously for Andropov.

Though such a rumour cannot, of course, be substantiated (and it must be emphasised that it is but one of a number of versions of the line-up in the Politburo in November 1982, with others giving Andropov a clear majority from the outset), it has a certain plausibility. The two younger men said to be for Andropov—Gorbachev and Romanov—were soon to be rewarded by promotion. Romanov was accorded a Secretaryship of the Central Committee in June 1983, thus bringing him into the select group of powerful people who combine a foothold in the Secretariat with voting membership of the Politburo; Gorbachev, who already possessed those advantages, had his Secretarial overlordship duties extended, so that they included not only agriculture but other areas of the economy and, importantly, supervision of the Secretary responsible for party appointments (first Kapitonov and then his successor,

[4] *Pravda*, 16 June 1983, p. 1. [5] *ibid.*, 13 November 1982, p. 2.

Ligachev).[6] Already under Brezhnev (and up to the present under Chernenko), Gorbachev was apparently also supervising the Administrative Organs department of the Central Committee which brings the armed forces, the Committee for State Security (KGB), the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and the Ministry of Justice, among other bodies, within his purview.[7]

If it seems strange that the subsequent unanimous vote did not go to the person who initially received what Khrushchev, on a famous occasion, dubbed 'a so-called arithmetical majority', it is less strange when the political weight of the two groups is examined. Two of the three Secretaries of the Central Committee with full membership of the Politburo were for Andropov, as were those members of the Politburo with defence and foreign affairs responsibilities. Four of the six votes for Chernenko, if this story has any foundation, were Brezhnev clients (Chernenko himself, Tikhonov, Kunayev and Shcherbitsky) whose political standing could not but be diminished by the demise of their patron.

All four of those Brezhnev protégés, whose positions began to look threatened during Andropov's brief ascendancy, were still there when Andropov died, as was Grishin. It required only two more votes from the now 12-man Politburo (Pelshe and Andropov having died and Aliyev, Solomentsev and Vorotnikov having been promoted to voting membership) to secure a majority for Chernenko. It would not be surprising if some of the others hesitated to support the candidacy of the youngest member of the Politburo, Mikhail Gorbachev (at that time 52, now 53). Anyone with the remotest aspiration to the top job might well demur on the grounds that Gorbachev could quite possibly spend the next 20 years in the General Secretaryship. Others might be put off by the fact that, of all Politburo members, he had revealed the most sympathy for measures of economic reform and for renewal of cadres. Yet it is clear that Andropov was grooming Gorbachev for the succession[8] and that of the three Secretaries of the Central Committee with voting membership of the Politburo who constituted the front runners for the succession,[9] it was he, rather than Romanov, who was Chernenko's closest challenger.

[6] Some of the evidence for this is collected in Jerry F. Hough's article, 'Andropov's First Year', in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 32, No. 6, November-December 1983, pp. 49–64. See also *The Times*, 18 February 1984, p. 5.

[7] The evidence for this from the Brezhnev and Chernenko General Secretaryships includes Gorbachev's signature of the obituary of S.K. Tsvigun, *Pravda*, 21 January 1982, p. 2, and the obituary of Marshal Batitsky, *ibid.*, 19 February 1984, p. 3.

[8] Hough, 'Andropov's First Year', esp. pp. 60–3.

[9] Rather belatedly, western observers are coming to recognise the importance for a serious contender for the General Secretaryship of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to combine full Politburo membership with a Secretaryship of the Central Committee. Writing while Brezhnev was still alive, I suggested:

'This is a logical requirement for the General Secretary who, as his title suggests, is head of the Secretariat as well as chairman of the Politburo. Apart from the desirability of his having gained experience of the workings of both bodies, there is a sufficiently strong sense of hierarchy within the Soviet political establishment to make it difficult either for someone who

To the outsider, it may seem barely credible that Gorbachev's age at the time of Andropov's death (52) should be regarded as more of a disadvantage than Chernenko's age of 72. There may indeed have been some even among the most elderly Politburo members who favoured the younger man. Gorbachev, after all, would surely have been happy to retain the vast experience and considerable abilities of a Gromyko or an Ustinov for as long as each was capable of doing his job. Yet the troubling paradox for thoughtful members of the Soviet Communist Party must be that the choice which was probably in the broad interests of the Soviet system was not in the narrow individual interests of a majority of members of the Politburo and of the Central Committee.

There are other reasons why Chernenko was able to make a successful comeback, having lost out in his first bid for the the top post in 1982. One is that it takes time for a new General Secretary to bring in his supporters and to consolidate his power base and what Andropov lacked most of all was time. Despite the fact that, as I have discussed at greater length elsewhere,[10] the General Secretary inherits a top leadership team which cannot instantly be changed (and in this respect at least is in an unfavourable power position as compared with in-coming American Presidents or most in-coming west European heads of government), Andropov made a more substantial start to changing the voting membership of the Politburo than any of his predecessors achieved in their first 15 months of office. Immediately after his death, the top leadership team as a whole—full and candidate members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee—consisted of 23 people. Just over a sixth of them (Vorotnikov, Ryzhkov, Ligachev and Chebrikov) were brought into that inner circle during Andropov's brief tenure of the General Secretaryship, while as many as a quarter of the voting members of the Politburo (Aliyev, Solomentsev and Vorotnikov) received their promotions to full membership during Andropov's 15 months.

---

has attended the Politburo in a non-voting capacity (as a candidate member or as a Secretary of the Central Committee) to leap-frog over the entire membership into the chairman's seat or for someone who (albeit a full member of the Politburo) has never attended the weekly Wednesday meetings of the Secretariat to turn up for the first time in the capacity of General (that is leading) Secretary.'

(Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (eds.), *Soviet Policy for the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1982), chapters on 'Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation', pp. 223–53, at p. 233 and 'Postscript: July 1982', pp. 267–72, esp. p. 267).

Both the successions which have taken place since then have, like previous Soviet successions, produced leaders from within that narrow circle of those possessing joint membership of these two key institutions. It may be objected that a number of east European party leaders have reached the top without such dual institutional footholds, but this merely illustrates the higher degree of institutionalisation of the Soviet system and the extent to which influence outside of the indigenous political elite may have a profound effect on the succession outcome in eastern Europe—whether the influence of the mass of the people (as in Gomulka's accession to power in 1956) or the pressures of the Soviet leadership (as in Dubcek's replacement by Husak in 1969).

[10] See Brown, 'Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation', in Brown and Kaser (eds.), *op. cit.* For a different view, see Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Yet, as Andropov's health deteriorated, Konstantin Chernenko was able to win back some of the influence which he was visibly losing in the earliest months of Andropov's power. It was he who must have chaired the Politburo and Secretariat meetings when Andropov was unfit to take his seat, and this was but one of his advantages.

Another was that in the Central Committee, a body which has had to be taken seriously in the post-Stalin era, people appointed during the Brezhnev years continued to predominate. It is of some consequence that the composition of the Central Committee can be changed only at a party congress. In between, the best a General Secretary can do is to have someone promoted from candidate to full membership of the Central Committee; if the person is not already a candidate, nothing can be done until the next congress. Andropov came to power less than two years after the last party congress and died two years before the next one was due. Thus, even a number of officials appointed under Andropov to those regional party secretaryships which normally carry Central Committee membership remain outside the latter body. This means that they did not have a vote during the plenary session which unanimously elected Chernenko to the General Secretaryship on 13 February 1984. Also, and more important, it means that they would be excluded from any informal sounding of Central Committee opinion which preceded Andropov's death or which took place between his selection by the Politburo[11] and the ratification of that decision by the Central Committee in plenary session.

Chernenko, at any rate, has had more than enough support (or, at least, more than enough control over the mass media) to enable him to receive more favourable publicity in the Soviet press than any previous General Secretary had during his first month of office. This has included extensive tributes to him in the published messages of congratulation of foreign Communist leaders, frequent citation of him as the apparent ultimate authority on matters great and small, and even an article in *Pravda* co-authored by his daughter just 10 days after Andropov's death.[12] Though the article was a tribute, on the centenary of his birth, to the old Bolshevik and party propagandist, Maksimilian Savelev (1884–1939), and did not mention Konstantin Chernenko, its appearance was another sign that Chernenko's style of rule was likely to have more in common with that of Leonid Brezhnev than of Yuri Andropov.

It has already been made known unofficially that Chernenko is chairman of the Defence Council[13] and an opportunity will arise very soon to complete his early elevation to the third of the three authoritative posts held by Brezhnev

[11] The Politburo decision almost certainly was made on 10 February, within 24 hours of Andropov's death. The Soviet leaders abhor any element of a power vacuum and for that reason alone would be likely to move quickly to a decision on the General Secretaryship. A strong signal that Chernenko had already been chosen came with the announcement the day after Andropov's death that he had been selected as chairman of Andropov's funeral commission; no-one needed a long memory to recall that Andropov had been placed in formal charge of Brezhnev's funeral arrangements.

[12] *Pravda*, 19 February 1984, p. 6.

[13] *International Herald Tribune*, 28 February 1984, p. 1.

and Andropov before him—namely, the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. If, as seems likely, Chernenko attains that post, we can begin to regard it as a 'constitutional convention', albeit one dating from as recently as 1977,[14] that the formal headship of state goes with the leadership of the party.

In terms of political activity, what does the elevation of Konstantin Chernenko to the party leadership mean? In the first place, given his age, it means that he may have to devote a great deal of time and effort to influencing and regulating the struggle between different tendencies and different personalities within the Soviet leadership, since many policy issues remain unresolved and since there will be a strong expectation of yet another change of General Secretary in the course of the 1980s. Within the Soviet system there is a strong disposition to refer matters upwards for decision which means, among other things, that the strains of office of General Secretary are considerable. Those within the Soviet political elite who favour Chernenko's style and approach may be satisfied if he remains physically and politically strong enough to guide the preparation and proceedings of the 27th Party Congress in 1986 and to exert a significant influence over personnel policy.

In Soviet foreign policy continuity may be expected. Chernenko is likely to adopt the same—on the whole, cautious—approach as was followed under Brezhnev and Andropov. The Soviet leadership collectively, in which Gromyko and Ustinov remain highly influential figures, will, however, continue to take basic foreign policy decisions. These are not a matter for the individual judgement of the General Secretary, especially one in the early stages of his party leadership and who does not have the background knowledge of the international scene possessed by his predecessor. It is with some foundation (apart, perhaps, from making more of the formal role of the Supreme Soviet than is justifiable in practical political terms) that the prominent Soviet political analyst, Alexander Bovin, recently remarked: 'It is of course rather difficult to convince the western public that the basic Soviet foreign policy line is determined not by Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko, but by the highest bodies of our party and the USSR Supreme Soviet.'[15]

There is unlikely to be any improvement in Soviet-American relations before the presidential election in November. It was always a misreading of likely Soviet reactions to imagine that the sharp increase in the American military budget and the placing of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe would herald a Soviet rush to the conference table. Before the American presidential election, the Soviet Union is likely to concentrate more on im-

[14] On the significance of the General Secretary combining the party leadership with the headship of state, see my chapters, 'Political Developments, 1975–1977', in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (eds.), *The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev* (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1978), pp. 299–329, esp. pp. 308–9; and 'The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU' in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway (eds.), *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 135–57, esp. pp. 141–3.

[15] Bovin was taking part in an interview for Czechoslovak radio. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/7584/C/1, 6 March 1984.

proving its relations with west European countries than with the United States. So far as the short-term prospect of a Soviet-American summit meeting is concerned, Bovin is almost certainly representative of official Soviet opinion when he says that 'to be frank, I would not even want such a meeting to take place; because, after all, in the current situation it would mean throwing a life-belt to Reagan, and I think there is no need to throw him such a belt.'[16]

It is in economic and personnel policy that some differences within the Soviet leadership are to be discerned. Thus, Chernenko in his Supreme Soviet election speech[17] spoke in rather general terms about 'restructuring the economic mechanism on a broad front'. He certainly did not dissociate himself from the economic experimentation under way, but Gorbachev's election address, delivered two days earlier,[18] put these points more strongly. Gorbachev spoke of 'the party and people' being determined 'to strengthen and develop the positive tendencies, to consolidate and augment everything new and advanced, that entered our public life in the most recent period'.[19] He also linked the need for economic reform with cadres policy when, after deploring the inadequacy of the existing degree of technological renovation of Soviet industry, he went on: 'There is only one way out here: in taking the trouble to create an economic mechanism which would make the advantages of reconstruction obvious, and in supporting cadres capable of securing these benefits.'[20]

For the moment, Chernenko seems firmly in charge. Gorbachev is in the number two position (if one excludes Tikhonov who, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, ranks above Gorbachev in protocol terms but who, at the age of 78, is not a candidate for the succession).[21] At present, Gorbachev looks strongly placed to succeed Chernenko when the latter goes, but there is nothing foreordained about it. Much depends upon how long a man of Chernenko's age is able to withstand the pressures of the top job and, equally, on who is able to exert most influence on other appointments at Politburo and Secretariat level in the coming months. By getting closer to espousing the cause of economic reform than any of his most senior colleagues, Gorbachev has also embarked on a high-risk policy. There are more people in important places with a vested interest in opposing radical economic restructuring than with an interest in promoting it. The possibility of Chernenko allying himself with them certainly cannot be excluded, though he may prefer to try to preserve a balance between the different tendencies—between those who take a conservative view of the economy, favouring only technocratic tinkering, and those who see a need for more far-reaching reform. Such an attempt at compromise would not resolve the basic dilemma but merely leave the task of grappling with it to his successor. Much is at stake—not only the careers of individuals but the future of the Soviet system.

[16] *ibid.*, SU/7584/C/3. [17] *Pravda*, 3 March 1984, pp. 1–2.
[18] *ibid.*, 1 March 1984, p. 2. [19] *ibid.* [20] *ibid.*
[21] Among other pieces of evidence is the ascending order of importance in which the various leaders delivered their Supreme Soviet election addresses. The last three speeches, published in successive issues of *Pravda* (1–3 March) were those of Gorbachev, Tikhonov and Chernenko.

East and West Germany: continuity and change

RONALD D. ASMUS

IN early October 1982 Helmut Kohl became Chancellor of West Germany after a parliamentary no-confidence vote which toppled Helmut Schmidt and his Social Democratic-Free Democratic (SPD–FDP) coalition that had ruled West Germany for 13 years.[1] At the time there was a good deal of speculation about what sort of foreign policy the new coalition between Kohl's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the FDP would pursue. Particular interest centred on its policy towards East Germany. Kohl's CDU and its sister party, the Christian-Social Union (CSU), had loudly criticised the previous government's *Deutschlandpolitik*. Kohl had specifically promised a 'turning point' not only in domestic but also in foreign policy.

A year and a half later it is possible to observe that under Kohl West Germany's *Deutschlandpolitik* looks remarkably similar to that of its predecessor. It is true that the CDU-led coalition has been more outspoken in asserting West German views about 'the German question' but its policy has been conspicuous more for continuity than for change. This, no doubt, reflects political realities as well as the limited room for manoeuvre available to any West German government in inter-German affairs. But it is also a reflection of a change in Christian Democratic attitudes which in turn reflect an emerging consensus within West German society about relations with East Germany.

Even more remarkably, East–West German relations have not only continued but also in many ways improved at a time when east-west relations have gone from bad to worse. Moreover, the Kohl government came to power at a time when both East Germany and the Soviet Union were attempting to link the future development of inter-German relations with West German attitudes on security issues, above all West Germany's position on the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany in line with Nato's dual-track decision of December 1979. But though the American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva over the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) proved unsuccessful and deployment has begun in western Europe, inter-German relations so far appear to have been spared from any repercussions. Several factors have combined to produce a certain 'decoupling' of East–West German relations from the broader east-west complex, with the tacit acceptance of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

1 For background, see Jane Hall's Note, 'Exit Herr Schmidt', *The World Today*, November 1982.

Mr Asmus is the German affairs analyst with Radio Free Europe in Munich and has contributed articles on East Germany to a number of specialist and other publications.

A rough start

East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) clearly had strong reservations about the prospect of having to deal with a CDU-led government in Bonn. This became evident even before Helmut Schmidt was officially deposed, as the party daily in East Berlin, *Neues Deutschland*, reprinted commentaries in late September 1982 from other 'fraternal' countries noting the CDU's 'revisionist baggage'. A long article on 22 September analysing the government crisis in Bonn came to the following conclusion: 'The importance of the imminent change of government in Bonn is quite obvious when one considers that it will put an end to a period in which West Germany had, on the whole, played a positive role in international life.' As to the future, the commentary merely noted that this would depend upon whether a new West German government would pursue an 'inflammatory confrontation course' or whether it would adhere to existing treaties and be guided by a spirit of détente. The commentary also noted that anyone serious about improving inter-German relations could begin by ensuring that INF deployment would not take place in West Germany, yet 'unfortunately' prospects for this had become worse and 'one can only hope that in the final analysis reason and good will, after all, prevail'.[2]

The nervousness apparent in East Berlin was also confirmed by the SED's reaction to Kohl's initial policy statements dealing with inter-German affairs. The Chancellor's soothing espousal of continuity and his pledge to adhere to existing agreements seemed of little consolation, however, as East Berlin immediately noted 'crass contradictions' in the West German Chancellor's initial official statement. The SED's anxiety was also reflected in the fact that *Neues Deutschland* misquoted Kohl's remarks on several key points, thus presenting the speech in a very one-sided manner.[3]

The wariness evident in East Berlin was attributable to at least three factors. First, the SED was only too well aware of the vocal criticism that the CDU/CSU had expressed for over a decade over precisely those agreements that East Berlin had found worthy of praise in its recent commentaries. With the exception of the 1972 Traffic Treaty, the CDU/CSU had opposed all of the so-called eastern treaties negotiated with East Germany and eastern Europe in the early 1970s. A second source of anxiety was the simple fact that the CDU represented a relatively unknown quantity for the SED. Finally, East Berlin's apprehensions were also undoubtedly connected with the fear that a CDU government might treat it as something less than an equal partner. It should not be forgotten that for over a quarter of a century the primary fixation of East German foreign policy had been to achieve international recognition and cast aside its image as a pariah state. These efforts had been vigorously opposed by a series of CDU or CDU-led governments in the 1950s and 1960s.

Bonn's initial reaction to the spate of polemics emanating from East Berlin was demonstratively to go ahead with a number of visits by various ministers agreed to under its predecessor. At Leonid Brezhnev's funeral in mid-

[2] See the article, 'A Deep Crisis on the Rhine', in *Neues Deutschland*, 22 September 1982.

[3] See Ilse Spittmann, 'Change and Continuity', *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 11, 1983, pp. 1121–3.

November 1982, the invitation originally extended by Helmut Schmidt to Erich Honecker, East Germany's party leader, to visit West Germany was officially renewed. By late November, the tone of East Berlin's statements had changed. The Politburo report to the Central Committee meeting merely noted that the change of government in Bonn had been 'an internal West German affair'. The SED signalled its interest in continuing relations 'according to the spirit and letter of the concluded treaties'.[4] At the same time, however, East Germany continued to link the future development of inter-German relations with the West German position on INF. During the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, to East Berlin in late January 1983, Honecker ominously warned that any government tolerating 'the stationing of new American missiles' on its soil would have to live with the consequences of 'destabilising peace'.[5]

Missiles and credit

The solid majority that the CDU/CSU–FDP coalition received in the West German general elections in early March 1983 undoubtedly contributed to a shift towards a more moderate tone in East German official proclamations.[6] The East German regime now found itself faced with the prospect of having to deal with a conservative West German government for a number of years. On 3 May, the eve of Chancellor Kohl's scheduled address to parliament, *Neues Deutschland* printed a sweeping appraisal of inter-German relations in which the SED clearly staked out its interest in 'normal relations'. The editorial was a careful combination of subtle warnings against 'circles' in West Germany allegedly intent upon torpedoing inter-German ties and soothing assertions of East German willingness to work for improved relations. Although Kohl himself was not mentioned, the editorial claimed that matters had been allowed to 'drift', enabling 'agitators' to create a shambles. In an interview later that month with the Japanese newspaper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Honecker also adopted a moderate tone, noting that his planned visit to the Federal Republic had merely been 'postponed' and not cancelled.[7] Commenting on persistent rumours over the seriousness of East Germany's debt situation, Honecker insisted that his country was solvent and complained that a number of capitalist countries were attempting to limit additional East German loans for political reasons. Some months before that interview, another SED Politburo member, Konrad Naumann, First Secretary of the East Berlin party district, had accused the west of trying to lend money for purposes of political blackmail; in contrast, Honecker now appeared to be complaining that East Germany was receiving no money at all.[8]

[4] *Neues Deutschland*, 26 November 1982. [5] *ibid.*, 21 January 1983.

[6] For background to the elections, see Caroline Bray's Note, 'The West German election', *The World Today*, April 1983.

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, 24 May 1983. On 28 April the official East German news agency ADN had announced that Honecker would not be going to West Germany: this followed a barrage of West German criticism caused by the deaths of two West Germans due to heart failure while undergoing questioning by East German border and customs personnel.

[8] Naumann, in a speech delivered in early November 1982, compared East Germany's current

The significance of these diverging assessments became clear shortly thereafter with the stunning announcement in late June 1983 that a DM 1 billion credit had been granted by a West German banking consortium to East Germany. The loan, the first non-trade-related credit ever granted by a West German bank to East Germany, consisted of two DM 500,000,000 tranches at an interest rate of 1 per cent above the London inter-bank rate, and was guaranteed by the West German government. Equally stunning was the revelation of the key role played by Franz Josef Strauss, CSU's leader, who had in the past claimed that West Germany was pursuing too lax a policy towards East Germany.

The consternation in the west created by the credit deal was due not so much to the financial details (most western bankers considered the deal quite lucrative) as to the political circumstances, since West German officials conceded that they had received no specific concessions from the East German side on any humanitarian issues. This was in direct contradiction to the oft-proclaimed principle of *quid pro quo*, which the CDU had made the primary pillar of its *Deutschlandpolitik*. At most, Bonn could maintain that a 'wish list' had been presented to, and accepted by, East Berlin. It soon became evident, however, that broader political calculations had also played a key role in the granting of the credit, namely, the West German government's wish to signal to East Berlin that it was interested in continuing relations, regardless of the outcome of the INF negotiations in Geneva. In essence, Bonn was attempting to counter the implicit linkage between inter-German relations and INF drawn by Moscow and East Berlin by making an advance concession to demonstrate West German willingness to do business and to underline the benefits that East Germany could receive if it cooperated. That such calculations played a crucial role in the credit deal was subsequently confirmed by several West German officials. The timing of the deal was moved forward to precede Kohl's July trip to Moscow. This was done to strengthen the West German negotiating position.[9]

As the summer and the autumn progressed, outside observers witnessed a remarkable situation in which inter-German relations improved considerably while, in sharp contrast, American-Soviet relations went from bad to worse in the wake of the shooting down by the Russians of the Korean airliner, the continuing stalemate in Geneva, and the American invasion of Grenada. Throughout the summer of 1983, a series of prominent West German politicians travelled to East Berlin; although a number of these trips were allegedly

economic situation with the early post-war period and the Marshall Plan, claiming that neither then nor now were East Germany's political principles for sale. See Ilse Spittmann, 'The Billion DM Credit', *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 8, 1983, pp.785-8.

[9] See Associated Press, 27 July 1983, for an interview wth State Secretary in the West German Ministry for Inner-German relations, Ottfried Hennig, in which Hennig confirmed that the credit was designed to demonstrate that West Germany did not want relations to deteriorate if Nato were forced to proceed with deployment plans. The same point was made in a more guarded fashion by Kohl himself in an interview with *Die Presse* on 15 August 1983. On the timing of the credit deal, see the *Wall Street Journal*, 19 August 1983. More recently, Dr Phillip Jenninger, State Secretary in Kohl's Chancellery, explicitly confirmed this in the CSU newspaper *Bayern Kurier*, 16 February 1984.

'private', they none the less carried strong political overtones, particularly the visit of Franz Josef Strauss who was received by Honecker in late July. The political message behind such visits was that East Berlin had adjusted to the reality of a conservative coalition in Bonn. To emphasise this point, Honecker entrusted Strauss with a series of documents in which the SED outlined its views on how cooperation between the two German states, above all in the economic field, could be improved.[10]

A considerable amount of uncertainty, none the less, continued to dominate the prospects for inter-German relations for two reasons. First, Bonn had made it quite clear that compensation was expected for its role in arranging the June credit deal. It was clear that the credit, while a welcome bonus for an East German leadership faced with serious debt management problems, would not solve East Germany's debt problem, and West German officials were confident that East Berlin would respond with some gestures to keep open the possibility of future loans. On 27 September, the East German government announced two minor 'concessions': the abolition of the minimum exchange rate for children of 14 or under; and the publication of a decree codifying regulations on family reunions and marriages between East Germans and foreigners.[11] These moves were also accompanied by reports that East Germany had started dismantling some of the estimated 54,000 SM-70 automatic shooting devices along the East-West German border, a move of symbolic significance given the maze of other barriers that continue to seal effectively the 836-mile-long border.[12] While greeted as a 'welcome trend' in Bonn, such gestures did not meet West German expectations.

The second factor that continued to cast a shadow of uncertainty over the future of inter-German relations was the imminent prospect of INF deployment in West Germany and western Europe. While on the one hand proclaiming its interest in improving relations, East Germany simultaneously continued to issue ominous threats of 'countermeasures' should Bonn 'stubbornly' persist in supporting Nato policy. Both the frequency and explicitness of such threats increased as the deadline for a negotiated settlement in Geneva approached. East German and Soviet commentaries maintained that the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany would violate The Potsdam Agreement and the so-called eastern treaties of the 1970s. A *Pravda* editorial on 1 August warned that deployment in West Germany would jeopardise West Germany's relations with the east and that West Germany would have to look at East Germany 'across a dense palisade of missiles'. East Germany itself continued to court anti-missile sentiments in West Germany, and in an open letter to Kohl published in late September Honecker issued a warning of a possible 'ice age' in inter-German relations, appealing 'in the

[10] See Fred Kempe in the *Wall Street Journal*, 19 September 1983.

[11] See Ronald D. Asmus, 'Signals From East Berlin', RAD Background Report/242 (German Democratic Republic), *Radio Free Europe Research*, 21 October 1983.

[12] Although Honecker subsequently claimed in an interview with Austrian journalists that all of the shooting devices would be removed, only some 10 per cent had been dismantled by the end of 1983.

name of the German people' for a cancellation of deployment plans and a 'coalition of reason' between the two German states.[13] Shortly thereafter, another East German official warned that humanitarian dealings and the 'buying' of political prisoners might also be affected by INF deployment; and on 24 October the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia jointly announced that preparations were under way in East Germany and Czechoslovakia for the deployment of 'operational-tactical' missile complexes as a response to a Nato deployment.

Such ominous developments were, however, also accompanied by other more positive signs, which indicated that inter-German relations were not to be fully subordinated to the dictates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact 'peace policy'. Negotiations between the two Germanies on an array of issues—such as environmental projects, a cultural treaty, postal services and the Berlin overground railway—were resumed or continued, negotiations that in some cases had been stalled or broken off for years. As the deployment deadline approached and the general east-west atmosphere became increasingly chilled, East and West Germany quietly concluded agreements on the cleaning up of the Röden river and a new postal treaty. The latter was signed only a few days before the West German parliamentary debate on INF deployment. The Bundestag vote on 22 November in favour of deployment was harshly criticised in East Berlin, but Honecker, speaking a few days later, adopted a surprisingly moderate tone, emphasising the need to 'limit' any damage resulting from this decision and leaving open the possibility of a return to détente.[14] Although the SED leader claimed that the deployment decision had destroyed the past basis for inter-German affairs, it remained unclear what this meant in concrete terms or what 'damage' there was to be limited. In sharp contrast to various Soviet counter-moves, contacts between the two Germanies continued in some 14 official forums. In late December 1983, at a time when American-Soviet relations appeared frozen, the two German states hammered out the final details of an agreement transferring operating rights for the Berlin overground railway to the West Berlin authorities, a small but politically significant step when viewed in the broader east-west context.[15]

Change and continuity

In official interviews towards the end of 1983, both Kohl and Honecker delivered positive assessments of the course of developments between the two German states.[16] This optimistic trend seems to be continuing into 1984, as both East and West Germany have used every opportunity to confirm their interest in improved relations.

First, in an interview with the French communist weekly *Révolution* in early

[13] See Honecker's letter to Kohl in *Neues Deutschland*, 10 October 1983.

[14] For Honecker's speech, see *Neues Deutschland*, 26/27 November 1983.

[15] For further details on the Berlin agreement, see the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30 December 1983.

[16] See Kohl's interview with the *New York Times*, 5 December 1983; and Honecker's in *Stern*, 3 November 1983.

January, Honecker surprisingly struck an optimistic note on the Euromissile issue. He emphasised the need for arms control negotiations and stated his conviction that 'sooner or later there will be negotiations on a new basis which will make a practical solution possible'. Then, at a gathering of district party secretaries in mid-February, the SED party chief underlined the special responsibility of both German states for peace, calling on them to 'use every possibility so that reason and realism will prevail, so that cooperation instead of confrontation will come to the fore, and so that disarmament will proceed and the process of détente based on the principle of equality and equal security can be revived.'[17] Similar tones were adopted by other leading SED officials; and the desire not to jeopardise relations with the West German state was also undoubtedly one factor contributing to the surprisingly quick decision by the East German authorities to allow two groups of East German citizens seeking political asylum in the American Embassy and the West German diplomatic mission to leave the country.[18] There have also been several reports of East Germany allowing large numbers of East Germans who have applied for emigration to resettle in the west.[19] Finally, both Honecker and Kohl met in Moscow during Yuri Andropov's funeral in February for over two hours of talks at which Kohl reconfirmed the invitation to Honecker to visit West Germany.

The factors which have contributed to this rather remarkable development may actually be quite simple. On the West German side, it has been primarily political considerations that have produced a CDU *Deutschlandpolitik* which, stripped of some of its rhetoric, appears remarkably similar to that of its Social Democratic predecessor. After more than a decade in parliamentary opposition, the CDU and Chancellor Kohl personally clearly felt the need to establish themselves as serious and competent negotiators on the inter-German scene.

[17] *Révolution*, 6 January 1984; for Honecker's speech before the district party leaderships, see *Neues Deutschland*, 13 February 1984.

[18] On 22 January 1984 a group of six East German citizens who had entered the American Embassy in East Berlin and demanded political asylum were allowed to emigrate to West Berlin; two days later a group of 12 East Germans entered the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin, also demanded political asylum, and were quietly transported to West Berlin as well. The speed with which the authorities acted may also have been influenced by the opening of the conference in Stockholm and the imminent visit to East Germany of the French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson.

[19] In the first two months of 1984, some 4,000 East Germans have arrived at West German refugee camps with nearly another 4,000 reported to have arrived in the first half of March alone. These figures already come close to matching the average figures on annual legal emigration registered in past years. (Since the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972, an average of some 11–13,000 East Germans have been allowed to emigrate annually to West Germany, of which less than half are usually family reunification cases.) If this trend continues, it would lead to the largest wave of emigration since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The factors behind the authorities' decision to grant a larger number of emigration visas undoubtedly include the East German leaders' desire to foster goodwill in relations with West Germany, to get additional hard currency and to rid themselves of disaffected citizens as a disruptive domestic factor. The number of East Germans who have applied for exit emigration visas is reported to have increased drastically in recent years in connection with the deteriorating economic situation in East Germany. Official Bonn estimates put the number of East Germans who have officially applied for emigration to West Germany at nearly 500,000.

By insulating relations with East Germany from the Euromissile debate and negotiating a number of concrete agreements in a relatively short period of time, the Bonn coalition has enhanced its domestic standing and pre-empted accusations from the Social Democratic opposition that Atlantic fidelity would come at the expense of 'German interests'. As CDU officials pointed out with some pride, they have produced tangible results in this sensitive area at least as good if not better than their predecessors, all without any visible irritation in Washington or other west European capitals. Domestically, Kohl's skilful handling of the credit deal and the personal involvement of Franz Josef Strauss have also brought the Chancellor a political bonus along with protection of his conservative flank. Although there have been major differences within the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition over numerous domestic and foreign policy issues, relations with East Germany have thus far been largely spared such dissent. At the same time, the SPD opposition has been forced on the defensive. A broadly based political consensus among the major West German political parties appears to have emerged over *Deutschlandpolitik* at a time when the past consensus over western security policy appears to be crumbling. This was demonstrated in the recent joint Bundestag resolution on relations with East Germany passed by the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD. The passionate debate of a decade ago over relations with East Germany and the other Soviet bloc countries has been replaced by an equally heated discussion over deterrence, security policy and West Germany's role in western defence.

On the East German side, economic considerations have been the determining factor. It has become clear that East Germany is not willing to renounce the economic benefits associated with its 'special relationship' with Bonn. Despite progress in reducing its western debt, East Germany still has considerable debt management problems and is undoubtedly interested in additional credits, particularly as a considerable portion of its remaining debt continues to be in short-term credits.[20] The special role of West Germany in this context is underlined not only by the June 1983 credit deal, but also the fact that nearly half of East Germany's debt is directly or indirectly owed to West German financial institutions. East Germany also receives more than DM 1 billion annually from the West German and West Berlin state budgets as compensation for various services. Western estimates of East Germany's total annual hard currency intake from West German private contributions, visa fees, and so on speak of DM 2·5 billion, a figure which does not even take into consideration the benefits of tariff-free East German access to West German markets. In re-

[20] Western figures on total East German debt vary depending upon whether one looks solely at obligations to western banks, or also includes supplier credits and inter-German debt. In mid-1983 the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements estimated East Germany's obligations to western financial institutions at $8,8 billion; estimates including supplier credits and inter-German debt place the figure at some $11 billion. A recent confidential West German report on East Germany's situation, however, noted that considerable progress in reducing western debt had been made by the East Germans in the last two years and concluded that although East Germany was not yet 'over the hump', a liquidity bottleneck was not on the cards. See the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 February 1984.

cent years, East Germany has also increasingly turned to the channel of inner-German trade to obtain products previously purchased elsewhere in an effort to save hard currency. Barter deals such as the envisaged DM 600 m cooperation project with Volkswagen, according to which VW will provide East Germany with a motor production line and a licence for producing some 286,000 motors annually, are also of considerable economic and prestige value. [21] Although undoubtedly irritated by some of Bonn's rhetoric, the SED is only too well aware of its economic woes and has quickly adjusted to the reality of doing business with a conservative coalition in Bonn.

The result has been a certain detachment of East–West German relations from the broader east-west context. How long inter-German relations can, or will, continue to be an island of détente remains to be seen. A note of caution, however, must be added. First, despite calls from both sides for a 'coalition of reason' between the two German states, there remains the stubborn fact that the longer-term interests of the two states are divergent, if not diametrically opposed. The primary West German goal remains the increase in personal contacts between Germans in the two German states in order to preserve the substance of a common German nation. The SED, on the other hand, continues to adhere to its strict policy of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation) and was recently reported to have tightened existing bans on contacts with foreigners. The credit deal or other agreements signed in 1983 have not altered this basic fact. Historical experience would indicate that the SED is prepared to negotiate and make concessions only when it can maximise its own benefits, above all in the economic realm, while simultaneously minimising any undesired negative consequences. Although Honecker can undoubtedly reckon with a certain amount of public support for a more open policy with West Germany (especially if it eases economic difficulties at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult for the SED to fulfil its social promises of the 1970s) security interests have always been the top priority in East Berlin. If and when they are thought to be endangered, the present flexibility is likely to disappear overnight.

A second equally important factor will be the future attitude of the Soviet Union. Moscow has thus far tolerated a certain 'decoupling' of inter-German relations from both the INF issue and broader east-west trends. It must be pointed out, however, that recent East German moves do not necessarily contradict Soviet policy or harm Moscow's interests. Increased economic cooperation between the two Germanies helps to keep East Germany solvent, and better East German access to western technology and West German markets also

[21] For the effects of East Germany debt situation on inter-German trade see Horst Lamprecht, 'GDR's Western Debt Favors inner-German Trade', *DIW Wochenbericht*, 10 March 1983. The final details of the VW deal are to be worked out in future negotiations. As currently envisaged, VW will provide East Germany with a Hannover motor production line along with a shipment of some 2,000 VW vans as a one-time deal, along with some 2,300 vans annually starting in 1988. In return, VW will receive some 100,000 motors annually from the GDR with the remaining capacity—nearly 200,000 motors—to be used for domestic production. Nearly half of the DM 600 million deal is to be covered by West German federal credit guarantees. See the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 February 1984.

off effects for the Soviet economy. East German calls for improved
have also clearly contained elements of attempting to woo West Ger-
o some type of special security arrangements, as for example in
·'s call for a nuclear-free Germany and, more recently, a zone free of
weapons for both German states. The loosening of West Germany's
·he Atlantic alliance has, of course, long been a Soviet foreign policy
and East Germany has played its part in this strategy. On the other
· Soviet Union cannot be too pleased about the unsuccessful attempt
ture inter-German ties with INF. When Soviet threats are shown to
rhetoric there is a risk that the Soviet Union will be shown to be a
ger'. Ironically, by allowing East Germany to take up and pursue
ons with the West Germans on a whole number of issues, the Soviet
s also allowed West German expectations to rise, thereby increasing
er of options for retaliation at some future point. From this point of
strengthening of inter-German ties can also be viewed as a long-term
o exert additional pressure on Bonn.

, one should also note that despite the welcome improvement in
·ries, West German officials are forced to concede that they have not
red any of the major humanitarian concessions they would like to
as a reduction in the minimum exchange requirements for West
visiting East Germany to cover not only some youths, but also pen-
r a lowering of the age limit above which East Germans are allowed
ie west. Although the government's oft-proclaimed principle of
quo in dealings with East Germany was only loosely applied in the
t deal, Bonn will want to press for further tangible concessions on
its in future negotiations. East Germany is undoubtedly interested
r West German economic assistance; yet West German financial
are by no means as plentiful as in years past. East Germany has also
elf an excellent pupil of Soviet negotiating tactics. It always makes
ncessions in the form of small grudging steps, thus constantly testing
man political will. By making advance concessions, Bonn leaves the
d timing of reciprocal gestures in East German hands. West German
e fully aware of such factors; even a CDU-led coalition, however, now
nder a certain amount of public pressure to come up with new policy
n this realm.

gh the Bonn government shies away from officially using the old con-
étente, preferring such terms as 'genuine détente' or 'a détente
', it is none the less clear that West Germany remains committed to
on with the east, and West German policy under Kohl towards East
has thus far been characterised more by continuity than by change.
between the two German states continue to provide perhaps a test
of the limits and possibilities of east-west cooperation, and the ex-
ich two states with clearly divergent long-term political objectives can
ly merge shorter-term interests in an attempt to develop a mutually
: *modus vivendi*.

Iran: the rise and fall of the Tudeh Party

FARHANG JAHANPOUR

ON 17 January of this year, almost five years to the day after the fall of the Shah, the secret trial of 101 leading members of the military wing of the Tudeh Party, including the former Navy Commander, Captain Bahram Afzali, and a number of colonels and other high-ranking officers, ended in Teheran. Four days later, on 21 January, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal of the Armed Forces, Mohammad Reyshari, announced the sentences. Out of the 101 already tried, 87 were given jail sentences, ranging from a year to life imprisonment. Four of them were given sentences of less than a year and released, because the court took into account the time they had spent in detention. The 10 leading members were sentenced to death. All of them, including the former Navy Commander, three colonels and a few junior officers, were executed on 25 February.[1] According to Moscow Radio, a number of the detainees have died under torture. The trial of the political leaders of the Tudeh Party has not yet begun.

The dissolution of the Tudeh Party, the arrest of most of its leading members, and the expulsion of 18 high-ranking Soviet diplomats from Teheran on charges of espionage and interference in Iran's internal affairs, as well as the recent trials and stiff sentences, are among the most significant events in the history of Iran since the revolution of 1979.[2] The crackdown on the Tudeh Party and the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats should be regarded as the final defeat of the radical wing of the establishment and the triumph of the traditionally conservative, right-wing elements of the Muslim clergy in Iran. The occupation of the American Embassy in Teheran in November 1979 and the holding of American diplomats as hostages, which was openly supported by the Tudeh Party, had represented the highest point of the influence of the radical and leftist factions within the establishment.

The destruction of the Tudeh Party is not only of immense importance for Iran's internal politics. It also marks a turning-point in its foreign policy, and may lead to a further deterioration in relations between Iran and the Soviet

[1] An official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) report, quoted in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter referred to as SWB), Part 4, 27 February 1984.

[2] For background to the 1979 revolution in Iran and subsequent developments, see Lawrence Whetten, 'The lessons of Iran', *The World Today*, October 1979; Vahe Petrossian, 'Dilemmas of the Iranian revolution', 'Iran's crisis of leadership' and 'Iran; a second revolutionary lesson', *ibid.*, January 1980, February 1981 and October 1981 respectively.

The author was Lector in Persian at Cambridge University where he also received his doctorate in Oriental Studies. He is a former Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Languages at the University of Isfahan. In 1974–5 he was a Senior Fulbright Research Scholar at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. Dr Jahanpour now lives in England.

Union. It might also have some bearing upon the fortunes of other pro-Moscow Communist parties in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world. The whole episode has demonstrated the Soviet Union's unwillingness (or inability) to come to the assistance of its 'fraternal' parties.

Background

Not only was the Tudeh Party the oldest political party in Iran, it was also believed to be the first organised Communist party in the Middle East. Iran's first Communist party was founded in 1921 and was very active for a number of years, until it was outlawed under Reza Shah in 1931, when it became illegal for any organisation to profess Communist views. However, in 1941, after the Allied invasion of Iran and Reza Shah's abdication, a new Communist party was formed under the name of Tudeh (People's) Party. Although a number of other Marxist and Maoist parties—such as Peykar, Mojaheddin-e-Khalq and Fedaiyan-e-Khalq—were formed later on, the Tudeh Party remained the orthodox pro-Russian Communist party of Iran.[3]

After the abortive attempt on the life of the Shah on 4 February 1948 by a member of the Tudeh Party, the party was once again officially outlawed, but owing to government weakness the ban was mainly ineffective. In fact, the Tudeh Party was very active during the oil nationalisation struggle in the late 1940s, when it had up to 400,000 full-time and affiliated members.

During the last days of the government led by Dr Mohammed Mosaddeq, the Tudeh Party organised and controlled the majority of strikes and demonstrations throughout the country. In one mass demonstration in July 1953 outside the Iranian parliament in Teheran, the Tudeh Party mobilised nearly 100,000 sympathisers, outnumbering Dr Mosaddeq's National Front by 10 to one. One foreign correspondent wrote that the Tudeh Party was gaining so many adherents that it would 'sooner or later take over the country without even the need to use violence'. Many people outside and inside Iran believed that, after getting rid of the Shah, the Tudeh Party would also get rid of Dr Mosaddeq and seize power. It was mainly the fear of a Tudeh take-over that made the western powers support the military coup to restore the Shah to power in 1953.

After the 1953 coup which deposed Dr Mosaddeq, the Tudeh Party was forced underground. Some 3,000 Tudeh militants were arrested and a network of 500 Tudeh members was discovered inside the officer corps. Forty leading members were executed and a few hundred imprisoned. However, most of them were subsequently released from jail, and a large proportion of them were absorbed into the system and became supporters of the Shah's regime. Some of them even achieved high positions in government and the imperial court, including ministerial posts. A former Tudeh theoretician was

[3] For details of the origins of the Tudeh Party and other Communist movements in Iran, see S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); and Arvand Abrahimian, *Between the Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

one of the main authors of the constitution of the Shah's Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, while another former Tudeh member became secretary-general of the same party.

After the dissolution of the Tudeh Party inside Iran, most of its leaders who had escaped arrest fled to Russia and other east European countries and continued their activities from abroad. In addition to publishing a fortnightly paper, *Mardom (The People)*, and a theoretical journal, *Donya (The World)*, the party also acquired a radio station known as Peyk-e-Iran (Iran Courier). It operated from East Germany and then Bulgaria, from December 1957 to November 1976, when it closed down in the wake of the establishment of growing economic cooperation between Bulgaria and the Shah's regime. The Tudeh Party also had, and continues to have, an unofficial mouthpiece in Seday-e Melli-ye Iran (National Voice of Iran) which has been broadcasting from Baku in the Soviet Union since April 1959.

As part of the liberalisation initiated by the Shah during the last few years of his reign, most remaining Tudeh members were released from jail, and a considerable number of them returned from exile to play a prominent role in the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

The clergy–Tudeh alliance

Since the 1979 revolution, Tudeh members have been among the staunchest supporters of the Islamic regime. In fact, the Tudeh Party was the last non-clerical group which continued to support Ayatollah Khomeini's 'popular and anti-imperialist line'; and it was, in turn, tolerated by Khomeini until it was no longer regarded as useful and joined those many other supporters of the Islamic regime who were eventually destroyed by it. Nureddin Kianuri, since 1978 the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, is the grandson of the most prominent anti-constitutionalist mullah, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, one of the heroes of Khomeini's regime. Kianuri himself was so close to many ruling mullahs that in Iran he was given the sarcastic nickname of 'Ayatollah Kianuri'.

Indeed, Kianuri continued to praise the achievements of the Islamic Republic right up to the time of his arrest. In *World Marxist Review* (March 1983) Kianuri wrote, 'the vigilance of the masses and Imam Khomeini's firm leadership are the most dependable guarantees of defending the achievements of the revolution. . .' Another article by Kianuri, published in the same periodical (February 1976), had played a major role in bringing the mullahs and the leftist forces together in their common quest to topple the Shah. There, Kianuri admitted the failure of the leftist forces to pose a serious threat to the Shah's regime, and called for an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, the clergy and some elements within the armed forces. Kianuri argued, 'the revolution in Iran is at its initial, i.e. anti-imperialist and democratic stage', and that Tudeh should include in its alliance 'social forces in Iran which, though far removed from the left, even from anything democratic, are eager to see the present regime done away with.'

It was this tactical and opportunistic alliance with the disaffected members of the clergy that proved the undoing of the Shah, but also, ironically, the undoing of the Tudeh Party. Instead of using the mullahs to achieve the establishment of a Communist government in Iran, the Tudeh Party was used by the mullahs for the establishment of a fundamentalist, theocratic state which ultimately destroyed the Tudeh Party and all other leftist parties in Iran.

Ayatollah Khomeini has demonstrated his shrewdness and ruthlessness in dealing with groups and individuals who helped bring him to power, and who were later crushed and destroyed by him. The list of those individuals and parties who assisted him during and after the revolution and who, one after another, became targets of his extreme hostility is a long one. The coalition of forces which opposed the Shah contained many disparate elements within it, ranging from the ultra-rightist mullahs and bazaar merchants to the most extreme Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups. Khomeini's genius consisted in uniting all these diverse and opposing factions under his own leadership and using them as a bulldozer to destroy the Shah's regime.

Many of the people who had opposed the Shah and had joined Khomeini's bandwagon were liberal, educated Iranians who were hoping to gain greater political freedom and a larger measure of democracy and economic justice in their country. That is why, before the 1979 revolution, Khomeini was forced to promise that the future government of Iran would be a democratic one, chosen by the people through a constituent assembly; that religious and ethnic minorities would be respected; that women's rights would be protected; and that political parties would enjoy freedom of action. That is why, after toppling the Shah, he chose Professor Mehdi Bazargan, leader of the Freedom Movement and a human rights activist, as the first Prime Minister of the revolutionary regime, declaring that it was the religious duty of every Muslim to obey Bazargan's government.

However, only a couple of months after the revolution there was a major split between Khomeini and the liberal and democratic elements within the revolutionary coalition over the referendum about the nature of the future government. Khomeini insisted that the voters should be given only one choice, that of voting for an 'Islamic Republic, nothing more and nothing less'. Many liberals boycotted the referendum and subsequent elections. Many other former supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini were driven to active opposition by what they regarded as major departures from the original goals of the revolution—the reign of terror, summary trials and brutal executions of hundreds of officials of the former regime, the monopolising of power by the mullahs, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the officials, the growing religious fanaticism, the repression of women, and ethnic and religious minorities, and the denial of all freedoms. Bazargan and his Cabinet were forced to resign after the 1979 hostage crisis. The more liberal Muslim Republican People's Party, supported by the most senior religious figure in Iran, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, was

dissolved, many of its leaders were executed or jailed and Ayatollah Shariat-Madari himself was disgraced and placed under house arrest. Bani-Sadr, the first President of the Islamic Republic, who was reportedly elected with over 11 million votes and was openly supported and endorsed by Khomeini, who used to call him his 'son', was deposed and sentenced to death, and had to flee the country. The Mojaheddin-e-Khalq, the largest guerrilla organisation in Iran, which had done more than anybody to bring Khomeini to power, were castigated as hypocrites and the greatest enemies of Islam. When they resorted to arms they, in turn, were ruthlessly suppressed and reportedly more than 7,000 of their members were executed.[4] Yet all through this period the Tudeh Party resolutely supported Khomeini and his regime.

The clergy turn on Tudeh

When the leaders of the Tudeh Party were first arrested, the Mojaheddin-e-Khalq organisation issued a statement claiming that Khomeini did not have mercy even for those who had cooperated with him in crushing his opponents. The statement criticised the cooperation between the Tudeh Party and Khomeini and went on to say: 'The tactical use of Kianuri and his colleagues by Khomeini has now ended, and they are now in the same trap of terrorism and religious fascism that they repeatedly praised and explained away as anti-imperialist and popular.'

The crackdown on the Tudeh Party started in December 1982, when the Soviet Union resumed its shipments of arms to Iraq, which had been halted since the start of the Iran–Iraq war in September 1980. Although closer links between the Soviet Union and Iraq provided a good excuse for the attacks against the Tudeh members, the defection of Vladimir Kuzichkin, the Vice-Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Teheran, to the west[5] was of enormous value in providing Iranian intelligence sources with the full list of Tudeh members and their connection with the Soviet Embassy. A considerable period elapsed between the time of the disappearance of Kuzichkin, who was the main Embassy official dealing with the Tudeh Party, and that of his appearance in the west. It is likely that, before leaving the country, he provided the Iranian authorities with the fullest list of the undercover Tudeh members who had infiltrated all sensitive sectors, including the government, the armed forces, radio and television, revolutionary bodies and even the revolutionary guard corps.

On 26 January 1983, 22 'leaders and important members of the Union of Iranian Communists' were executed in Amol in northern Iran for their alleged involvement in the disturbances in that city a year earlier. *Sobh-e Azadegan*, the mouthpiece of the ultra right-wing Hojjatis, wrote on that day: 'It was not only the members of the Union of Iranian Communists who were on trial. At

[4] The Mojaheddin-e-Khalq have produced the names and details of more than 7,000 of their members who were executed by the regime, but they claim that the real number is almost three times that figure.

[5] *The Times*, 23 October 1982.

present the entire concept of Marxism, blasphemy and atheism is on trial in the court of Iranian history.'[6]

On 6 February 1983, some 80 leading members of the Tudeh Party, including Kianuri, were arrested in a sudden nation-wide swoop. On 5 April, the head of the Middle East section of the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry, Vasili Safronchuk, paid an unpublicised visit to Teheran, ostensibly for talks on mutual relations; but his real mission was to intercede on behalf of Tudeh members. However, his mediation was unsuccessful, and the arrest and interrogation of Tudeh members continued.

On 30 April 1983, the 71-year-old First Secretary of the Tudeh Party, looking haggard, shaken, confused and visibly trembling, appeared on Iranian television and humbly confessed that he and some of his colleagues had been acting treacherously towards Iran and had been spying for the Soviet Union. He further admitted:

> 'In my opinion, the mistakes made are really grave. There was espionage, deceit, treachery, all of these were there. These are serious aberrations and, in my opinion, they deserve the most severe punishment that the Islamic Republic may decide to mete out.'[7]

During the next few days, many of the leading members of the Tudeh Party were interrogated in front of the television cameras. All of them confessed to having been members of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, or to having close links with it. On 4 May 1983, the Islamic Revolution Prosecutor-General officially dissolved the Tudeh Party, saying:

> 'Following the arrest of the leaders of the hated Tudeh Party and their explicit confessions concerning conspiracy against the order of the Islamic Republic of Iran . . ., spying in the interest of the aliens, plundering and keeping arms and ammunition in order to confront the order of the Islamic Republic of Iran, conspiracy against the Islamic Republic and planning to topple it, connection with armed groups, sabotage in factories and industrial and production units of the country and, finally, infiltration into government and revolutionary organisations as well as military and security centres, the Islamic Revolution Prosecutor-General . . . announces the dissolution of the Tudeh Party and declares any activity in favour of it to be illegal and counter-revolutionary.'[8]

On the same day, in a strongly worded message, the Ayatollah Khomeini praised the revolutionary guards for arresting the Tudeh members. Thereupon, the National Voice of Iran, the Tudeh Party mouthpiece, which had consistently supported Ayatollah Khomeini right up to the previous day, took off its gloves and called on the Iranian people to 'arise in the defence of the revolution's gains before it is too late'. In a commentary on 4 May 1983, in an unmistakable reference to Ayatollah Khomeini, it declared:

[6] SWB, Part 4, 28 January 1983. [7] *ibid.*, Part 4, 2 May 1983. [8] *ibid.*, Part 4, 6 May 1983.

'Yes, the enemy is extremely dangerous, brutal, blood-sucking, cowardly and one that breaks his promises. If it were not so, he would not have thrown into prison in such a cowardly manner and by breach of promise the leaders and members of a party which according to the testimony of historical documents and records had always defended the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and would not have accused the best sons of this nation of espionage by resorting to the brutal torture of the Middle Ages . . . including injection of shots with the aim of creating mental disorders in leaders and members of the Tudeh Party for the purpose of obtaining desired confessions, and filmed this shameful scene.'[9]

However, arrests of Tudeh members continued and, according to official Iranian sources, more than 8,000 of its members have been arrested in Teheran and other cities throughout the country. There have been ugly scenes, including lynching and the setting on fire of some 50 houses belonging to Tudeh members. Judging by the past record of the Khomeini regime, there are many more executions in store for the Tudeh members, unless their lives are spared as a result of a political or military deal with the Soviet Union.

No matter what happens in the future, the Tudeh Party in its traditional form has been totally disgraced and will probably cease to exist. It is not possible to write the obituary of Iran's oldest party without a certain sadness for its many mistakes; for many lives and careers which have been lost; for the wastage of great talents such as that of Professor Ehsan Tabari, the chief theoretician of the Tudeh Party, who is one of the best historians and literary critics of contemporary Iran.

Tudeh and the Soviet Union

Yet the Tudeh Party was itself responsible for its own tragic end. One of its major mistakes was that it identified itself too closely with the Soviet Union, slavishly pursuing pro-Soviet policies even when they were clearly contrary to Iran's own national interests. During the oil nationalisation crisis, the Tudeh Party strongly supported the nationalisation of southern, i.e. British, oil interests; but insisted on giving the Soviet Union the concession for northern oilfields. When, after the Second World War, the Soviet Union set up two puppet regimes in Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan, the Tudeh Party firmly supported those breaches of national sovereignty. By allowing itself to be turned into a tool of Soviet policies in Iran, it suffered the consequences of fluctuations in Iran-Soviet relations.

Its second major mistake was to align itself too closely with Khomeini's autocratic regime, remaining silent about, indeed encouraging, all the excesses of the Islamic Republic. In its publications, the Tudeh Party often took pride in having tipped off the government about the Nowzheh coup plot a year after the revolution, as well as the alleged conspiracy of the former Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, to bomb Khomeini's

[9] SWB, Part 4, 7 May 1983.

residence and topple the regime. The first incident resulted in the execution of over 300 pilots and air force technicians; while the second led to the execution of Qotbzadeh and a number of his collaborators. The Mojaheddin allege that the Tudeh Party was also implicated in the arrest and execution of many of its own members. The Tudeh leaders have now fallen victim to the same brutality which they helped unleash against others.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is not much that it can do about the expulsion of its diplomats and the suppression of the Tudeh Party. The Soviet government, which tacitly supported the seizure of American hostages by Muslim militants, cannot now over-react to the expulsion of some of its diplomats; while its pleading on behalf of the Tudeh members has already prompted the Iranian authorities to charge that Soviet interest in the fate of Tudeh leaders is a further proof that they were Soviet spies.

Finally, the crackdown on Communist groups in Iran should not be seen in the west as a hopeful sign for the future orientation of the Islamic Republic, which continues to exert a harmful influence in the Middle East and beyond, as demonstrated by its alleged links with terrorist activities in Lebanon, Kuwait and even some European countries. On the whole, it poses a greater threat to western interests in the region that to those of the Soviet Union.

Also, the suppression of the Tudeh Party in Iran does not necessarily mean any long-term hostility towards the Soviet Union. Indeed, it could prove the reverse. It should be remembered that it was after the suppression of the Communists in Egypt that the late President Nasser felt secure enough to turn in a big way towards the Soviet Union. The execution of many Communist leaders in Iraq did not harm the relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union.

The official Soviet reaction towards recent events in Iran has been very restrained and low-key. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, in a statement on 3 May 1983 after the Tudeh members' arrest, claimed that there had been no threat to Iran from the Soviet Union and that none existed now. The Soviet Union stood for the development of 'normal, good-neighbourly relations with Iran, based on principles of mutually advantageous cooperation' and that it had 'proved this by its practical deeds as well'.[10]

On 17 January 1984, Teheran Radio reported a meeting between the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran and Akbar Hashemi-Hafsanjani, the powerful Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Majlis). Although both sides complained about the hostile attitude of each other's mass media, both at the end expressed a wish for the continuation of 'good-neighbourly relations' between Iran and the Soviet Union and reaffirmed their 'joint struggle against imperialism'.[11]

The Tudeh Party was used by the Soviet Union, as it was used by the mullahs; and it seems that it is no longer of any use to anybody and may be conveniently disposed of.

[10] *ibid.*, Part 4, 5 May 1983. [11] *ibid.*, Part 4, 18 January 1984.

Democracy and debt in Latin America

ROLAND DALLAS

SOMETHING odd is happening in Latin American politics. The countries of the region, sunk in foreign debts to banks of up to $215 billion, are in a slump with no sign of an up-turn. Gone are the boom years of the 1970s, when ambitious and often wrong-headed investments were paid for by foreign loans. Unemployment, bankruptcies and misery are spreading. Yet voters are ignoring extremists of the left and right and plumping for mild-mannered social democrats who want to service their debts. This oddly moderate reaction is unlikely to last if the slump persists. But there are only a few ways of ending the slump; and most are painful. How long can it all last?

Dire warnings of what might happen are being voiced. Latin American presidents meeting in Ecuador on 13 January talked about their 'worst economic and social crisis of the century' which was 'affecting the stability of the region'.[1] Mr Manuel Ulloa, a former Peruvian Prime Minister and Economy Minister, has been predicting general instability and the radicalisation of governments if a solution is not found in the next two years. A paper shortly to be published by the Brookings Institution in Washington says that political stresses now beginning in Latin America will put democracy at risk, yet are unlikely to lead to a return to military rule. 'The risk may well be disorder rather than dictatorship', it says.[2]

The president of the Inter-American Development Bank, Mr Antonio Ortiz Mena, fears that the crisis is 'jeopardising our achievements and endangering the social stability of many of our member countries'.[3] The UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (Ecla) worries about 'situations difficult to control, economically and socially'.[4]

The economic profile of Latin America is appalling. Last year, the gross domestic product (gdp) of the region fell by about 3·3 per cent after falling by 1 per cent in 1982, according to Ecla. The gdp per head of the growing population fell by 5·6 per cent last year. It is now at about the same level at it was in 1977. Inflation rose from an average of 47 per cent in 1982 to 68 per cent in 1983.

There was a spectacular drop in Latin America's imports, by 29 per cent in

[1] Declaration of Quito and Plan of Action.

[2] Thomas O. Enders and Richard P. Mattione, *Latin America: the Crisis of Debt and Growth* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984)—in press.

[3] Address to the Organisation of American States, 8 November 1983.

[4] Preliminary Balance of the Latin American Economy in 1983 (Santiago: Ecla, 1984).

Mr Dallas is Editor of *The Economist's Foreign Report*. He is a former Reuters correspondent in Argentina and visits Latin America regularly.

1983 after a 20 per cent drop in 1982. Some countries have almost stopped importing. Exports increased in volume by 7 per cent but their value dropped slightly because of unfavourable world prices and devaluations of Latin American currencies. This enormous effort slashed the region's balance of payments deficit on current account from $36·4 billion in 1982 to $8·5 billion in 1983.

The inflow of capital slumped from $38 billion in 1981 to less than $4·5 billion in 1983. Instead of being a net recipient of resources, Latin America transferred last year about $30 billion out of the region, according to Ecla. One advantage of this blood-letting was that Latin America's foreign debt increased by only 7 per cent in 1983, compared with an average of 23 per cent a year between 1977 and 1981.

In the midst of this economic calamity, what happened to the easily predictable revolution? So far, it amounts to a protest vote. Electors regularly throw out one moderate party in favour of another one.

In Ecuador, a poor country which has enjoyed some economic growth on the basis of its oil income, the presidential election on 29 January was a sharp rebuff to President Osvaldo Hurtado's Christian Democratic Party. The two top vote-getters, who will face each other in a run-off on 6 May, were a liberal lawyer, Mr Rodrigo Borja, of the Social Democratic Alliance, and a businessman, Mr León Febres, of the Conservative Party. The candidate of the outgoing President's party won only 2·8 per cent of the vote. The voters were giving vent to their unhappiness about the slump and the country's debt crisis. Refinancing of the $6·2 billion debt by agreement with the International Monetary Fund has meant increases in subsidised food and fuel prices and a 27 per cent cut in imports in 1983. Public spending cuts made a nonsense of the national development plan and the gross domestic product fell by 3·3 per cent.

In Venezuela's presidential election on 4 December last year, the opposition social democratic party, Democratic Action, replaced the ruling Christian Democrats in the most decisive result since democracy was re-established in 1958. The winning candidate, Mr Jaime Lusinchi, collected 57 per cent of the vote against 34 per cent for ex-President Rafael Caldera, of the Christian Democrats; Mr Lusinchi also carried 19 of the 20 states and won clear victories in both Houses of Congress and all state legislatures.

Mr Caldera tried unsuccessfully to distance himself from the policies of the outgoing President, Mr Luis Herrera Campins, who was blamed for four years of economic stagnation, unemployment and, finally, a chronic debt problem. As notable as the ruling party's defeat was the dismal showing of the two leftist candidates, Mr Teodoro Petkoff and Mr José Vicente Rangel, who collected only 7·5 per cent of the presidential vote.

The new President runs the risk of incurring unpopularity too. He has to face up to paying, or delaying payments on a public-sector debt of $18 billion falling due in 1983 and 1984. He has devalued the bolivar by 74 per cent (leaving it still roughly half the unofficial rate against the dollar); fuel prices, among the lowest in the world, are being increased.

In Argentina, the election on 30 October last year, ending 10 years of military rule, was forced on the army by intense popular discontent over 400 per cent inflation, slump and a $43 billion foreign debt as much as by the Falklands failure. Voters plumped firmly for moderates, preferring the left-of-centre Mr Raul Alfonsín, of the Radical Party, to a pragmatic bourgeois lawyer, Mr Italo Argentino Luder, representing the Peronists. There was not an extremist in sight.

The charismatic Mr Alfonsín swept into office promising that living standards would not drop any more; he would bring economic growth, more jobs and less inflation to Argentina. Mr Alfonsín knows the volatile nature of the Argentines and was not ready to court instant unpopularity by imposing yet more austerity at the wish of the IMF. It was, however, hard to see how he could achieve his goals and pay his debts at the same time. As this article went to press, it seemed that Mr Alfonsín had decided to delay debt-service payments as long as he could. He cancelled a line of credit with the IMF which was tied to Argentina keeping to IMF targets. In early March, international banks discussed Argentina's debt-service arrears of more than $3 billion and planned ways of applying pressure on the government. American banks faced the possibility that they might have to put their big Argentine loans into their bad-debt lists on their balance sheets.

In Mexico, an IMF stabilisation plan designed to enable the country to service its $86 billion foreign debt is having considerable success with bankers, but economists estimate that the buying power of the average Mexican has fallen by 50 per cent since the beginning of 1982. Inflation is still rampant. The gross domestic product probably fell by more than 4 per cent last year and manufacturing by 10 per cent.

Popular reaction to this was to vote for the opposition National Action Party (Pan), a small conservative group financed mainly by businessmen, in local elections last year in Chihuahua, Mexicali and Puebla. Pan won in Chihuahua and Mexicali and lost in Puebla, it is said, only because ballot boxes there were stuffed by the government. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Pri), which has dominated Mexico for 50 years, fears more losses in state elections next year and is being rudely shaken up. Its chairman, Mr Adolfo Lugo, in an extraordinary act of contrition, said recently that the party had been plagued by 'dogma, ritual language, outdated structures, opportunistic behaviour, traitors, bad leaders and bad candidates'. Almost the entire national committee has been sacked.

In debt-ridden Brazil, the military-backed government of President Joao Figueiredo is concentrating its efforts on servicing its $93 billion foreign debt by making deals with the IMF and commercial banks. The gross national product has fallen by 12 per cent since 1981 and is expected to fall by 4 per cent this year. Industrial production fell by 10 per cent last year, the buying power of the better off has fallen by between 20 per cent and 40 per cent and the poor are becoming desperate.

The Brazilian public has responded to the crisis by voting for opposition par-

ties in elections to the Chamber of Deputies and state governorships last year and by seeking salvation in a direct presidential election next year (the election, in November, is to take place in the regime-dominated electoral college). Demonstrations for direct elections have been held across the country. If a direct election is held, the generals believe it might well be won by one of the politicians whom they ousted in their coup 20 years ago: Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro state. Mr Brizola, once a populist firebrand, now sounds more like a left-of-centre democrat or, at most, a democratic socialist. The alternatives are all moderates. One of the candidates of the regime's Democratic Social Party, Vice-President Aureliano Chaves, says that Brazil cannot pay its debts unless there is a return to economic growth—an impossibility under the terms to which his government is committed in its agreements with the IMF.

In 1983, by dint of austerity and great effort, Brazil achieved a trade surplus of $6 billion, as it had promised the IMF. But it was due to pay more than $10·3 billion in interest to its creditors. It slipped deep into arrears before it obtained a jumbo loan; it is expected to seek another loan later this year. In 1984, Brazil is heading for a trade surplus of $9 billion by tightening its belt even more.

In Peru, the opposition social democratic party, Apra, came out top in local elections on 13 November and pushed Popular Action, the moderate ruling party, into third place. A fragile coalition of leftist parties led by a Marxist won the election in Lima, the capital. The fall from grace of President Fernando Belaúnde, who was elected in 1980, is due to a rapid decline in living standards as the economy has plunged into one of the worst recessions in its history. Mr Belaúnde's party lost 60 of the 100 provinces it had previously controlled. Apra is firm favourite to win the presidential election in 1985.

Mr Belaúnde has been trying, frequently without success, to keep to policies agreed with the IMF in return for credits and support in rescheduling Peru's $11·6 billion foreign debt. Substantial cuts in government spending have reduced the budget deficit (though not as much as the IMF wanted) but have also deepened the recession. Last year, the gross domestic product probably fell by more than 7 per cent. There was a much bigger drop in manufacturing. Average wages fell in real terms by 25 per cent. Unemployment is put at 60 per cent of the work force, but vast numbers of Peruvians survive—and some prosper—in the 'black economy'.

In slump-hit Chile and Uruguay, where chances of a return to democracy still look slim, the only recourse available to the voters has been to demonstrate. They have been doing this regularly and are likely to resume now that the summer holiday period is over. In Chile, the outcome of an election is far from clear, but it is likely that the country would divide roughly three ways, as it has in the past, with voters sharing their favours between the conservatives, the left-of-centre Christian Democrats and the Marxist left. In Uruguay, the leading parties remain stolidly middle-class: the Blancos and the Colorados. One exception to the pattern is in near-bankrupt Bolivia, ruled by a democratic socialist, Mr Hernán Siles Zuazo, in collaboration with some

cautious communists, Mr Siles has been unable to patch together a plan to restore the economic shambles which he was bequeathed by the generals; his failure could lead to the disintegration of his government.

There are several reasons for this mild-mannered Latin attitude. Voters are more tolerant of hardship if it is imposed by the government they elected. Encouraged by their leaders, voters blame foreigners for their plight: the commercial bankers who lent too much money, the United States for causing high interest rates and the industrialised world for the recession of the past two years. The IMF is easily cast as bogeyman for its tough terms and for interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Government leaders can, and do, point across their frontiers to neighbouring countries where the mess is usually just as bad. And for many of Latin America's poor, inured for generations to a life of hardship, the present crisis means little change. Nature can be blamed too: a change in the course of a Pacific current caused drought and floods on the west coast and there was scarcely a let up in the drought which has parched Brazil's northeast.

Will Latin American democrats have enough time to put their houses in order and get their economies going again before the patience of the voters runs out? It could be a close-run thing. An economic revival is not expected before 1987.

A number of solutions are being pursued or discussed. Some are painful, others unrealistic. Among them are:

- Reluctant continued acceptance of IMF austerity programmes in return for new loans from the IMF and commercial banks. Conventional wisdom says that the IMF's prescriptions will work; but the political price is high.
- An export-led strategy involving further small real devaluations by governments which accept IMF policies. This is favoured in the Brookings Institution study, by Mr Thomas Enders, a former Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Latin America, and Mr Richard Mattione. They say it can promote economic growth, while a country is following IMF rules, and imports from the industrialised countries. Only with export growth will Latin American countries be able to import more.
- A moratorium on debt repayments (which would give immediate relief but leave a country with a bad name and damage its chances of medium-term economic growth).
- Big cuts in international interest rates (unlikely while the American budget deficit persists).
- More delays in payments, and conversion of present debts into long-term bonds (likely to discourage commercial banks from making new investments).
- More funds for the IMF to be lent on easier terms, and a big new issue of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights to needy nations (unlikely to win American support).
- A big increase in trade within Latin America (a solution often preached but rarely practised) avoiding the use of hard-to-find American dollars.

The Latin Americans hope that the economic revival now beginning in the western industrialised nations, especially the United States, will eventually pull them up as well. Higher demand ought eventually to increase the prices of Latin America's copper, tin, wheat, coffee and cocoa. That has not yet happened.

The Reagan Administration, the IMF and the big commercial banks hope that the loan packages which they have stitched together, often in a crisis atmosphere, will hold. They work closely together, aware that mistakes will be extremely costly; they hope the bitter experiences of the early 1980s will lay the basis for sounder economic development thereafter.

There are many pitfalls down this path. If the American interest rate rises later this year, the reaction in countries like Brazil, where a 1 per cent increase means it has to find an extra $400 m, will be very negative. In countries where voters switch a few times between parties, to no avail, doubts will grow about the value of democracy. The generals, who have in several cases abandoned government after enduring painful unpopularity because their economic policies failed, are not likely to face it all again.

The next three years look decidedly rough. 'The change from 6 per cent average annual growth to falling or stagnating activity, with all that means in construction and industrial jobs, has dramatic implications,' is the Brookings study's verdict. 'Many of these people are now being pushed into destitution. In some places, hunger has become a factor, in others rioting has begun. No-one can know how the situation will develop.'

Antarctica: a case for the UN?

PETER J. BECK

'THE Antarctic is likely to become a major crisis zone in the 1980s . . . there is a major crisis brewing.'[1] This prediction made at the close of 1983 by an Australian international lawyer might seem over-dramatic. The Antarctic continent has tended to be treated as marginal not only geographically but also politically. But the continent is now assuming a new importance.

A few governments have been involved with Antarctica for several decades. Their interest provided the background to the conclusion in 1959 of the Antarctic Treaty, which was signed in Washington by 12 governments, including Argentina, Australia, Britain, France, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United

[1] Keith D. Suter, 'Aspects of International Environmental Law in Relation to Antarctica', paper delivered in Australia, November 1983.

Dr Beck is Principal Lecturer in International History at Kingston Polytechnic. His book, *The International Politics of Antarctica,* is due for publication in 1985.

States.[2] These governments—known as the Consultative Parties (CPs)—have continued their Antarctic involvement in the form of an uneasy combination of science and politics. In many instances, scientific activity has proved to be more the instrument of political and economic interests than the expression of a quest for knowledge about the 'unknown continent', which comprises some 10 per cent of the world's land surface and exceeds the combined area of China and India.

In recent years the Antarctic CPs have seen other governments and international bodies, including the United Nations, assume an interest in 'their continent'. This was demonstrated when the governments of Spain (on 31 March 1982) and of China (on 8 June 1983) acceded to the Antarctic Treaty. Then, in September 1983, Brazil and India became fully-fledged CPs, and therefore entitled to a decision-making role.[3] These are the new Antarctic powers, which have become involved only recently in scientific research there: India has sent annual expeditions to Antarctica since 1981, while Brazil and Spain followed suit during the 1982–3 season.

Thanks to the interest of 'outsider' governments in Antarctic affairs (notably that of Malaysia) Antarctica became an agenda topic at the Non-Aligned Summit Conference at New Delhi in March 1983, the meetings of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in May, and of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) in June. In November 1983, Antarctica was discussed at the United Nations. This was the first real intervention by the UN in this question. The UN's role in Antarctic matters is likely to grow in the near future: Malaysia is already pressing for a UN-based alternative to the Antarctic treaty system. The resort to the UN represents an attempt to transform Antarctica from the preserve of a select grouping of governments into a 'global common'. This move has made Antarctica yet another source of north-south controversy. An additional complication derives from the campaign of environmental groups, such as Greenpeace International, to safeguard Antarctica from the effects of resource exploitation by declaring it a world park or by introducing an exploitation moratorium.

And there is also what might be described as the Antarctic dimension of the 'Falklands factor'.[4] The Anglo-Argentine war of 1982 drew international attention both to the Falkland Islands and the geographically adjacent Antarctic continent, wherein Argentina and Britain were also in rivalry for a sector of territory. The period since the Falklands war has witnessed growing international (particularly British) interest in Antarctica. For example, the 1982 Shackleton Report on the Falklands referred to the need to view the future of the islands in the wider Antarctic perspective, while in November 1982 the British government announced a 60 per cent increase in the funding of the British Antarctic Survey.

[2] See F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics* (London: Hurst, 1982), pp. 84–94; P. J. Beck, 'Britain and Antarctica: The Historical Perspective', *Journal of Polar Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1984), pp. 66–82.

[3] Accession, the first stage of treaty involvement, means acceptance of the treaty's principles, whereas CP status, open only to those active in Antarctica, embraces a decision-making role.

[4] P. J. Beck, 'Britain's Antarctic Dimension', *International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 3 (1983).

Antarctica's resource potential

During the late 1970s, the scramble for increasingly scarce resources caused a surge of interest in the potential marine and mineral resources of Antarctica. This concern has continued into the 1980s, as shown by the conclusion of the Antarctic Marine Resources Convention in 1980 and, since 1982, by the Antarctic mineral regime negotiations which are still in progress. During this period certain governments, aware of Antarctica's presumed natural wealth and its debatable political and legal status (the 1959 Antarctica Treaty served merely to suspend rather than to resolve the sovereignty problem), have been arguing that the continent remains *terra nullius* and should be treated as a global common, that is, as the common heritage of mankind rather than as the site of 'the last great land rush on earth'.[5]

In this context, Antarctica and its surrounding oceans have been depicted as a potential source of marine and mineral resources. For example, the Southern Ocean is regarded as a source of fish, although most attention has been devoted to krill, a shrimp-like crustacean, rich in protein and supposedly available in vast quantities. The 1982 Shackleton report suggested the possibility of an eventual krill catch amounting to 70 or even 100 per cent of the existing total world fish catch, although at present only small quantities are being harvested (about 500,000 tons each year), by Japan and the Soviet Union. In addition, the towing of Antarctic icebergs has been suggested as a way of alleviating the water shortage in the Middle East and Australia. A recent Australian study suggested that Perth, the capital of West Australia, could be supplied with fresh water from an iceberg towed from Antarctica far more cheaply than by pumping water from the Ord river or getting it through desalination. But the paper concluded that the continued existence of a range of economic, technological and other problems rendered it 'unlikely that icebergs will be harvested for fresh water in the near future'.

Most international interest has been devoted to minerals, and especially to the prospects of offshore oil, since the recent acceptance of the Gondwanaland theory of continental drift suggests Antarctica's geological continuity with other oil-bearing continents. Optimistic statistical estimates have been advanced for both oil and natural gas, but it is clear that the exploitation of Antarctic minerals, like that of icebergs, lies in the next century. There remain a number of cost, environmental, political, technological and other obstacles—quite apart from the fact that the existence of minerals in commercial quantities has yet to be established. This point was reaffirmed in the 1982 Shackleton report.[6]

Nevertheless, the speculative nature of its resource potential has not delayed the process by which Antarctica has been drawn as an alleged global common into the debate about the New International Economic Order. According to this interpretation, any benefits from resource exploitation should be made available to the international community, which should share, too, in the pro-

[5] M. J. Peterson, 'Antarctica: the last great land rush on earth', *International Organization*, vol 34, no. 3 (1980), p. 398.

[6] Lord Shackleton, *Falkland Islands: Economic Study 1982*, Cmnd. 8653, p 131.

cess of Antarctic decision-making. This interpretation has heightened tension on the subject, for it has offered a head-on challenge to the Antarctic Treaty powers, which have used the 1959 treaty to place the continent under a separate system controlled by a relatively small number of governments, the CPs.

Initially there were 12 Consultative Parties but recently these have admitted four more governments to their number: Poland in 1977, West Germany in 1981, and Brazil and India in 1983. The Antarctic Treaty came into effect in 1961 and may last indefinitely, even if there exists a provision for review during and after 1991; thus, the frequent references to a 30-year time limit are incorrect. Since 1961, the CPs have in effect governed Antarctica through a series of biennial Consultative Meetings in the interests, it is argued, of international political stability and of scientific cooperation in Antarctica. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Antarctic treaty system appeared to be evolving in a sound and responsible manner. In 1980 the Antarctic Marine Resources Convention was concluded, and in 1981 the Antarctic mineral regime negotiations began.

In view of the Malaysian-led campaign to involve the UN in Antarctica, it was perhaps inevitable that the most recent Consultative Meeting, held at Canberra in September 1983, served to highlight the determined opposition of the 16 CPs to any attempt to set up an alternative to the Antarctic Treaty system. A communiqué issued after the meeting stated the unanimous view of the CPs that any move to modify or replace the Antarctic Treaty would tend to introduce instability and friction into a region of hitherto unparalleled peace and international cooperation.[7] However, even before the communiqué was issued, the Antarctica question was placed on the agenda of the UN, thereby illustrating the failure of the CPs to block the challenge. There is a question mark now not only over the role of the CPs, but also over the future political stability of the Antarctic continent.

The United Nations and Antarctica

Towards the end of 1983 the UN took up the question of Antarctica for the first time, in spite of the fact that the region had been identified over a long period as a suitable topic for consideration. The early years of the UN witnessed a number of calls for its involvement, such as in the UN Trusteeship Council in December 1947. But these demands fell upon barren ground. The governments involved in Antarctica preferred a more direct approach. In 1948–9 Argentina, Britain and Chile responded coolly to American proposals for an international solution of the Antarctic through the UN.

In 1956 and 1958 India made two attempts at the UN to place Antarctica on the General Assembly's agenda in order 'for all nations to agree and affirm that the area will be utilised entirely for peaceful purposes and for the welfare of the whole world'. These came to nothing. The preamble and Article 10 of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty stressed a desire to promote the principles of the UN and to harmonise activities with the UN Charter, but in practice the Treaty assigned the UN a non-role in the affairs of some 10 per cent of the world's land

[7] *Canberra Times*, 29 September 1983.

surface. The Antarctic powers successfully blocked further efforts to involve the UN made in 1971 and 1975.

However, increased preoccupation with resource issues in the late 1970s made it more difficult for the Antarctic powers to maintain their primacy. Since the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty a large number of new states had emerged. This tended not only to boost the membership of the UN but also to foster criticism of existing arrangements. A new concept emerged, that certain parts of the world, including the deep seabed, Antarctica and outer space, should be treated as the common heritage of mankind. Predictably, the Law of the Sea negotiations were interpreted as providing substance for a principle, which many argued should next be applied to Antarctica.

However, at that time the developing countries' interest in Antarctica was pressed neither vigorously nor constantly. Isolated exhortations made little headway against the Antarctic treaty system, even if some of the Consultative Parties began to refer to the need to prove that the system promoted the interests of the whole international community. For example, Ted Rowlands, British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, opened the 1977 Antarctic Consultative Meeting by saying,

> 'whether we like it or not, one of the tests of the obligations imposed on us . . . is whether the decisions we reach are acceptable to the wider world community. The test of that acceptability will largely depend on the clarity with which we are seen to be serving the long-term interests of the Antarctic and the world community rather than short-term illusions of national advantage.'[8]

Such statements may be dismissed as rhetoric designed to appease critics, but it is clear that the British government, among other CPs, has been compelled to concede the realism of taking into account the interests of the international community (or at least appearing to do so).

One reason why the 'global common' lobby had failed to achieve success in the 1970s on the Antarctica question was the developing countries' preoccupation with the Unclos (Law of the Sea) talks. The Antarctic powers capitalised on this; although they admitted that, eventually, the application of the common heritage principle to the deep seabed would have implications for Antarctica. In 1979, an Antarctic Treaty working group on minerals commented that 'representatives were mindful of the developments likely to result from the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea'. A further cause of anxiety in the same year was the UN General Assembly's approval of the Moon Treaty, which proclaimed that the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies were 'the common heritage of mankind'.

Malaysia takes the initiative

At the signing of the Law of the Sea Convention at Montego Bay in Jamaica in December 1982, it was urged that 'it is time now to focus our attention on

[8] Speech on 19 September 1977, *Final Report of the 9th Antarctic Treaty Meeting* (London: FCO 1977), p. 25.

another area of common interest... Antarctica, where immense potentialitie exist for the benefit of all mankind.'[9] That statement came from the Malay sian delegate, Ghazali Shafie, and developed a point made the previous day b the Tanzanian representative. In 1982–3 the Malaysian government emerge as the leading advocate of a UN-based alternative to the Antarctic treat system. In fact, the Malaysian government and its Prime Minister, Dr Maha thir bin Mohamad, provided something which the global common lobby ha hitherto lacked—consistency and strength of pressure guided by a clear sens of purpose. The Malaysian government proceeded to engage in a well orchestrated campaign aimed at international opinion.

Dr Mahathir launched his campaign on 29 September 1982, a few month before the Law of the Sea signing ceremony, in a speech to the UN Genera Assembly. He ranged over various topics relating to the gulf between rich an poor nations and to the particular need to protect the interests of developin nations.[10] He dismissed the Antarctic Treaty as 'an agreement between a selec group of countries' which 'does not reflect the true feelings of the members o the United Nations', and called for a new international agreement. Durin 1983, the most significant moves occurred in March at the Non-Aligne Summit Meeting held at New Delhi, where Dr Mahathir succeeded in secur ing the backing of the non-aligned movement for at least part of his policy He sought two things: an alternative to the Antarctic Treaty and a detaile UN study of the Antarctic question. However, the Economic Declaratio issued at the end of the conference restricted itself to considering 'that th United Nations should undertake a comprehensive study on Antarctica'.[11] I appears that behind-the-scenes lobbying by Argentina, one of the CPs, ha scaled down the original demand for a condemnation of the Treaty so that th Economic Declaration merely noted its existence.

Nevertheless, the non-aligned movement had been mobilised in support o Malaysia, and this served to ensure greater international visibility for Antarcti questions. Malaysian ministers tried to keep the topic to the forefront. Thus Dr Mahathir's own speeches returned constantly to the UN–Antarctic theme He used his meetings with other governments to secure declarations of suppor at the UN. In this manner, Antarctica emerged as a more significant interna tional issue, even for governments which had previously taken no interest i the continent. The Caribbean governments' new interest, for example, stem at least partly from their wish to end South Africa's involvement as a CP i Antarctic deliberations.

The momentum of the campaign to involve the UN persisted, and it strength proved sufficient to cause considerable anxiety to the Consultative Parties. Some CPs tried to exert diplomatic pressure upon some of the critics. These individual and secret efforts were paralleled by a note handed to the Malaysian representative at the UN on 29 July 1983 by the Australian govern-

[9] *Record of Third Conference on Law of the Sea*, A/CONF 62 PV 189, pp. 81–2; A/CONF 6 PV 192, p. 12.

[10] *UN General Assembly Records*, A/37/PV 10, pp. 17–20.

[11] *ibid.*, A/38/132 S/15675 Economic Declaration, paragraphs 122–3.

ment, acting on behalf of all the CPs. This note attempted to stress the solidarity of the CPs in opposing UN intervention, since 'the revision or replacement of the Treaty which Malaysia is now proposing would undermine this system of international law and order in Antarctica with very serious consequences for international peace and cooperation . . . the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty object unanimously to the Malaysian initiative, and to any attempt to revise or replace the Treaty.' The defence of the Treaty had brought together not only the Soviet Union and the United States but also Argentina and Britain. However, these individual and collective diplomatic efforts failed to deter Malaysia and its supporters. On 22 September 1983, Malaysia and Antigua and Barbuda, supported by such governments as Algeria, Pakistan and Singapore, succeeded in having Antarctica placed on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly.

The agenda reference prepared the way for the passage of a resolution on Antarctica by the General Assembly's First Committee. This requested the UN Secretary-General to prepare for the next Assembly 'a comprehensive factual study of all aspects of Antarctica, taking fully into account the Antarctic Treaty system and other relevant factors'. This should be done after consultations with interested governments and organisations.[12] The First Committee's report was adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1983.[13]

Future developments

The resolution of December 1983 proved the first involvement of the UN in the affairs of Antarctica. It is clear that, without the determined efforts of the Malaysian government, there would have been no UN reference in 1983. Its campaign has accorded Malaysia greater international visibility; and this has led some commentators to question Dr Mahathir's motives in pursuing the Antarctica question. However, Mahathir's support for the common heritage concept can be interpreted as following on from his philosophical and radical approach to politics.[14]

At the time of writing, the UN Secretary-General is engaged in the production of the Antarctica study, and it is clear that the unanimity and resolution of the CPs will continue to be tested, not only by their own mineral regime negotiations, but also by inevitable attempts in the future to develop a role for the UN. Malaysia's original intention was to have the Antarctic treaty system replaced. It now seems likely that the publication of the UN study will prompt attempts to develop the UN's role beyond the limited objective embodied in

[12] *United Nations General Assembly Records*, 38th Session, 46th meeting of the First Committee, 30 November 1983, A/C 1/38/PV46, p. 13.

[13] *ibid.*, 38th Session, 97th meeting of the General Assembly, 15 December 1983, A/38/PV97, pp. 30–1. For a detailed survey of the speeches delivered in the General Assembly and the First Committee, see the forthcoming study (due May 1984), P. J. Beck, 'The United Nations and the Study of Antarctica', *Polar Record*, vol. 22.

[14] On Mahathir's general policy, see R. Kershaw, 'Anglo-Malaysian Relations: Old Roles versus New Rules', *International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 4 (1983); S. Drummond, 'Mahathir's Malaysia', *The World Today*, July–August 1983.

the December resolution. What is going to be the impact of these developments upon the political stability of Antarctica?

The position is complicated by the opposed interpretations advanced by the respective parties. On the one hand, the CPs argue that any change in the present arrangements will destabilise the situation, for

> 'it is unrealistic to think that in the present state of affairs a new or better legal regime could be agreed upon. Revision could open the way to an arms race in the region and might lead to new territorial claims. It will not serve the interests of any country, or group of countries, if Antarctica becomes an area of international conflict or discord.'[15]

Malaysia and its supporters take a different line. As Dr Mahathir informed the Non-Aligned Summit, the treatment of Antarctica as a global common 'would ensure that the Antarctic continent is to be used for peaceful purposes and not degenerate into a new hotbed of tension and discord'.

Obviously, question marks surround Antarctica's future stability. These uncertainties are reinforced by the intrinsic fluidity of Antarctic politics. For example, how will India, which was for a long time the leading critic of the Antarctic club and remains a prominent member of the non-aligned movement, behave now that it has itself become a Consultative Party? Will South Africa's position as a CP be threatened? The UN resolution made no reference to South Africa, but the matter was raised in the UN's First Committee, on 30 November 1983, by Sierra Leone, acting on behalf of the African group. A paragraph was proposed expressing concern 'that the apartheid regime of South Africa has been allowed to remain a party to the Antarctic Treaty'. In the event, this point was not incorporated in the resolution, but the problem is likely to recur, particularly as the African group will be able to present their views to the Secretary-General.

So, finally, the traditional isolation of the Antarctic Treaty system from international politics has come under threat. From some viewpoints, the Antarctic system seems well established, and the successful outcome of the mineral regime negotiations would serve to consolidate this position. But the challenge from outside cannot be ignored, and inevitably the forthcoming moves at the UN will pose the severest challenge yet to the survival and relative exclusivity of the Antarctic club.

[15] Note from the CPs to Malaysia, 29 July 1983.

CORRIGENDA

In John Eisenhammer's Note of the month 'Europe's disappointing Socialist summit' (*The World Today*, December 1983), on p. 465, lines 4, 18 & 23, *for* Heads of State *read* Heads of Government.

In Paul Hainsworth's article 'Northern Ireland—towards EC involvement?' (*ibid.*), on p. 486, in the second line of the section **The European Commission**, *for* Richard Tugendhat *read* Christopher Tugendhat.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Note of the month

•

REFORMING THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

THE decisions taken by the European Community's Council of Ministers in Brussels in the early morning of 31 March this year deserve careful analysis. What did the 10 Ministers of Agriculture decide? Was it really a reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP)? What does it imply for the future development of the Community?

What is clear is that this was more than a price negotiation for the 1984–5 farm year. It was the culmination of more than three years' effort by the European Commission to adapt the CAP, to check the surpluses, and to control the cost of their disposal. Some have complained that the reform was not radical enough. Even before the decisions were taken, one commentator regretted that the Commission's proposals left the basic structure of the CAP unchanged.[1] That was hardly surprising, since they stemmed from a request of the 10 Heads of Government in Stuttgart in June 1983, which began with the injunction that 'the basic principles of the CAP will be observed, in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty'. On the other hand, the Community's agricultural organisations have been loud in their condemnation of the package as a step backwards for the CAP and as detrimental to farmers—to the point where one anonymous cynic remarked that 'if the farmers really hate it so much, it can't be all bad'.[2] The purpose of this article is to analyse the package to see where, between those extremes, the truth may be found. The decisions can be summarised under six heads.

Guarantee thresholds. Already in 1980, the Commission issued a warning that 'in the present state of agricultural technology, it is neither economically sound nor financially feasible to guarantee price or aid levels for unlimited quantities'.[3] This was the political testament of the late Finn Gundelach, the Commissioner for Agriculture. He argued that the Community had passed the level of self-sufficiency for many major products, and while production was continuing to rise, the increase in consumption was practically nil. In these circumstances, there should be 'producer coresponsibility above a certain level of production—that is, two stages of financial responsibility, a first stage in which Community responsibility would be total, and a second in which it would be shared between the Community and producers'.

In the following years, the idea was refined by the development of the 'guarantee threshold'. This term, which has rapidly entered the Eurojargon, indicates the level of farm production beyond which producers have to share financial responsibility. In 1982, the Council introduced thresholds for several

[1] Nick Butler, 'EEC agriculture after Athens', *The World Today*, February 1984.

[2] *Financial Times*, 2 April 1984.

[3] 'Reflections on the CAP', Supplement 6/80 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, 8 December 1980.

sectors (milk, cereals, colza, processed tomatoes) in addition to those where analogous measures already existed (sugar, cotton). The level of these thresholds differed according to the products, as did the steps to be taken in the event of their being exceeded: in general, they consisted of a cut, direct or indirect, in the price or aid for the product in question. In July 1983, in response to the request of the Heads of Government, the Commission made new proposals in which guarantee thresholds constituted the centrepiece.[4] In its decisions of March 1984, the Council not only extended thresholds to further products (sunflower seed, durum wheat, dried raisins) but, in an important political declaration, approved the Commission's guidelines for guarantee thresholds, and 'emphasised the advisability of introducing these instruments for products in surplus, or on which expenditure is likely to increase rapidly'.

Milk. The milk sector, with its grave imbalance between supply and demand, had to be at the centre of any plan for reform of the CAP. In 1983 the price increase for milk was abated as a result of the guarantee threshold being exceeded. Despite this, milk production increased by 4 per cent in 1983, and the Commission was obliged to pose a stark choice to the Council: either a drastic cut of the order of 12 per cent in milk prices, or the introduction of quotas to limit production and maintain prices at a more reasonable level from the point of view of farm incomes.

The Ministers chose the latter. They froze the common price of milk, and fixed quotas for 1984–5 amounting to 99·6 m tons, less than the 103 m tons delivered by farmers in 1983, or the 105–106 m tons forecast for 1984. The quota system, which is to last five years, has been criticised by economists because it will distort the market, hinder structural development in the dairy industry, and prove long-lasting. These arguments have their force, but it must be remembered that neither the European Parliament, nor any of the 10 governments—with the exception of the British—was prepared to comtemplate a significant cut in milk prices. Consequently a quota system was the only alternative to collapse of the milk regime under the weight of its surpluses. As a German commentator remarked with reference to the Council's decisions:

> 'Brussels is not an advanced seminar in economic and political theory, but a place where the representatives of 10 national interests struggle together'.[5]

Monetary Compensatory Amounts. The continued existence of border charges in agricultural trade within the EEC, to compensate for the revaluations and devaluations of currencies, was identified as a major problem at an early stage. However, there was resistance from countries with stronger currencies, and in particular West Germany, to any dismantling of the monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) which would reduce farm price support in

[4] 'Adaptation of the CAP', Supplement 4/83 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, 29 July 1983. It is also widely known as 'document 500' since its internal reference number was COM(83) 500.

[5] *Die Welt*, 2 April 1984.

nominal terms. The Commission's initial proposals for 1984–5 would have cut prices in West Germany, for example, by 5·4 per cent and this was rejected by the West German Minister as unacceptable because of its effect on farm incomes.

In the end, the Council approved a programme under which the positive MCAs will be phased out by dismantling 3 points immediately (by the device of converting them into negative MCAs, which does not affect prices in Germany), 5 points on 1 January 1985 (by reducing prices in Germany, with income compensation for farmers through the Vat mechanism) and the remaining 2 or 3 points by 1987–8. Meanwhile, the negative MCAs are eliminated immediately, except for 2·4 points for France. For the future, a new system is introduced so that change in parities in the European Monetary System cannot lead to the creation of positive MCAs, but only negative ones. This represents a big step towards restoring the unity of common prices. The technical nature of the 'agrimonetary' changes, which are a veritable Chinese puzzle, should not disguise their political and economic importance. But it must be remarked that, until the EEC achieves greater monetary stability, MCAs will continue to be created and the CAP will continue to suffer the consequences. Moreover, the future creation of negative MCAs whose dismantling involves increases in farm prices, may pose problems for the price policy.

Prices. In recent years, the price policy has had to take account of the market situation, as well as the farm income objectives of the CAP. During this time, the Commission has practically exhausted its armoury of epithets for the price policy, from 'prudent' through 'rigorous' to 'restrictive'. For 1984–5 it proposed an average increase of only 0·8 per cent in the common agricultural prices denominated in European Currency Units (Ecu). With the MCA adjustments proposed at the same time, this in fact represented an average decrease of 0·5 per cent in farm price support in national money, for the Community as a whole.

The Council, in a mood of rigour, decided even lower common prices than proposed by the Commission, with a reduction of 0·5 per cent in prices in Ecu. However, this must be evaluated with the agrimonetary adjustments already described including the conversion of positive into negative MCAs, which mean that in national money there was an average increase of 3·3 per cent in farm price support for 1984–5. With inflation of 5·1 forecast for 1984, this demonstrates the wish of the Ministers to be more prudent than in 1983–4 (6·9 per cent increase in farm price support, with 6·3 per cent inflation) or 1982–3 (12·2 per cent increase, with 9·0 per cent inflation).

Aids and premiums. In the interests of good financial management, the Commission advocated a severe pruning of subsidies paid under the CAP to producers, consumers and processors. But several of its proposals fell victim to the process of bargaining, traditional in Brussels marathons. For example, the British Minister insisted on continuing the variable premium for beef, of particular interest to his country. When, towards dawn on 31 March, the other Ministers wearily agreed with him, they were obliged also to keep the calf

premium—of particular interest to Italy, Ireland and Greece. In general, the Council showed itself reluctant to wield the axe in this sensitive area.

Community preference. Although the main burden of reform of the CAP will fall on Europeans—and particularly on Europe's farmers—it is not surprising that, for political and budgetary reasons, the Community wished its trade partners to share some of the burden. 'Community preference'—that is, the advantage enjoyed in Community markets by the produce of member-states over the produce of third countries—is one of the principles of the CAP. Thus the Council decided a reduction for 1984 in the volume of butter and beef imported under concessionary arrangements, and the opening of negotiations for a minimum import price for mutton, and for a stabilisation of imports of cereals substitutes, particularly corn gluten feed.

The way ahead

Such were the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers (Agriculture). It was a surprise to some commentators that they were taken by Agriculture Ministers (who might have preferred Foreign Ministers, or Prime Ministers, to grasp the nettle) by unanimity (for it had been predicted that, as in the preceding year, a majority vote might be necessary) and by the start of the milk year on 1 April (an annual deadline not frequently respected by the Council). This was a welcome sign of health in the Community institutions, after the failure of the Athens summit in December 1983, and the Brussels summit in March 1984, to settle the agricultural dossier and the other questions linked to the future development of the Community. However, the courage of the Agriculture Ministers did not prove immediately contagious in other Councils, and in particular the problem of Britain's budget payments still remained unsolved by the Foreign Ministers in the following weeks.

Nor does the agricultural package rescue the Community from its present financial crisis, in which the limit of its budgetary resources has been reached. Because the Council did not accept all the Commission's suggestions, including the proposed tax on oils and fats, the decisions imply spending some 200 m Ecu beyond the 1984 budget of 16,5 billion Ecu for farm price support. If account is taken of the carryover of farm payments from 1983, and the turndown in agricultural markets, some 2 billion Ecu more than the budget are likely to be needed for agriculture in 1984.

Nevertheless, the long-term proposals for control of agricultural policy and its expenditure have been improved. The Council has accepted three points of major importance. First, the principle that the agricultural guarantees can no longer be unlimited in nature. Second, an effective control of milk production by means of quotas. Third, a tough price policy, inluding—for the first time—price cuts for several products in several countries. Meanwhile, a budgetary framework is being evolved by the Community, in which financial discipline for all policies, including agriculture, will be exercised.

More hard decisions, and fresh political will, are required in the coming years to continue with the rationalisation of agricultural policy on which the

Community is embarked. The Commissioner for Agriculture, Poul Dalsager, said that 'it would be an illusion to suppose that our task is completed, but the Council's decisions have at last put the CAP on the right path'. France's Minister of Agriculture, Michel Rocard, who presided over the sessions of the Council, declared:

> 'The CAP will remain at the centre of the European construction, but the benefits which it gives to farmers will perhaps no longer be so exclusive, so wonderful, and so unlimited, as in the past. What is needed now, if the European adventure is to continue, is for the construction of agricultural Europe to be accompanied by common policies in the fields of industry, money, research and even defence.'[6]

It is this recognition that agriculture—despite its difficulties, and its differences from other sectors—must be more and more integrated into Europe's economy, and must find its place alongside other policies of the Community, that is perhaps the most important aspect of the decisions now taken on the CAP.

GRAHAM AVERY*

* The author is head of the European Commission's coordinating unit for agricultural policy. He was formerly a member of the cabinet of the President of the Commission, Roy Jenkins.

[6] Interview in *Libération*, 9 April 1984.

The superpowers: is there a moral difference?

JEANE KIRKPATRICK

The famous cracks within the western alliance are much discussed in public. There exists on both sides of the Atlantic a growing sense that we have come again to one of those periodic times of decision: will we continue as we are, working in and through the existing framework, or is it time for new departures? Not all issues that are discussed in public places make their way onto a legislative calendar. Some simply die. But widespread public interest in an important subject, if not a harbinger of official changes to come, at least gives notice of that possibility. Articles on the 'crisis' of the alliance have become a staple of the editorial pages in the United States and Europe. In the European press these articles usually deal with American faults and raise questions

Mrs Kirkpatrick is the United States Ambassador to the United Nations and a member of President Reagan's Cabinet and the National Security Council. This article is based on a talk she recently gave at Chatham House.

whether our policies and our rhetoric do not make the world more dangerous—for Europeans. The American articles deal with European shortcomings and question whether it makes any sense at all for the United States to go on investing men and money in the Nato enterprise.

I should like to emphasise that there is no discussion in the American government of withdrawing American troops from Europe or changing American strategic doctrine. None the less, editorial pieces about the alliance multiply and influential persons join the dialogue. The *Wall Street Journal* recently featured a column on anti-Americanism by a Swiss diplomat which paraphrased Lord Acton: 'Dependency corrupts, and absolute dependency corrupts absolutely.' Recently also, James Schlesinger and Helmut Schmidt had a widely reported public dialogue in Brussels. Henry Kissinger has suggested the time may have arrived for Europe to assume the responsibility for its own defence against conventional attack, time to draw down or withdraw entirely the 300,000 American troops in Germany. The persistence of the unofficial discussions made it almost inevitable that officials would join the discussion. That has happened. Under-Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, has recently addressed the issues in two public forums. I propose to enter this discussion at a somewhat different point. Naturally, being an American and an official of the American government, I write from an American perspective—but my subject is not only the United States. I shall, too, try to tackle the same subject addressed here in Britain by my colleague, the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, concerning whether there is or is not a moral difference between the so-called 'superpowers': the United States and the Soviet Union. But this subject is, I think, only a subtopic (albeit a terribly important one) of a more general question: whether there is a significant moral difference between the democratic countries of the west and the Communist countries of the eastern bloc.

Many, perhaps most, of the most influential treatments of east-west differences during the last decade or so propose tacitly and sometimes explicitly that the differences are not that great after all. First, there was the vogue enjoyed by theories of converging development not long ago, which argued that the dynamics of modernity would force increasing openness and liberalisation of the Soviet Union and at the same time force progressively autocratic centralisation in the industrial democracies—in such a way that, before long, both would become modified bureaucratic autocracies presided over by technocrats with a feel for popular desires. When 'things' seemed not to develop as predicted, the convergence theory was shelved without comment, to be replaced by a more aggressive argument that required less cooperation from history: now it was argued that in fundamental moral respects the democracies and Communist states were already much alike—a position that simultaneously denies the virtues of the democracies and the vices of the totalitarian systems of the east. This position, too, threatens, as Raymond Aron emphasised in his important book, *In Defence of Decadent Europe* (South Bend: Regnery/Gateway, 1979), to undermine the *virtù* of the western nations, the 'capacity

for collective action and historic vitality that now, as always, remains the ultimate cause of the fortunes of nations and of their rise and fall'.

Recently, another Frenchman, Jean-François Revel, has sounded a more urgent alarm. In his book, *Comment les démocraties finissent* (Paris: Grasset, 1983), Revel wonders aloud if democracy may not be a mere parenthesis in the long march of autocracy, 'the first system in history which, confronted by a power that wants to destroy it, accuses itself . . . The distinctive mark of our century,' Revel wrote, 'is the humility with which democratic civilisation agrees to disappear and works to legitimise the victory of its mortal enemy. That communism shall have been more clever and effective in its offensive would only be one additional example of one power being a better strategist than the other . . . it is less natural and newer that the targeted civilisation should not only judge that its defeat is justified, but provide it partisans as well as its adversaries with ample reason to regard all forms of self-defence as immoral, or at best superfluous and useless, if not downright dangerous.'

Revel's subject is the delegitimisation of the west, which he believes is in danger of becoming a willing victim. My subject is the delegitimisation of the United States by and within the west. I am concerned not with the charges of our adversaries, who accuse us of the most terrible crimes, but rather with the growing tendency inside the political class of our allies in Great Britain and continental Europe to feel that after all, in many important respects, there may not be a significant difference between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To illustrate my meaning, to dispel any suggestion that my impression of the situation is illusory or exaggerated, I shall take as my text three recent comments: one from *The Guardian*, a second from *The Observer*, the third from a leading politician.

First, *The Guardian*, which wrote on 28 October:

> 'There are plenty around who are already prepared to see the United States as no better than the Soviet Union in the standards of its international behaviour. There are many more, however, who still expect superior standards of the United States, who are shocked and bewildered at the spectacle of Americans engaging in an act of aggression quite as blatant as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which was deplored in such fine-sounding words.'

Next, *The Observer*, in its leader of 30 October, said:

> ' . . . Reagan should be told that when the United States borrows Soviet methods . . . European distrust of American behaviour, which lies at the root of the peace movement, is vastly reinforced.'

And finally, these comments from a political leader who provided unwelcome confirmation that extreme distrust of the United States displayed by the peace movement, in some of its forms, was shared in high political circles. Concerning threats to the peace, he was reputed to have said: 'There is

an almost miserable equity of threat'; or, in another formulation, an 'equity of menace'.

The suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union are morally equivalent, that with regard to methods and policies there is a rough moral symmetry, is now so common among our closest allies that its expression no longer causes shock in Europe. Obviously, this is a serious matter. We are democratic countries in which broad consensus is required to sustain foreign policy. If the opinion that the United States is a lawless, reckless gunslinger spreads widely enough, the alliance will simply collapse by mutual consent based on distrust on the European side and disgust on the American side.

As I understand it, the charge that there exists a moral symmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union has taken form only in the past year or so, with Grenada, Central America, and missile deployment serving as landmarks in its evolution. Less harsh but still serious charges had been around for some time. Chief among them was the conviction that the United States —especially under Ronald Reagan—is obsessed with east-west relations, and that viewing the world through the lenses of east-west conflict causes us to see political conflicts where there may be none and obscures more important, indigenous, basic social and economic factors, and predisposes us to emphasise bilateral approaches over broader international cooperation and military solutions where economic and social remedies would be more appropriate. Now, on behalf of the American government, and very formally, I should like to enter a plea of 'not guilty' even to this charge, which though serious is less so than those associated with the doctrine of moral symmetry.

And, though I could spend the rest of the article on this subject alone, let me simply note briefly that our economic assistance programmes alone belie the charge that American foreign policy is driven by a preoccupation with east-west conflict. The United States is a major supporter of multilateral assistance programmes. We remain the largest contributors to United Nations independent agencies and special programmes and to the international development banks and multilateral fiscal institutions. The contrast between American and Soviet support for multilateral programmes is important. But that is not all.

Today, as in the past, the United States has a powerful proclivity for trying to serve universal goals through its foreign policy. Reluctant to become deeply involved in foreign affairs in the first place, we have always tended to feel that our participation is justified only if it is devoted to abstract universal ends like 'making the world safe for democracy', 'abolishing war, hunger, chaos'. We are still at it, as demonstrated by Secretary Shultz's speech to the Congress this year on the foreign assistance package. In that speech the Secretary of State emphasised to American lawmakers that the proposed American assistance programme for some $15·9 billion in economic and military assistance in fiscal year 1985 serves four American interests:

- Our interest in a growing world economy which enhances the well-being of citizens in both the developing and the industrialised world;

:test in security, protecting our vital interests abroad, strengthen-friends, contributing to regional stability and backstopping our ιtic efforts for peaceful solutions to regional problems;

:rests in building democracy and promoting adherence to human ıd the rule of law and

manitarian interest in alleviating suffering and easing the im-consequences of catastrophe on the very poor.

is that when we speak to one another, we justify our assistance in ng to build a 'world of stability and progress'. Contrast, I suggest, s not only with those of the Soviet Union, which limits its aid to stance to countries who are members of the Soviet bloc or ripe for ın in it; compare our assistance progammes even with those of our , who to an extent greater than we use aid to reinforce special rela-ɔr example, with former colonies.

:udos when I say that the American assistance programmes provide γ more economic than military assistance and only rarely are the basis of American national security in what are called 'super-ties'. I am not even certain this is a wise allocation of scarce ut it is a fact.

ue for our assistance programmes is true also for many other aspects ŗn policy: in Africa, for example, the United States has worked hout this Administration and previous ones to achieve, through gotiation, an independent, democratic, stable Namibia. Why? Namibia is a matter of vital American interest. It is not. It is on the the world. We have no significant cultural or historical ties with it. ve believe Namibia's right to independence should be achieved in l settlement rather than through the imposition of solutions by homever.

recent example of American efforts to achieve relatively l goals through foreign policy may be seen in Lebanon. A myth has :n that the United States sought to impose a military solution ɔropriate to the problem, which, according to some mythology, is storic, indigenous Lebanese rivalries. Nothing could be more n 1958, the United States, seeing Lebanon's independence by radical Arab nationalism, sent 15,000 marines to protect ıdependence.

he United States sent 1,500 marines to a joint peacekeeping effort the United Kingdom and Italy, first, to ensure the safe evacuation :ine Liberation Organisation (PLO)—hardly a goal sought by us are trying to fit the conflict into an east-west framework. The al force (MNF) departed as soon as that task was completed. But, .bra and Chatila massacres, the MNF returned in a classical

peacekeeping role, interposing itself between factions all of whom, it was believed, basically desired peace. The effort was sabotaged by someone else's determination to impose a military solution, but not that of the United States, the other MNF parties or Israel. Syria, sending more than 100 tons of ordnance daily into the Shuf, has very nearly succeeded in imposing a military solution. It is symptomatic of the different approaches that President Assad, in his search for a settlement, undertook no shuttles in the manner of Ambassadors Habib, Rumsfeld, or Secretary Shultz. He sent armed emissaries and waited for peacekeepers to come to him. Various criticisms may be made of our Lebanon policy, but not, I think, that it reflected a preoccupation with east-west affairs, nor a predilection for military solutions.

But even if our whole policy is not governed by obsession with east-west rivalry and even if we do not have an uncontrollable desire to impose military solutions everywhere, surely in Central America the United States reflects, in purest form, all the worst tendencies of American foreign policy: seeing Communist influence where there are only indigenous social and economic factors, attempting military solutions where only reforms are appropriate.

Once again, I respectfully dissent. The government headed by Ronald Reagan has not the slightest tendency to imagine that the political turmoil in Central America has no roots in social and economic problems. We know the people of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica have been ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clothed, illiterate for centuries. We know they have generally been governed by bad governments, one-party systems as under Somoza or military dictatorships as in El Salvador before 1979. We know that there existed in both countries neglect, unmet needs, unfulfilled hopes, and that these gave rise to movements for reform and revolution. We understand, broadly speaking, how it happened.

In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, three political currents existed: first, the traditional oligarchs who had most of what there was to get; second, a large group of middle class, farmers, trade unionists, businessmen, who wanted to get rid of the dictator and establish a democratic government; and third, a small group of Marxist-Leninists tied to Havana and Moscow, trained, as they themselves have told us, in Havana, in the Middle East with the PLO, or elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, armed and advised by their Soviet sponsors.

In Nicaragua, these two groups, the democrats and Leninists, joined in a broad-based popular front to overthrow Somoza. Their programme was democracy, but once in power the Leninists forced out the democrats and betrayed the promises of democracy made to the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Nicaraguan people. Most of the democrats are now in exile, many are with the Contras, still fighting for a democratic Nicaragua. The Leninists, meanwhile, have consolidated one-party control.

In Salvador, where the same three-sided contest existed, no popular front was formed. Instead, after a coup overthrew General Romero in October 1979, the democratic forces came to power in the administration of Napoleon Duarte, who immediately undertook to democratise the government,

nationalise credit and instigate sweeping land reforms; the guerrillas and the traditional armed right took up armed struggle against the government—one operating out of Managua, the other, it is said, out of Guatemala.

The stakes are high. The Soviet Union understood the strategic importance of the region, through which most sea lanes pass with most of the oil and other strategic materials the United States would supply to Europe in case of an emergency. By 1967 the Soviet theoretical journals were writing about opportunities for tying down the United States in the western hemisphere and rendering us less able to act in such remote places as Europe and Asia. The United States, finally, has also understood the stakes and the challenge and believes that challenge must be met.

Here, concerning American policy in Central America, the charge of obsessive concern with east-west relations melds imperceptibly into an argument that there is no significant moral difference between Soviet policy in eastern Europe and American policy in Central America. This position was put with clarity during the Oxford Union debate by a questioner who asked: 'Is it not true, that your country controls in, for example, the whole of Latin America, many corrupt and puppet governments—and surely the question we are asking you to address yourself tonight is what is the difference, if any—and I suspect there is no difference—as do many, many people in this country—what is the difference between your puppet regimes and the puppet regimes of the Soviet Union?' In a follow-up exchange the questioner charged Central American governments, supported by the United States, with 'terrorising, torturing, killing'.

The first striking fact about views such as those of the questioner is that the level of outrage far exceeds the level of information. The charges do not square with the facts. The United States does not support dictatorships in Central America. Let me be specific. It is not generally understood in Europe that the United States tried hard to encourage and help develop a democracy in Nicaragua: (1) by supporting the efforts to replace Somoza and helping to negotiate his departure, supporting the OAS resolution that called for his ouster; (2) by providing $25 m in emergency food and medical aid in the first week the Sandinistas came to power and $115 m in generous, prompt, economic aid; (3) by offering assistance of divers kinds relevant to the development of democratic institutions, even though the Sandinista junta gave early signs of claiming a monopoly of power and imposing censorship. We also supported, inside the international fiscal institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, Nicaraguan loan applications enabling it to secure from these institutions more assistance than the Somoza regime had received from international fiscal institutions in the previous 20 years.

The United States remains hopeful that Nicaragua's government will decide to cease destabilisation of its neighbours, relax repression and expand freedom in Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, it is well known that the United States supported the coup that brought down General Romero in October 1979, and installed Napoleon

Duarte and his Christian Democrats in office, and sponsored the land reforms which were designed by American trade union specialists. From that time forward, the United States has encouraged and assisted a process of democratic development in El Salvador, which has been warmly supported by the Salvadorean people—who walk for miles, stand for hours, braving bullets and threats to cast their votes in favour of democracy in El Salvador. In a hundred ways the people of El Salvador continue to demonstrate their lack of support for the guerrillas whose violence has not won the hearts or minds of the Salvadoreans. Violent minorities, relying on revolution and not persuasion, can devastate the economy, terrorise families and villages, but in more than four years of trying they have not prevented the great majority of Salvadoreans from showing their opposition to politics of violence and extending their support for democratic politics.

It is true that the United States has strategic goals in Central America. We believe it would be bad for the people of the region and bad for the United States for there to be installed one-party, Marxist-Leninist states integrated into the Soviet bloc and willing to have their territory serve as bases for the projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere. That is the strategic basis of our policy. We also have serious political and moral grounds for this position:

(1) We do not think it is moral to leave small countries and helpless people defenceless against conquest by violent minorities which are armed and trained by remote dictatorships. The amount of Soviet bloc arms funnelled into El Salvador is staggering. So is the sophistication of the guerrilla command and control system, including especially communication systems, that guides the insurgency from outside Managua.
(2) We believe our political goal, a more democratic and stable hemisphere, requires building democracies, not the multiplication of dictatorships.

The American government warmly supports the democratic governments of Costa Rica and Honduras and works to further democratic development in Central America. To that end, the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission have been translated into a legislative package which has been submitted to Congress. The package calls for a mix of social, economic, political, security assistance, not unlike the support package that helped to rebuild Europe after the Second World War.

The American government agrees with the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America that 'Central America is both vital and vulnerable and that whatever other cases may arise to claim the nation's attention, the United States cannot afford to turn away from that threatened region. Central America's crisis is our crisis.'

We do see east-west dimensions to that crisis. We do see external support as well as indigenous social and economic factors. We want to respond to all levels of the problem. We do seek a negotiated diplomatic solution. We support and

have supported a wide variety of diplomatic efforts, including the most important current one, the Contadora process, to resolve the regional problems within the region. We will continue to do so.

The time has come to confront the issue of using force. I am aware that the United States is charged today with displaying a proclivity for the use of force to solve problems, a penchant for military solutions: the proofs cited, as I understand it, are our landing in Grenada—which both we and the Grenadans call a liberation, not an invasion; our military assistance to the government of El Salvador; our presence, through military manoeuvres, in Honduras; and our putative support for Nicaragua's insurgents. Sometimes participation in the multinational force in Lebanon is also adduced to support the view that the American government is headed by gunslingers who would, in the words of a famous cigarette advertisement, 'rather fight than switch'.

I desire to deal forthrightly with these questions, beginning with Central America. Let me turn, then, to Grenada and the arms race.

The facts are not really difficult to establish. El Salvador has been the object of unceasing armed attacks by insurgents whose identity, training, supplies and goals are clear. The leadership of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has been open about their commitment to armed struggle and prolonged war. An article by Shafif Handal in the *World Marxist Review* of fall, 1980, straightforwardly explains that the FMLN has no interest in a negotiated settlement, being persuaded that full victory is within reach. Since then, certain proposals for what they call 'power sharing' have been made: all involve 'restructuring' the government, 'purging' the armed forces, national guard and police, and otherwise assuming power over the state. They have continued to this moment to reject utterly 'power sharing' based on free elections held in the presence of international observers. The reasons, doubtless, are that they know they do not enjoy popular support, and they do not in any case recognise popular sovereignty expressed through free elections as the legitimate basis of a legitimate government.

Confronted with the need to combat the guerrillas and also control violence from other sources, the government of El Salvador requires arms, training, communications equipment. Otherwise, it will simply be vanquished by superior force, after which a new dictatorship will be imposed on an unwilling people. There is only one group seeking to impose a military solution in El Salvador; they are the guerrillas. It is all very well to argue that persons of good will ought to be able to find a peaceful solution peaceably. But if one side makes surrender a precondition of peace, then the alternatives are only to surrender or resist. We can of course continue to try to persuade the other party to reconsider. And that is precisely what the United States has done and is doing in El Salvador. Meanwhile, however, we believe it necessary and acceptable to supply the military assistance needed to permit the government to continue to resist guerrilla attacks. Morality does not, indeed cannot, require that we stand by passively while a small nation, under-equipped and unsophisticated, succumbs to well-armed and trained guerrilla forces.

More than El Salvador is at stake. Subversion and violence have already disrupted ordinary life in Costa Rica and Honduras. Do we leave them essentially defenceless against externally supported violence? What of Chad? What of the Sudan? Has the transvaluation of values so far progressed that now, in the west, it is not permissible to help countries help protect themselves against armed subversion and armed aggression?

From our side of the Atlantic, it sometimes seems that in Europe there is more sympathy for the Nicaraguans who threaten the peace, independence and freedom of all their neighbours than for the neighbours themselves. Sometimes it seems there is more 'understanding' of the thousands of Cuban and Soviet bloc military advisers in Nicaragua, one of whose tasks it is to direct the struggle against El Salvador, than for the 37 or so American military advisers in El Salvador to help that country fend off its would-be conquerors. Sometimes it seems that there is more enthusiasm for Nicaragua's preparations for what gave every evidence of being staged, rigged elections than for El Salvador's earnest efforts to have genuinely free elections under difficult circumstances. Sometimes it sounds as though our friends are as inclined to exaggerate American minimal use of force for limited defensive purposes as they are to minimise the Soviet bloc's regular reliance on force to subvert and overwhelm hapless, too often helpless, third world nations.

With the landing on Grenada, attacks on the United States reached a crescendo. Americans, it was asserted, were no better than the Soviets. Invading Grenada is no different from Argentina invading the Falklands. One MP asserted there was an 'uncanny resemblance'. Another charged: 'If the governments arrogate to themselves the right to change the governments of other sovereign states, there can be no peace in this world in perhaps the most dangerous age which the human race has ever known. It is quite improper for Honourable Members to condemn, as we have, the violation of international law by the Soviet Union in its attack on Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan if we do not apply the same standards to the United States' attack on Grenada two days ago.'

Obviously, we don't agree. Moreover, we found it truly unbelievable that countries which were themselves so recently liberated by force from the occupying troops and quisling governments of Nazi tyrants, or who participated in that liberation, should have been unable to distinguish between force used to conquer and victimise and force used to liberate. We believe we acted on solid legal grounds to protect 1,000 American nationals, some of whom we had good reason to believe were in real danger, and at the request of the Governor-General and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS),which in turn acted in accordance with its treaty. We have discussed our view of the legal grounds of our action at length in other arenas. I am concerned here with the Grenada–Afghanistan analogy, which is perhaps the clearest example of the argument that there is no moral difference between the superpowers.

To argue that the use of force by the United States in Grenada was

equivalent to the Soviet Union's use of force in Afghanistan, it is necessary to overlook the circumstances under which the two 'invasions' were undertaken, the policies followed after the so-called 'invasions' took place and the views of the populace involved.

First, the circumstances. It is true that the Soviet Union cited as justification of its invasion of Afghanistan a supposed request for assistance made by the Afghan government under the 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship. But, whereas American and OECS forces went to great lengths to protect and rescue Sir Paul Scoon, who was in hiding for his life and who is now alive and free to verify his participation in invoking the action— as well as to lay the groundwork for free elections and the establishment of constitutional government in Grenada—the very first action of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was the murder, by a special Soviet assault team, of then-President Hafizullah Amin, in whose name they claimed to be acting.

Second, less than one week after the military action in Grenada began, Governor-General Scoon was beginning to lay the groundwork for future free elections and a return to constitutional government. American forces were reduced from 3,000 to fewer than 300 in a matter of weeks. Four years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there has never been the slightest suggestion by Soviet authorities or by the regime they installed in Kabul that free elections will ever be held in Afghanistan. Moscow has repeatedly declared that the 'socialist revolution' in Afghanistan, i.e. the coup of 27 April 1978, is 'irreversible', has refused to suggest any timetable for withdrawal of its forces, has annexed portions of Afghan territory, has built massive permanent military installations and has thousands of Soviet personnel making the actual decisions in nominally Afghan government offices.

Third, the people of Grenada have welcomed American and OECS forces as liberators, and are assuredly not fighting against them; indeed, many if not most members of the Grenada army and militia laid down their arms and returned to civilian life. It was outside occupation forces—i.e. Cubans—who dug in and fought, leading to further suffering.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, Soviet forces numbering close to 125,000 are supported by a mere handful of Communist Party functionaries dependent on Soviet protection and are opposed by the general population, who form the resistance which has been fighting the Soviet occupation for four years. Not even the Soviet Union reported grateful Afghans lining the streets of Kabul to shout 'God bless Brezhnev'.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Not only did the students and the people of Grenada welcome the American, Jamaican, Barbadian and OECS forces as liberators: a recent poll in Grenada, conducted by an American academic organisation not famous for its support of the Administration, shows approximately 84 per cent of the population both believed they were in danger and were glad that American troops came to Grenada. The American students feel the same way, and still have not forgiven the American reporters whom they accuse of failing to understand the danger.

In conclusion, let me say that the most important problem about the doctrine of moral equivalence is that it eliminates all the most important distinctions and confuses almost all the important issues of international affairs today. I will add a word about the arms race: the very notion that there is an arms race in the first place and not a belated response to Soviet military build-up is a problem. The very widespread assumption that the Soviet Union responds to our provocations is equally false; in fact, we permitted it, as a matter of deliberate policy, to gain parity. And, having gained parity, the Soviet Union proceeded to accelerate further its arms build-up, not to slow it down.

In thinking about the doctrine of moral symmetry, I was reminded of the doctrine of '*tous azimuts*', which the French Communist Party has advocated from time to time in regard to the *force de frappe*. It seemed to me that having a doctrine of *tous azimuts* in regard to moral quality is perhaps even more dangerous than one with regard to nuclear weapons. If it is no longer possible to distinguish between freedom and despotism—the United States is a free society—between consent and violence—we are a society based on consent—between open and closed societies—we are an open society—then the erosion of the foundation of a distinctively western democratic civilisation is already far advanced and the situation is serious indeed.

Reagan, Congress and foreign policy: a troubled partnership

BRIAN HOCKING AND MICHAEL SMITH

DURING the past decade analysis of the American foreign policy process has come to concentrate on the relative power of Congress and the Executive. As Congress began to exert its power in the face of a presidency weakened by the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate 'syndromes', many commentators sought to explore the causes and consequences of this change. Whether or not this congressional resurgence would prove permanent became the central question and the main point of difference in the developing debate. For some, legislative assertiveness in the early and mid-1970s was a purely temporary phenomenon to be explained by America's international and domestic political traumas. For others, the trend appeared to be part of an irreversible revolution by which a Congress newly endowed with resources and policy instruments had staked out an enduring role in policy-making.

Recent developments, however, suggest that the picture may be more com-

The authors are Senior Lecturers in International Relations at Coventry (Lanchester) Polytechnic.

plex and that Congress's ability and willingness to involve itself in foreign policy will fluctuate as changes occur in the international system, in American domestic politics and in internal congressional relationships. This article is concerned with the current state of these fluctuations as the Reagan presidency draws towards the end of its first term. How does the balance between Congress and the Executive in terms of foreign policy initiative appear in the spring of 1984? We shall first examine the picture in general, and then consider two central but contrasting policy issues—the commitment of American marines to the Lebanon, and the proposed increase in the American contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Reagan and Congress, 1980–3

During the first two years of the Reagan presidency, predictions that the initiative in foreign policy would inevitably be restored to the President appeared to be vindicated. Reagan's popularity in the country at large was reflected in the creation of a coalition in the House of Representatives between Republicans and conservative Democrats; this combined with a Republican Senate majority to ensure that the President could exercise a degree of control over Capitol Hill not enjoyed by his immediate predecessors.[1] However, by the time the 98th Congress convened in January 1983 after the mid-term congressional elections, significant changes in the political landscape had occurred. During the latter part of 1982 and in early 1983, the Reagan image was undermined by doubts about the Administration's economic strategy and about its foreign policy—particularly in Central America. In part, this was due to the emergence of more organised opposition to the Administration (including a 'peace' movement stimulated by concern over White House policies on defence spending and arms control). In part, too, it was a reflection of the 'politicisation' which always attends the onset of presidential elections. But dominant among the problems which confronted Reagan in early 1983 was the changing complexion of Congress.

The return at the 1982 mid-term elections of 26 additional Democrats, together with a growing nervousness among Republicans looking ahead to the 1984 elections and showing a more 'centrist' orientation, destroyed the coalition of Republican and Democrat conservatives which had oiled the wheels of White House–Capitol Hill relations during 1981–2. In mid-April, the change in the configuration of political forces was underlined when the key Republican-controlled Senate Budget Committee rejected by a 13–4 vote Reagan's $849 billion budget for fiscal year 1984.

On the foreign policy front, executive-congressional tensions centred on the President's increasingly unpopular Central American policies and White House requests for additional funds to support the El Salvador government. Distrust between the White House and Capitol Hill was strengthened by revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was short-circuiting

[1] On the implications of this for the defence budget, see Stephen Kirby, 'Reagan, Congress and national security', *The World Today*, July–August 1981, pp. 270–6.

congressional restrictions on the use of federal funds to provide aid for right-wing guerrillas fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Senator Moynihan, vice-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, accused the Administration of destroying the relationship between the congressional security committees and the CIA, through its attempts to evade congressional restrictions by stealth. Reagan's concern with his diminishing control over Congress impelled him to address a joint session of both Houses on 27 April. Only nine such sessions had been held since 1945, and so this decision demonstrated the importance that the White House attached both to the apparent Soviet-Cuban threat in what Reagan called America's 'own backyard' and its concern with the balance of political forces in Washington.

The potential for acrimony was further increased by a Supreme Court judgment on 23 June 1983 (in the case of *Immigration and Naturalisation Service v. Chadha)* which seemed to some to eliminate the use of the so-called 'legislative veto'. As a consequence, it was argued that there was a threat of presidential pre-eminence in foreign policy especially, which might lead Congress either to retreat from its involvement or to intervene in ever more detailed ways. The dilemma for congressional leaders was both obvious and taxing.[2]

From the President's point of view it was clearly necessary not only to work hard on specific issues such as Central America, but also to develop new relations with the shifting political forces in Congress. By the latter part of the year, observers were noting that this was being achieved by the establishment of a new relationship based on 'mutual respect' between Reagan and the Democrat Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas ('Tip') O'Neill, which according to some conferred on the latter the status of 'co-President'.[3] Certainly the Administration's difficulties in dealing with Congress appeared to diminish. Disputes over appropriations, for example, began to disappear in the autumn as Congress processed money bills with an unaccustomed speed. The relationship between Speaker and President was also to be an essential element in the conflict between Congress and Executive over the presence of American marines in the Lebanon.

Reagan, Congress and the marines

In examining the relations between President and Congress over the deployment of American marines in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, we find ourselves immediately in one of the areas central to the conflict and traumas of the 1970s.[4] The War Powers Resolution of 1973, while milder in tone than some of the canvassed alternatives, placed specific conditions on the commitment of American forces in areas where 'hostilities' were seen to be im-

[2] See I. M. Destler, 'Dateline Washington: life after the veto', *Foreign Policy*, No. 52, Fall 1983, pp. 183–6.

[3] David S. Broder, 'An unusual Co-Presidency that raises questions', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 October 1983.

[4] For background to the setting up and the operations of the MNF, see Ramesh Thakur, 'The olive branch brigades', *The World Today*, March 1984.

minent. Although Congress had never imposed the time-constraints or financial limitations which are recommended by the Resolution, successive Presidents had felt it advisable to consult congressional leaders and inform them (admittedly after the event) when their actions carried a risk of military involvements. In much the same way, when the Reagan Administration decided in the summer of 1982 to commit 1,600 marines to a peacekeeping role based on Beirut airport, the President took care to keep Congress informed. In setting out the aim of the proposed force, Reagan stressed that it was in no way intended to fall foul of the War Powers Resolution; the marines were to provide a symbolic presence and to back up the forces of the newly established Lebanese government of Amin Gemayel in their attempts to restore stability. Most important, the troops would not be involved as combatants in any hostilities—a condition clearly influenced by the 1973 legislation.

It soon emerged that the MNF—and the American contingent in particular—confronted a fluid and ambiguous situation, in which their role was exceedingly difficult to define. The presence of the force was based on assumptions about the capacity of the Lebanese government which proved ill-founded, and as a result the direction of American policy came increasingly to be questioned. During late August 1983, matters came to a head. The Israeli withdrawal from parts of west Beirut, despite the President's pleas for delay, left a vacuum in which further clashes between Lebanese factions flared up. At the same time, the Lebanese government itself called upon the Americans to take up a wider and more active role in policing the continuing crisis. In the face of these pressures, and the first deaths among the marines themselves, the White House seemed incapable of mustering a coherent response. This was partly due to internal power struggles between the Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the then National Security Adviser, William Clark.

September 1983 thus ushered in a series of critical challenges for an increasingly unsure executive branch, foremost among them the increasing congressional discontent at the marines' predicament. As the marines prepared to retaliate against attacks on them in Beirut, the President insisted that such measures did not imply 'participation' in the fighting; at the same time, he pledged that Congress would be consulted if any additional forces were to be committed. By the time Congress reassembled in early September after its summer recess, it was evident that such pledges were treated with considerable scepticism by many in the legislative branch, but it was also clear that the President faced a genuine dilemma. How could he combine the search for domestic—and particularly congressional—approval for his policies with the flexibility needed if he was to send the appropriate 'signals' to the Syrians?

The result of this dilemma, and of the consultations held by Reagan with congressional leaders, was a deal which seemed to preserve the interests of both branches of government. Significantly, a key factor in the evolution of a compromise was Speaker O'Neill. As a consequence of intensive consultations involving not only O'Neill but also Howard Baker, the Senate majority leader, and other committee leaders, a plan emerged by which the Administration's

posture could be legitimised without reducing the operational capacity of the marine force. Democrats in the Senate, led by Charles Mathias, attempted to invoke the War Powers Resolution, but the White House and congressional leaders moved to a compromise which was eventually embodied in a resolution of 4 October 1983. By this compromise, the White House avoided the formal use of the War Powers legislation (indeed, when he signed the resolution, the President explicitly stated that it in no way curtailed his constitutional authority); meanwhile, the Congress maintained its voice, especially since the President undertook to consult on any changes to the marines' mission, which was formally extended to March 1985. This gave an 18-month mandate from August 1983, as opposed to the 90-day maximum under the War Powers Resolution, but left ambiguous the applicability of the Resolution itself.

A creative bargain thus appeared to have been struck, between a President anxious not to fall foul of legislative restrictions and a Congress dedicated to the maintenance of some kind of voice in the national security debate. However, there were criticisms from some Democrat Congressmen of O'Neill's role in the episode, as well as those commentators who pointed to the risks inherent in 'quiet compromises' which left major assumptions unquestioned. In late October, their doubts seemed amply borne out: the 'terror bombings' of 23 October which killed many French as well as American troops signalled a major change in the terms of the Lebanon controversy, and reopened the whole issue of the marines' mission. Reagan attempted to hold the line—no pullout, nor any change in the terms of the American presence—but on the ground in Beirut the situation was becoming rapidly more hazardous. Anxieties in Congress and among the broader American population were sharpened by an apparent convergence of American and Israeli policies, and by evidence that active and extensive retaliation was being contemplated. If this line were pursued, it appeared, two consequences might follow: first, the marines and offshore naval forces could become exclusively identified with one side in the conflict, and second, their military position would become untenable without massive reinforcement.

It was on this note of uncertainty that Congress recessed on 18 November; but the debate did not die away. Indeed, it was during the Christmas recess that the compromise of August and September, and the consensus between White House and congressional leaders on which it was based, began to disintegrate. The visit of Yitzhak Shamir, the new Israeli Prime Minister, during late November produced widespread fears that American neutrality might be questioned, thereby undermining further the role of the MNF. Meanwhile, an intense debate continued over the military appropriateness of the marines' mission, and it began to be argued that the whole episode could have adverse effects during the imminent 1984 electoral season.

The climax of this continuing debate occurred effectively between Christmas 1983 and the New Year, when a series of shocks were administered to the carefully balanced bargain between White House and Congress. First, in a press conference on 21 December, the President implied that a new and more

: for the marines was being contemplated. Next, a subcommittee of
e Armed Services Committee produced a report on the Beirut bomb-
h was sharply critical of the security measures taken by the American
ie final and severest blow, however, was contained in the report on
bings commissioned by the Department of Defence (the so-called
ort, named for its chairman, a retired admiral). Ostensibly devoted
v of the military measures, the report raised fundamental questions
: ill-defined mission of the American forces. Although efforts were
play down the impact of the report, its effect was profound, in Con-
in the broader political arena.

s the most significant reactions to the Long Report came from pre-
se congressional leaders who had lent themselves to the 'deal' in
983. Tip O'Neill had already—on Christmas Eve—received a letter
Congressmen calling for an immediate consideration of the marines'
n the reassembly of Congress (set for 23 January 1984). Soon it be-
r that O'Neill himself had lost faith in the September bargain: on
ıber, he let it be known that if Reagan had not changed the forces'
y the end of January, then Congress would intervene. He was also
is feeling that a 6-month rather than an 18-month mandate for the
appropriate. This would effectively have meant withdrawal at the
bruary 1984. Successively the House minority leader, Robert Michel,
Baker, and even Charles Percy, the hitherto docile chairman of the
reign Relations Committee, came out in favour either of immediate
al from Beirut or of far-reaching changes in the terms of the marines'
ent.

time, the issue was unmistakably on the broader political agenda.
ic presidential hopefuls vied with each other to advocate with-
ne of them, Jesse Jackson, pulled off a coup by visiting Damascus
the release of an American pilot held as a prisoner-of-war. In mid-
hree former directors of the CIA publicly expressed doubts about the
l presence of the marines. It was clear that in these circumstances,
eeded all the help he could muster both in Congress and in the
ast itself; and by late January, although events in Beirut looked
ss cataclysmic, there was an ominous silence from Capitol Hill. The
announced on 19 January that the marines would not be redeployed
would bring no military benefit, but this really begged the question
te withdrawal which was bound to be raised as soon as Congress re-
l. Perhaps significantly, it was reported on 25 January that new divi-
arty lines were emerging in Congress, with O'Neill and many Demo-
ng for withdrawal whilst Baker and the Republicans seemed willing
to the President.[5] Reagan's State of the Union Address on the same
e ball firmly in Congress's court, by reaffirming his reliance on the
983 joint resolution.

nouement which occurred during February, however, had less to do

es, 25 January 1984.

with congressional pressures than with the disintegration of the Gemayel regime in the Lebanon. This is not to imply that Congress—and the House Democrats in particular—did not exert themselves to maintain a role in the Middle East policy arena. A House resolution calling on the President to plan for an early withdrawal was introduced (and as quickly repudiated by the White House), whilst it was apparent that many Republicans had growing doubts about the electoral wisdom of the President's commitment. The chaos in Beirut after the resignation of the Lebanese Cabinet evidently convinced the White House as well that what was described as a redeployment to 'more defensible positions' was in order. In consequence, by the end of February the marines were ship-borne and the Democrats appeared to have lost a major means of embarrassing the President; on the other hand, the House leadership had declined to push its opposition to the level at which it could be accused of having undermined White House policy, though the continued shelling of Syrian and other positions in Beirut contained the potential for new confrontations.

The IMF controversy

The conflict between the White House and Congress concerning the approval of an $8·5 billion increase in the American contribution to the IMF belonged to a different category of external policy. Here, issues relating to international and domestic economy became intermingled with factional rivalry on Capitol Hill to produce a crisis demanding the application of all the techniques for congressional management available to the Administration.

The chain of events began with the decision of the White House (somewhat reluctantly reached) to support a 47·5 per cent increase in IMF funding, entailing a significant increase in the American quota. This decision did not appear to imply any diminution of Reagan's expressed scepticism about a number of international agencies of which the United States is a member, but it did reflect a concern with the international debt crisis and the ability of the IMF to play a role in dealing with it. Problems in giving legislative effect to the decision were soon evident, however. Having passed its first stage in the House by a comfortable majority, the IMF bill was to emerge on 3 August 1983 by a narrow six vote majority. Moreover, attached to the bill were a series of amendments clearly unacceptable to the White House and of concern both to the American banking community and to the IMF. The most radical included instructions to the American executive director at the IMF to oppose loans to Communist countries or to those which practise apartheid, and instructions to American banks intended, *inter alia,* to limit profits from overseas lending. The Senate version of the IMF bill, passed on 8 June by a majority of 55 to 43, was much milder, and it became clear during the summer that congressional interest would anything but diminish as a conference committee of the House and Senate attempted to iron out the differences between the two versions.

Several of the amendments attached to the House bill appeared to have little to do with American foreign policy but much to do with domestic politics. The problems confronting the Reagan Administration in attempting

to persuade the House to drop, or at least modify, the most controversial clauses had several sources. At one level, as many observers were quick to point out, the White House was reaping the harvest of its own ambiguous attitudes towards agencies such as the IMF. Approval for the increased contribution had been given in an atmosphere critical of the Fund and, indeed, the United States had opposed the much larger increases which some countries had favoured. In this sense, congressional reservations reflected those of Reagan himself. Secondly, the debate on the IMF bill has to be seen in the context of the shifting alignments of congressional forces, for Democratic assertiveness in the wake of the mid-term elections was as significant here as in other issues.

Tensions between congressional factions were heightened, however, by an aggressive right-wing campaign directed against those liberal Democrats who opposed the amendment prohibiting IMF loans to Communist regimes. Much to the embarrassment of Reagan, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee accused Democrat opponents of the amendment of being supporters of Communism. Threats made by the Democrats that they would oppose the bill unless the White House despatched a letter apologising for the Republicans' action confronted Reagan with a dilemma. Clearly, the political realities of the balance of power within the House required that he gain the support of the Democrats if the IMF legislation were to be enacted. But how could a Republican President, contemplating renomination for a second term, be seen to apologise to his political opponents for the actions of his own party?

While the President reflected on this problem, another obstacle to the IMF bill manifested itself as Democrats sought to link the issue to Senate approval for a bill providing for low-cost housing. This piece of legislation was strongly supported by Mr Fernand St. Germain, chairman of the House Banking Committee, who made it clear to the White House that an indissoluble linkage had been established between these otherwise unconnected issues.

Such a development was symbolic of a broader trend whereby a coalition of interests reflecting a variety of issues, some domestic, some international, was assembling around the IMF bill. Thus Ralph Nader, defender of consumer interests, was able to articulate deeply-held prejudices against the American commercial banks. The view that the IMF bill was intended to 'bail out the banks' from a problem which had been created by their own profligacy was shared by many, including Democrats, on Capitol Hill. One of the disputed amendments, that requiring the National Advisory Council to report within a year on the impact of steel subsidies in countries borrowing from the IMF, reflected the concerns of another interested lobby, the American steel industry. As the debate grew, so did the number of groups concerned to express an interest; the organised 'peace' movement, the anti-apartheid and anti-nuclear lobbies among them.

Confronted by a diverse coalition of forces, the White House was compelled to engage in intensive lobbying as it attempted to placate one group while avoiding the danger of alienating others. Part of this process involved an ap-

peal to national self-interest as both the President and the Treasury Secretary, Donald Regan, emphasised the effects that failure to rescue the IMF—and, thereby, to relieve the debt crisis—would have on American export markets. Another element of the White House strategy involved the attempt to transfer the international pressures bearing down on the Administration to Congress itself. In addressing the 146 member-nations of the IMF represented at the World Bank and IMF meeting held in Washington during September, Reagan expressed his firm commitment to seeing the IMF bill passed. As the IMF froze its lending programme, the pressures from other governments for an increase in the IMF's liquidity must have been apparent to all but the most insensitive members of Congress.

Such tactics could not, however, solve the basic domestic issues that had become linked to the IMF bill. Indeed, some Congressmen predicted that any attempt by the IMF managing director, Jacques de Larosière, to orchestrate a campaign in favour of the bill could be counterproductive. The last days of the session were spent in White House attempts to soothe the wounded sensibilities of the 20 Democrats accused of pro-Communist leanings, while hammering out a compromise on the housing legislation. Reagan's reluctance to issue a letter of 'apology' to the offended Democrats was overcome after a meeting with House majority leader, Jim Wright, a Democrat from Texas. In fact, the letter sent by the President expressed the White House's 'strong appreciation' of their support during the passage of the bill and although regarded by many as inadequate seemed to overcome this problem.

On the housing legislation front, White House, Senate and House staffs put together an agreement which cleared the way for the passage of the IMF bill. Both House and Senate passed a housing-IMF package as the session drew to its close on 18 November. Approval was based on compromises which, while retaining many of the controversial amendments, sought to dilute their force. What had clearly been demonstrated by the end of 1983 was Congress's growing recognition of the significance of international economic issues, both in domestic and foreign policy terms. Moreover, the implications of this growing congressional interest for the management of foreign economic policy had become equally obvious.

Conclusion

Seen in one light, the events of 1983 and early 1984 appear to confirm the 'pendulum' thesis: the balance of initiative between Congress and the White House will swing between these two poles of political power impelled by a variety of international and domestic factors. Indeed, this article has suggested that there are three elements which promote changes in the congressional-executive relationship in the foreign policy field: first, the nature of the issues arising in the international arena; second, the broader political mood in the United States itself and, finally, the changing nature of Congress and its 'presence' in decision-making. The pendulum image, however, does not do justice to the complexity of the problem. It is not simply that a confluence of

domestic and international factors produces more rapid shifts in the balance between White House and Capitol Hill (which it does), but also that several 'pendulums' are in motion at any one time. These may move independently of one another, reflecting different patterns of interest focused on distinctive foreign policy issues, and an erratic movement in one area can affect the functioning of the machinery elsewhere. This produces a degree of unpredictability in congressional-executive foreign policy relationships that makes simple generalisations about their nature of dubious validity.

The pattern of events surrounding the Lebanon peacekeeping force and the IMF bill reflected the different nature of the two issues. The first involved the traditional trappings of 'high politics' replete with symbolism both for Reagan's foreign policy and also for Congress. The deployment of troops overseas stirred the collective legislative memory of earlier battles with the White House, one memorial to which is the War Powers Act. By way of contrast, the IMF bill incident represented a classic instance of the ways in which, in a situation of enhanced economic interdependence, apparently unconnected domestic and international issues can become linked. This may be because vested interests perceive a connection between issues, as was the case with the American steel lobby, or because politicians perceive an opportunity to further domestic policy interests by creating linkages with foreign policy issues. The linkage that emerged between the IMF and low-cost housing bills is a clear example of this process.

As the pendulums representing these two sets of events moved between the two poles of political power, both were affected by other events and developments on other issues on the agenda of congressional-executive relations. Some of these appeared suddenly such as the Korean airliner disaster in September 1983, or the Grenada incident in October. Others were long-running issues as in the case of defence spending and Reagan's policies in Central America. Some (the Korean airliner incident and Grenada) could be turned to presidential advantage; others (Central America and the defence budget) stimulated Congressional opposition, which had more general effects on the atmosphere of foreign policy making. When—as in early 1984—the impact of electoral competition also made itself felt, the makings of an intensely 'political' contest were discernible.

In these circumstances, how can the qualities necessary to the conduct of foreign policy, such as coherence and flexibility, be reconciled with the need to ensure a domestic consensus for, and hence the legitimacy of, that policy? Increasingly, the intimate connection between the domestic and foreign policy agendas requires the participation of a variety of domestic political actors, among which Congress will be predominant. Consequently, the need to develop strategies and techniques of management at both levels—Capitol Hill and White House—becomes ever more imperative. The stakes in terms of policy legitimacy are high: the experience of the Reagan presidency as it draws towards the close of its first term indicates both the nature of the difficulty and the limited success of the White House in dealing with it. Successful manage-

ment by the central actors in the political arena requires a variety of skills, which have been noticeably lacking in White House strategy.

No clearer confirmation of this could be provided than the defeats inflicted on the White House in late March regarding its wish to sell Stinger missiles to Jordan. The clumsy handling of this issue, in which Reagan's advisers appeared to panic at the first signs of congressional opposition, is indicative of one part of the problem. Maximising the benefits of a congressional presence in foreign policy making and minimising its disadvantages requires a judicious combination of presidential skill and fortitude. Moreover, it assumes that the Administration is in control of foreign policy, a fact which revelations of CIA operations in Nicaragua together with statements by its Director, William Casey, have caused many on Capitol Hill to question. The other part of the problem—the recognition by Congress of where its role can be most usefully developed and at what points influence applied without undermining the conduct of foreign relations—is equally demanding. Whatever the fate of the Reagan presidency, the problem will not disappear.

Vietnam: a new turning-point?

DENNIS DUNCANSON

EARLIER this year, on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the Vietnamese Communists' take-over of North Vietnam under the 1954 Geneva Agreement, the editor of *The People* (Hanoi's *Pravda*) told his readers that the regime was now secure at home and abroad; 'Socialist relations' and 'social production' had reached an 'important turning-point' and the nation was 'about to make a vigorous leap to a new stage of development'.[1] The editor did not say what the new stage would comprise, but something about the old stage emerged clearly: the deep disappointments which the interval between the Fourth (1976) and Fifth (1982) Communist Party Congresses had brought the country's ideologues. The party had taken nine years since the conquest of South Vietnam even to reach 'the initial stage' of socialist transformation of society, that of 'identifying the potential of human strength and the prospects for exploiting the wealth of land, forests and sea'. What has gone wrong was shown by what the article claimed had been put right: 'the state of sluggishness and deterioration' had been 'eradicated' and 'all major upheavals and ordeals' had been 'overcome'. The significance of the 'turning-point' was

[1] *Nhan Dan (The People)*, 1 February 1984, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB), FE 7559.

Mr Duncanson is the author of *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1968). He has been contributing articles on Indochina to *The World Today* since 1967.

that today, in the teeth of external hostility as well as home-based enemies, the position of the revolution in the country, as in all three countries on the Indochinese peninsula, was 'firmer than ever before'.

For *The People*'s readers who know the code, the implications seem to be two: first, on the economic plane, that while mass effort to replace foreign aid which until 1975 sustained and largely fed both South and North Vietnam has hitherto been lacking, and living conditions have been getting worse, a new remedy has now borne fruit.[2] Second, that on the political plane, dissident minorities and anti-Communist guerrillas have at last been brought to heel, the army's hold on Laos and Cambodia after the latter's 1978 revolt is demonstrably secure, and the threat of renewed Chinese punitive incursions has faded away in spite of mutual abuse and frontier skirmishes. The party feels it is safe to relax the collectivisation of material and human resources, especially in agriculture, on which it has built its dictatorship but which has seriously constrained peasant productivity. Behind the allusions and generalisations in the editorial, there lurk details crucial for assessing the balance of power in South-East Asia today.

'Socialist relations' and 'social production'

In 1954, the party imposed its dictatorship in the provinces transferred to it at Geneva by the same cautionary brutality to deter opposition on the pretext of land reform, as had been employed by the Chinese Communist Party a year or two before, in China. Also in the same way as in China, it then forced collectivisation through within four or five years, and managed to do so without much trouble in spite of the acknowledged unpopularity of the measures. In 1975, after the conquest of South Vietnam where party rule was even less likely to be welcome (a fact that even the Politburo occasionally admitted in the open[3]), prudence was all the more necessary. The pretext of land reform could no longer be pleaded because, as was widely known, agricultural land had already been parcelled up into smallholdings. The party had long been aware that 'political constraints inherent in progressive socialist revolution' slowed economic growth.[4] The 1976 Fourth Congress did not repudiate collectivisation. Indeed, it reaffirmed Marxist-Leninist faith that collectivisation could make 'new socialist men' of the vanquished southerners, and it endorsed a still more radical measure that would mask denial of ownership over smallholdings. It was the transportation of 4 million peasants from one part of the country to another. 'Transportees' were to join the hundreds of thousands of town-dwellers evicted from the cities of the south in close-settled housing, in which it was said it would be easier than on the old collectives to move labour from one activity to another and in which traditional village communities could be obliterated. An industrialised agriculture which mixed frugal, if

[2] On the severity of food shortages, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 9 January 1981.

[3] Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in *Nhan Dan*, 29 November 1975, SWB, FE 5065.

[4] *Van Nghe* (*The Arts*, Hanoi), 16 November 1964, repeated by Pham Van Dong in *Nhan Dan*, 1 September 1977, SWB, FE 5603.

backward, 'socialist men' from the north with the technically advanced, if socially decadent, 'embourgeoisés' of the south, would facilitate social control; and the southerners could not complain of discrimination-in-defeat if the victorious northerners were treated no better. What other difficulties may have snagged this specimen of 'creative Marxism' in addition to passive resistance, drifting home, and the party's own administrative incompetence (all acknowledged subsequently) is hard to tell; but it appeared to peter out. By January 1982, Radio Hanoi was admitting that resettlement of Tonkin's surplus millions in the south was a task yet to be tackled; when the Fifth Congress convened in April that year, no mention of it was reported.[5]

The party reports submitted for endorsement to the 1982 Fifth Congress followed two contradictory lines. Le Duan, the Secretary-General, still idealised 'collective mastery' as the source of what good things there were in society and the economy and as the sole theoretical hope for the future, whereas Pham Van Dong, in the same mood as quoted above, bewailed the shortcomings of management and of mass response. The country's economic difficulties were acute, he said: there were no consumer goods or amenities for workers, especially in industry and the civil service; energy sources were nowhere near requirements; the supply of materials for manufacture was poor, and transport was quite unable to cope with needs; the state financial system was bureaucratised, and prices were spiralling 'out of control'. Above all, exports could not pay for imports, and although (with a bow to the ideologues) 'social production' would be pressed on with in the south and 'socialist relations' be 'perfected' in the north, membership of Comecon and the gains to be expected from economic cooperation with Laos and Cambodia had become indispensable props to Vietnam's economy.

It fell to a third voice to resolve the contradiction by announcing a 'new management system'. It was the voice of Le Duc Tho, a member of the Politburo, whose military planning and international diplomacy for the campaign to conquer the south between 1969 and 1972 won him the offer of a Nobel Peace Prize (and who would probably assume power if Le Duan were ever incapacitated unexpectedly). Tho spoke at the congress, chiefly to urge a party purge calculated to eradicate cadres' dishonesty and alienation of the masses, but he reserved his main thrust for an occasion of his own choosing four months later.[6] Then, he hammered home how bad collectivisation's record really was. By 1982, private plots tolerated on the collectives, though nominally not exceeding 5 per cent of tillable land, were yielding up to twice as much value as the cooperatives disposing of all the rest. There had been widespread swindles in cooperatives' accounts. Peasants had cheeked the party by demanding extra chemical fertiliser before they would meet party quotas, had been appeased, had then still not delivered, but finally had agreed to the quotas if allowed to labour each on his own— in effect nullifying the principle

[5] For an analysis of the Fourth Congress, see R. Smith, *The World Today*, May 1977. Texts of speeches at the Fifth can be found in SWB, FE 6991–7005.

[6] Radio Hanoi, 4–9 September 1982, SWB, FE 7144.

tive mastery. On the other hand, in the north, collectivisation had had :hievements to its credit: its economies-of-scale had redounded to the s' advantage; it had prevented small-scale production from 'giving spontaneous capitalism' in infinite little ways and—part confession, sonal boast—it was the collectives which had enabled the north to con- › much free labour for 'liberating' the south. The last point could a similar 'progressive' argument for collectivisation in the future.

: Fifth-Congress new system is reminiscent of Lenin's New Economic It still defends 'socialist relations' through collectivisation and still land transactions (although they are going on), but in practice 'per- moderates it radically in two ways: first, as a concession to persistent ›roducer mentality', quotas for state delivery are being 'contracted' to instead of big teams; and second, social administration (health, police) is taken away from the cooperatives and given back to the lapsed nmunist district administration. Since even the use of force had only ›ne in five of families in the south for cooperatives by 1982—one in day[7]—there must have been families still outside any government con- il district administration was re-established. With help from the , the relaxation of 'social production' under the new economic system as been rewarded with much bigger 1983 crops. It is that improve- 1ich contributes most to the 'new turning-point'—although at such ›le costs as that of working water buffaloes to death, or the exuberant :r of the national stock of pigs which are being bartered illicitly for ıd in order to meet the demand created by expectation of profits from ıtracts.[8] As in China under Mao, cereal production has thus had to be by sacrifice of the protein essential for a balanced diet.

l relations' with Laos and Cambodia

ındreds of years, reunifiers of a centrifugal Vietnam have found it im- to try to exert suzerainty ('hegemony') over Laos and Cambodia. The ıre both economic and political. Landless Vietnamese peasants have grating to Laos and Cambodia in increasing numbers for 200 years— ›easants but as traders, hardwood-fellers and miners, freshwater :n on the Tonlé Sap, or as clerks in native administrations. All these ; received new impulse from the French protectorate, and both the ıese Communists and their nationalist rivals envisaged continua- hem after independence (especially access to the dried fish and the rairies of western Cambodia to help feed their Malthusian populace). association of all Indochina has been important to Vietnam's despots e that country reached its present borders at the expense of Cambodia, and in order to prevent the use of neighbouring territory as a sanctuary dents and on the other as a spring-board, conversely, for bringing ıists to heel. French constitutionalists thought of post-colonial in-

Hanoi, 2 January 1984, SWB, FE 7537, compared with *Nhan Dan*, 24 February 1983.
ḃi *Cong-san (Communist Review)*, Hanoi, No. 1, 1983.

dependence as unworkable unless the three national states submerged their sovereignty in a federation (the *Etats associés de l'Indochine*).[9] The Comintern and the Vietnamese party's own manifestoes shared that assumption, and the Vietcong themselves represented the Communist interest in Laos and Cambodia until, after 1945, lip-service had to be paid to nationalism (however 'irreconcilable with Marxism', in Lenin's dictum), notably in propaganda overseas. The recent suppression of the 'upheaval' of hill tribes known for 20 years as Fulro, one aspect of the 'turning-point', will have owed much to Hanoi's renewed control over Cambodia.

The 1975 victory of Vietnamese Communist arms throughout Indochina could not have been won unless large tracts of Cambodia and Laos had been made accessible by diplomatic settlements (Geneva, Paris) to Vietcong guerrillas and denied to the defenders. The Hanoi Politburo's intention, evidently, was that the very small Communist Parties of Laos and Cambodia would thereafter continue in subordination to itself, and that 'the unity of the Indochinese peoples forged in armed struggle' would be reflected in a 'special fraternal relationship' of integrated public administration, defence and external relations. Hanoi's garrisoning of Laos with 70,000 men met no opposition. Nor was there any to the standard Communist enabling-treaty of friendship-and-cooperation and lesser agreements on defence, designed to regularise the 'fraternal' integration of state policies, especially military command.[10] In Indochinese languages, 'fraternal' does not imply equality but 'big brother, little brother' relations, and the half dozen Cambodian party leaders were ambitious to be sole cocks of the Khmer walk ('fiercely independent nationalists' is the usual euphemism), encouraged by China, as we shall see below. They wrung from Hanoi a public renunciation of intentions to federate the three states, but still declined to sign up with Laos. In the end, the Vietnamese army drove Pol Pot out and substituted, belatedly in the name of humanity, his equally bloodthirsty henchman, Heng Samrin, willing partner in the 'special relationship'. The latter is protected by a 200,000-man garrison standing-to 120 miles from Bangkok.

Current relations in Indochina resemble in some ways those between satellites of the Soviet Union, in others those of Soviet autonomous republics. The party in Cambodia and Laos is an offshoot of the Vietnamese Communist Party but has not shot off very far and still lacks a true mass element, so that it is more autonomous than satellite. Diplomatic relations of due formality between the three states are emphasised, but there is no clue as to what gets transacted through this channel: their purpose may be no more than to justify separate foreign recognition, retention of three seats in the United Nations, additional bids for humanitarian relief, and eventually plurality of rights to finance from international capitalist institutions. Under the treaties, Hanoi

[9] On French policy and its outcome, see Dennis Duncanson, 'The scramble to unscramble French Indochina', *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1982.

[10] For further references on Lao-Vietnam relations, see Dennis Duncanson, '"Limited Sovereignty" in Indochina', *The World Today*, July 1978.

coordinates measures for internal security and Vietnamese advisers direct central government departments *sine die*, while territorial 'friendship/fraternity' (each partner 'according to his capabilities') is contrived largely by the twinning of provincial services across the state frontiers. This is a device of which the region has had 30 years of informal experience and which has obvious merits for Hanoi today, not least for facilitating the movement, the victualling and the supply of the Vietnamese garrisons. There have been frequent foreign press reports of the settlements, with extraterritoriality, of Vietnamese peasants on Laotian and Cambodian agricultural land; since the reports are condemned as exaggerated, not false, it is fair to infer that the 'special relationship' does include this kind of creeping annexation.

Indochina in the wider world

The Soviet Union gave indispensable help to the Vietnamese party at every moment of its long struggle for power in Indochina, and the basis of relations today is the membership of Vietnam and Laos (but not yet of Cambodia) in Comecon and a mutual defence pact. However, it was one thing for the Soviet Union and allies to sustain the Vietnamese party and its army during the long, but still finite, phase of widening the Communist pale. It is quite another to award it a lasting pension—whence Le Duan's Fifth-Congress lament quoted above. The Vietnamese may also be chagrined that, although Comecon aid passes through their hands, Moscow has taken to dealing with Laos direct. The aid is largely repayable, and Hanoi has defaulted, but rouble-exchange from the despatch of well over 50,000 labourers to eastern Europe reduces or wipes out the deficit.[11] Whatever the unpublished sums of money involved, Comecon aid is not able to furnish certain vital modern technology (for example, equipment and method for seabed oil exploitation), nor does it help mitigate the food shortage, as it did before 1975. In any event, like many associations for economic cooperation in the world today, the link has a defence dimension, and the Vietnamese make no bones about Indochina being a firm ally of the Warsaw Pact in all international confrontations, including the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet Union profits from the link through this general alliance, but also specially through naval use of Cam Ranh Bay on the fringe of China's claimed territorial sea.

The limitations on China's technology, itself a candidate for modernisation, must have been one reason for preferring Russian patronage; another was certainly strategic—not simply that the Soviet Union is a bigger friend to have in the wider world, but also that Vietnam and China have competing interests in South-East Asia, not least in the common purpose of 'liberating' it. First, China's sovereignty claims over the South China Sea include nearly all islands and sectors claimed by Vietnam. Second, the two countries share one social and political culture, and it is remarkable how, notwithstanding conflict between them, the Vietnamese go on adopting Chinese policies, at times

[11] That this is the undeclared purpose of the draft, places on which can be bought ('with plums going to cadres' children'), is admitted by a French Communist source (*L'Unité*, 4 February 1983).

slavishly, so that China-watchers will recognise in Vietnam's 'new economic system' a variant of China's 'responsibility' system; the same applies to the restoration of district administration. Third, both countries portrayed themselves as civilising suzerains over western neighbours: the Vietnamese on their own account, the Chinese as top hierarchs over the whole system, including Vietnam and its vassals—the stratified 'tribute' system. Peking had reason to believe in 1975 that, whatever independence between all the states it might be expedient to display to the non-Communist world, the traditional hierarchy would be preserved in party-to-party relations. Fourth, it could not suit China to see Indochina unified party-to-party, even though not state-to-state, when the new relationship meant unified army-to-army as well—a military power second only to itself in the Far East. China had army pioneers garrisoning the northern province of Laos from 1962 onwards and after 1975 condoned Pol Pot's extreme 'proletarian cultural revolution' in Cambodia with foreign exchange and simple technical aid (particularly cotton-raising for Shanghai mills), as a counterweight to Vietnam. Unfortunately for Peking, Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, in the interval between Fourth and Fifth Congresses, undermined Pol Pot with factional subversion and then invaded his dominion with a blitzkrieg over Christmas 1978; China's punitive retaliation six weeks later failed to oblige Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia but did oblige China to withdraw from Laos. The 'turning-point' article implies that China's support for Pol Pot and infiltration of anti-Hanoi guerrillas into Laos has ceased to be felt as a serious threat to Vietnamese authority.

So China looks to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), which has its own reasons for apprehension at the unification of Indochina, to help generate international opposition to the annexation of Cambodia. After the Chinese army was repulsed from Tonkin in 1979, Peking launched a campaign to warn Asean countries that Laos and Cambodia were not Hanoi's last territorial ambitions; a great deal was made of Hanoi's bragging after the 1975 victories and of sabre-rattling about 'liberating' all of South-East Asia, especially in an article on 'South-East Asia "after Vietnam"' in the party's theoretical review; the article had come close to owning up to a domino strategy of people's war aimed at setting up and dominating 'a zone of peace without external attachments' similar to Russia's position in eastern Europe.[12] The Vietnam Communist Party's retort is that Peking harbours an identical ambition (of which, of course, the party was at one time the chief instrument itself). Both accusations are substantiated by the bitter experience since 1950 of all Asean's members, and that is the latter's motive for mobilising the United Nations General Assembly's condemnation of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Laos and refusal to recognise the puppet state installed in the former. UN condemnation is the principal obstacle to Vietnam's

[12] 'Dong-nam A "sau Vietnam"', *Hoc Tap*, No. 2, 1976. Chinese commentary in New China News Agency (NCNA), 6 May 1979, SWB, FE 6111. A Lao-Vietnam joint statement of 12 February 1976 spoke of having achieved 'an attacking position', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 February 1976.

entry into the capitalist market to get the technology Comecon cannot supply and its own exports could not buy even if its workers worked harder to produce them. However, the Vietnamese party's experience is that it is through the ranks of one's biggest enemy of the moment that success is to be had; as a result, Hanoi has been playing up to Indonesia, more vulnerable from China than from Vietnam, to break an Asean solidarity that is chiefly beneficial to Thailand[13]. Visits to Hanoi by Indonesian leaders early this year, and the conclusion of the Indonesian army's commander-in-chief, Murdani, that Vietnam does not have further territorial ambitions after all, provide the most dramatic aspect of the 'turning-point' so far.[14]

All its aspects considered, therefore, the 'turning-point' has substance. Like the Chinese Communist Party since Mao, the Vietnamese revolutionaries are looking chastened by the experience of enlarged government responsibilities at home and abroad. Yet it behoves the rest of the world—and perhaps the Vietnamese peasants no less—to remain on the alert, for the party's sobered tone is a reaction to firm resistance on both fronts and might not outlast that resistance.

[13] For further background, see Leszek Buszynski, 'Vietnam's ASEAN diplomacy. incentives for change', *The World Today*, January 1984.

[14] Indonesia responded to the 1976 sabre-rattling by inviting Vietnam to join Asean, Radio Kuala Lumpur, 11 February 1976, SWB, FE 5183.

Sino-Soviet relations: the road to détente

GERALD SEGAL

SINO-SOVIET relations are at their best in 15 years—and they are likely to improve further. This fact may be discomforting to sceptics about Moscow–Beijing détente, but the trend is by now undeniable. To be sure, there remain serious problems in Sino-Soviet relations, and many in Moscow and Beijing encourage cynicism about further improvements in relations. But to emphasise only what is yet to be achieved, is to miss the important gains already made. The reweaving of the Sino-Soviet cloth has been patchy. Yet when analysing precisely those threads that were torn in the 1960s, the repairs in the cloth are most evident. Briefly, five such threads are most important.[1]

[1] This article is based on the author's forthcoming *Adelphi Paper* for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). He is grateful to the IISS for permission to use this material, as well as to various government and academic officials in China for discussing these issues in February–March 1984.

The author is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Bristol.

The single most important one was China's abandonment of 'road to socialism'. The decision to define a Maoist mode for Chin the Cultural Revolution, with its main target of Soviet-style 'revisi 1980–1, China reassessed the meaning of Maoism, rehabilitati President Liu Shaoqi (denounced as China's Khrushchev), emph moderate and pragmatic elements of Maoist ideology and re-e party-to-party ties with west European Communist parties. In recc these changes, the late President Brezhnev accepted that China wa 'socialist' state. However, by 1984, party-to-party ties between most of the Soviet bloc (severed in 1966 by China) had not yet bee as Moscow insisted on a broader state-to-state 'normalisation'. Chi pared to restore party ties with the east European parties apart from one, but the Soviet Union blocked the way.[2]

Second, the military dimension of Sino-Soviet relations has impr cent years. During the 1960s and 1970s both sides vastly increas preparedness along the world's longest frontier. In 1969 the tensio in brief fire-fights that continued sporadically through the 1970s. Union's threats of a surgical strike on China's nuclear weapons capa followed by deployment of new Soviet SS-20 missiles able to strike a China.

Yet, by 1981, the trend slowly began to follow the improvement political relations.[3] To begin with, both states took unilateral mov up their armed forces and to give themselves greater confidence in potential threat. Neither side could negotiate with one hand tied back. By 1984 neither side had reported a border incident in four ye 1982 China noted that tension was in fact declining. The Soviet U more openly about the need for cooperation against the growing threat in east Asia, recalling that it was the United States that killed of Chinese in Korea and still sells arms to a rebel part of China Soviet appeals for cooperation included a reference to Soviet mili the 1950s, which included a nuclear umbrella for a vulnerable Chi China was less cheery about prospects for Sino-Soviet military déten did now claim to see Soviet military power in Asia as primarily air United States and Japan.

Third, economic relations also took a marked turn for the better middle 1960s, Sino-Soviet trade had fallen to miniscule levels. Not the massive levels of the 1950s economic cooperation not maintaine level of trade was low even for natural cross-border traffic.

In 1982 the trend turned upward and by 1984 Sino-Soviet trade than quadrupled in three years.[4] The new planned total of $1.2 higher than at any time since the mid-1960s, even if seen as a per

[2] *The Economist*, 26 March 1983. See also the Polish paper, *Nowe Drogi*, June 1 tion (as well as others in the text) is based on interviews in China.

[3] Gerald Segal (ed.), *The Soviet Union in East Asia* (London: Heinemann, for stitute of International Affairs, 1983).

[4] *Beijing Review*, No. 9, 27 February 1984, p. 11.

each state's total trade. Both sides seemed confident that trade would continue to grow, even while broader political issues remained unresolved. As China's experiment with its western economic option ran into serious trouble in the early 1980s, the Soviet economic option began to take on new relevance. Certainly, the prospect of Soviet aid in renovating Soviet plants from the 1950s offered a cheaper, if less adventurous, route to China's four modernisations.

Fourth, the United States factor seems to cause fewer problems for Sino-Soviet relations than at any time in the past 20 years. In the early 1960s the Chinese opposed what they saw as the Soviet Union's 'capitulationist' policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. By the early 1970s it was China that was colluding with the United States. The Soviet Union watched with growing horror as China seemed to play the part of Nato's 16th member.

The United States, of course, remains important for Sino-Soviet relations, if only because it is the Soviet Union's primary foreign policy concern, and China's second most important foreign policy problem. But, for the first time in nearly 20 years, both Moscow and Beijing have broad (if tacit) agreement on a mixture of cooperation and conflict with the United States. Neither Communist power seems prepared to play off the other against the United States in the great power triangle. Both accept the need to coexist with and combat the United States.

Fifth, Sino-Soviet conflict in the third world has considerably abated. In the 1960s Moscow and Beijing split the revolutionary movements. In the 1970s China blindly sided with western and 'reactionary' forces anywhere in simple-minded anti-Sovietism. Now China more often than not (tacitly) cooperates with the Soviet Union.

China's new pragmatism in the third world, including a new policy of arms sales, provides for equal opposition to both superpowers. In practice, China primarily denounces the United States while supporting movements and states aligned with the Soviet Union. In Central America, the Middle East, and most of Africa, these trends have been apparent for over two years. Only in Asia has the trend been different. In fact, it is in the Asian dimension that the most serious problems in Sino-Soviet relations persist.[3] Yet, even here, there is reason to believe that Moscow and Beijing are making progress in reducing tension.

The three main obstacles

Both the Soviet Union and China claim to want a 'normalisation' of relations. Unfortunately, neither side defines normalisation in the same way. For the Soviet Union, normalisation is essentially a reduction of tension along the frontier resulting from agreements on confidence-building measures. 'Normal' cultural, trade, diplomatic and party relations will then follow, including a reduction of tension with Vietnam, Afghanistan and Mongolia.

For China, normalisation is broader and more ambitious. Beijing sees

[3] The Sino-Soviet dispute in Asia has not worsened in all cases. In both the Sino-Indian and Sino-Korean relations there has been an evolution of Chinese policy leading to a greater coincidence of interests with the Soviet Union.

a more comprehensive Soviet threat, including troops along the frontier, support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and its own invasion of Afghanistan. These three dimensions to Sino-Soviet relations are seen as obstacles that must be removed prior to any normalisation. Thus, at the four rounds of 'consultations' on normalisation, China has held up speedy progress. China's insistence on Soviet concessions before serious talks not only defies normal negotiating practice, but undermines its claim to be as serious about Sino-Soviet détente as the Soviet Union.[6] China normalised its relations with the United States, tolerating American arms sales to Taiwan, but refuses to talk to the Soviet Union (it claims to be holding only 'consultations') until Moscow concedes Chinese demands.

The Sino-Soviet Frontier. China and the Soviet Union are in agreement that the level of mutual threat along their frontier is excessive. However, each blames the other for this state of affairs. From the Chinese point of view the most important obstacle to Sino-Soviet détente is the direct threat posed by Soviet troops. China now speaks less urgently about the 50 Soviet divisions it faces, but it still insists that normalisation cannot be achieved unless there are normal, i.e. peaceful, cross-border relations.

That requires a standing down of the most threatening forces, and at least a partial withdrawal of troops (and nuclear weapons) from both sides of the line. It remains unclear how many troops need to be pulled back—and how far. It also remains unclear whether China also insists on a recognition by the Soviet Union that it holds land beyond that acquired in the so-called unequal treaties as a precondition to normalisation. It seems the latter issue is less pressing. However, it does seem that China will allow the Soviet Union to retain the bulk of its present forces, so long as there are adequate confidence-building measures agreed in bilateral talks.

The Soviet Union shares the belief in the usefulness of confidence-building measures, but there are some problems of timing. Moscow is unwilling to withdraw (or agree to withdraw) any troops unless China does the same. That is straightforward enough. But the Soviet Union is also unwilling to pull out its five divisions in Mongolia without the latter's consent. Moscow claims those troops are only there at Mongolia's request and that summary withdrawal would adversely affect 'third party's interests'.

The Mongolian issue is, however, not so serious a problem. Moscow also claims that the troops in Mongolia need only stay to defend the frontier, and if there is a reduction in tension, then the defence needs are equally reduced and troops can be pulled out. In any case, China seems prepared to tolerate Soviet troops in Mongolia as a 'matter between sovereign states', so long as their numbers are reduced as part of a general confidence-building agreement.

[6] The United States and western Europe have been negotiating with the Soviet Union for decades without prior resolution of obstacles. China's present position is as if the west refused to negotiate mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) or maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union first reduced its troops in Europe, withdrew from Afghanistan, and stopped supporting Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria. Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal (eds.), *Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Thus, once again, the problem along the frontier is one of scale and timing. Mongolia itself seems acutely concerned that it not be 'sold down the river' for the sake of a Sino-Soviet deal. This concern no doubt explains the 1983 Mongolian expulsion of Chinese residents while Sino-Soviet talks were taking place.[7] But China seems to have appeased at least part of Mongolia's concern and the Soviet Union has also taken a cautious line.

Thus the deeper issue remains whether the Soviet Union and China are sincere in their desire to reduce tension on the frontier. The signs are largely positive. Not only have there been no reported border incidents for four years, but frontier crossing-points have been reopened and a great deal more local trade is taking place. So what then is holding up settlement of this issue?

The problems are real, but by no means insurmountable. Both sides are prepared to withdraw troops as part of a broader confidence-building programme. The modalities of such a withdrawal require negotiations, which cannot take place until China's other two obstacles are manoeuvred out of the way. Thus, almost by definition, this first obstacle—the frontier—is in theory no longer a problem. Chinese officials admit as much in private. Yet they continue to doubt whether the Soviet Union would in fact be willing to build confidence along the frontier. Some Chinese see the entire Sino-Soviet détente process as little more than tactical détente in a broader strategy of conflict. These cynics need to be convinced before real movement can take place.

The Soviet Union could go a long way to proving its good intent by at least a token withdrawal of troops from, say, its own territory opposite Manchuria. While this would not in itself remove the obstacle to détente, it would demonstrate that more progress can be made at the negotiating table when the time comes. China recalls only too well how important it was for Sino-American détente when President Nixon symbolically withdrew the Seventh Fleet patrols from the Taiwan Straits.

Should the Soviet Union fail to take a similar placatory action, it runs the risk of confirming the views of the Chinese cynics, and making any further détente impossible. This would indeed be counterproductive from a Soviet point of view, for this issue of the frontier seems to be the most important of the three obstacles as well as the one that could most easily be eased.

Afghanistan. Before the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this insignificant state with its even less significant frontier with China leaned toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. China accepted the Soviet Union's predominant voice in Afghan affairs, so long as it did not result in a sharply anti-China line, or threaten Pakistan. The Soviet invasion, as opposed to the 1978 pro-Moscow coup, changed all that.

In January 1980, China suspended its talks with the Soviet Union on the grounds that the Afghan invasion had made negotiations 'inappropriate'. China then insisted that Soviet troops had to leave Afghanistan before Sino-Soviet relations could be improved. But in October 1982, with no reduction in the 100,000-strong Soviet force in Afghanistan, China began 'consultations'

[7] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 November 1983.

with the Soviet Union. However, Beijing did insist that relations could not be normalised until Soviet Union withdrew its troops.

The reason for China's apparent retreat is to be found in a two-fold assessment by Beijing. First, the invasion was not seen as primarily a threat to China, for it posed more of a threat to the west and its need for Gulf oil. Second, the Soviet army is bogged down in combating a guerrilla war, and thus the whole venture suggests more the weaknesses rather than the strengths of Soviet power. To be sure, this assessment is not without challenge in Beijing, but it does suggest three basic aspects of China's position.

First, it is not deeply concerned about Afghan events. In the ranking of China's three obstacles, it is a poor number three. Second, to the extent that China is concerned, it merely seeks a withdrawal of Soviet troops. China fears that Afghanistan will be added to the list of 'tame' Soviet republics, and provide another ring in the containment fence around China. Third, China is willing to tolerate a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, so long as Afghanistan is an 'independent' state.

The view from Moscow is less accommodating. The minimum Soviet objective remains a friendly and stable regime on its southern border. The invasion was apparently designed to ensure both, and so far has achieved neither. For the Soviet Union, the Afghan issue is essentially not concerned with Sino-Soviet relations. That China tries to make it a component of their bilateral relations is viewed in the Kremlin as both unrealistic and unfair. The Soviet Union suggests it is just as much in China's interest as its own that a militant Khomeini-like Islamic regime in Kabul is avoided and a Marxist regime maintained in its place.

To the extent that there is any broader dimension to the Afghan issue for the Soviet Union (and there is very little), it is in relations with Pakistan and Iran which provide sanctuary for rebels. A Soviet-Pakistani pact on terminating support for the rebels could help to ensure a Soviet withdrawal and the stabilisation of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. As China is one of Pakistan's main allies, this would give the Chinese some say in the Afghan issue. But apart from this minimal involvement, China has no active role to play. Its military aid for the rebels is small, and in any case now passes through Pakistan.

While rumours of a Soviet-Pakistani deal periodically surface, no agreement seems imminent. The slow pace seems to be due to two factors. First, there is no urgency about this largely forgotten, small-scale war. Second, the combat has been inconclusive, with neither side yet ready to sue for a compromise peace. However, should an agreement be reached, then the issue will also disappear from the Sino-Soviet agenda. If no agreement is forthcoming, China may abandon its policy anyway, as it did in 1982 when it agreed to resume consultations suspended after the Soviet invasion. But in the final analysis, the Afghan problem is not a Sino-Soviet problem, and its resolution depends primarily on local Afghan events and Soviet-Pakistani relations. Thus, while the Afghan problem may be the least important of the three Sino-Soviet obstacles, it may also be the most long-lasting.

Vietnam and Kampuchea. Both China and the Soviet Union share at least one view of South-East Asia—that its politics are complex. Until the early 1960s, both were allies (if uneasy ones) in support of the Vietnamese Communists and other revolutionary movements. During the Vietnam war of the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union tacitly cooperated in support of Hanoi. Both Communist powers vied for influence in Hanoi, and despite repeated exasperating experiences, the Soviet Union won out.

The Soviet 'victory' was especially clear with the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. Hanoi not only appreciated the greater Soviet aid capability, but also needed a great power ally to deter threats from its Chinese neighbour. Similarly, triumphant Kampuchean Communists needed a Chinese ally to deter their Vietnamese neighbour. But China failed to prevent Kampuchea's aggressive attacks on Vietnam, or its lunatic domestic policy. Not surprisingly, Vietnam took advantage of the instability in Kampuchea. After Vietnam's conquest of Kampuchea in January 1979, China sought to 'punish' Vietnam in a three-week campaign in February–March 1979. China's failure to scare Vietnam into loosening its grip on Kampuchea only showed up Chinese military deficiencies, and encouraged greater Soviet aid to Vietnam.

Thus, by 1979, China had added a new condition for its talks with the Soviet Union—ending support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Not only had China failed to restrain its Kampuchean allies, but in defeat it was unable to provide the rebels with sufficient weapons to expel the Vietnamese.[8] Once the military option had failed, China was left with a weak political hand to play in attempting to force the Soviet Union to pull out the Vietnamese.

China's objectives emerged as two-fold. First, it wanted a Vietnamese withdrawal. While it would be best if this could also result in the demise of the Vietnamese-installed Kampuchean government, by 1984 it seemed this latter point was not a primary Chinese demand. Second, China also sought the withdrawal of Soviet bases in Vietnam and Kampuchea. However, this second objective now appears distinctly less important than it did in 1980. In the new atmosphere of China's opposition to both superpowers' bases, it acknowledges that Soviet bases in Asia are primarily anti-American, and therefore their presence will not block Sino-Soviet normalisation.

The Soviet Union is caught by several policy predicaments. Its commitments to Vietnam were made at a time when they were useful in the anti-China struggle. Now they block normalisation of relations with Beijing. The Soviet Union has always had an uneasy relationship with Vietnam, but it remains a useful point of pressure on China. Détente with China at Vietnam's expense is not in itself a problem, but it could be too costly if it meant losing important military bases in South-East Asia. Therefore what kind of a Sino-Soviet deal is likely?

First, neither Vietnam nor the Soviet Union desires a long occupation of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime is not yet ready to

[8] Interview with Xinhua spokesman, London, conducted by Ann Gilks for the Economic and Social Research Council's project on China's military aid.

stand alone, yet it is far closer to doing so than the regime in Kabul. Of course the problem would be eased if the Chinese-supported rebels in the west of Kampuchea would cease to exist, but in any case they now seem to be only a minor military problem. Thus a Vietnamese withdrawal may not necessarily be imminent, but it may also not be for off. What is more, there are increasing signs that some South-East Asian states are prepared to live with Vietnam's new strength in the area, and China risks isolation if it prolongs regional tension.[9] As with the settlement of the Afghan issue, its resolution does not depend on Sino-Soviet relations, even though it does affect Sino-Soviet relations.

Second, China now appears willing to tolerate Soviet bases in South-East Asia, much as it tolerates American bases. This latter part of the deal is already in place, although China does not speak openly about its more moderate line. Neither does the Soviet Union publicise its willingness to reduce its support for Vietnam.[10] To do so might jeopardise its basing rights, without ensuring normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. Thus the Vietnam-Kampuchea issue appears to be somewhat nearer resolution, with both Communist powers showing a flexibility born out of a recognition that they do not control South-East Asian politics.

The road to détente

The road to Sino-Soviet détente is paved with good intentions. At least both countries claim to desire normalisation, even if they see different pitfalls in their path. For China, there are three obstacles on the road. For the Soviet Union, there is only one: China's obstacles.

What is more, the issues are often complex. The order of importance of the three problems in the Soviet perspective is the frontier, Afghanistan and then South-East Asia. For China, the order of the last two is reversed. Yet for both Communist powers, the frontier is potentially the easiest issue to tackle, followed by South-East Asia and Afghanistan.

In the final analysis, both Moscow and Beijing see normalisation as a long-term goal. The speed of change hinges on the firmness with which China holds to its three preconditions, and the way in which local conflict in Afghanistan and South-East Asia is resolved. The latter is a process over which neither China or the Soviet Union has much direct control. The former is mostly in China's hands.

[9] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 March 1984.
[10] See, for example, the Soviet snub to Vietnamese officials during M. Kapitsa's visit to Beijing, September 1983.

Uganda: 'the Pearl of Africa' loses its lustre

A CORRESPONDENT

UGANDA today is a country of uncertainty. Recent events there have, in some cases, only served further to confuse the outside world, much of which still views Uganda as the land where Idi Amin committed his ugly deeds. Yet, tragically, the present situation in the country known as 'the Pearl of Africa' is in some ways little better than during Amin's dictatorship.

Uganda has recently returned to the front pages as a result of four major incidents: the death of army Chief-of-Staff, Major-General David Oyite-Ojok;[1] the seizure of 11 Red Cross workers by the main guerrilla group, the National Resistance Army;[2] the shooting of three Swiss and one Briton by unknown gunmen;[3] and the intensified anti-guerrilla sweep by the army, in the area to the north of Kampala, in early 1984. In the welter of accusation and counter-accusation that has followed these events, one important fact has probably been obscured, namely that Uganda has, since 1980, witnessed a wave of violence, lawlessness and mass killings of a type that is reminiscent of nothing so much as the horrors of the 1970s. Nowadays the wheel has turned full circle: the victims of Idi Amin have been reinstated as the new aggressors.

The return to power of Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress Party (UPC) in December 1980, in a widely disputed election victory, has alienated a great part of the population. Most of UPC's support derives from the broadly Protestant, Nilotic, pastoralist peoples of the north and east of Uganda, like the Langi and Acholi; whereas the mainly Catholic, Bantu agriculturalists of south and west Uganda, like the most populous tribe, the Baganda, claim that their Democratic Party (DP) was robbed of victory in the polls. A previous contributor, writing in the spring of 1980, applauded the optimism in post-Amin Uganda, but concluded by expressing the belief that: 'the Baganda . . . feared the return of instability, of secret government, and of Dr Obote, whose name was anathema.'[4] Sadly, since that time, the fears of the Baganda have been realised. The UPC government has used the Nilotic-dominated Ugandan army (the UNLA) to impose its will on those of the Ugandan population who reject their regime. In the process, many thousands of Ugandans have lost their lives. This article will attempt to provide a background to the 1980 elections that returned UPC to power; a summary of the attempts by the army to supress opposition; an analysis of the guerrilla groups and the UNLA; and a brief appraisal of the successes and failures of the present leadership.

[1] *The Times*, 5 December 1983. [2] *ibid.*, 9 January 1984.
[3] *The Guardian*, 24 January 1984.
[4] Sir Richard Posnett, 'Uganda after Amin', *The World Today*, April 1980.

The author, a close observer of Ugandan affairs, has recently spent four years in the country.

The background

Obote's UPC party had previously held power, from independence in 1962 up to Amin's coup in 1971. By the time of his overthrow, Obote, from Lango in the north, was profoundly unpopular with the majority of Ugandans. The main reasons were Obote's abolition of the traditional Bantu kingdoms in 1966; his increasingly socialist leanings which horrified most of the instinctively capitalist southern tribes; his banning of opposition parties; and his growing tendency to resort to political detention as a means of silencing opponents. When Amin ousted Obote in January 1971, the Baganda danced for joy in the streets of Kampala. Only as the terrible 1970s unfolded did the Ugandans realise how mistaken they had been.

Eventually, in April 1979, the Tanzanian army, aided by the UNLA, managed to overthrow Amin. Two Bagandan presidents, Yusufu Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, were each in their turn overthrown, while President Nyerere of Tanzania, with 20,000 of his troops still in the country, did nothing to intervene. They were succeeded in May 1980 by a Military Commission headed by Paulo Muwanga, which began to prepare the country for party-contested elections. (Lule and Binaisa had supported the idea of elections held on a non-party basis.) This was the signal for Obote to return to Uganda, to spearhead the UPC campaign. The Baganda shop-keepers, who had expressed their approval of Amin's removal by lowering their prices, duly raised them again as the mood of post-liberation optimism and idealism was replaced by one of anxiety over the return of party strife.

UPC was well organised, with catchy political pop songs on the radio, distribution of free Obote T-shirts, and a nationwide campaign using a fleet of brand-new Mercedes cars. Much of this was financed by Asian business families, dispossessed and expelled during Amin's cruel but popular 'Africanisation' programme of 1972, and eager to return to Uganda to reclaim their businesses and properties. (Many of these Asian families now hold privileged positions, with monopolies of certain essential goods, and access to foreign exchange at the most favourable rates.) Newspapers reflecting all shades of opinion began appearing on the Kampala streets. The tension in these pre-election days was almost tangible. Tribal animosity mounted: there were confrontations between the army and the local people in Buganda and West Nile. DP supporters began to voice fears that the northern-dominated UNLA would not allow a DP victory in the polls to be implemented.

The fears, again, proved to be well-founded. The UPC victory was finally achieved only thanks to Muwanga, head of the Military Commission, and himself a keen UPC supporter (though he comes from Buganda). As the results started coming in, and the DP office announced that it had already won enough seats to form the next government, Muwanga took over personal control of the election, decreeing that anyone who made further announcements would be liable to a prison sentence of up to five years. The previous Chairman of the Electoral Commission promptly fled into hiding. Muwanga then sat up all night with Obote. The following day a UPC victory, by 72 seats to 51, was announced. Some observers reckon that at least 15 seats changed hands over-

night, including some which had already been conceded to DP by the losing UPC candidates.[5]

The Commonwealth observers gave a reasonably favourable report on the conduct of the vote. They argued that the result gave a broadly fair view of the wishes of most Ugandans, although a few days previously they had declared that there was little chance of a free and fair election. Most of the team, however, had already left the country before the results were announced. On the night that the result was declared, the troops in Kampala celebrated by shooting into the air for two hours, perhaps to deter anybody who might have been contemplating an uprising. The first appointment of the new government was that of Paulo Muwanga as Vice-President and Minister of Defence.

UNLA versus the opposition

The problem for the new government was how to maintain control in the face of widespread allegations that the election had been rigged. Nyerere was about to withdraw his remaining 10,000 troops in June 1981. They were proving costly to maintain, and increasingly unpopular with the Ugandan people; in addition, Nyerere was disillusioned by his old friend's sudden abandonment of socialist policies. Already, in February 1981, guerrilla attacks on police stations and army patrols had begun, coupled with bomb explosions and machine-gun raids in Kampala itself. The government's response was to allow the army greater leeway to deal with the situation. Since at the time many of the troops were not receiving their wages, looting by the soldiers soon became widespread. Similarly, at road-blocks around the country, persons without proper papers, or suspected of having anti-government sympathies, were arbitrarily arrested, and sometimes killed. Yet these individual incidents paled into insignificance beside the more systematic acts of tribal victimisation perpetrated by the UNLA. The three most notable instances have involved the peoples of the West Nile, the Rwandese, and the Baganda.

The first act of tribal revenge began even before the election. In October 1980, there were reports (denied by Tanzanian officers present in the area) of an attack by Amin's ex-soldiers, based in Zaire, on a UNLA garrison at Koboko in West Nile province. In the days that followed, large contingents of the UNLA, reinforced by Langi and Acholi militia and volunteers, rushed up to West Nile, and killed sizeable numbers of the civilian population, especially those from the Kakwa, Lugbara, Madi, and Aringa tribes, who had once supplied Amin's power-base, and who had themselves conducted much of the killing of Langi and Acholi in the 1970s. Varying reports have claimed anything between 5,000 and 30,000 West Nile civilian deaths, but the net result was that the people who survived either fled over the borders into Zaire or Sudan, or else 'went to the bush' to fight against the army. This event occurred at the time of the registration of election candidates, and West Nile, traditionally an area of DP support, eventually submitted only unopposed UPC candidates. There are now 200,000 West Nile refugees in Sudan alone.

During the 'Rwandese exodus' from the Ankole region of south-west

[5] For more detail about the conduct of the elections, see *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 22, No. 4.

Uganda in October 1982, there were fewer deaths, but the degree of human suffering was still considerable.[6] The incident began when three UPC youths were shot after having been discovered in the act of stealing cattle from Bunyarwanda herdsmen. In response, a Bunyakole government minister, together with local UPC party chairmen, enlisted soldiers and youth-wingers to drive almost 100,000 people of suspected Rwandese origin out of Ankole. The refugees were forced to march, with what possessions they could carry, and often without food and water, nearly 100 kilometres to the Rwandese border. Several people, mainly the elderly, died en route. Less than half of the 100,000 who had been driven out of Ankole were accepted by the Rwandese authorities as nationals of Rwanda, and admitted to refugee camps across the border. Another 30,000 found temporary accommodation in existing refugee camps in Uganda, and were eventually moved, more than a year later, into a new camp in Toro in the north.

The Ugandan government came out with a belated statement alleging that the incident in no way represented official government policy towards the Rwandese. The impression, however, is that Obote merely turned a convenient 'blind eye' to the incident, thus allowing a growing enclave of UPC supporters in Ankole to benefit from the spoils. Certainly little action has been taken to reinstate, or recompense, those who suffered. At the end of last year, there were further reports of Rwandese expulsions.[7]

The third instance of tribal persecution took place in the districts of Luwero, Mpigi, and Mubende in Buganda. Since early 1983, the army has attempted to clear the people from these districts, and thus drive back the guerrillas (who were believed to be gaining material and moral support from the local population) from the immediate vicinity of Kampala. The process of creating this 'free-fire zone' has affected 750,000 people of which 'there are estimated to be 125,000 in camps' according to a Ugandan government appeal[8] for aid for the 'displaced persons'. These camps, run by the army and police, are said by many observers to be more like detention than relief camps. The government admits that any adult male found moving outside these camps by the army will be shot as a 'bandit'—the government term for a guerrilla. Food, water and medicine are in short supply, and there is a high death rate, especially among the children; the houses which they have left behind have, where accessible, been looted, often down to the doors, window-frames, and roofs. In June 1983, a reported 200 refugees were slaughtered in one of the camps, at Kikyusa; the army and guerrillas blame each other for the massacre. The seizure of the Red Cross workers (two of whom were held for a fortnight) in January 1984 was, according to the guerrillas, in order to show the aid officials the conditions obtaining in the guerrilla-held areas, which are receiving no international assistance, and where, it is claimed, many local civilians have sought refuge after the army sweeps. The remainder of the 750,000 are

[6] *The Guardian*, 9 October and [illegible] November 1982. [7] *The Times*, 6 January 1984.

[8] *Government Memorandum on Relief Operations in Luwero, Mubende, and Mpigi Districts in the Republic of Uganda* (Kampala: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 September 1983).

presumably either in the army-run camps, or have fled to other regions of Uganda, or they are dead. In the first few months of 1984, the army intensified its activities, and successfully pushed back the guerrillas from northern Buganda and Bunyoro, before the seasonal rain set in. Guerrilla units will now attempt to regroup to the west of their former positions.

The guerrilla groups and the UNLA

There are three official guerrilla groups fighting from the bush. They number probably about 5,000 fighters. Foremost is the Marxist-oriented National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni, a charismatic leader who trained with Frelimo in Mozambique, and then fought a guerrilla war against Amin, before joining the Military Commission government as Minister of Defence. He returned to the bush in 1980, in protest at the outcome of the elections. Soon afterwards, several of his political associates were murdered by security police. The NRA consists mainly of members of western tribes like the Bahima; and operates in the region to the north and west of Kampala. The NRA has been the most effective of the guerrilla movements. It is ably led by Museveni and has a London-based political wing, the NRM, led by ex-President Lule. If the NRA was indeed responsible for the shootings of the four Europeans, then a new, more radical and violent leadership has taken over.

The second group, the Uganda Freedom Army (UFA), is led by ex-minister Andrew Kayiira, and is largely Bagandan, and right-wing in its political leanings. It apparently receives a lot of money and support from DP sympathisers, but its effectiveness was reduced by the arrest of many of its leaders, including Kayiira, in Nairobi in 1983.

The third group, the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), operates in the northern part of West Nile, and from across the borders of Zaire and Sudan, where some 200,000 West Nilers have fled as refugees since the events of October 1980. It was, until recently, led by Amin's ex-Minister of Finance, Moses Ali, but it is dedicated solely to the overthrow of Obote, rather than to the reinstatement of Amin. After being driven back northwards by the UNLA in 1981 and 1982, the UNRF had a revival of fortunes with a series of successful raids in late 1983. It is believed that all three groups received training and arms from Libya until 1982, but the greater part of their weaponry seems to come from attacks on Ugandan army bases and convoys. Despite a meeting of the three groups in London in May 1981, there have been few signs of their overcoming their differences to present a united front.

Despite the efforts of the 30-man Commonwealth training team, the UNLA is still badly organised and ill-disciplined. The system for providing wages, food and housing has been inefficient; there are no accurate records of garrison strengths or personnel; training of officers and troops is inadequate; and no real effort is being made to confine the troops to barracks or to restrict their access to weapons. The problem facing the government is whether to attempt to restrain the army, at the risk of giving renewed hope and incentive to the guerrilla opposition. This problem was compounded in December 1983,

when Major-General David Oyite-Ojok, the Langi Chief-of-Staff of the UNLA, who was Obote's right-hand man and the effective power behind the army, was killed in a helicopter crash. (The NRA claimed responsibility, but this may have been sheer opportunism.) His successor has not yet been named, which could precipitate an Acholi-Langi power struggle, with each tribe fearing the prospect of an army dominated by the other.

In the army prisons, such as Makindye and Kireka in Kampala, and in military interrogation centres around the country, conditions are little improved from the days of Amin, even though the notorious sledgehammerings and dismemberments seem to have ceased.[9] Killings and torture are still endemic; a prisoner's principal hope of escape lies in the ability of his relatives to bribe the guards.[10]

Good signs, bad signs

There is no doubt that the UPC government, backed by western aid money, had made significant, if slow, progress in rehabilitating Uganda's collapsed economy. For instance, the long-awaited contract for the repair of Kampala's devastated roads has finally been awarded; and the ferry link to Tanzania that effectively connects Uganda to Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean, has been reopened.[11] There are other encouraging signs: Obote has played an important role in the moves to reconvene the East African Community; the police force is making a genuine attempt to impose law and order; and, for the first time since 1979, people are sitting up late drinking in the city centre bars. Enthusiasm for these developments is, however, blunted by the knowledge that a great part of the aid money that is now pouring in has to be used to repair the infrastructure, and help areas like Luwero and West Nile which have suffered from the Ugandan army's heavy-handed tactics.

There are still many honest idealists within the UPC government, but sadly the assumption of power has corrupted many more. Generally, bribe-taking and allocations to favourites and family are widespread; the visible wealth of government appointees and the inner coterie (which extends to tribes-mates and favoured girl friends) is quite astonishing. 'Magendo' or entrepreneurial black-market dealing, is visible everywhere; so is the 'Baganda-go-slow', the tacit renunciation of the government by the tribe that boasts nearly half of the country's undergraduates, businessmen and civil servants. 'Popping out for five minutes' is a common habit among shop and office workers: people can only survive by means of their small hidden incomes. The average professional wage has just been raised to the equivalent of $15. But in Uganda for $1 you can buy only a bottle of beer, a loaf of bread, or four large eggs. Newly qualified doctors are deserting the country in droves, for the higher wages and

[9] For a first-hand account of current conditions in Uganda's military jails, see *The Observer*, 12 December 1982.

[10] 'Human Rights Violations in Uganda: Extra-Judicial Executions and Political Imprisonment', *Amnesty International*, July 1982.

[11] *Africa Now*, December 1983.

eater security elsewhere. Hundreds of other qualified Ugandans languish in il, detained without charge as political prisoners.

Obote's regime discourages publicity as assiduously as Amin's courted it. ne last of the resident foreign correspondents were expelled in February '82, after reporting a massive guerrilla rocket attack on Lubiri barracks in the pital. Shortly afterwards, the International Committee of the Red Cross CRC) was also instructed to leave, being under suspicion of leaking adverse formation about West Nile to the world press. The government constantly mplains of biased reports in foreign papers, although it welcomed the reign press contingent which arrived to cover the visit in January 1984 of the chbishop of Canterbury, Dr Robert Runcie. Clearly this was seen as a golden pportunity to publicise the government line on the activities of the 'bandits'. eanwhile, political pressures mount. All but one of the Democratic Party puties for Busoga province, around Jinja, suddenly switched sides to e UPC in 1982; the man who refused has been in detention ever since. PC youths man unofficial road-blocks around the country, demanding oney, and making arbitrary arrests. UPC party chairmen, rather than the cted MPs, run most of the regional towns and villages. They have well-nigh solute authority in their areas. Semi-official security organisations are pro- erating. The situation is so tense that many ministers and political gnitaries seem preoccupied only with their personal safety. Even among the lotic top brass, there is internal discord: it is rumoured that on two occasions ce 1980, Acholi officers have attempted to assassinate Obote.

e international outlook

The western powers took some time to make up their minds, but appear fin- y to have decided to back Obote. This is partly the philosophy of 'better the vil you know'; partly because he is seen as an elder statesman of African litics; and partly because of his new-found capitalist sympathies. The pre- it government has pledged itself to promote a market economy. The ineffi- nt system of state-run companies is to be dismantled, and foreign investors couraged. In May 1982 a donors' meeting, chaired by the World Bank in is, voted $557 m towards this rehabilitation programme. Only a few coun- s such as West Germany, Denmark and Holland expressed concern over the man rights abuses chronicled by such organisations as Amnesty Interna- nal. The pressure exerted on the government by the International Monetary nd for a drastic devaluation of the Uganda shilling, and for two different eign exchange rates, one for essentials and one for luxuries, has to some gree rationalised the situation of 1981, when a dollar would buy 30 times re on the black market than in the bank. A further $430 m of aid money was ed in January 1984. The government's fears that the murders of the four ropeans a few days before the conference would prejudice its chances of suc- s proved unfounded.

Meanwhile, Obote has not completely abandoned the traditional ploy of ying off east against west. Russian and North Korean military advisers are in

evidence, and a team of Cuban media experts was recently recruited to 'help improve Uganda's image'; these offset the Commonwealth training team, and western aid money. Obote has made it clear that he can turn elsewhere, if the west chooses not to 'deliver the goods'. It seems that Uganda's growing strategic importance in East Africa may stand her in good stead in the future; from the west's point of view, Tanzania under Nyerere has always espoused a dangerous brand of socialism, while Kenya might have followed suit if the April 1982 coup had succeeded. Uganda thus provides an important back-stop: if Kenya should fall, then Uganda would take over as the pivot of western strategy in the region. At present, the only other countries that openly support western policy in the East and Central African region are Sudan and Somalia.

However, it seems doubtful whether a small economic recovery will automatically bring peace and stability. The international community is lending support to Uganda because of its strategic significance, but it is ignoring a state of internal chaos that amounts to disaster for most of its citizens. This policy is misguided and counterproductive. Rehabilitation cannot go hand-in-hand with repression. The guerrillas will continue to claim successful attacks; the army will continue to maintain that the 'bandits' are running out of weapons and resources, and that the problem has been brought under control. In fact, it would appear that neither side has the strength to destroy the other. Reconciliation is the only hope.

Book note

CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY
By Alexander M. Haig, Jr (London: Weidenfeld, 1984), 367 pages, £12.95.

THIS book is, in certain ways, a frightening one; not for what it says about American foreign policy, but from what can be inferred about the processes of American policy-making. By the selection of his title, 'Caveat', which Webster's dictionary describes as 'a caution', former General Alexander M. Haig is sounding a warning to his own country that should not go unheeded.

When Al Haig was appointed to the office of Secretary of State in December 1980, he was no stranger to the White House. He was, however, very much a stranger to President Reagan and his newly appointed team. The first part of this book deals to a large extent with Secretary Haig's efforts to establish his place in the new Administration as the principal focus for all matters of foreign policy. This was more than a fight for 'turf', the American slang for areas of defined responsibility; it was an attempt to establish a disciplined structure of policy-making that would help to avoid the criticisms, made so

frequently in recent years, of inconsistency and incoherence in foreign policy emanating from Washington.

Military men are by training and experience much concerned with organisational structure. Military operations are governed by the concept of command. It is, however, influence that is the governing factor in the art of politics. And the characteristics of influence are very different from those of command. This provides difficulty for those of a military background who move into the field of politics. But those of us who knew Al Haig as the Supreme Commander Europe and who worked with him and who learned to admire his qualities of mind, his strength of character, his integrity and his courage, had hoped that not only his considerable knowledge of European affairs but also his previous experience as White House Chief-of-Staff to President Nixon would bring qualities to the foreign policy scene that would help to heal the growing transatlantic misunderstandings that had been a feature of President Carter's regime. We were sadly to be disappointed.

The cause of Al Haig's continuing fight with the White House staff and, as this book makes clear, the degree to which personalities in Washington counted for more than policies, is centred in the fundamental difference between the American and the British systems of government. The former is designed to get one man, the President, to decide. The latter is designed to get a number of people, the Cabinet, to agree. In the American system there is thus intense competition to gain the ear of the President. This focuses the clashes of personality that in other organisations are diffused. But furthermore, if the differing strands of opinion on international affairs within the White House staff, the National Security Council and the American Cabinet are not effectively coordinated and controlled by the President, or by his Secretary of State, and if policies are pursued by means of leaks designed to discredit the opposition rather than to argue the merits of policy, then this is the formula for discord, disruption and danger. This is the story which Haig presents of the early months of President Reagan's Administration: the picture of a President who is a 'good guy' but who is not effectively in control. That this should occur in that early period is disturbing; but understandable. That the situation had not changed in any meaningful way long after a reasonable settling down period had been completed, and as shown by the description of the events of President Reagan's tour of Europe in the summer of 1982, particularly in respect of the Israeli attack in south Lebanon, is more deeply worrying. And it was these events which led to Al Haig's resignation. What has followed under the stewardship of his much respected successor, Mr George Shultz, does not give confidence that this fundamental weakness of the Reagan Administration has since been corrected.

While the book deals at some length with Haig's relationships with the other principal players on the White House stage, it tells us almost nothing about his relations with his own officials at the State Department. Nevertheless, we can gain considerable insight into the character of Haig himself, Haig the thinker, Haig the leader, Haig the administrator. He emerges as

a man of deep loyalty to his President; but a man of contradictions. He recognises the danger of too ideological an approach to foreign policy—but reveals himself deeply motivated by ideology. He recognises the complexities and nuances of international diplomacy—but his actions and his words too often indicate a dangerously oversimplified view of the world. In the well-known 'I am in control of the White House' episode after the attempt on President Reagan's life, there is a clear case that Haig overreacted and thereby caused unnecessary concern at a time when his every intent was aimed at maintaining order and calm.

Haig recognises the requirement for a 'team' approach to the needs of governance—but does not appear a good 'team player'. Nevertheless, there can be no reasonable criticism of the extent of Haig's efforts to make the system work. But, as has always been his wont, he is able to approach a clash of personality with some humour. In describing his efforts to keep closely alongside Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary for Defence, with whom he had an uneasy relationship, Haig was once reported to have said of their weekly working breakfast together, 'Just to make sure that there can be no misunderstanding between us, we eat entirely alone—except for our "tasters"'.

The book describes sequentially the events which unfolded within the major areas of concern in American foreign policy—east-west relations, Central America, the Middle East, China, the Polish crisis, arms control and the Falkland Islands war. It is the latter which will be of special interest to British readers. Haig's account reveals nothing fundamentally new. Its principal value is for the light it throws on the attitudes of those involved in the complex negotiations which were eventually to fail. The details will be pored over by experts looking for inconsistencies with other published accounts and will no doubt be contested by some who look more to self-justification than to historical accuracy. But even in this book, the record of historical accuracy cannot be taken for granted. The idea that, during the initial invasion of the Falkland Islands, the Argentines 'did not fire back' at the British defenders runs contrary to all contemporary accounts. Nor were British warships, in any legalistic sense, 'withdrawn from Nato'.

But these matters should not detract from this gripping account of the diplomatic negotiations during which the Argentine Junta became enmeshed in a web of its own making from which it eventually could not escape without a war which it did not want or expect.

Caveat is neither an autobiography nor a formal history; although it will surely be drawn upon by historians. It is readable, enjoyable and sometimes moving; although the style is occasionally irritating as the syntax collapses into American jargon. At the end I wanted to believe that some of it, as in a good historical novel, was based on fiction rather than fact. But I had to accept that this is Al Haig's version of what actually happened—and to face the disturbing implications for international stability which follow from it.

ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE*

*Admiral Sir James Eberle is the Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Note of the month

A NEW START IN EL SALVADOR?

THE record of rigged elections is so strong in El Salvador that exceptional measures are needed to run a clean one. So the counting in the first round of the presidential election on 25 March and the run-off on 6 May took a long time. First, the votes were counted at polling places in the presence of representatives of the parties involved. Then, tally reports were signed by all observers and sent to San Salvador, the country's capital. The election commission then solemnly sat and read out the returns from hundreds of polling places, giving representatives of the parties a chance to challenge each one. Finally, the result was announced.

The parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party, did it all much more quickly. Their representative at each polling place went straight to San Salvador after the tally reports were completed and handed over their carbon copy to the party headquarters, where a national count was under way. The Christian Democrats accurately announced the victory of their candidate, Mr Napoleon Duarte, several days before the election commission. But Mr Duarte did not win 50 per cent plus one vote, so there was a run-off with the second-place Mr Roberto d'Aubuisson of the far-right National Renewal Alliance (Arena). Mr Duarte won again (53·6 per cent of all votes, according to the Central Electoral Commission), but Mr d'Aubuisson did not accept the result, which gave him 46·4 per cent of the vote. Displaying a special kind of logic, Mr d'Aubuisson, who had accused Mr Duarte during the campaign of being a crypto-Communist, claimed (without proof) that the election had been rigged by the American Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr Duarte's victory ought to be the start of a new era in El Salvador. The election was not just clean. In a major break with the past, the army did not interfere. The outgoing President did not have a favourite. There was no 'official' government candidate. Under the *ancien régime*, deposed by liberal officers in 1979, generals were 'elected' President as candidates of the National Conciliation Party. In this election, the National Conciliation Party ended up in third place with 19 per cent of the vote.

The electors had a choice, though no Marxists came down from the hills to take part. In the second round, it was between Mr Duarte, a moderate reformer and convinced democrat, and Mr d'Aubuisson, a hardline rightist and convinced extremist, with links to the death squads. Such is the anger in San Salvador towards the country's guerrillas that it can be safely said that a Marxist candidate would have had no chance at all of qualifying for the run-off, still less of winning.

Mr Duarte has a political strategy as President to win the war and bring peace to his country. His first priority is to eliminate the death squads. In this, he has the support of the Defence Minister, General Eugenio Vides Casanova, and

the Chief of Staff, Colonel Adolfo Blandón. All three know that their chances of receiving more American aid will dissolve if they do nothing about the death squads. Much will depend on Mr Duarte's ability to impose civilian political control on the armed forces, which, in association with the business and farming establishment, have dominated El Salvador for decades.

For Mr Duarte, however, elimination of the death squads is the essential first stage of his strategy for dealing with the guerrillas. He must establish social peace in the part of El Salvador which he controls. If he achieves this, and it is a big if, he will then be able to make a genuine offer of amnesty to the guerrillas in the hills, who will not be able to refuse on the grounds that they would be immediately killed by the death squads.

This stage, if it is ever reached, will be the crucial one for two reasons. Mr Duarte hopes to attract young, non-ideological rebels by the prospect of peace, democracy and a popular government, not to mention a comfortable bed at night. He knows the Marxist hardliners, who think only in terms of victory, will never agree.

The second reason is that Mr Duarte ought also to be able to convince suspicious western democrats, especially in western Europe, that he is a committed democrat who is offering a fair deal to his enemies. El Salvador needs to win over governments like those in France and Sweden as well as more sympathetic ones like Mrs Thatcher's. He has already made an important stride forward: the Socialist International, which for years has supported the political wing of the rebels led by non-Communist Mr Guillermo Ungo, has congratulated Mr Duarte on his victory and offered to help in mediation with the rebels. The Socialist International statement carried the names of Mr Felipe Gonzalez, Mr Willy Brandt and Mr Carlos Andrés Perez, ex-President of Venezuela.

If, and again this is a big if, Mr Duarte can manage to convince his young, unbrainwashed rebels, and western democrats abroad, that he is the man of reason and the way to peace for El Salvador, the hardline Marxists and their supporters abroad (Nicaragua and Cuba) will be isolated. He will then be able to home in on the remaining guerrillas.

While the unbrainwashed may be attracted by social peace in Mr Duarte's part of El Salvador, they will also need some shoving to leave the hills. This can only come from an expansion of the army's sporadic attempts to harass them. The more the guerrillas can be kept on the move, the more tired and fed up they will become. And the more attractive a comfortable bed at home will seem. As it is, the guerrillas are firmly in control of several large but remote pockets of territory and can frequently be found operating on highways outside San Salvador.

The army is vulnerable to ambushes in which many soldiers are killed. It is powerless to prevent the guerrillas from blowing up pylons and causing power failures. Nevertheless, a new generation of battle-tested army officers is emerging. An attempt is being made to adopt mobile tactics to move against the guerrillas rather than to react against their attacks. The new colonels are

aware of the need of winning support among the country-people through the opening or reopening of schools, clinics and roads. It is all being done very imperfectly, but an attempt is being made.

What Mr Duarte will need, now, is more American aid. The army could use some helicopters to move its men into action quickly once a guerrilla base has been spotted and to pull out the wounded during battles. It needs more aircraft to attack the bases. More patrol boats can help to stop gun-smuggling from Nicaragua across the Gulf of Fonseca.

Mr Duarte will not have a clear majority in the constituent assembly, which has become a legislative body. This means he will have to negotiate over legislation with smaller parties. It may not be a bad thing to have limits on presidential rule. The limits may well be placed by the astute leader of the National Conciliation Party, Mr Francisco José Guerrero, in return for parliamentary support.

Though the National Conciliation Party and the Christian Democrats have traditionally been bitter rivals, Mr Guerrero was a key figure in Mr Duarte's victory. In the first round, Mr Duarte won 43·4 per cent of the vote, Mr d'Aubuisson 29·8 per cent and Mr Guerrero 19·3 per cent. Mr Guerrero then played a delicate hand in deciding how to swing his party's vote.

He knew that a d'Aubuisson victory could spell the end of American congressional approval of further aid for El Salvador. He disliked Mr d'Aubuisson's extremism and his personal reputation. But his party militants, strongly conservative, were equally strongly opposed to Mr Duarte. Instead of encouraging them to support fellow-conservative d'Aubuisson, however, Mr Guerrero stayed neutral. This decision was a great favour to Mr Duarte. (It may also have been an act of common sense, since Mr Guerrero knew his party would be swallowed up by Mr d'Aubuisson's bigger one if Mr d'Aubuisson became President.)

Now, Mr Guerrero may have another service to perform for his country: to broaden the base of the Duarte government, by quietly supporting it, so that it wins the trust, if not the affection, of the business class. His influence over the government would be along pragmatic, common-sense lines. Mr Duarte is often described as self-willed and determined. He will, however, have to listen to Mr Guerrero.

Barring accidents, a new, democratic stage in El Salvador's history is beginning. With judgement, and determination, it could bring the country to something approaching peace.

ROLAND DALLAS*

* The author is Editor of *The Economist's Foreign Report*. He was in El Salvador for the election.

Nigeria: economic options and political constraints

QUENTIN PEEL

NIGERIA is in a mess, politically and economically. The country's attempt to return to democracy in 1979, after 13 years of military rule, lasted barely four years before the soldiers decided it was a failure. As for the economy, the oil giant of Africa today appears to be little more than just another third-world casualty of the international recession, with a massive pipeline of unpaid bills, and the indignity of prolonged negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to qualify for a standby loan.

Some of the reasons for the country's plight are of relatively recent origin, but others are much more deeply rooted. In order to assess Nigeria's options and prospects, it is necessary first to identify the causes of the crisis, and the extent to which the political and economic problems are interrelated. Then it may be possible to hazard a few guesses about the future.

When all but a handful of Nigeria's top military commanders decided to seize power on New Year's Eve, their action was a reflection both of frustration and impatience.[1] To allow no more than four years for the democratic experiment they had initiated was decidedly precipitate, however many mistakes the civilians may have made.

Equally, there is no doubt it was a popular move. The attitude of most Nigerians was not to blame the soldiers, but rather President Shagari and his fellow civilians for having squandered their opportunity. His administration was seriously corrupt, greedy and incompetent. The politicians, in particular, appeared to regard public office not so much as a means of improving their society and promoting economic development, but rather simply as a path to personal enrichment.

In some respects, the democratic Constitution worked reasonably well. The judiciary managed to stand up to government on several occasions, and maintain a degree of independence rare in Africa. The press was outspoken and critical, even if often inaccurate and almost invariably partisan: everyone had some axe to grind. But the legislatures were a great failure at both the federal and state assembly levels: the standard of debates was disappointing, and their relevance rarely apparent to an outside observer. When they had legislation to process they were interminably slow, voting appeared to be determined largely by venal considerations, and executive incompetence was always permissible if the price was right.

[1] For background, see Nicholas Harman's Note, 'Nigeria's generals make their comeback', *The World Today*, February 1984.

Mr Peel, Africa Editor of *The Financial Times*, visited Nigeria in May. This article is based on a talk he gave recently at Chatham House.

The Constitution worked reasonably well in one other way—the balancing of regional and political forces. It was successful in ensuring that no party could become the federal government without winning the support of a regional coalition of interests. At the same time, it decentralised government enough to give everyone some degree of power to satisfy them.

When all the failings are taken into account, President Shagari and his colleagues still had one overriding problem to cope with: they had to learn how to run a new and expensive system of government, making inevitable mistakes, at a time when their economy was heading into a disastrous depression. Perhaps that task in itself was too much for the bravest administration, let alone one so flawed.

The causes of Nigeria's economic mess undoubtedly go back much further than the immediate accusations of corruption and mismanagement which have been levelled at the civilians. Many of the mistakes for which Nigeria is paying today were made under the former military governments. Some go back to the colonial era. The problem is that Nigeria has become a mono-economy, overwhelmingly reliant on oil, both for its government revenues (some 85 per cent) and export earnings (at least 95 per cent). As a result, it has lost the ability to cope with a sharp reversal in the oil market, which is exactly what happened in 1981–3.

Back in the 1970s, when the first oil boom brought Nigeria sudden and undreamt-of wealth, the response of the military governments was to spend it at all costs. Development was seen in terms of huge and grandiose capital projects, rather than any gradual and balanced process. They dreamed up a host of over-ambitious projects, generating no significant revenue, and for which Nigeria only began to pay in the 1980s. The most obvious example is the steel industry, the building of two huge complexes—the direct reduction plant built by the West Germans at Aladja, and the blast furnace complex, using Soviet technology, still under construction at Ajaokuta—and three rolling mills at opposite ends of the country. Both main plants will continue to rely heavily on imported raw materials for the foreseeable future, and the cost of the steel they produce is expected to be roughly double the world price. Far from saving foreign exchange, and making Nigeria more self-sufficient, they are likely to prove an indefinite drain on the government budget.

Other similar projects included the concept of converting Nigeria to standard-gauge from its existing narrow-gauge railway—fortunately aborted by the country's present plight—largely because the latter is regarded as the 'colonial' gauge; investing vast amounts of money in the river basin development projects—hugely capital-intensive irrigation schemes which have yet to increase agricultural production significantly; and the construction of a new federal capital city at Abuja, laudable politically, but once again over-ambitious and carried out too fast. It now has to be cut back.

The Shagari government inherited that whole concept of development unquestioningly, and then compounded its problems by failing to come to grips with the economic downturn in time. The critical year was 1981, when imports

poured in—both consumer goods and capital goods for the incoherent development plan—while oil production slumped. The current account of the balance of payments moved from a surplus of $4·3 billion in 1980 to a deficit of $6 bn in 1981, a phenomenal turnround of $10 bn in 12 months. In 1982, emergency import restrictions still failed to staunch the haemorrhage, and the current account worsened to a deficit of $7·3 bn, before narrowing last year to $3·8 bn (estimated) after further draconian cuts.

The situation was actually worse than it seems on paper, for at the same time the Shagari government was building up a backlog of arrears in trade payments, which the new government now has to reschedule. What President Shagari and his advisers failed to implement was a coherent economic policy aimed at tackling both the symptoms and the cause of the problem. They concentrated almost entirely on restricting physical imports, without rethinking their development programme. The result was growing unemployment—as construction projects slowed and stopped, and manufacturing industry was starved of its imported raw materials—combined with shortages of all kinds in the shops and markets, causing ever-accelerating inflation.

Now it is the turn of the military rulers once more to inherit a situation—or rather to take it upon themselves—where there is very little room for manoeuvre. In the first place, the new government does not appear to have been prepared for the scale of the problem. Many Nigerians believe the coup was a pre-emptive move to avert a more radical action by junior officers. There is actually no firm evidence to support that, although it would explain the timing—before the new Shagari team appointed after the August 1983 elections had a chance to show its mettle—and the lack of preparedness. Secondly, many members of the government firmly believe their own propaganda that corruption and mismanagement were overwhelmingly to blame for the economic plight. Meanwhile they still have to perform the same regional and tribal balancing act which greatly adds to the cost of government in the country.

Membership of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), reflecting the top echelons of the army, is drawn heavily from the same essentially conservative and cautious northern Muslim establishment which surrounded the ex-President. After the initial popular euphoria, southerners have begun to question their motives and intentions. Inevitably, the coup has reopened old north-south rivalries, which were, as already stated, relatively successfully defused by the democratic Constitution. President Shagari's National Party of Nigeria may not have represented either the western Yorubas or eastern Ibos in significant numbers, but it was a working coalition of northerners and minority groups from other areas. Moreover, the Yorubas and Ibos did have control of their own states. The military rulers now have to show they can achieve a similar balance.

Under former military rule in Nigeria, there were three power centres in the federal government: the SMC, the Ministers, and the senior civil servants. The SMC remains the supreme decision-making body, but its members are still finding their way, and coming to terms with the problems of government.

Moreover, they are virtually all trying to be both military commanders and government leaders at the same time. Another possible indicator of their uncertainty about the mood in the lower ranks is the amount of time they spend in the barracks, apparently needing to reassure their fellow officers and men.

The soldiers had difficulty persuading experienced people to become Ministers in the weeks immediately after the coup. Many leading Nigerians were apparently very cautious about identifying too readily with a new government, however instantly popular, when its direction and stability remained uncertain. There was also concern at how long it would be possible to survive in office during an anti-corruption campaign which could easily turn into a witch-hunt. As a result, the new team is of very mixed quality. Most members have some previous experience, although usually in state governments under military rule. Few have had much federal experience.

As for the civil servants, they have been the ones to provide continuity in the past, and on their shoulders the burden of putting together a comprehensive economic recovery programme might be expected to fall. Yet here again, there is an unwillingness on the part of many to identify too wholeheartedly with a new and possibly transitory regime. Part of that caution dates back to the purge instituted by Murtalla Mohammed when he overthrew General Gowon in 1975: any civil servant regarded as too identified with Gowon lost his job. So today, just when there is an urgent need for the top officials to be working long into the night to effect a coherent recovery programme, there is no strong incentive to do so.

The lack of commitment has been compounded by a comprehensive shake-up of the permanent secretaries: 17 out of 45 were retired, while all but two of the rest were reassigned to new ministries. Only Finance and Planning kept their top officials, in apparent tribute to the key role they have to play.

The first pronouncements of the new regime have been concerned with the anti-corruption drive before all else, followed by actions on the economic front. Yet that concentration on corruption could have two negative effects. It could result in a witch-hunt, with individuals realising their personal grievances by making false accusations; and it may aggravate the popular belief that the only necessary economic remedy is to root out corruption, and all will be well. The special military tribunals set up to try some 500 former politicians for corruption, the first of which started sitting in May, have also aroused controversy and suspicion by deciding to hear evidence in secret, and look like being effectively boycotted by the legal fraternity.

Meanwhile the new government is in urgent need of an economic programme which will not just correct the immediate balance-of-payments problem, but also lay the foundation of a restructured economy, reducing the excessive dependence on oil, revitalising agriculture so that food imports can be cut down, and creating a manufacturing sector that is not such a heavy importer of raw materials as at present. Given the present straitened circumstances, it is a very tall order.

When the new government took over, the growing shortages of imports had resulted in an unmeasured leap in unemployment (there are no reliable statistics), and an inflation rate probably running at 60 per cent per annum in the country as a whole, higher still in the conurbations. Without statistics, unemployment can only be measured by the rising crime rate. When the new regime tried to remove roadblocks from the Lagos streets to build confidence, the decision had to be rapidly reversed because of the increase in armed robberies. Major employers admit privately to laying off thousands, but dare not announce any global totals for fear of political repercussions. Factories tend to work a few weeks on and a few weeks off, depending on the arrival of necessary imports. The worry now is that skilled workers, as well as the unskilled, are starting to be laid off.

The Shagari government's remedy of import restrictions alone has proved both inefficient and open to corrupt abuse. Although the absolute volume of imports finally came down sharply in the last part of 1982 and early 1983 (followed by a pre-election surge), the cuts fell as much on spare parts and raw materials for industry as on non-essential consumer goods and luxuries. Smuggling has continued in spite of strenuous efforts to control it.

Last month's revised budget did not depart significantly from the previous regime's thinking; it trimmed government spending further, but still relied upon substantial borrowing of nearly N3·3 billion ($4·3 bn) to finance capital spending. It included very large sums for defence spending, and to continue the steel development programme. A disturbing feature was its re-emphasis of the leading role of the River Basin Development Authorities in the effort to revive agricultural production. But it did seek to widen the government's revenue base, by raising more excise taxes, and to rationalise the complex system of import duties. It also seems certain to put severe restraints on the spending power of the 19 state governments, which have been debarred from further foreign borrowing, a key area of financial indiscipline over the previous four years.

What alternatives are open to the new government to balance its books? It can try to increase oil production, either inside or outside the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec). That body might be prepared to consider a modest increase in Nigeria's 1·3 m barrels a day production quota, but probably of no more than the odd 100,000 b/d. If Nigeria wanted more—and the figures suggest it needs at least 1·7 m b/d to balance its current account—then it would have to go it alone, almost certainly setting off a new free-for-all in the oil market, in which Nigeria would not be strong enough to maintain its position. The end result could be higher production at a much lower price.

Of course, fate could yet take a hand. If the present confrontation in the Gulf were to curtail oil production there in any way, Nigeria would be an obvious alternative source of supply for Europe and the United States. Production could fairly swiftly be increased to 2 m b/d. But that doomsday scenario must still be considered hypothetical.

;ond alternative to buy time would be simply to cut back imports so
.lly that Nigeria lives within its means again, and indeed generates
ı surplus to pay off its accumulated arrears, now estimated at some
This is seen as a popular alternative inside the country.
ıo one seems to have worked out just how much of a further cutback
trategy would require. Debt-servicing in the coming years could reach
year by 1986 and 1987, around half the income currently earned from
›rts. Food imports could reach another $2 bn, given the poor results
'esident Shagari's Green Revolution, ever-increasing population pres-
ıd now drought in many parts of the north. That leaves little more than
›r non-food imports. Only three years ago Nigeria imported more than
worth in that category. Manufacturing industry would be decimated,
ure starved of necessary inputs, and spare parts would be lacking to
sential services going.
: Nigerians believe that it may still be possible to borrow money with-
ıgs attached, for example from Saudi Arabia. Yet there is no evidence
ve that significant amounts would be available, given the Saudis' com-
ıts in Iraq and at home. Moreover, one string would probably be that
should not exceed its Opec production quota. It might well be argued
;eria could get as much if not more money from increasing oil produc-
ın from borrowing from fellow Opec members: an extra 100,000 b/d
›ring in about $1 bn over a full year.
leaves the option of borrowing with strings attached: from the Interna-
Ionetary Fund, the World Bank, and from other western institutions if
y. The problem is that they are seeking to prescribe an economic
ıe which seems decidedly unpalatable to most Nigerians, involving a
tion of the naira, dismantling of much of the current cumbersome
›f import licensing, cuts in government subsidies on key commodities
rol, and strict wage restraint in the public sector. Yet most outside
rs now believe that such a package is not only inevitable—without it
will be unable to reschedule its trade arrears and obtain new short-
:dits—but also necessary, if the government is both to stabilise the
y and begin the task of restructuring.
· is needed is a comprehensive economic strategy which would reduce
ntry's dependence on oil for export earnings and the government's
on oil revenues and royalties for its income; it would therefore increase
exports and revive agriculture to reduce excessive food imports; it
lso redirect the manufacturing sector away from import-dependent
y industries to ones more reliant on indigenous raw materials.
a strategy would require the whole pattern of incentives to be changed,
ır agriculture and agro-industries, and to reduce the bias in favour of
, trading and urban life in general. Both the IMF and World Bank
ıat such a restructuring is impossible with the presently overvalued
hich appreciated steadily during the oil-boom years of the 1970s, and
:t significantly depreciated since. The trouble is that maintenance of

the naira exchange rate has become virtually an article of faith in Nigeria, and rational debate at the very highest levels is virtually impossible.

The Nigerian arguments are that devaluation would result in no benefit to exports because oil is sold in dollars at a fixed price. It will, however, cause a big leap in inflation inside Nigeria because the country has become so dependent on imports. Many industries could be put out of business because of a quantum leap in their raw material costs, and because they might face a big increase in the naira cost of arrears in trade payments, if they are not covered for a devaluation risk. Moreover, the Nigerian argument goes, the economy is not price-sensitive: people do not respond quickly to changes in pricing because supply bottlenecks are more important. The danger of a devaluation would therefore be an increase in overall inflation rates without any effective change in incentives.

The counter-arguments emphasise the importance of devaluation as one key element in a whole package of measures, designed to ensure that its effects are not dissipated. Proponents argue that while it might not boost oil exports, any prospect for increases in non-oil exports is hopeless at the prevailing exchange rate. Devaluation would also dramatically increase the naira revenue to government from oil exports, greatly easing the present budget deficit, reducing the need for local borrowing, and the resulting inflationary pressure. While it might hit certain parts of manufacturing industry, such a shake-out is necessary. However, the present import restrictions have already caused such widespread redundancies and closures that it is unlikely devaluation would have much more of an effect. As for inflation, it already reflects a heavily devalued naira in all black market transactions, so again the effect might be less than feared.

The problem for the new military government in Nigeria is how to promote rational discussion on a comprehensive economic programme at a time when it is feeling uncertain politically; and how to pay for the sort of restructuring needed when it is actually suffering from an acute cash shortage.

The omens are not particularly good for a swift economic recovery, and therefore the economic pressures will continue to undermine political stability. Barring a sharp upturn in the oil market, Nigeria faces very tight balance of payments constraints at least until the end of the decade. Debt-servicing costs on its existing medium-term debt, compounded by the new medium-term debt to be added from the rescheduling of some $6 bn in trade arrears, could reach about 50 per cent of oil revenues by 1987, leaving very little for other imports.

Austerity could help the new government, to the extent that the sort of projects embarked upon in the 1970s will simply be out of the question. Instead, it will have to concentrate on smaller-scale development, and ration the available foreign finance for income-generating schemes like the exploitation of natural gas. Unpalatable political decisions, like the temporary suspension of steel development and drastic slowing down of work on Abuja, may have to be taken. Nigeria will also have to consider policies now taken for granted in

like energy conservation. The only way the new regime is going to be
ersuade ordinary Nigerians to go along with such ideas is to be as open
ble in its government, to encourage better understanding of issues,
an trying to push through unpopular policies behind closed doors, as
led to be the system in the past.

, however, the omens are mixed. On the one hand, the government
nced its reputation for decisive action with its decision to change the
tes, designed to catch out currency hoarders, including those with ill-
ains. On the other hand, it has started to alienate the press by an over-
ponse to relatively harmless speculative stories (two journalists were
for writing about the appointment of new Ambassadors). The
ent is obviously still finding its feet, but it has very little time to do so.

South African sport: apartheid's Achilles heel?

PAUL MARTIN

SOUTH Africa's participation in international sport is threatening once again to disrupt international relations between those countries maintaining contact and those which have none. The England Rugby tour to South Africa this year, and the proposed New Zealand tour there the following year, have already led to African threats against the 1986 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. A mass African boycott at this stage appears less likely than a demand that England (and, if their rugby tour goes ahead, New Zealand) be banned from the Games.[1] The case of a 17-year-old South African-born girl runner being registered as a British citizen by virtue of her grandparents' birth, and her eligibility for Britain's Olympic team, has also focused attention on the thorny dilemmas faced by the world's politicians and sports administrators in responding to the South African sports issue.[2]

This article proposes to examine whether present responses and policies, especially by western and Commonwealth countries, are effective in their declared objective of helping to end apartheid. To determine the efficacy of present actions, it is necessary to examine the moves being made in South Africa towards integrated sport. Are they simply 'cosmetic', a confidence trick to lure international competition? Or do they affect the political system in such a way that the outside world should respond positively to them?

These questions cannot even be considered until the history of South African sports policies and practice and the philosophy underpinning them are understood.

The development of sports policies

Sport and politics have been intertwined in South Africa for decades. At first, it was an unwritten norm that whites, Coloureds (mixed race) and blacks

[1] This could be achieved by applying the agreement reached between sports administrators at the last Commonwealth Games in Brisbane. It imposes an obligation on Olympic and Commonwealth Games Committees to seek to prevent any sporting links with South Africa, even in sports, like rugby, over which they have no control. Britain, which abstained, has since declared itself not to be bound by the decision, though a *pro forma* letter asking the (England) Rugby Football Union to change its mind was sent by the Sports Council in March 1984.

[2] For background to recent political developments in South Africa, see James Barber, 'White South Africa—into the political unknown', and 'Afrikanerdom in disarray', *The World Today*, December 1983 and July-August 1982 respectively.

The author, a former correspondent for the BBC in Africa and the Middle East and now a freelance journalist and author living in London, is a graduate in African Government and Law from the University of Cape Town. He has made a close study of the question of sport in South Africa.

played sport in their own social groups.[3] There were a few rare exceptions when Coloureds played representative matches in predominantly white teams—but even then it was often done stealthily, to the extent of Coloureds not revealing their ethnic origin.

The advent of the Afrikaner National Party government in 1948 led to a spate of racial legislation throughout the 1950s and 1960s that entrenched apartheid in all walks of life, and made racial mixing on the sports fields and amongst the spectators not merely socially unacceptable but illegal.[4] The government first interfered in 1951 by banning visits from black boxers to fight the new British Empire flyweight champion Jake N'Tuli.[5] In 1955 the right-wing Bloemfontein City Council banned non-white spectators from watching the British Isles play South Africa in a rugby international on the grounds that it would 'cause friction'.[6] Blacks have traditionally cheered vociferously for the visiting team, enjoying the (infrequent) spectacle of the all-white Springboks being beaten. Their support for the opposition enraged most white supporters.

But South Africa's first major policy statement on sport came in 1956, after three blows to the white sports administrators' complacency. South Africa's white table tennis body was excluded from the recently formed International Table Tennis Federation; soccer's international federation, FIFA, urged white and black soccer administrators in South Africa to merge their separate organisations; and several non-white sports bodies applied to international associations for recognition.

The government's sports policy specified that: whites and non-whites could not play mixed sport in South Africa; mixed teams could not compete abroad either; foreign teams touring South Africa to play whites could contain no non-white players; non-white sportsmen from abroad could compete in South Africa, but only against non-whites.

In essence, this remained the basis of South Africa's sports policies until significant shifts were wrung out of the government in response to threatened or actual breaks in sporting links. First, in 1967, Maoris were grudgingly allowed to play in a New Zealand rugby team, but a South African-born England cricketer, Basil D'Oliviera, was barred from an international touring team of the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). South Africa's then Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, declared: 'This is not the team of the MCC. It is the team of the anti-apartheid movement.'[7] The tour was cancelled by the MCC. Then South Africa proposed sending a multi-racial squad to the Olympic

[3] The terms used here reflect the official terminology for race classification in South Africa. Blacks are the majority (approx. 25 m), whites 4 m, Coloureds and Asians 3 m.

[4] R. E. Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport: the Case of South Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 21.

[5] *ibid.*, p. 23. See also Muriel Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations—South Africa, 1955–56* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1956), p. 226.

[6] Lapchick, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–6. See also J. Lawrence, *The Seeds of Disaster* (London: Gollancz, 1968).

[7] Speech excerpted in 'Sport and the Boycott', BBC Television, 9 May 1984.

Games the next year in Mexico, though the selection was not to be made at mixed trials.[8] The new policy appeared to open the way for South Africa's participation, but the invitation was eventually withdrawn under African boycott threats. And despite two Australian tours after the D'Oliviera affair, South Africa has played no recognised international cricket since 1970.

South Africa is now totally excluded from all major team sports except rugby: it is banned from the world bodies representing soccer and cricket. It is also banned from the international representative competitions of tennis (the Davis and Federation Cups) and of golf (the World Cup), though its players take part freely in the individual events, which represent the bulk of competition in these sports. South Africa is barred from athletics and swimming. But there is no bar on South Africans in motor-racing and professional boxing.

Attitudes to mixed sport

Afrikaners, who form over 60 per cent of South Africa's 4 million whites, have been riven into opposing camps by changes in the apartheid policies. In considerable measure, these changes were spearheaded by sports 'adaptations' (as the government originally termed them for internal consumption) which undermined the stated objectives of apartheid.

The philosophy behind segregation in sport was summed up in 1965 by the National Party's official organ, *Die Transvaler* newspaper:

> 'Social mixing leads inevitably to miscegenation... In South Africa the races do not mix on the sports fields. . . If they mix first on the sports fields, then the road to other forms of social mixing is wide open... With an eye to upholding the white race and its civilisation, not one single compromise can be entered into—not even when it comes to a visiting rugby team.'[9]

Another basic tenet of the segregationists was, and is, that social and sports contact between the races leads to racial friction and violence. In 1967, for instance, when a white tobacco firm offered to sponsor a cricket series between South Africa and the West Indies, to be played in Britain, South Africa's Sports Minister, Mr Frank Waring, declared: 'If whites and non-whites start competing against each other, there will be such viciousness as has never been seen before.'[10]

Present policies

Yet, through a series of 'adaptations', the National Party has now exempted all sports meetings from the effects of racial legislation. Until recently it was necessary for permits to be granted allowing these events to take place; this requirement has been scrapped. The result is that sports bodies are free to select all their representative teams, at club, provincial and national level, on merit. Spectator facilities need not be segregated, and provisions that blacks and

[8] Lapchick, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[9] *Die Transvaler*, 7 September 1965, in Lapchick, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[10] Quoted in Lapchick, *op. cit.*, p. 83; also in Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

whites may not drink liquor together in bars have been waived for sporting occasions.[11]

The policy was expressed in these terms by the Minister of Education, who is also in charge of sport, Dr Gerrit Viljoen: 'Our policy is one of Separateness and Togetherness. In sport, Togetherness is far advanced. In other areas Separateness prevails.'[12] (Dr Viljoen, who as past head of the Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond, had been instrumental in drawing up the early 'adaptations' to South Africa's sports policies, managed only to sow confusion in the minds of foreign correspondents, who had been taken on a two-week tour and had attended several days' symposia on the sports issue as part of the International Rugby Media Congress, 1983, held under the aegis of the South African Rugby Board, presumably with the government's financial support.[13])

The Minister conceded, however, that sports at schools level could not be fully integrated. He said the 'bulk' of schools sport would remain segregated. South Africa's new Constitution, which came into force this year, requires that 'each population will regulate and manage its own school education programmes, including official school sports'.[14] This would appear to keep schools sport segregated. But Dr Viljoen has subsequently made it clear that if the school committees elected by parents agree, and if the respective education departments approve, inter-racial or multi-racial competition can take place.[15] It is noteworthy that as blacks (the bulk of South Africa's population) are excluded from the new Constitutional deal, both white and black education are effectively in white hands, though Coloured and Indian education will be under Coloured and Indian control. The upshot of all this is that the government has made it difficult for black, Coloured and white schoolchildren to play sport together regularly, and to that extent it has not yet removed all legislation that hinders integrated sport.

It is clear that the government fears a further white right-wing backlash if schools sport were to be properly mixed. The government does not prohibit children of any racial group from playing sport outside the official schools programme. The child can join any club that will accept him, and take part in any mixed sports league that may exist. Yet even here the permission of the parents is said by the government to be essential.

The reality

Not all sports in South Africa have achieved the maximum degree of racial integration allowed by law. Professional soccer, the game that draws by far the greatest number of supporters, being the black man's top sport, is fully

[11] 1983. For the previous few years, permits had been granted to the same effect.

[12] At the International Rugby Media Congress, Pretoria, 1983. Quote in P. Martin, 'Togetherness in South Africa', *The Listener*, 21 September 1983.

[13] The author attended this Congress, held in August–September 1983.

[14] As quoted in the South African Rugby Board's pamphlet on the Congress, printed in Dublin in 1984.

[15] *ibid.* For a pro-South African view, see A. Joubert, 'South Africa and the world of sport', *South Africa International*, Vol. 8, No. 2, October 1977.

integrated. Its controlling body is dominated by blacks, and the top club are very wealthy. Indeed, one black football boss actually bought out a previously mainly white club, Highland Park, lock, stock and barrel. Yet soccer is not fully integrated at amateur level.

Cricket formed one governing body, the SA Cricket Union, in 1976, uniting the white SACA with the almost exclusively Coloured and Asian SACBOC. Swimming and athletics, as well as boxing, are fully integrated so far as can be established, though again amateur boxing is said to retain a degree of segregation. Tennis has no discrimination based on race.

But the most important sport for white South Africans, rugby, has not yet completed its plans for integration. Its policy, in contrast to cricket, has been to 'integrate from the top down', according to its long-serving chairman, Dr Danie Craven. Clearly changes in rugby have the most impact on the white Afrikaners' attitudes, and can be seen as the litmus test for the degree of change they will tolerate in sport. Already a Coloured man has worn the hallowed Springbok jersey, a sight that would have been anathema to most white South Africans only a decade ago. Coloureds and blacks may be (and occasionally are) selected at provincial level. But in the main, they play in leagues run by their own racial groups, and the national Coloured or black sides take part in the equivalent of the Second Division of 'Currie Cup' provincial matches. One of the Springbok selectors is Coloured—and the black and Coloured rugby bodies each have one representative on the governing organisation, the South African Rugby Board (SARB).

The black and Coloured sports administrators insist in conversations, both privately and publicly, that these remnants of segregation are necessary to help to build up black and Coloured strengths before their players can compete successfully in fully integrated rugby. Nevertheless, they also concede that the pace of progress towards full integration in rugby is too slow, and lay the blame at the door of recalcitrant members of the white-dominated controlling body of rugby (SARB).

The opposition

Despite the changes that have come about (to a greater or lesser extent), many of the sportsmen of black or Coloured origin have not joined in the moves towards integration. They are grouped under the South African Council on Sport (SACOS). Their slogan is 'there can be no normal sport in an abnormal society'. They point out that after the sporting events are over, blacks and Coloureds return to their segregated housing areas and suffer the disadvantages of second- or third-class citizens.

Essentially their argument has two dimensions, one avowedly political, the other at least nominally sporting. In sporting terms, they argue that truly equal sport requires fully equal opportunities to achieve success. And a second-rate education, second-rate diet, and second-rate sports facilities, resulting at least in part from racial discrimination, create an inbuilt disadvantage to the average black or Coloured sportsman in relation to his pri-

uite counterpart. Thus, the argument runs, until the apartheid :lf is abolished, there can be no 'fair and equal competition' in

:reasingly, their argument is purely political. Sports isolation is a punishing white South Africa for its race policies, and all available iould be used to attack the current rulers, irrespective of the impact :d and black sportsmen themselves. This position has been stated reasingly radical sports administrators, whose head, Mr Van der lared last year that SACOS was 'part of the liberatory movement'.[16] nan who first coined the 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' se, the cricket administrator, Mr Hassan Howa, has been shifted ACOS because of his 'moderation'.

;inal demands of SACOS and its affiliated sports bodies had been far ie. In the early 1970s, for instance, Mr Howa had argued for inte- rt at national and provincial level only, with clubs able to be racially f they wished. His players, he said, would play anywhere, even if it ne of the players could enter the clubhouse together or drink

:quirements have long since been met in practice and by law. But :s he was appealing for in cricket happened at the time of the So- in 1976, and coincided with a hardening of Coloured and black

etween the sports administrators

affiliates have therefore refused to become involved in moves to- -racial sport. In effect, apart from the rare exception, their own sions are confined to non-whites, while their rivals play sport that hite and non-white participants. There is a certain irony in sports- sed to apartheid refusing to become involved in sport with another p.

COS leagues have had greatest success in cricket, where many ind Indian clubs which joined the new dispensation reverted to the filiate. This was partly due to a degree of neglect by the new 'non- ket body of the needs of lower-league cricketers. It may also have :cted with maladministration.

:e is considerable evidence to indicate extensive pressure and in- by SACOS supporters against those who tried to defy them. This n invasion of their playing fields, and more seriously, at schools imination by radical teachers and headmasters against pupils who le SACOS affiliates' leagues.[18]

in the *Cape Herald*, 29 August 1983, reporting his address to the rally.

at a special congress of the Western Province Cricket Board of Control (SACOS), e Town, 1976, attended by the author as a Member. SACOS accepts it has hardened but says this is because it has been offered 'too little too late'.

employed by a government department, Coloured and Indian teachers are usually sed to the system.

The government and its local councils undoubtedly discriminate against SACOS in terms of granting them facilities. Most sports grounds in Coloured and black areas are controlled by local or provincial councils, most of which are pro-government. The Administrator of the Cape Province has warned that if SACOS continues to 'intimidate' those who do not wish to play for it, he will eject them from some of the facilities they use.[19] Then, too, it is clear that the established sports bodies have the money and the superior facilities, at least in the higher echelons of their sport, to induce the top sportsmen to join them.

The international boycott

SACOS fully supports the efforts made by organisations abroad, principally the United Nations Committee against Apartheid and the London-based South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), to impose total sports isolation on South Africa. Indeed, a leading figure in SACOS has candidly said that no matter what changes came about in South African sport, SACOS is so closely connected to those abroad who demand a boycott that SACOS would have no option but to keep up that demand.[20]

On the other hand, the established sports authorities argue that the boycott is now only harming sportsmen of all colours. It is making no impact on the government any more. They suggest that far more change would come about if those sports bodies who have made the necessary changes, were to feel some tangible response and reward. They see that reward in the form of readmittance to the international governing body of sport, or else a tour to or from South Africa. SACOS, however, argues that such a tour or readmission would simply allow the South African political and sports authorities to sit back smugly and make no further changes.

The options

The present situation, where some sports are totally isolated while others maintain international sporting contacts, is untenable. The basis for exclusion or inclusion has little or nothing to do with the degree of integration within that particular sport. It has far more to do with the composition of the international governing body. Generally, in organisations where the power lies mainly in the hands of African, Soviet bloc or third-world countries, South Africa is excluded. A classic example has been cricket. The International Cricket Conference sent a committee to South Africa in the late 1970s, which concluded that the South Africans had met all the conditions laid down for its return to test cricket. But because the West Indies, India and Pakistan would not accept the findings, the report was ignored. With the addition of Sri Lanka more recently, there is a 4-3 majority of black nations to white. The white nations have no desire to disrupt test cricket by bringing South Africa back into it.

[19] Eugene Louw, in a speech at the International Media Congress, Cape Town, 1983.
[20] Interviews with the author, in London and Johannesburg, 1983.

rnational rugby is played in countries with white majorities in all
se: South Africa itself, which is a full member of the International
rd.[21] The widely varying approaches of different controlling world
ies ensure that the South Africa issue will remain inflamed and
explosive. Pressures will mount from both sides, and naked power
nine the outcome.

frica has considerable financial resources available to disrupt several
is can be done, as indeed it already has been in cricket, by attracting
iring teams or individuals through financial inducements, so result-
re losses to the sport through bannings.[22]

ports boycott would at least provide consistency. It would state that
on of apartheid itself was necessary before sporting contact could be
The object would be to force white South Africans to abandon their
ctrines. At the very least, it could be argued, it would provide a
could stimulate the abolition of such policies as segregated housing
ated schooling.

tion is, however, destined to fail dismally in that objective. All the
dicates that the white rulers of South Africa, probably with the sup-
of those whites who oppose apartheid, would retreat into a white
simply entrench the racial policies that already exist. It would be
it the total boycott, ignoring all progress towards non-racial sport,
ved the world's duplicity and double standards. Sport plays a big
th Africans' lives, but the lack of international competition would
ort being played. While motivation in the case of some top sports-
l be lacking, the internal competitions would simply take on more
e. A number of South African sportsmen would go abroad to pur-
port (as indeed some already have done). But that would not radi-
the conduct of sport in South Africa, much less the policies of the
nt.

warnings have already come from black and white sports ad-
rs that unless South African sportsmen feel they have some realistic
taying in or getting back into international competition, a serious
ould occur. The extreme right wing would be strengthened, and all
urther sporting and political change would be eliminated.

, a total sports boycott would surrender the outside world's
it could no longer influence events in South Africa through sport.
re is another option that could be called the 'carrot-and-stick'
It is based on one or both of two premises:

ie objective is to break down all the barriers to completely non-racial
and

en other members are: England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland (both parts), New Zea-
ia and France. They meet annually in London.
teams to tour South Africa since 1981 were from England, Sri Lanka and the West

[illegible] barriers would of itself help dramatically [illegible] in other areas as well.

[illegible] believe that the first objective is as far as an [illegible] should become involved: to go beyond that is the job of a politician. Those who believe in the second premise would see the breakdown of sporting barriers as a means to an end.

But it is necessary first of all to determine whether truly non-racial sport can be achieved by overseas action. A number of South African opposition figures have argued that the sports administrators and the government would make further changes if they were convinced that these changes would be rewarded by the international sports community. A clear offer could be made by all sporting bodies, for instance, that South Africa would be guaranteed international competition if it allowed total integration of all sports between schools; formed integrated governing bodies; and injected large funds into upgrading training and facilities in underprivileged areas. Each sport would be assessed, and those which have met one or two of these conditions substantially could be rewarded with tours, perhaps slightly below full international level, as a 'carrot'. Those that have done too little would then see the benefits that the more integrated sports would be receiving. It would spur them on to faster change.

The Coloured Labour Party's National Chairman, the Rev Alan Hendrickse, once detained for a lengthy period by the South African police, came to Britain this year and urged a five-year moratorium on the sports boycott. His argument was that significant changes had been brought about in sport which were already having a considerable impact on South African society and politics. He argued that if sporting contacts were renewed, this would spur more changes. If these did not come about, the boycott could be resumed and tightened, he suggested.

That is one variation of the carrot-and-stick approach, though with more carrot and less stick than the previous proposition. If then the carrot-and-stick approach does help to bring about wider sports integration, would that effect political change in South Africa?

The present author believes that it would be an effective means of subverting apartheid. Naturally, the entire edifice would not collapse overnight. But there is a certain degree of truth in the right wing's fear that sports integration 'leads inevitably to miscegenation'. Although the ultimate test of an integrated society is whether the majority is no longer ruled over by the minority, the system of apartheid that underpins white privilege is unable to tolerate integration in one sphere while holding on to segregation in all others.

Integration on the sports fields, especially at schools level, disproves apartheid's basic tenets—that white and non-white cannot meet as equals, and that friction is the inevitable result. If blacks and whites stand shoulder to shoulder cheering black and white players, if black children have white sporting heroes and white children rush for autographs of blacks (as is already hap-

d if they visit each other's areas and schools to play sport, the
n' for keeping the races separate in terms of housing or even educa-
rates from Afrikaner political mythology.
practically, the political ramifications would put an added strain on
rtheid system. Indeed, the turmoil would weaken the ruling National
's monopoly of power, with challenges both from left and right. There
d, in short, be a powerful element of change to shake up a system that had
n static for decades. The white racialists, who would rub their hands in glee
the thought of more international competition, would discover that a heavy
rice was being asked.

Conclusion

Impetus for other boycotts of sports occasions for political reasons undoubtedly arose from the moves against South African sport. With three successive Olympic boycotts, it is clear that the boycott weapon in general has done sport far more harm than good. Nor has the political objective of the boycotters been achieved. However, the use of the sports weapon is legitimate in South Africa because it was South Africa which brought politics into sport through its racial discrimination between sportsmen; and because the sports weapon's judicious use can help to destroy an evil system. In the light of the (as yet incomplete but nevertheless important) changes that have come about in South African sport, what are the best means of exploiting the developments in a way that would help stimulate wider political change?

The most sensible means is a carrot-and-stick approach, providing tours for some sports which have achieved satisfactory progress (like cricket, soccer, swimming and athletics) while demanding further progress from others which are less advanced (like rugby). These tours should be conditional upon far more substantial changes taking place like, for example, the abolition of apartheid in schools sport. As soon as each sport achieves full integration and meets the conditions, it should be guaranteed full membership of the sports international body and normal treatment.

To implement such a proposal the Gleneagles Agreement, signed in 1977, needs no amendment, merely reinterpretation. It calls on Commonwealth governments 'vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by . . . taking every practical step to discourage contact by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sport is organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.'

If the conditions are met, South Africa would no longer be organising its sport 'on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin' and sporting contact need no longer be discouraged by Commonwealth states. The idea of simply refusing any sporting contact with South Africa till all apartheid ends is counterproductive, as it removes any incentive for change, and releases all the pressure that could be brought to bear. It is time for the sports weapon to be used not with the crudity of a sledgehammer, but with the precision and efficacy of a rapier.

The Balkans: Soviet ambitions and opportunities

J. F. BROWN

THAT proverbial 'powder-keg', the Balkans, has been strangely quiet for mor
than a generation. Counting Turkey, it covers 500,000 square miles and has
population of just over 110 million. It is a region that has traditionally bee
prey to great-power ambition, with foreign penetration facilitated by conve
nient communication routes through difficult mountain terrain. In moder
times, of the great-power predators, Russia has been the most persistent.

In 1945 Russia returned to the Balkans more mightily than ever. What ha
been the centuries-old ambition of the tsars had been largely fulfilled unde
Stalin. And this time the Russians were only partly to be curbed by the kind o
great-power opposition that had thwarted them some 70 years before. Ther
is no doubt that Stalin had wanted more: Greece, for example, and parts o
eastern Turkey, a base on the Bosphorus, even Istanbul itself. But what he go
was big enough. Russia came unchallenged into most of the region, and wit
the new messianism of Marxism–Leninism. It was one that was fervently ac
cepted by a few, and passively accepted by many, in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria an
Albania. By contrast, in Rumania, repeatedly victim to Russia's Balkan am
bitions, there was no enthusiasm. But there were several hundred thousan
Soviet troops, and it was they who guaranteed the installation of a Communis
regime in Bucharest.

But, since 1945, the Soviet Union has been compelled steadily to retrea
from the Balkans. By 1948, Communist regimes controlled from Mosco
ruled Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania. Twenty years later Com
munist regimes still ruled all four countries but only Bulgaria was fully con
trolled by the Soviet Union. Rumania had carved out for itself a considerabl
degree of autonomy in both domestic and foreign policy. Yugoslavia has bee
independent since 1948, anxious for good relations with Moscow, but on a
totally independent footing. Albania finally broke with the Soviet Union in
1961 and has been defiantly hostile since then. National Communism had
replaced Soviet-dominated Communism.

Greece and Turkey followed a totally different path from their Communis
neighbours. Greece narrowly missed entering the Soviet orbit and then pro
ceeded on a faltering path of modernisation, relative prosperity, and a tur
bulent political democracy which was interrupted by a seven-year blight of
military dictatorship. Turkey survived Stalin's post-war territorial demands
intact and proceeded, like Greece, towards modernisation and greater pros-

Mr Brown, author of numerous studies of eastern Europe, was from 1979 to 1983 Director o
Radio Free Europe in Munich. He is currently living in Oxford and working on a new book o
eastern Europe.

perity, with a shaky parliamentary democracy interrupted three times by brief periods of 'corrective' military rule.

But now the Balkan area generally—Communist and democratic—is facing a more precarious future than it has done since the Second World War. With Bulgaria as the exception, five of the six countries present the Soviet Union with opportunities which, though of different kinds, have a common denominator: the possibility of recovering old, or gaining new, influence.

Why is this future precarious and what opportunities does it offer the Soviet Union? A thumb-nail sketch of the present situation in each of the six countries could at least indicate the answer.

Yugoslavia

The general western relief that the 'post-Tito transition' has so far been made without the Yugoslav federation unravelling should blind no one to the fact that none of the three great overlapping crises besetting Yugoslavia has been overcome.[1] Not only that: none of them is being tackled consistently. The crises are three: the leadership, the economy and the nationalities.

The leadership crisis is the simplest to describe and diagnose. Tito bequeathed to Yugoslavia a governing artifice based on the twin principles of collectivity and rotation, imbued with the ideal of national equality. In the four years since he died, it has defied the pessimists by not collapsing. But its very artificiality must militate against its durability. Nor does its survival so far mean that it is coping with the federation's problems.

But whatever the leadership, it is now faced with an economy which is almost totally out of control. Last year the inflation rate reached 58 per cent, the debt to the west over $20 billion, and only eleventh-hour interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prevented Yugoslavia from becoming a declared bankrupt. Living standards have been falling sharply; the shops are less well stocked than for 20 years; electricity cuts result in industries grinding to a halt and millions of private homes being shrouded in darkness. The reasons for this decline include: incompetence (and often corruption) of economic officials at both federal and republic levels; rivalries between the different republics which make the European Community disputes look bland and trivial by comparison; world recession and world energy prices; a continuing failure to harmonise central control with self-management; allowing, in the name of self-management, individual factories to contract foreign debts with no guarantees; declining *Gastarbeiter* remittances because of recession in the west; the failure even to begin building up a unified Yugoslav market. This list is not complete but it gives some idea of the daunting magnitude and complexity of Yugoslavia's economic problems.

The national problem, the most basic of all, seems as far from solution as ever, despite the momentary quiet. It has as many aspects as there are nation-

[1] For background, see F. B. Singleton, 'Yugoslavia: economic grievances and cultural nationalism', *The World Today*, July–August 1983; K. F. Cviic, 'Yugoslavia's double crisis', *ibid.*, September 1982.

alities, but there are four which today seem the most intractable and menacing: the Serb–Croat divide; the danger of a Serbian backlash; the situation in Kosovo; and the growing assertiveness of Islam in Bosnia–Hercegovina.

There has been a deceptive quiet in Croatia since the days of 1971, when Tito threatened to use the army to put down Croat nationalists and save the federation. It is this quiet that has led some observers to believe that the danger has receded. Certainly the incidents in Kosovo have distracted attention from Croat nationalism. But the historic Croat attitude of grievance towards Serbia has diminished only slightly. Indeed, for many Croatians, Yugoslavia and Serbia are virtually synonymous.

This chronic Croat animosity could be fed by a relatively new aspect of the Yugoslav national dilemma: a growing frustration among many Serbs arising from their conviction that they, once the 'nation of state' in Yugoslavia, are being increasingly disregarded and relegated into impotence. The Croat animosity and the Serb frustration could, therefore, be mutually reinforcing. The post-war concept of a federation, plus the accepted Communist view that the change of social order would solve the national disputes that had rent the old Yugoslavia, were all very well in theory. But the Serbs continued to be the 'nation of state' until the fall, in 1966, of Alexander Rankovic, the champion of Serb supremacy. Since then the Serbs have been on the defensive—in a country they traditionally regarded if not exactly as their own then at least as their own creation, and one in which they felt and still feel entitled to pride of place.

Nothing in recent years can have fuelled Serb resentment more than events in Kosovo. There is an earthy saying in Yugoslavia that every Serb is suckled on Kosovo: it is the centre of the Serbian empire of the fourteenth century, its culture and its religion, as well as the site of the heroic defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1389 that marked the empire's end. In the last 250 years, however, as the centre of Serbia shifted north-eastwards and as Albanians moved steadily northwards into Kosovo, the whole demographic composition of the region changed dramatically. Now Albanians outnumber Serbs and Montenegrins (who, ethnically, are essentially Serbs) by more than three to one. The implications of this demographic trend were always serious, but as long as Rankovic was in power in Belgrade and controlled the Yugoslav security service (UDBA), the Albanian majority, inured to submission anyway, was under control. After 1966, however, the familiar syndrome became evident: the down-trodden Albanians began asserting themselves. Periodic disturbances ensued, culminating in the bloody riots of 1981. A Serbian exodus, prompted by hopelessness or intimidation, is under way at the rate of about 400 a month. If this continues, by the turn of the century there will be practically no Serbs left in their ancient homeland. And what must add to the Serb humiliation is that it is at the hands of the Albanians, who in a peninsula pervaded by racialism have been amongst the most thoroughly despised of nations. The future of Kosovo itself is uncertain. Tirana denies irredentist aspirations but does want increased influence, and poses as the champion of the

Kosovars, many of whom would be satisfied with full republican status for their province within the Yugoslav federation. But Serbia opposes this strongly and, in the overall Yugoslav context, it could establish a disruptive precedent. There are many Albanians in parts of Macedonia and Montenegro who would want to join the new republic. The several hundred thousand Serbs in Croatia could demand incorporation into Serbia. The possibilities—or dangers—are endless. The patchwork-quilt that is Yugoslavia could unravel very easily.

The Muslims, too, like the Kosovo Albanians, most of whom are also Muslim, have long been a despised minority. But the recent Islamic revival has not left them untouched, and Bosnia, once dominated by Serb–Croat rivalry, has had this explosive new dimension injected into it. The trial in Sarajevo last August of a group of well-educated Muslims on charges amounting to sedition could well be an ominous portent.

Albania

Just as the Tito era came to an end in Yugoslavia in 1980, so in Albania the Hoxha era is drawing to its close. Enver Hoxha is now 76. Already it appears that he spends most of his time writing his memoirs, a task of Himalayan proportions already scaling 40 volumes. For Albania, his departure will be as momentous as Tito's was for Yugoslavia. Party leader since 1941, undisputed leader since 1948, he has survived many domestic and foreign intrigues against him—some real, some concocted for propaganda purposes, some the product of an imagination verging on the paranoid. He first had to endure the virtual subjection of his country to Yugoslavia. After Tito's break with Stalin, he adroitly moved into the Soviet orbit. Khrushchev's designs against him and in favour of reconciliation with Tito led him to use the emerging Sino-Soviet dispute to switch loyalties to Peking, to which he remained calculatingly loyal for 17 years. Then, in 1978, as China lost its ideological virginity by a liaison with, of all people, the hated Tito, Hoxha renounced it too. Now the slogan became 'ourselves alone', a novel situation for a country which, throughout its 75 years' existence, had needed, and often suffered from, the patronage of a greater power.

Albania's future course is unpredictable. The ruling group around Hoxha has already been fragmented through death (natural and, like Premier Mehmet Shehu's demise, spectacularly unnatural), purge and imprisonment. There have also been many changes in the senior ranks of the army and the civilian bureaucracy, at least some of which may have been occasioned by disputes over future alternatives in foreign policy. There would appear to be six alternatives: to persist in trying to 'go it alone'; to seek openings to the west; to extend and intensify ties with the third world; to move closer to Yugoslavia; to move closer to the Soviet Union; and to try to revive the alliance with China. These alternatives need not all be mutually exclusive although, obviously, some are.

Albania has been virtually 'going it alone' for over five years now. Despite its self-sufficiency in energy and its valuable deposits of nickel and chrome, it is difficult to see how this can last indefinitely. As for the third world, this could

not help in furthering Albania's industrial development. In view of Kosovo and the historic fear of Yugoslavia, any move in that direction also seems precluded.[2] So does a speedy return to China: relations have indeed improved slightly, but it is hard to see them ever returning to what they were. In any case, for the new pragmatic China, Albania has little value. This leaves the west and the Soviet Union as the most likely possibilities. Attacks against both are a staple of the Albanian media. The United States seems as much a pariah as the Soviet Union. But towards western Europe the tone is different and it is in this direction that Hoxha and in particular his putative successor, Ramiz Alia, may eventually be constrained to look.

Rumania

Here the story is simple and depressing. Gheorghiu-Dej was allowed to initiate the policy of limited independence from the Soviet Union and to formulate it in the famous April 1964 Central Committee declaration, and Ceausescu was then able to continue and amplify it, solely because of Rumania's strategic unimportance to the Soviet Union. Had Rumania had any such importance, its insubordination would have been nipped in the bud. No one is more aware of this fact than the Rumanians themselves. But it should not detract from the courage and skill of both leaders concerned, or underplay the excellent nerves of the Rumanian people who, at one of the most critical moments in their recent history—immediately after 21 August 1968—when their leader had roundly denounced the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, strongly supported and acclaimed him.

But, since then, the story has been one of disappointment and degeneration. The governance of Rumania has been characterised by personal misrule more in the Oriental than in the Balkan tradition. Indeed, the closest analogy in Communist history to the Rumania of Ceausescu is that of the North Korea of Kim Il-sung. The result has been massive demoralisation, together with an economic deterioration that puts in jeopardy the limited, but not inconsiderable, degree of independence Rumania has managed to win. Many Rumanians now contrast their lot with the neighbouring Hungarians'—never an enjoyable exercise for them—and wonder whether 'Kadarism', with its loyalty to the Soviet Union combined with relatively efficient and relaxed government at home, might not be preferable to their own situation. The returns on independence are constantly diminishing. The resentment among a nation slow to anger against a nepotism which has not only made Ceausescu's wife the second power in the land but which now even threatens to bring to the fore his despised son, 'Nicu' (again the North Korean example), is steadily mounting. So far, Ceausescu has maintained himself by his periodic defiance of Moscow (which still commands some support among the Rumanian population); his control over the army and the *Securitate*; and a skilful shuffling of the *nomenklatura*. The question is, for how long. Moscow can wait.

[2] For background, see Patrick F. R. Artisien and R. A. Howells, 'Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo riots', *The World Today*, November 1981.

ı's foreign policy embarrasses it less and less. And, thanks to his
: policy, Ceausescu is an example tempting no one.

ıa

ria remains the model satellite. Its strategic location has long been
ed. Controlling Bulgaria has not automatically meant control of the
, but no foreign power could ever control the Balkans without control-
garia. This is what the Russians realised in 1878, and San Stefano re-
t is what the western powers also realised—and the Congress of Ber-
ted. More recently, Bulgaria's strategic value to the Soviet Union has
reased by its adjacency to two vulnerable and volatile western allies,
ınd Turkey. Politically, it has been useful as a Soviet proxy, directly
ng diplomatic Soviet initiatives in the Balkans. But, most of all, its
s been enormously enhanced simply because it is now the only real
ly left in the Balkans.
'ecisely this reliability that has made it the subject of ominous specula-
'ecent months. This has centred on the question of whether Soviet
will be deployed on Bulgarian soil. There is no doubt a certain logic in
If missiles are being deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia to
:he cruises and Pershings in West Germany, then something is needed
er the cruises in Comiso, Sicily. Bulgaria would clearly be the most
site. Missiles in Bulgaria—or the possibility—could also be used to in-
:ece's Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, to close American bases
e by 1988 and preferably earlier. Diplomatically, of course, it would
ult: Bulgaria, as it was a generation earlier, has been one of the loudest
ıding a Balkan nuclear-free zone.[3] But Balkan diplomacy takes second
Soviet strategy.

ı western allies

wo western allies in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey, have been
l targets of Soviet penetration or subversion, the internal instability of
senting a constant temptation. For most of the last 30 years, the Soviet
vards Greece has been to appeal to public opinion over the heads of its
ents. With the Andreas Papandreou government, installed in late
ere has been no need for such circumvention. Essentially western
'apandreou himself is, and reluctant, despite all the rhetoric, to sever
stays of his relations with the west, he has pandered to popular whims
udice in Pasok (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) with a series of
estures aimed particularly at the United States. These, if taken singly,
:tle more than irritation, but they could have a dangerous cumulative
r conditioning many to an anti-Americanism both virulent and
ing.
nore serious could be the effects of the domestic situation on Greek
olicy. The Papandreou government is more than half-way through its

ckground, see Liliana Brisby's Note, 'Much ado in the Balkans', *ibid.*, April 1984.

term of office.[4] In a few months' time the electioneering run-up will beg for November 1985. Despite the implementation of some long-overdue soci reforms, many Greeks are disillusioned with the Pasok government—pa ticularly its economic record. But the beneficiaries of this disillusionment hav not been so much the toothless opposition on the right as the purposeful ac tivists on the left, spearheaded by the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Ex terior (KKE). What could happen at the next election, therefore, is that Papandreou will be returned to power but will be dependent on the KKE for staying there—almost literally hoisted by his own petard.

With Turkey, where democratic processes are less developed and public opinion less articulate than in Greece, the Soviet strategy has often consisted of direct contacts with the government in power. After 20 years of minimal contact, Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Ankara at the end of 1966, and top-level exchanges have continued ever since. This closer relationship with Moscow has brought Turkey considerable economic aid and has undoubtedly strengthened its bargaining leverage with the United States. But it has been handled by successive Turkish governments with an aplomb and finesse worthy of the Sublime Porte in its best days. Though obviously fearful of Soviet power, Ankara has refused to be intimidated by it. It has negotiated with Moscow as a partner, and has certainly got much more than it has given.

Domestically, the mandate Dr Turgut Özal has received and his proven economic ability augur reasonably well for the reduction of the huge number of Turkey's short-term problems.[5] But two longer-term problems could emerge, endangering not only Turkey's dependability as a western ally but even its integrity as a state. The first is the revival and spread of Muslim fundamentalism. This revival was referred to earlier, in connection with Yugoslavia. But in Turkey, of course, the potential danger is far greater, due to its proximity to the well-spring of the movement. At present the danger is small, but it is growing. The westernising legacy of Atatürk, once so enthusiastically embraced by the younger generation, has lost much of its dynamism. It is the new dynamism spreading from Iran that has gained a bridgehead—one that could be expanded in the years ahead.

The second problem concerns the army. It is an institution which in Turkey is accorded a reverential respect as the saviour of the nation, the guarantor of its integrity, above politics yet ready to descend into the political arena when politicians fail, as so often they manifestly have done. This political interference has been necessary three times in 20 years. On the first two occasions in 1960 and 1971, after order had been restored, the officers returned to their barracks and parliamentary democracy was given another chance to prove itself. Since the 1980 coup, however, the return to civilian government has only been partial. General Evren remains President (at least till 1989) with very

[4] See Richard Clogg, 'PASOK in power: rendezvous with history or with reality?', *The World Today*, November 1983.

[5] For background, see William Hale's Note, 'Turkey after the general election', *ibid.*, January 1984.

wide powers; and the new Constitution approved in 1982 gives the armed forces sweeping executive and supervisory powers. The army, therefore, is already much more involved in politics than for many years. And it could become more involved if civilian government fails again, the economic situation worsens, and public order is threatened. Then the intellectual dissatisfaction, already widespread owing to persecution on a scale that often seems unwarranted, could be compounded by growing worker and peasant opposition. The army, drawn more and more into active politics and probably as unsuccessful as the civilians in remedying the situation, would steadily begin to lose its aura. Modern Greece always lacked a unifying factor: the monarchy, the army, the church have all been divisive. But Turkey has had its army. If that fails, then the very integrity of the state is threatened. And the two forces which could reap the advantage are the Soviet Union and Islam.

Finally, there is Cyprus. Its complexities are irrelevant here. What is relevant, though, is the fact that it is the biggest of many issues which make Greece and Turkey, nominal allies and both members of the western alliance, regard each other as deadly enemies. Moscow holds far fewer terrors for Athens or Ankara than they do for each other. Obviously, no responsible western politician is unaware of this. The question is whether the diplomatic minefield which Cyprus has become can be traversed without the kind of disaster that could send either the Greeks or Turks scurrying to Moscow in their resentment.[6]

Soviet opportunities

Pessimism comes easily to those who study the Balkans. Sometimes it is misplaced: resilience, a capacity for muddling through, and a strongly developed survival instinct have often tended to avert the 'worst-case scenario'. Still, there have been disasters enough in Balkan history to make complacency as misguided as despondency. The dangers are there; they could multiply. The situation is likely to get more, not less, precarious.

What would the Soviet Union hope to gain from a situation in which the dangers sketchily outlined above were to materialise, partly if not entirely? In the case of Greece or Turkey, it would presumably seek either neuterisation or neutralisation. Neuterisation would involve a degree of instability or ungovernability in either or both countries that would render them more of a liability than an asset to the western alliance. Neutralisation would result from an internal or external situation which would force either country into a state of non-cooperation with the west, particularly the United States, and possibly of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. Papandreou's dependence on the KKE, discussed above, would be an 'internal' case in point. A western move on Cyprus which totally alienated one of the contending parties (or a Soviet move which totally satisfied one of them) would be an 'external' case.

With regard to the three Communist states in question (loyalist Bulgaria is irrelevant here) the following possibilities seem to be open: first, the use of

[6] For recent background, see Nancy Crawshaw, 'Cyprus: a failure in Western diplomacy', *ibid.*, February 1984.

force. This appears the least likely, except in the event of overall east-west hostilities. It would be as difficult militarily as it would be disastrous diplomatically. Nor, for the purposes of recovering control in those countries where it had been lost, would it be necessary.

Second, masterly inactivity. This would mean allowing the centrifugal, fragmenting, economic and demoralising trends already evident to take their course without Moscow itself becoming involved at all. Such a course might, however, be seen as too lethargic in view of the opportunities existing, particularly in Yugoslavia and, perhaps, Albania. It might work effectively in Rumania where the Soviet Union might see Ceausescu as doing its work for it, ie creating a situation in which the Soviet presence—economically and politically—increased steadily but almost imperceptibly.

Third, indirect interference, through political, economic, diplomatic and subversive means. The Soviet authorities are presumably perceptive enough to know that, in the case of Yugoslavia, nothing would unite the federation more solidly than evidence of direct Soviet interference. That, more than Tito and even the army, has constituted the most cohesive element in Yugoslavia. But what the Yugoslavs fear most is 'sly infiltration and subversion'. This is already taking place. For political purposes, Moscow could offer extensive aid and open its markets for Yugoslav goods, although its Comecon partners would certainly object. It could do the same, of course, for Albania, which may very soon find that 'going it alone' is unviable. In Albania there may also be elements in both the party and the army which believe at least a partial return to Soviet protection is the only means of protection against Yugoslavia and Greece.

The most intriguing question relating to 'indirect interference' is whether the Soviet Union would overtly or covertly take sides in the national disputes that dominate Yugoslavia. Its failure to do this up to now suggests that it realises this could be a highly counterproductive course of action. For example, Soviet support for Croat nationalism against Serbia or, conversely, feeding the Serbian sense of frustration, would only unite the rest of Yugoslavia against Moscow and against the nation it was supporting. Kosovo might seem a more promising area for intrigue, such as full support of the status quo; supporting republican status for Kosovo; supporting Albanian charges and encouraging irredentist claims. Certainly if Moscow were to decide that control of Albania and, with it, the power to intimidate Yugoslavia, were a better proposition than a *divide et impera* policy in Yugoslavia, then it might embrace the Albanian cause. It would, however, be an audacious move, hardly consistent with the image projected by the ageing Chernenko leadership. And every Russian should know that irredentism is a weapon that could be turned just as easily against themselves as against others.

A continuing Russian ambition?

Does Russia still care? Are the Balkans as important to it as they once were? Now a world power with such tempting opportunities in areas like Latin

merica and Africa, is Moscow still so interested in south-eastern Europe? lave not priorities changed and is there not a danger for observers of confusing 'sense of history' with ossified conceptions? Are the Balkans still important ɔ the Soviet Union from strategic considerations—offensive or defensive?

These are all legitimate questions. Without doubt, the Communist 'northrn tier' countries, for example, are now more important to Soviet security, s is the long border with China. Greater opportunities for gaining influence and subservience certainly do exist elsewhere. But, strategically, the Balkans remain an area which is of great importance to the Soviet Union. The Straits, and passage through them, could take on even more importance as the Soviet fleet expands and modernises. Presumably, this would not lead to any Soviet aggression but to pressure on Ankara to connive at Soviet flouting of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates and restricts passage through the Straits. Strategically, the neuterisation or neutralisation of Turkey would seriously undermine American naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. Politically, it would change the whole balance of power in the Middle East. If Greece were to suffer a similar fate, the military impact would be almost equally damaging. As for Yugoslavia, its Adriatic coastline is strategically important, with harbours suitable for naval repairs and refitting. At the mouth of the Adriatic, only 42 miles from Italy, Albania has a submarine base at Vlorë which the Russians were reluctant to leave some 25 years ago. They might be less reluctant to return.

The answer to the questions posed above must therefore be that the Balkans do indeed retain their importance for the Soviet Union. But these questions and their answers still miss the most essential point. This is that the Soviet leaders have probably never resigned themselves to the 'loss' either of Communist Yugoslavia or of Communist Albania; nor to the partial loss of Communist Rumania. In this sense, the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' is not only current but retroactive, and the means of implementing it can vary. The distinguished American journalist, Joseph Kraft, recalled in *The New Yorker* of 21 January 1983 an outburst by a Soviet official in Moscow at the end of 1982:

> 'We are not going to be bogged down in Poland and Afghanistan and cut off from the rest of the world for a hundred years. We can draw closer to China. We can bring back Yugoslavia and Rumania. You will see many things happening in eastern Europe.'

This threat was more visceral than cerebral, but it illustrates perfectly that instinctive Soviet Russian insistence that what they have lost they can regain —and that they have time to do it.

Defending the Eastern Caribbean

GRAHAM NORTON

LAST October's events in Grenada have drawn international attention to the Eastern Caribbean and have contributed, in the words of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, to a 'wider appreciation of the vulnerability of the individual islands of the area and the desirability of establishing regional security arrangements to protect individual states from covert infiltration and overt military threat'.[1]

An overt military assault in strength by an external power capable of bringing air and naval forces to bear could not possibly be resisted by the Eastern Caribbean states alone: for example, the combined population of the Leeward and Windward Islands is only 578,000, with a gross national product per head of less than $1,000 a year. The democratic electorates in these islands and in prosperous Barbados, by their expectations of better social services and economic development, place severe restraints on defence force levels.

None of the English-speaking Eastern Caribbean islands is more than 300 square miles in area, and some are very considerably less. From north to south they comprise: St Kitts/Nevis; Antigua and Barbuda; Montserrat; Dominica; St Lucia; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Grenada. With the exception of Montserrat, an internally self-governing colony of the United Kingdom, all are independent states. Interposed between Dominica and its neighbours are the larger French islands of Guadeloupe, to the north, and Martinique, to the south. Barbados lies 97 miles due east of St Vincent.

The islands set up, in 1981, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which grew out of the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers, established in 1966. Its objective is cooperation and the harmonisation of policies among its members. The OECS has only a small secretariat which, basically, services the meetings of ministers. There is a Defence and Security Committee, consisting of the Ministers responsible for Defence and Security (inevitably the Prime Ministers), or other members designated by Heads of Government.

It was this Committee which met in Barbados on 21 October 1983[2] en route to a meeting of Heads of Government of Caricom[3] in Trinidad which was to consider the crisis caused by the murder of Mr Maurice Bishop, Grenada's

[1] *Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee*, Session 1983–4 (London: HMSO, 1984).

[2] The Heads of Government met also as the Authority, established under the Treaty, as well as the Committee. It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the interpretation placed on the Treaty by the OECS; the concern here is with what was done, and precedents created.

[3] Caribbean Community and Common Market: members comprise all independent English-speaking nations of the Caribbean basin plus Montserrat, with the Bahamas as a non-economic member.

The author is a writer and political analyst specialising in the Caribbean area.

ime Minister since the coup of 13 March 1979 against Sir Eric Gairy's government, and the subsequent setting up of a Revolutionary Military Council. The OECS Heads of Government, more immediately affected than any other Caribbean governments (for Grenada was a signatory of their Treaty), decided that their own initiative was called for. Citing Article 8 of that pact (and interpreting the requirement for unanimity as unanimity of all present), they began to seek the assistance of friendly countries to stabilise the situation, and to establish a peacekeeping force. Miss Eugenia Charles, the Prime Minister of Dominica, chaired the meeting—the Treaty provides for annual, alphabetical rotation of the chair.

Almost exactly a year before, on 29 October 1982, Barbados had signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of a Regional Security System to which all the OECS members, with the exception of Grenada, Montserrat and St Kitts/Nevis (now a member), subscribed.[4]

Moreover, the defence forces of Barbados had, between 1979 and early 1982, been put on a more extensive basis, and, even before the Memorandum of Understanding of October 1982, cooperation with other island defence forces had been further established. Indeed, Barbados had at the request of Mr Milton Cato, the Prime Minister of St Vincent and the Grenadines, sent detachments of the Barbados Defence Force to St Vincent's Arnos Vale airport, and, later, to various small islands in the Grenadines. This was done after the seizure of Union Island by a group of insurgents issuing out of Carriacou, an island forming part of the territory of Grenada, on 7 December 1979. Thus, rules of engagement for a possible friendly intervention were evolved for the Barbados Defence Force. Clearly, engagements of a similar character, perhaps on a greater scale, formed part of the contingency planning within the Regional Security System.[5]

It was therefore natural that the OECS Ministers should turn formally to Barbados with an invitation to participate (the Montserrat Minister attended and defiantly added his voice to the unanimous resolve for intervention).

The Cabinet in Barbados had already decided, a few hours before the murder of Prime Minister Bishop became known, to examine the possibility of an intervention to rescue him in collaboration with other countries including those with the requisite resources for such an operation.[6] This had already been discussed on the telephone with the Windward Islands Prime Ministers.

With Bishop's murder, consultations between the local Heads of Government, particularly those of Barbados, Dominica and St Lucia, were almost continuous, and as views coincided, appropriate preliminary dispositions were made. Cabinet colleagues were consulted: the Barbados Cabinet decided to support multilateral intervention in Grenada—but it hoped, like the OECS

[4] The defence and security of Montserrat is at present a United Kingdom responsibility. By a Declaration of Non-Participation of 1 March 1982, the Governor certified to the OECS that the island withheld its participation in respect of defence and security under that treaty.

[5] The Regional Security Coordinator was, and is, a Barbadian.

[6] At a low official level, the United States had come forward with an indication of the possibility of transport for such an operation.

states, that such a step would have the complete backing of all the members of Caricom.

This backing was not obtained. But the American Administration took the view that circumstances and its own interests demanded an intervention in force, in collaboration with OECS, Barbadian and Jamaican forces. From the point of view of all the Eastern Caribbean governments, and of public opinion in the islands (ascertained by opinion polls supervised by academics), the action was extremely successful and enjoyed overwhelming public support.[7]

The circumstances, a Marxist-Leninist government, ruling Grenada with such a large military establishment, which then turned, directed by an even more extreme ideological faction, and destroyed that government, can be deemed exceptional. The question of how to counter foreseeable, more likely threats to security in the area, by local forces at an appropriate level, and thus ensure the stability necessary for economic and social advance, is now being further examined by those responsible for defence and security in the islands. There is a possibility that a single Regional Defence Force will be established under united command. More likely, however, is an ever-increasing degree of cooperation between island defence and para-military forces.

The manner of the intervention by the United States has provided a precedent to which the islands can look if a perceived threat of such a magnitude occurs again, and it is reasonable to assume that the general safety of the islands from a clear external threat involving outside powers is now unequivocally an American concern. It is equally plain that such matters are now not within the present or future scope of the United Kingdom.[8]

The task of the security arrangements made between the islands to guard against threats of a lower scale is to be, as far as possible, preventative. Such a deterrent effect is enhanced if there is seen to be a force in being capable of responding to an appeal for help from properly constituted legal authority, or capable of the rescue of such authority when it is held under duress. An important precedent in such circumstances has flowed from the Grenada intervention; equally, the importance of contingency planning and close consultation before the actual appeal itself has been underlined.

Elements of great doubt which hovered over the Eastern Caribbean from the time when the islands first began to go independent have thus been significantly abated. The present Heads of Government have demonstrated very considerable political will and nerve as well as a resolve and unity of purpose. Such unanimity cannot be banked upon completely in the future, as governments and personalities change; but in national security questions there is likely to be a developing agreement of view..

The category of threat which is of most concern in the Eastern Caribbean is

[7] For a contrasting interpretation of the circumstances and the future impact of the operation, see Tony Thorndike, 'The Grenada crisis', *The World Today*, December 1983.

[8] Speaking at the Royal Commonwealth Society in London on 9 December, some weeks after the Grenada action, Mr J. M. G. M. ('Tom') Adams, the Prime Minister of Barbados, said that 1983 was the 'watershed year in which the influence of the United States, willy-nilly, came observably to replace that of Great Britain'.

that of an attempted coup d'etat, the overthrow of a member government by armed force. (This was a main concern of the states comprising the OECS over Grenada in 1983, and in 1979.)

Once elections are held in Grenada, all the OECS member-governments participating in the regional security arrangements with Barbados will be democratically elected, with very similar institutions. There will, thus, be a clear common perception of constitutional legitimacy and what is liable to constitute a threat to it.

Such a threat could come, as, for instance:

- An armed insurgency, perhaps by a small group of adherents of an opposition political party (46 members of the New Jewel Movement sufficed to overthrow the elected government of Grenada in 1979[9]).
- A mutiny in the army, or action by army personnel.
- Mercenaries working in conjunction with internal elements. The OECS Treaty is particularly concerned with the dangers from mercenaries; a palpable threat to Dominica from that quarter existed at the time of the Treaty's signature.
- An attempt to separate a smaller island from the national territory by armed force. It could be argued that this is what was done in the case of Anguilla in 1967. In the past, the people of Barbuda and of Nevis have spoken loudly of a desire for independence. In 1979, as has been noted, an attempt was made to seize Union Island, in the territory of St Vincent and the Grenadines.
- A coordinated series of insurgencies throughout the island chain must also be considered. This could be achieved only by groups with a strong ideological linkage, which in the context of the Eastern Caribbean in the foreseeable future could only be 'leftist' (these small groups are at the moment greatly in discredit with the public at large).

Typical scenarios which regional security planners will anticipate could include any one of those mentioned earlier, or a combination of them. Provision must be made against the seizure of an airfield or an airstrip (as happened at Union Island), or an attempt on, or the seizure of, government or defence or police headquarters (Dominica), and of the radio station (Grenada, 1979).

At what point regional rules of engagement—which already exist—would indicate a response, and the appropriate level of such a response, are matters necessarily known to very few.

At the highest level, however, a very fine degree of political judgement and calculation will be needed to work out the appropriate response to a situation short of outright insurgency. Some past elected governments in the Eastern Caribbean during the past five years overstepped the bounds of constitutional government as this is generally accepted in the Eastern Caribbean area. This

[9] In his *Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), for instance, Mr Hugh O'Shaughnessy seems to accept that Sir Eric Gairy's government was legitimately elected.

occurred in Grenada (under Eric Gairy), Dominica (under Patrick John and again under Oliver Seraphin) and in St Lucia in the final chaotic days of its Labour Party government in 1982.

The remedy in Dominica and in St Lucia was a united display of disapproval, determined non-cooperation and mass demonstration from all sections of society, though John's soldiers, who fortunately were few, caused several casualties in Dominica. The governments crumbled, and elections eventually brought to power the present, more constitutionally scrupulous, administrations.

In the circumstances of the Eastern Caribbean it should be noted that not merely a government but, perhaps at the same time, viewed from a different perspective, the population of an island may ardently desire an intervention by a regional force (or as in Grenada in 1983, and in Anguilla from 1967–9, forces from further afield). They may even act with such an objective in mind, though perhaps stopping short of actual armed insurgency.

The present political leaders of the Eastern Caribbean have during these last five years learned much: their joint judgement in the immediate foreseeable future at a time of crisis is likely to order an appropriate response. However, apart from Barbados, where there is a very stable two-party system (the opposition firmly supporting the government over the Grenada intervention), in the other islands the oppositions are now (with the exception of St Kitts) characterised by fragmentation, past disreputable associations, and a discouraging awareness that electoral support is not at present with them. All this, in democratic societies, could change fairly quickly.

At its present stage of development, therefore, regional security depends very much on the unity of purpose and identity of view among the Heads of Government and their mutual good relations (though a small 'brush-fire' amount of assistance could, of course, be offered on a bilateral basis from one state to another).

Personal qualities, by the very nature of these small island states, will always form a factor of the first importance. The advent of new, untried or ideologically hostile personalities into the councils of this Caribbean 'Congress System' could, quite conceivably, result in the deadlock and disagreement which have characterised Caricom in recent years.

This could be fatal, and could give rise again to the same situation which resulted from the coup d'etat of 1979 in Grenada. For, in the putting down of such unconstitutional acts to change an elected government, it is important that action be quick and decisive. The Prime Minister of Barbados, addressing Parliament after the Union Island intervention in December 1979, commented:

> 'In the last 12 years there have been four insurgencies in the English-speaking Caribbean aimed at toppling a national government, or, at least, separating a portion of national territory . . . only one of these four was put down summarily. . . The lesson is thus underlined that, in most coups, the

first 24 hours are decisive. Any policy of "wait and see" is a policy of "no assistance".'[10]

The Adams' doctrine of swift intervention accords with the old military adage that the force required is in inverse proportion to the time in which it can act. The forces at the disposal of regional military commanders are in any case small, and speed and mobility is therefore of the essence, both tactically and politically, for successful counter-insurgency deployment.

The situation calls for a secure method of immediate consultation between the Heads of Government; once intervention has been decided upon, then the small central planning organisation which exists in Barbados to accomplish the work of the Regional Security Organisation will become the central military staff.

Whether or not a formal joint Regional Defence Force is established, the procedure required is much the same. Owing to its greater size and sophistication, and the facilities available, the Barbados Defence Force must be considered as the 'central' or 'ear-marked' force available for action, though other defence and police forces hopefully would also have ear-marked units (though 'units' in the case of the smaller islands will literally mean individuals). Barbados has proved to be an excellent base for operations involving Grenada and St Vincent. It might also be useful to establish a sub-base in Antigua for counter-insurgency purposes in the northern section of the Eastern Caribbean island chain.

The most effective means of getting forces to the point of need amongst these scattered islands is by troop-carrying helicopters: their purchase and maintenance is, however, beyond the unaided financial resources of the states concerned. It remains to be seen whether the United States will assist in this direction. Without helicopters, however, providing an airfield or even an airstrip remains secure and free from flanking fire, there are plenty of small civil aircraft in the region, the availability of which should be ensured.

Barbados possesses a number of coastguard patrol vessels, and the Eastern Caribbean states, too, are acquiring such vessels. These ships, cheaper both to buy and to run than helicopters, would also have their part to play in force deployment.

The main purpose of these coastguard vessels is not a counter-insurgency one, and it should also be borne in mind that the preparedness of regional defence forces, in an area which is always at risk from hurricanes, and where other natural disasters are not infrequent, can have important advantages. It was along these lines, a relatively long time ago, that the region discussed the possibility of a long-term programme involving helicopter training with American equipment and personnel. This seems to be no further forward, and in any case the United States would not necessarily permit the use of such helicopters in any counter-insurgency action deemed necessary by regional states.

[10] Barbados House of Asembly, *Hansard*, 18 December 1979, p. 3168.

There is, however, in the gravest emergency, nowhere other than the United States for the islands to look for assistance. Britain will continue to provide assistance with police training which is greatly valued, but clearly the days of swift aid and intervention are over. France has the most powerful and best equipped forces in the region in Martinique and Guadeloupe, with helicopters and STOL aircraft carrying tracked vehicles. French intervention at the request of the governments of St Lucia or Dominica should by no means be ruled out—but the French, in doing this, would be wary, acting only if it were clearly in the interests of France to do so, and not as the surrogate of the United States.

It can be seen from all this that Eastern Caribbean defence cooperation is not new, but has been in train since 1979. The islands—particularly in the Leewards and Windwards—see themselves as having much in common. They share many institutions, including the higher judiciary and a central bank with a common currency. Barbados, though at a more advanced economic stage, is also seen as a member of the same family. Defence cooperation will further strengthen the links between all these states, and is likely to act as a reminder of the fundamental common interest when this, as will happen from time to time, is clouded by argument over political or economic issues.

Surinam and the Antilles: a new perspective

EMBERT HENDRICKSON

THE Netherlands Caribbean has recently moved closer to the maelstrom of world affairs. In an area already vexed by social and political upheaval, Surinam has experienced a military takeover while the Antilles face the prospect of Aruban separatism. Thus it is appropriate to examine the politics, parties, and leadership of these erstwhile European colonies in their new circumstances.

The background

A point of departure for any political consideration of the two states is a recognition of their fragmented politics and societies. In Surinam it is the outcome of a racial chasm between the two largest groups, Hindustani and Creole; whereas in the Antilles it is the result of the geography that separates the islands. With the realisation of self-rule and the concomitant political rewards, the factors of racial and island-oriented politics became more significant.[1] Such was the case after 1954 when Surinam and the Antilles attained local autonomy within a tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands.

From the constitutional reforms of 1954 to the end of the 1960s the two self-governing states enjoyed political continuity and stability.[2] In the election of 1954, the Democratic Party (DP) of Curaçao joined with the Aruban Patriotic Party (PPA) and the Democratic parties of Bonaire and the Windward Islands to fashion a durable coalition which ruled until 1969. The principal opposition parties were the National People's Party (NVP) of Curaçao and the Aruban People's Party (AVP). Since the larger Curaçao elected a majority of 12 members to the Staten (Parliament), its parties became the core of any coalition. From the remaining islands, 10 representatives were chosen: eight from Aruba, one from Bonaire, and one from the three Windward Islands combined.

During the period, both the DP and the NVP were plagued by internal dis-

[1] Surinam's multi-racial population of 370,000 is distributed as follows: Hindustani 36·9 per cent, Creole (African and Mixed) 30·7 per cent, Javanese 15·3 per cent, Bush Negro 10·2 per cent, Amerindian 2·6 per cent, and the remainder a mixture of European, Chinese and others. The Antillean islands are arranged into two groups of three islands each situated about 550 miles apart. One group, the Leewards, consists of Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire, and the second, the Windward group, of St Maarten (southern part), Saba, and St Eustacius. Approximately 64 per cent of the total population of 260,000 reside in Curaçao, while 25 per cent live in Aruba.

[2] For a historical discussion of both states, see Edward Dew, *The Difficult Flowering of Surinam: Ethnicity and Politics in a Plural Society* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), and William Anderson and Russell R. Dynes, *Social Movements Violence and Change: The May Movement in Curaçao* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975).

The author, a specialist in Caribbean affairs, is Professor of History at San José State University in California.

sension, which reflected the unrest prevalent on the island. The younger members of the parties, who were often the more liberal, frequently challenged the old guard for leadership. Within the DP, black Antilleans charged that they were largely ignored in key party decisions. Both parties espoused essentially conservative programmes, despite their appeals to lower classes and labour organisations for votes. Labour had become restive as a result of declining employment and the dismissal of many after the reorganisation of the petroleum industry in Curaçao and Aruba. Automation and a further rationalisation of the refining process ended the rapid growth of job opportunities which had started in the 1920s when the refineries were established. The outcome was to weaken local economies, hasten social discord, and contribute to an outburst of protest and violence in Willemstad during 30–31 May 1969 that caused millions of dollars in property damage. The so-called May Movement, consisting of a violent phase of two days and a succeeding one of social change, brought about the immediate collapse of the long-standing DP bloc, the formation of new political groups, and the recasting of Curaçao's two main parties.

Likewise in Surinam, a single majority coalition controlled the government during the earliest years of local autonomy, in this instance from 1958 to 1967. Creole leader, Johan Pengel, who had emerged as the dominant figure in the Surinam National Party (NPS), and his Hindustani counterpart, Jaggernath Lachmon of the United Hindustani Party (VHP), forged an inter-racial populist alliance in the name of ethnic ***verbroedering***. The two political rivals had made great sacrifices to each other in order to reach an accord, and their personal relationship was genuinely warm for many years.[3]

The end of *verbroedering*

The years of the ***verbroedering*** marked the longest era of political stability that Surinam has experienced since attaining self-rule. Political harmony resulted from the sharing of governmental offices by the NPS and VHP, who enjoyed the support from a majority of Creoles and Hindustanis respectively, and from a vigorous economy receiving Dutch financial assistance and new investment in the bauxite industry. But it failed to last. During the period, election by proportional representation, which tended to encourage splinter parties, was established in all districts with more than two representatives. The practice of winner-take-all did not represent the popular vote and, in particular, had worked to the advantage of the NPS in the largest district, Paramaribo. Also, by 1967, racial tensions and distrust at the grass-roots level spread to the government. The VHP began to demand a greater share of patronage so that, in the election of 1967, the NPS joined instead with a splinter party from the VHP. Thus the ***verbroedering*** of the two largest parties was terminated.

The May riots in Curaçao and the collapse of ethnic ***verbroedering*** in Surinam produced new political alliances fashioned by the principal parties in

[3] Dew, *The Difficult Flowering*, p. 103.

order to restore the earlier stability. But their successes were short-lived. For the Antilles, two opposing coalitions, established only after considerable negotiation and compromise, each governed during the 1969–77 period. In forming the first one in 1969, the DP had to accept a Premier from the PPA and the newly formed labour fronts from Curaçao and Bonaire. Four years later, the DP's 20-year dominance ended as leadership shifted to the opposition NVP, renamed the NVP-U following its alliance with a splinter group. The new NVP-U government included members from the two labour fronts and a new Aruban party, the People's Electoral Movement (MEP). The latter not only controlled the majority of Aruba's seats but, more important, raised the spectre of Aruban separation from the federation.

Advanced by the MEP and its leader, Betico Croes, the separatist movement had evolved out of a historical sense of isolation, racial differences, and a general resentment of domination by Curaçao. Its proponents became more vocal when they concluded that Aruban economic potentialities were as great or greater in an independent status.[4]

To transcend Surinam's Creole-Hindustani split, the NPS and the VHP from 1967 to 1973 allied with a smaller party from the rival's ethnic group each time they formed the government. However, this strategy proved unsatisfactory. Part of the problem was the considerable labour strife and general unrest of these years which caused the fall of the NPS government in 1969 and severely crippled the successor VHP coalition. Failure to revive even the façade of *verbroedering* produced, in the election of 1973, a degree of Creole–Hindustani polarisation unmatched since the attainment of self-government some 25 years earlier. In preparing for the campaign, the NPS had formed the National Party Alliance (NPK), a pact of three Creole parties and one Javanese. Its rival, the VHP, sought to disprove allegations of racism by forming a new political bloc and renaming the party. The outcome favoured the NPK, which captured a majority of 22 seats out of 39, thus enabling the Creoles and their leader, Henck Arron, to return to power. There were no Hindustanis in the government or Creoles in the opposition. Surinam had finally succumbed to a racial separation similar to that which had convulsed neighbouring Guyana.[5]

Since the mid-1970s, instability coupled with uncertainty have become the watchwords in the political evolution of both states. A swing back to the right characterised the election of 1977 in the Antilles, when the DP returned to its earlier domination of the coalition. The campaign had occurred amidst controversy due to the growing nationalist spirit, talk of independence, the Aruban separatist movement, and the emergence in Curaçao of the reformist New Antillean Movement (MAN) to challenge the two traditional parties. The new Premier, Sylvius Rozendal, a younger DP black leader, presided over an alliance consisting of the NVP-U, PPA, and single members from Bonaire and

[4] Interview with Betico Croes, 'An Independent Aruba', *Caribbean and West Indies Chronicle*, July 1980, pp. 19, 27.

[5] For a discussion of racial politics in Guyana at a comparable time see Embert Hendrickson, 'New directions in Republican Guyana', *The World Today*, January 1971, pp. 33–9.

the Windwards. But circumstances dictated a short tenure for Rozendal. I 1979, he called for a new election in order to defuse the tension caused by strike of civil servants and to secure a popular mandate for his economic pro posals. His appeal, however, was rebuffed as the electorate favoured a shift to a first-time MAN–MEP coalition.[6] In perspective, Rozendal's brief regime was only the first of the short-lived governments which have characterised the Antilles since 1977.

The new government brought together the unlikely union of the separatist MEP and the reformist MAN whose leader, Donald Martina, became the Premier. Predictably, the MEP soon withdrew, compelling the Premier in January 1982 to call for new elections. Although he retained the Premiership, Martina's new bloc of parties still held only a narrow majority in the Staten.[7]

The present instability of Antillean governments stems largely from the system of multiple-parties. They are the product of the predisposition to organise parties on an island basis, the election of members to the Staten by proportional representation and the emergence in recent years of new, divisive forces and issues. Usually coalitions have combined one party from Curaçao, one from Aruba, and occasionally, the single members from Bonaire and the Windward Islands. However, the backbone and the largest party is from Curaçao, at present either the long-standing DP or NVP-U, or the more recently organised MAN. One way to understand the politics of the Antilles is to envision it as a continuing process of trying to establish and maintain a working majority in the Staten.

For Surinam, the question of independence during the 1970s served increasingly as both a dominant and a divisive issue. Under its Premier, Henck Arron, the NPK pressed for independence in disregard of the feelings of Hindustanis who feared economic and political repression from a Creole-dominated government. As a consequence, large numbers left for the Netherlands. Although migration had already become a serious problem, the rate of departure climbed steadily after the election of 1973. As a precondition for his support of independence, VHP leader Lachmon argued that Surinam must first be economically self-sufficient. Among his other demands were two which stipulated that the Surinam army be composed of all ethnic groups and that new elections be held within a reasonable time.

Despite the controversy, independence was not to be delayed. The Hague had insisted that any golden handshake depended upon the opposition's acceptance of the final terms of independence. So, Arron and Lachmon finally agreed upon a constitution and managed an uneasy embrace on that historical moment in November 1975.[8] But the post-independence euphoria was short-lived. Although the NPK retained its majority after the election of 1977

[6] *Caribbean Contact* (Barbados), September 1977 and July 1979.

[7] *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean* (hereafter LARRC), 10 December 1982 and 13 May 1983; *Antilliaanse Nieuwsbrief*, 29 January 1982.

[8] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 9 January 1976, No. 27515; *The Economist*, 29 November 1975, p. 63.

through a reshuffling of parties in its combination, within a short time it was compelled to advance the date of the next election by one year to March 1980 in order to preserve its majority in the government.

The military takeover

Surinam's second election since independence never took place. In February 1980, to the shock of its population and foreign observers, a military coup, under the leadership of 16 non-commissioned army officers, easily toppled Arron's beleaguered government. That the NCOs wanted 'a union but ended up with a country' is only part of the explanation.[9] First, the role of the newly established armed forces in an independent nation was ill-defined. They had not assimilated the rules and practices of the Surinam political system and since several of the sergeants in the 'Group of 16' had returned from service in the Netherlands, where trade unions were recognised, a clash was to be expected. Second, the year-long dispute about unionisation, which reached its climax in February when three NCOs were charged with mutiny, was mishandled by Arron. Finally, there existed an increasing dissatisfaction with the government's social and economic policies. It was aggravated by a series of political crises and allegations that Ministers had misused their powers for personal and political advantage. So it is understandable that there was no immediate outcry when the National Military Council (NMC) was established as the government. While it may appear that the coup was an unplanned reaction by frustrated sergeants, there is evidence that it may have been plotted for over a year.[10]

Hampered by political naivety and a lack of ideological consensus, the NMC turned initially to those civilian groups it thought to have been sympathetic during the struggle against the Arron government. These were, principally, the radical trade unions and the Nationalist Republic Party (PNR). The new government, multi-racial in membership, centrist in ideology, and composed of technocrats, was established in March. PNR sympathiser, Dr Henk Chin A Sen, became Prime Minister and the new Administration soon outlined a reformist programme. Instead, what followed up to the end of 1982 was a regime dominated by military figures and embroiled in various crises caused by an internal struggle for power, frequent changing of its civilian leadership, confrontation by at least four counter-coups, and opportunistic and wavering political policies.

By August 1980, Sergeant Desi Bouterse had emerged as the dominant figure in the regime. As part of his consolidation of power, Sergeant Badressein Sital and other leftist military leaders were jailed, the Constitution was suspended, and the offices of President and Prime Minister were combined in

[9] Rob Kroes, 'The Small-Town Coup: the NCO Political Intervention in Surinam', *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1982, pp. 115–20.

[10] Sandew Hira, 'Class Formation and Class Struggle in Suriname: the Background and Development of the Coup d'Etat', in Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen, eds., *Crisis in the Caribbean* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), pp. 182–4.

the person of Chin A Sen. The following March, those soldiers in custody were released in the first of a series of manoeuvres which represented a tactical move to the left.[11]

The year 1982 confronted the 'Sergeant's Revolution', now personified in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Bouterse, with its severest test. In February, Chin A Sen was dismissed after a political showdown with Bouterse over the latter's resistance to the adoption of a new Constitution. Then, in March, an abortive counter-coup resulted in the summary execution of its ringleader. This further disturbed the uneasy calm of the nation. Threats by the Netherlands to suspend its financial assistance may have persuaded Bouterse to form another moderate civilian government headed by banker Henry Nyhorst and including several members from the previous Administration. New resistance in the late summer ultimately placed Bouterse at the crossroads. Critics of his regime included such articulate groups as the media, clergymen, the university community, and the largest labour federation, the *Moederbond*. In October, during the visit of Grenada's Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, demonstrations reached new heights and embarrassingly incapacitated the nation. After an interval for reflection, Bouterse ruthlessly countered the challenges to his authority with the arrest and summary execution in December of 15 opposition leaders and in January of his closest ally, Roy Horb.

The reaction, locally and abroad, raised new problems for the military regime. The bloody purge had severely tarnished its image abroad, and locally had driven off all but the most radical supporters. Nyhorst resigned and was replaced in March 1983 by Erroll Alibox, a politician associated with a small leftist party. However, opposition to price and tax increases caused the fall in January 1984 of the fourth Cabinet since the coup.[12] Abroad, Surinam exile groups, including Chin A Sen, now became bolder in their opposition. Another outcome of the December 1982 massacre was the suspension of financial support from the Netherlands and the United States, thus denying the government important sources of revenue. It was later revealed that at that time the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had devised a plan, subsequently rejected by the Congress, to oust the regime. The Reagan Administration saw Bouterse as a capricious leader with pro-Communist sympathies.[13]

Throughout the first half of 1983, Surinam's international and ideological policy veered between Cuba and the west. A newcomer, Brazil, assumed a more active role in its relations with the unpredictable Bouterse. Fearful of possible Cuban influence on its borders (and perhaps with some prodding from the United States), Brazil offered a modest amount of economic and military assistance. Its assessment of Surinam concluded that Bouterse was not an ideological leftist but a pragmatist who sought only political power. In seeking new alternatives for a deteriorating economy, Bouterse accepted

[11] *LARRC*, 27 March 1981. [12] *New York Times*, 10 January 1984.

[13] *ibid.*, 1 June 1983. During 1982–3, the United States made three unsuccessful covert attempts to overthrow the Bouterse regime, according to a study by Tom Gervasi, director of Centre for Military Research and Analysis, cited in *Harpers*, April 1984, pp. 17–18.

Brazilian aid.[14] His edging to the west became more apparent when he purged the Cabinet of its most pro-Cuban members, including Sital, who was exiled to Cuba, and he persuaded the NPS, which he had ousted in 1980, to try to negotiate a resumption of Dutch financial assistance. But NPS talks with The Hague foundered because of the latter's insistence upon a return to democracy.

In October 1983, after the murder of Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada, and the invasion of Grenada by the United States, Bouterse expelled the Cuban representative and his delegation. While it looked as if the decision on the Cubans was prompted by the events in Grenada, it was probably linked with the earlier shift to the west now hastened by Bishop's death. Despite overtures to the west, Bouterse still maintained that internationally Surinam was non-aligned. His zig-left, zag-right politics become understandable when they are seen as part of his attempt to stay in power. In the opinion of one observer, the more he switches 'the more he stays the same'.[15]

The economic scene

Any study of the political trends cannot be sharply divorced from questions of economics. The per capita income of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles is among the highest in the greater Caribbean, but there has been little economic growth in recent years and the outlook is not promising. Indeed, the recession among western nations has had a severe impact on the local economies. In Surinam, exports of bauxite products, rice and shrimp have fallen, causing a severe reduction in exchange reserves, an increase in the nation's budget deficit, and a decline in the gross domestic product (gdp). Bauxite revenues have slumped from the year 1980, when they made up about 20 per cent of government revenue and accounted for 80 per cent of the value of all exports. The Bouterse regime is fully aware of bauxite's importance and has sought satisfactory relations with the foreign-owned bauxite companies. But its future is uncertain because of a declining international market, rising production costs, the shortage of new investment capital[16] and the loss of Dutch financial assistance in the wake of the massacres of December 1982.

The oil industry in Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire and tourism in the former two islands and St Maarten have both declined in recent years. During the 1970s, oil revenues provided 40 per cent of the gdp compared with 15 per cent at present. Shell's Curaçao refinery is operating at 50 per cent capacity and suffers from the current recession, competition, over-supply and high labour costs. It has been suggested that Venezuela, the principal supplier of crude oil for the refineries, may acquire partial ownership so as to provide more stability. But the recession in Venezuela has not only curtailed its investments

[14] *Latin American Index*, 1 November 1983; *LARRC*, 13 May 1983.

[15] Edward Dew, 'Did Surinam Switch?', *Caribbean Review*, Fall 1983, pp. 29–30; Clifford Kraus, 'Surinam Zigs Left, Zags Right', *The Nation*, 11 February 1984, pp. 153–8.

[16] *Quarterly Economic Review of Venezuela, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1983), Annual Supplement, pp. 31–3.

but also discouraged tourism to Curaçao. The tourist industry, more labour-intensive than oil, contributed about 16 per cent to the gdp but, like oil, is unpredictable because of its dependence upon other states. The Netherlands also gives financial aid to the Antillean economy. Less publicised are the offshore banking and financial activities, a source of both revenue and employment. Although statistics are limited, a recent outside study has been more explicit and positive in its assessment than Antillean authorities could have expected. Yet such promise is threatened by a tightening of tax regulations in the Netherlands and the United States.[17] Like most Caribbean micro-states, Surinam and the Antilles are distressingly dependent upon outside forces and nations.

The political outlook

One of the formidable headaches for Bouterse's revolution in Surinam is the establishment of a power base. Toward this objective, he has talked about the formation of a new official party to serve the masses. In June 1983, Bouterse established the United February 25 Movement, a quasi-political party with military leadership, but then on the anniversary of independence he proclaimed the Stanvaste Unity Movement. Apparently, the date of the military coup was now felt to hold insufficient emotional power. Bouterse picked up some backing in the rural areas, but his political base became even more tenuous in early 1984 after a stand-off with striking bauxite workers who had gained the support of much of the population.[18] The issue of his arbitrary politics now overshadows the historical political rivalry between the Creoles and the Hindustanis, although the military group in power relies more on the former than the latter for support. The salient question is how long will the highly literate population of Surinam tolerate a regime which has subverted its representative government, lacks any significant popular base, and has neither devised a legislative programme nor indicated any consistent political goals. From nearby areas, exile and mercenary groups actively plot to oust the Bouterse forces.

In the Antilles, the prospect of independence has accentuated differences between local leaders. For the most part, The Hague favours granting independence to all six islands in a single state as they are at present. But a Kingdom commission has recently proposed separate status for Aruba, a plan opposed by Curaçao federalists who include Premier Martina and insist that economic viability would be severely impaired without Aruba.

As The Hague dismantles its colonial obligations in the Caribbean, greater tasks and responsibilities devolve upon Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Their future as nation-states depends on whether they will be resolved prudently and successfully.

[17] *Quarterly Economic Review of Venezuela, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles*, No. 1, 1983, p. 25; 'Venezuela and the USA take Active Interest in the Netherlands Antilles', *Antillen Review*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 5–7.

[18] Dew, 'Did Surinam Switch?', pp. 29–30; *San José Mercury News* (California), 10 and 13 January 1984.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

ılf war and the littoral states

FARLEY

has been much in ... recently. It has sometimes been he forgotten war' by Arabs who live within its shadow. It has , they argue, by both the superpowers and western Europe, only inently in the western press when threats arise to the latter's ne such occasion was in September and October 1983 when ndard aircraft to Iraq, and Iran threatened to close the Hormuz ', in April and May of this year, was the start of a series of attacks by both belligerent powers, in the one case interdicting Iran's in the other the Saudi and Kuwaiti ports from which Iraq had . These moves by Iraq against Kharg and by Iran against the threaten the existence of this whole inland sea as a commercial nal waterway, and give rise to the possibility of external inter- ure that it remains open. Hitherto, however, the political and ts of the Gulf war on the world at large have been marginal ay change). Much more significant have been its effects on the Middle East generally.

tbreak in September 1980, the Gulf war has increasingly politics of the Middle East. Arab countries as close to the area of and Jordan and as remote from it as Libya and Morocco have d inter-Arab relations have largely manifested themselves in the this issue. The littoral states of the Gulf, however, clearly have n the war, as its outcome is likely to affect them directly. This examine the principal implications which the Gulf war has— -for the various littoral states.

t formally started the war on 22 September 1980 by crossing ab and invading the Iranian province of Khuzistan. It believed g, it would engender so much confusion and demoralisation in hat the regime of the holy men would be toppled within a mat- l a new one come to power less overweening and threatening in cy outlook. Instead, the opposite happened. The rather un- Teheran, which might well have succumbed to internal pres- self, was able to galvanise the country against the Iraqi invasion litical capital out of it. The shortcomings and oppressions of ere for the time being forgotten, as Iran girded its loins against hbour. After initial military successes in the period from Sep- September 1981, the Iraqi military thrust was halted and the fined to the border areas—where it has since remained. One

rincipal Lecturer in the Department of History and International Affairs at the e, Greenwich. He visited the Gulf area earlier this year. The views he expresses

grave political miscalculation on the part of President Saddam Hussein of Ira was to suppose that the predominantly Arabic-speaking peoples of Khuzista would rise against Khomeini, once Iraq had invaded. That this did not happe was due to the underlying hostility which has always existed in this region be tween Arab and Persian, irrespective of the linguistic factor: Saddam Hussein' underestimation of the strength of this hostility has been of the utmost conse quence, in that the failure of the regime in Teheran to collapse on schedule ha since involved Iraq in a war of attrition, which it has been hard put to sustain Although its army is rather larger than Iran's,[1] it is less competently led[2] an certainly less fanatical. The holy men have, by contrast, been prepared to whi up the youth of Iran to a state of willingness to die on the battlefield in a *jiha* against Iraq unwitnessed since the fall of the Japanese empire in 1945. Often a the cost of their lives, young teenage soldiers discover a passage through th Iraqi minefields, and the Iranian infantry then attack in waves across groun they know is safe. Against these waves, the thinly-stretched Iraqis have n assured defence and can often only retreat. To its rear, Iraq has another enem in the shape of Syria whose leader, President Assad, has dealt Iraq a body-blo by cutting the oil-pipeline which runs through Syria to the Mediterranean an through which Iraq has hitherto exported most of its oil. Thus Iraq is unable t sell the bulk of the oil it produces and has to rely on the smaller pipeline run ning through Turkey to the Mediterranean.[3]

The second littoral state is, of course, Iran. It might be argued that, as Ira was attacked by Iraq in September 1980, the war was not its responsibility This is, however, to ignore the considerable provocation it offered to Iraq dur ing the immediately preceding months. In April 1980, a bomb attempt wa made on the life of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, as he wa visiting Wustansariya University in Baghdad. It failed in its objective, but number of people were killed. A few days later, their funeral processions wer also attacked. Subsequently, members of Iraq's Shia community were im plicated and Iranian complicity in these crimes alleged. Before long, Iranian living and working in Iraq were being denied work permits and expelled fror the country. Tension between the two governments rose dramatically durin the summer and on 4 September 1980 Iran started, without warning, to shel Iraqi border villages: its failure to desist prompted Iraq's massive interventior of 22 September.

The Wustansariya incident was the symptom rather than the cause of Iraqi Iranian friction. The two regimes had little in common and their respectiv leaders had old scores to settle even as 1980 dawned. Ayatollah Khomeini exiled from Iran by the Shah early in the 1960s, had taken up residence in Iraq

[1] The Iraqi army numbers 300,000, the Iranian 150,000. Each possesses a high reserve element *Military Balance, 1982/83* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983).

[2] There is some evidence that the Iraqi military leadership is so closely monitored and controlle by the ruling Baath Socialist Party that it is inhibited from taking positive professional decisions lest it fall foul of the political leadership.

[3] Iraq's oil sales are now down to 800,000 barrels per day, as distinct from 2,400,000 b/d at th start of the war.

but in 1975 was expelled by Baghdad as part of the treaty whereby agreement was reached over navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. Saddam Hussein had been instrumental in negotiating this treaty. Khomeini had neither forgiven nor forgotten that. The regimes also differed in character: though both Islamic, Iraq's was of Sunni persuasion and Iran's of Shia. Iraq's comparatively eclectic interpretation of the Koran—with its more liberal legal code—was excoriated by Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini advocated an interpretation infinitely more rigorous and a legal code infinitely more constrictive, with bans on alcohol, western pop music, night clubs, and curbs on women working or wearing makeup or short skirts. To him, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was an apostate state which, having forsaken the true precepts of Islam, needed to be led back onto the paths of righteousness and true holiness. Khomeini therefore saw it as his political and religious duty to try to unseat the Baghdad regime and replace it with one which would be Shia-dominated, favourably disposed towards his brand of Islam and susceptible to Iranian pressure. To this end, Khomeini unleashed late in 1979 and early in 1980 a stream of propaganda against Saddam Hussein, directed primarily at the Shia community of southern Iraq who make up some 55 per cent of the country's population.[4] Khomeini believed that there existed much grass-roots discontent among the Shia with the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein and that such a propaganda campaign would achieve the desired effect.

This, too, proved a miscalculation. The Iraqi Shia were not nearly as discontented as Khomeini believed: indeed, they were a reasonably quiescent and placid people. During the 1970s they had been very much the beneficiaries of development schemes, which massive oil revenues had been able to sustain, and their general standard of living had risen considerably. Provided that they did not meddle in politics, Baghdad did not make undue demands of them and so, when Khomeini unleashed his campaign of subversion, he found his co-religionists not only unreceptive but unenthusiastic about the possibility of receiving mullahs' rule and all which that implied. Though Shias, they were still Arabs and did not want to be ruled by Persians.[5] Despite the relative failure of Khomeini's campaign, Saddam Hussein felt intensely threatened by it as 1980 advanced, and feared that unless he moved decisively against Iran, its attempts at destabilising his government would ultimately be successful. His invasion of Iran, however misconceived, however unjustified in political or moral terms, must be seen in this light. It was a pre-emptive war which went badly wrong and which perforce continues, Iran being unwilling to end it on terms acceptable to Iraq.[6]

If the outcome of the Gulf war is crucial for the two combatants, it is only slightly less so for their neighbours on the Gulf's southern shore—Kuwait,

[4] The Sunnis make up 23 per cent, Christians 18 per cent, Kurds 4 per cent.

[5] The importance of the nationalist factor in this whole conflict has gone unappreciated by both leaders, each believing that the religious and the linguistic factor would be decisive.

[6] Iran has demanded the deposition of the Saddam regime and payment of reparations as a pre-condition of negotiations.

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. There is a certain communality of feeling between these countries (which with Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates make up the Gulf Cooperation Council). This communality of feeling will be analysed later, but the GCC, established in May 1981, is perhaps its most important manifestation. Whilst the various members emphasise the GCC's economic dimension, its security function, with the Gulf war still unresolved, is probably of greater importance.

Of these GCC countries, Kuwait is geographically closest to the area of conflict. Since independence in 1961, it has grown exceedingly affluent on oil revenues. Its oil deposits are projected to last into the twenty-second century. Its relations with Iraq have never been easy: in 1961, the latter laid claim to the whole of Kuwait's territory and was only dissuaded from pursuing this claim by a British military guarantee to Kuwait. Since then Iraq has cast envious eyes on its wealth, and disapproving ones on its non-republican regime, and has not formally renounced its claim to Kuwait and its offshore islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. However, after the Iranian revolution of 1978–9, Iraq ceased to be Kuwait's main foreign policy preoccupation. It soon became clear that Ayatollah Khomeini's accession to power in Iran posed a threat to traditional Sunni regimes generally. When the Gulf war broke out in 1980, Kuwait felt a distinct empathy with Iraq, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein had started the conflict, and gave Iraq substantial subventions once it became clear, as it did by September 1981, that the war might go against Iraq. Kuwait also made available its port at Shawik for the transmission of munitions to Iraq, earning much foreign exchange in the process, though incurring also the bitter resentment of the Ayatollah.

The reasons for Kuwait's disquiet are not far to seek.[7] An Iranian military thrust cutting the Baghdad–Basra road would isolate the Iraqi army in the south from its supply lines and lead to Iranian domination of the west bank of the Shatt-al-Arab and possibly even of most of southern Iraq. This poses the question of the loyalty of Kuwait's Shia community, who make up a quarter of the country's population and who tend, in economic terms, to be less affluent than their Sunni counterparts. While they have not been actively dissentient against the government of Sheikh Jabir-al-Ahmad, this might change if Iranian troops were actually on Kuwait's northern border and, indeed, the temptation for the Ayatollah to stir up the Shia in these circumstances would probably be irresistible. The Sunni–Shia cleft, always important in Kuwaiti society, has in the last three years become more marked as a result of the Iraq–Iran war and people feel the need to make their allegiance clear in a way they would have deemed unnecessary during the 1970s. This heightened tension was manifested in the bomb explosions of 12 December 1983 both at Kuwait airport and at the American and French Embassies, in which members of an extremist Shia movement, the al-Dawa al Islamiya, acting with Iranian backing, were subsequently implicated.

[7] It had already sustained a direct Iranian bombing attack on its oil centres (in the autumn of 1982).

In Bahrain, the Sunni regime of Sheikh Khalifa shares similar preoccupa-
ions. Here, the Shia community is noticeably larger than in Kuwait, number-
ng some 55 per cent of the island's population, and there is an element of
ympathy for Islamic fundamentalism and for Iranian ideals.[8] Nevertheless,
Khomeini has protested his benevolence in recent years towards this island-
tate: various goodwill visits have at intervals been made by Iranian ministers,
who stress that Iran has no intention of reviving the old claims to Bahrain made
y the Shah in the early 1970s. The Khalifa government is suspicious of these
rotestations but receives them urbanely, whilst continuing to give what help
: can to Iraq by way of the GCC. However, as one of the poorer states[9] of the
Gulf, it is not in a position to give as much as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, though
: has used its experience as one of the more politically experienced littoral
tates to work for a strategic consensus on the war between Qatar, the UAE and
)man, and to act as broker for the interests of these smaller states with Saudi
Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is by far the most important of the southern littoral states. By
s very economic strength it dominates the GCC, though this dominance is
acitly resented by Bahrain and rather less tacitly by Kuwait. But, over security,
here is an almost complete identity of views: Saudi Arabia is, like the smaller
tates, exceedingly worried about the ambitions of Khomeini's Iran. Whilst
here has been a history of friction between Iran and the Southern Gulf, the
laims of the Shah only related to specific territories like Bahrain and the
'unmb Islands. They were not, like Khomeini's blasts, directed at the whole
ystem of traditional rule. The Islamic Republic of Iran sees itself as a revolu-
onary state, which is therefore duty-bound to cleanse the Middle East's
Augean stables, starting in the Gulf but working gradually westwards. The
arallels between Trotsky and Khomeini in this connection are strong: in the
atter's eyes, all these states are degenerate and ripe for revolution. After Iraq,
is the kingdom of Saudi Arabia which Khomeini most reviles, first, because
is a monarchy, second, because the regime is Sunni, third, because it has op-
osed Iran's price proposals within Opec and, fourth, because it has a close
olitical and strategic relationship with the United States. It is this last factor
'hich is probably the principal determinant of Iran's attitude. How can any
Arab state with the interests of the Palestinians genuinely at heart enter into
ich a relationship with Israel's closest ally? Iran regards itself, along with
ibya and Syria, as being in the forefront of the struggle for Palestine and con-
ders any Arab state entering into bilateral deals with the United States as
etracting from that struggle and guilty of the worst kind of treachery.

Saudi Arabia understands this only too well and has placed its substantial
conomic weight behind the Iraqi war effort. Together with the other GCC
ountries it has assisted Iraq to the tune of $20 billion, itself furnishing the
on's share of this. Saudi Arabia is, above all, anxious that Iran should not
revail in the Gulf war: a vanquished Iraq would leave it directly threatened

[8] This was evidenced by an abortive revolt against the Khalifa government in December 1981.
[9] Its oil supplies are likely to last only another 15–20 years.

by the Ayatollah on its northern frontier, threatened less in a military than in a political and psychological sense. As in Kuwait, an Iranian victory could stir up feeling in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces among the Shia who, some argue, have traditionally been treated by Riyadh as second-class citizens. For all these reasons, Saudi Arabia sees its strategic frontier as lying on the Shatt-al-Arab: it does, however, seek an early end to the war, partly because it fears it may spill over and affect it directly, and partly because it does not wish to go on paying massive subsidies to Iraq.[10] A peaceful stalemate with both powers exhausted indefinitely would probably suit it best, though the chances of this happening remain slim unless Iran's recent losses persuade it, against past trends, to come to the conference table with terms for ending the war which Iraq could accept. It must not be forgotten that Iran sees its struggle with Iraq as much in ideological as in territorial terms and regards massive manpower losses among its youth as a sad, but acceptable, price to pay for its maximalist objectives. Saudi Arabia, like Iraq, lacks the crusading zeal of Iran; unlike Iraq, it lacks also strong and well-trained armed forces; better, therefore, for it to assist Iraq financially by breaking Khomeini in the marshes of the Shatt-al-Arab before he approaches the kingdom of the House of Saud.

These, then, are some of the implications for the littoral states of the Gulf. Is it possible to draw up some kind of balance sheet? It is, though without any high degree of exactitude, given the present state of the Iran–Iraq war. Certain conclusions, however, suggest themselves.

First, Islamic fundamentalism. This seems to have become a permanent feature of the area and will remain so, unless Iraq succeeds in defeating Iran outright. The extent of the fundamentalist appeal is difficult to gauge: certainly the Shia of southern Iraq were not swayed by Khomeini's blandishments in the months immediately prior to the war, but they had admittedly been sweetened by Saddam Hussein with development projects and given something of an economic stake in the system. The attitude of the Kuwaiti Shia is less predictable: they have not been similarly sweetened and remain to an extent deprived. Any notable Iranian military success of the kind earlier described might have the effect of turning them against the present Kuwaiti regime. Evidence of current Iranian attempts to subvert it is by no means lacking. A successful Iranian move against the independence of Kuwait would have major consequences for the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council in political, economic and strategic terms. Both Amir Khalifa of Bahrain and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia might then have to counter dissidence emanating from their own Shia and encouraged by Khomeini.

Second, the Gulf Cooperation Council itself. Its members increasingly view it as an alliance for their mutual security rather than as a vehicle for their joint economic and social development. Conceivably, its setting up in 1981 was accelerated by the manifest failure of Iraq, even at that stage, to topple the regime in Iran. The concern of the GCC countries has since proved well

[10] The decline in Saudi Arabia's balance-of-trade surplus from $30 bn to $3 bn over 1982–3 has made it distinctly more onerous for it to continue support for Iraq.

founded and their financial support of the Iraqi war effort, massive by any standards, has only succeeded in containing, not halting, Iranian military power. Nor is the GCC really credible as a military alliance. Their armed forces combined are about half those of Iran and there is no unified command structure. Despite their professions of 'non-alignment', each country has strong bilateral links with outside powers in regard to munitions supplies, manpower and training: Oman with Britain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with the United States. Arms procurement would be unlikely to be well coordinated in the event of an emergency and there would be little in the way of a common pattern of training. At root, these countries rely on these external powers for their defence rather than upon one another, however much they may keep this reliance discreet and under wraps. Basically, the United States is the power relied upon, and its recent withdrawal from the peacekeeping process in Lebanon has done little to enhance its reputation as an ally. The states of the GCC may, in the event of a strategic threat from Iran, find it more expedient to come to some accommodation with Ayatollah Khomeini than to rely upon the steadfastness of President Reagan. Kuwait's position is crucial here, for if its regime collapsed, not only would the GCC lose one of its richest members, but Iran would be able to pose a direct political and religious threat to Saudi Arabia, itself the cornerstone of the GCC.

Third, and last, the belligerent powers. The almost indefinite prolongation of the war has resulted in great losses for both sides in material and manpower terms as well as enormous human suffering. There is some evidence that this combination of material and human loss is having graver effects on Iraq than Iran: the precise position about Iraqi use of gas and chemical warfare remains to be ascertained, but it is unlikely that it would resort to these weapons unless compelled absolutely by its military situation to do so. Allegations against Iraq on this issue have been made and not denied.[11] Suspicion that it has done so lowers its reputation in the world generally, though this probably weighs little in the balance when set against the direct threat which Iran poses to it. Its role in the Non-Aligned Movement is diminished, as a result of the changed venue of the Seventh Conference from Baghdad in 1982 to New Delhi in 1983. Finally, nearly every Iraqi household has suffered a member killed, wounded or taken prisoner in the war, and the hopelessness of the struggle is beginning to make itself felt amongst the mass of Iraqis. If Saddam Hussein continues to gloss over this grass-roots feeling, he will do so at his own and the Baath Party's political peril. Whilst GCC subsidies have helped him sustain the war, they can in no way protect him against threats from within.

Iran remains, in this conflict, something of an enigma. The losses it has sustained have been enormous, but it retains the initiative, having pushed the Iraqis back from Abadan in the autumn of 1982 and now fighting Iraq on its own soil. Iran remains apparently impervious to foreign influences of any kind: neither superpower has the slightest control over its policy and attempts

[11]See report in *Le Monde* by Jean Gueyras, as quoted in the *Guardian Weekly*, 18 March 1984.

by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organisation and the GCC to mediate in the war have come to nothing. The holy men appear to view the continuation of the war with equanimity, Iranian manpower losses notwithstanding, believing that in the end Iraq will succumb.[12] If the Saddam Hussein regime were to collapse and be replaced with one either sympathetic to Iran or susceptible to its pressure, the way would lie open to Kuwait and the other states of the Southern Gulf. Beyond these lie the conservative states of the Middle East heartland, Jordan and Egypt, both ruled by Sunnis, both committed to Iraq and both having strong links with the west. Beyond these lies the state of Israel, to the destruction of which the Ayatollah has personally pledged himself. Only when this pledge is fulfilled will he be likely to rest his case.

[12] Throughout the war, Iranian oil sales, unlike those of Iraq, have continued at a high level, so foreign exchange has not been a problem.

The struggle for Afghanistan

ANTHONY HYMAN

THE Afghan war has entered a crucial phase this year. Soviet air and ground forces are conducting massive offensives against resistance strongholds in many provinces. The Russians appear to be willing to destroy the country in order to 'save' it for socialism. It is the opinion of some observers of this brutal and tragic war that further resistance to the Soviet war machine is futile: the tiresome Afghans should give up their stubborn insistence on keeping their independence, along with their traditions, and be content to have their country occupied. But the Afghan resistance is by no means finished yet, in spite of its evident problems. The Afghan opposition to the Soviet-imposed government of Babrak Karmal still has some important assets in this struggle, which could in the long term enable it to frustrate the Soviet Union's determination to consolidate its hold on Afghanistan.

On 27 April 1978, a Communist-led military coup in Kabul brought to power a radical new government led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).[1] Early hopes of building a reformed, new society foundered as this small party split rapidly into two rival factions, and the country drifted into civil war. In quick succession, the three chief figures of the PDPA became President, each after the murder of his predecessor—Taraki

[1] See Richard Newell, 'Revolution and revolt in Afghanistan', *The World Today*, November 1979.

Mr Hyman is a journalist who has recently visited the region. He is the author of *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-83* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

replacing Daoud, Amin Taraki and, after the Soviet invasion at the end of 1979, Karmal replacing Amin.

The six years which have passed since the revolution have seen a radical shake-up of Afghan society, which does constitute a revolution—although hardly of a type or pattern attempted under Communist direction from Kabul. After the Soviet invasion, the civil war developed into a nation-wide guerrilla resistance, and the spreading devastation led to a mass exodus of refugees. The effects of the war have touched all aspects of Afghan society and economy, shattering traditional patterns and, for better or worse, recasting them permanently. In destroying the old, this war is helping to create a new order—though it is rather disorder and anarchy which are in evidence now. There has been a virtually complete breakdown of the central government's administration of the provinces, the rural population being mostly independent. Where taxes are paid by farmers, it is often to the various resistance parties, rather than to the Kabul government. The marked decline of schools and medical clinics and of access to improved seeds and fertilisers for farmers is another aspect of the destruction that this war features, which has wiped out decades of progress in development.

The impact of the war on agriculture inside Afghanistan is now becoming better appreciated, after careful studies made in difficult conditions. The sharp decline in crops through disruption caused by military bombardments since 1978 was shown last year by a group of Afghan agronomists and economists originally of Kabul University.[2] In a scholarly report published from London this May, the Afghan Aid Committee warn that there is now a threat of widespread famine in many regions inside Afghanistan, which could lead to the death of at least 500,000 people unless they receive immediate food aid from outside.[3] Among the likely consequences of famine, or of serious food shortages, would be the weakening and even the end of guerrilla resistance, together with another big increase in numbers of Afghan refugees—which stands at some 3·5 million and is already the biggest single refugee community in the world.

There are also many more internal refugees, displaced persons inside Afghanistan, who have found refuge from the war in the capital, Kabul. The process whereby peasants flee to the capital from the dangerous, ruined countryside has already been seen, dramatically, in Saigon and other cities of Indochina in the 1970s. Kabul's central location has attracted hundreds of thousands of desperate villagers from Logar, Parwan, Kapisa and other fertile provinces who might otherwise have made longer journeys across the borders to Pakistan or Iran. Kabul's population is at present at least double the 700,000 of pre-war times, in spite of the large number of established Kabul families who, since 1978, have departed into exile. The effects of this increase

[2] *Agricultural Survey of Afghan Farmers in Pakistan, March 1983* (Peshawar: Afghan Information Centre, 1983).

[3] Frances D'Souza, *The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan* (London: Afghan Aid Committee, 1984).

in population include serious strains on the city's already inadequate supplies of water, housing, heating and cooking fuel, and food. Only large-scale imports from the Soviet Union of wheat and other items have eased problems caused by shortages and inflation of prices. Those families who could not afford or find a rented room in Kabul have been forced to pitch tents or to build shanties on the outskirts of Kabul. Bitterness among internal refugees at lack of government help reportedly led to demonstrations in Kabul last winter.

The effect of these changes has been a steady altering of the political map of Afghanistan.[4] Until recently there had been a clear Pushtun dominance in the country as a whole; this is now being challenged by the refugee exodus, which has affected mainly Pushtun tribes living closer to the Pakistan border. Pushtuns now form a minority of the total population inside the country, and by no means the sole active element in the resistance. As for the swollen capital, obviously Kabul is now much more important than it was: it contains a considerable part of the Afghan population and probably 15 per cent of those left in the country.

Kabul is a vital constituency, and the Karmal government is, naturally, concentrating on it. The Afghan capital has long been the centre of the country's modernisation drive, containing many of the schools, colleges, hospitals, businesses and government departments and, inevitably, many of the educated elite, too. Since the war its importance has increased, as more than half the country's schools and hospitals have been damaged or destroyed (according to Kabul government official figures in 1983: 1,814 schools and 31 hospitals, together with 111 basic health centres). The latest available statistics state that the capital has 152 schools functioning, with a total of 135,000 students and 9,234 teachers. The fact that two-thirds of these teachers are female reflects the conscription into the army, or flight into exile, of many male teachers in Afghan towns. Three teacher-training institutions in Kabul have 2,700 students on courses, besides others in the country.

Education in Afghan schools has a high political content. Even in the 10–14 age group, Young Pioneers have been organised on the Soviet model. With a membership claimed to be 40,000 already at the end of 1982, the Pioneers are pointedly described by PDPA activists as 'the school for sound training of children and youth'. It is youth organisation which is treated as a key area, not only in Kabul, but in all the towns where the Karmal government has control. Literacy classes, vocational training and other part-time courses are usually linked to political ideology classes given by PDPA activists. Considerable attention and help has also been given to these areas by foreign specialists and advisers from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In these circumstances it is all the more surprising that a considerable number of teachers continue to oppose Communist political indoctrination of their students. Organised among female school-teachers, the Revolutionary

[4] For further details see Anthony Hyman, *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964–83* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

ety has published many clandestine opposition newsletters distributed widely by students and teachers who claim to be d socially aware women' and at the same time are hostile to the on.

ation has suffered quite as much damage as lower since 1978. ty, its Polytechnic and the small Jalalabad University have all ·dly. Over half the teachers are now living in exile, or have been ɪprisoned, or were killed in prison before 1980. The arrest of University's best-known professors in 1982 further demoralised ɔmmunity, convincing many of the independent-minded that ɪger any room for them. Commenting at his trial in Kabul last Hasan Kakar, head of the history department, said: 'Our arrest tension and insecurity in the University, and even professors ɪo were politically neutral were forced to flee the country . . . it untry decades to replace such losses.'

ɔf foreign teachers, almost all of them Soviet citizens, have n teachers at the University and the western teachers (from the West Germany and France) who taught there before 1980. The ɪ educational system is being reorganised in line with the Soviet ɛ Russian language has rapidly replaced English, French and principal foreign language studied in Afghan schools and col- 80, Russian had been restricted to Kabul Polytechnic, where s were from the Soviet Union. Because of the disruption of ıanistan, at least 10,000 Afghans are currently studying or on ; in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. An indication of just igher education has been affected by the war strains comes from ɪlments for university: down from almost 15,000 in 1978 to just The majority of students are female, and many male students the end of courses, to avoid conscription. Many students are, ɪelves sympathetic to the ruling party: some male students have ted military service on its behalf.

:udents, the PDPA is also concentrating on other sections of the ed likely cadre material as members of the party itself, or the rland Front, a grouping intended to attract 'progressive' (that ınist) Afghans supporting the government. Special newspapers are being published for students, the Democratic Youth vomen, industrial workers, farmers and soldiers. A number of ganisations for the PDPA receive substantial material and ɪelp from 'twins' in other friendly Communist countries; thus ak Socialist Union of Youth works closely with the Democratic ıtion. An informal link of growing importance for the PDPA is ɔmmunist exiles of Iran's banned Tudeh Party.[5] The Tudeh Asia's veteran Communist parties, with valuable experience

ɪanpour, 'Iran: the rise and fall of the Tudeh Party', *The World Today*, April

in organising labour unions in Iran's industrial centres. Tudeh Party ideologists are reputed to have a firm grasp of Marxist-Leninist theory and a sophisticated understanding of propaganda techniques in the Persian-language medium—Persian being, along with Pashto, the lingua franca of Afghanistan. By comparison with Tudeh, the PDPA is immature, amateurish and virtually lacking in ideologists. Tudeh Party activists are reportedly trying to mobilise the small industrial proletariat of Afghanistan, concentrated in the capital and in a few pockets in northern Afghanistan. It is the declared aim of the PDPA to recruit people from 'the working class and ranks of toilers' up to more than half its membership: at present these people are still only very thinly represented in the PDPA. Unlike so many Afghans of the educated class in the civil service, with uncertain, often divided, loyalties, Iranian Tudeh members can be relied upon by the ruling party in Kabul, as well as by the Russians.

The Afghan army is a major area of concern to the Karmal government. The task of rebuilding it from a poorly trained, unmotivated army and a deeply split officer corps into a reliable, motivated and well-trained force is still in progress. Officials claim that this programme is already showing signs of success in lowered 'rates of defection' by conscripts and higher morale in army ranks, but these claims are largely discounted for lack of evidence. What evidence there is lies in the opposite direction: the stream of deserters continues, and so does in-fighting between the majority Khalq faction in the officer corps, and officers and political commissars more inclined to the Parcham faction of President Karmal. The fact remains that the bulk of the army is composed of unwilling conscripts, who are keener to desert or defect to the Mojaheddin (the guerrillas of the resistance) than to fight for the regime.

The desperate state of the Afghan army can be pictured from the pressures exerted and the cash inducements offered to those soldiers who are trained to sign on for extra terms of service, and from the activities of press-gangs in areas under government control. Length of service for conscripts has increased progressively up to four years, and this now applies to all males from 19 to 39 years. The continuing drain of weapons and ammunition through Afghan deserters and officers collaborating with the resistance is said to be the main cause of Soviet refusal to supply the most modern equipment to the army, or to replace that destroyed in action. However, there seems little reason to doubt that the strength of the Afghan army is kept up to between 50,000 and 60,000 men, mainly by means of press-gangs. The army had some 80,000 men in 1978. There is a core of officers and NCOs loyal to the regime and able to enforce obedience, and the activity of political commissars in army units is said to have been stepped up in the past year. President Karmal told the army's primary party organisations in November 1983 that the role of the party was being 'consistently increased', urging the need for every man in the army to understand correctly the goals of the revolution.

In spite of its deficiencies, the Afghan army still hangs together, being a major source of support for the government and an important part of the anti-

guerrilla strategy, although it seems very much a junior partner to the Soviet army in joint offensives. More progress has been made with new auxiliary forces, created since 1979 under Soviet direction. These include local militia units, paramilitary police and civil defence groups—all volunteers, with generous pay allowances attracting recruits for the first two forces. The expansion of the police force was designed to bring its strength up to 60,000 in 1983, with weapons and training planned to give the police an important role in the anti-guerrilla war.

It is KHAD, the secret police, which is in charge of counter-intelligence and espionage, working closely with recruits from the border militias. KHAD is credited with considerable successes against resistance forces, and its lavish Soviet funding allows it to maintain an efficient network of some 20,000 paid informers in the provinces, as well as across the border in Pakistan. Officers from the KGB (the Soviet security police) are reportedly placed in many KHAD posts in Kabul, as well as being responsible for training. A measure of KHAD's importance can be gathered from the fact that its director, Dr Mohammed Najibullah, is an intimate friend of Karmal and one of the principal figures in the PDPA Politburo which, together with the Revolutionary Council, is the official centre of authority in Afghanistan.

Assuming that Soviet military, financial and economic support for the Kabul government continues, it is likely to keep indefinitely its somewhat shaky control of the capital, the main towns and the attached rural areas. The actual needs of the restricted administration are supplied largely through deficit financing, recourse to printing large amounts of paper money for the salaries of several hundred thousand people, and considerable Russian loans. A big factor in paying the war costs is the expanding production of Afghan natural gas—96 per cent of it for export to the Soviet Union. Priced at what is believed to be half the world market figure, Afghan natural gas production amounted to 2·36 billion cubic metres in 1983, helping to offset the costs of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which some observers estimate at a minimum of $1 billion a year. The economic trend is towards integration in the Comecon bloc system, and in particular towards closer integration with the economy of Soviet Central Asia. Comecon's share of Afghanistan's trade has increased from 40 per cent in 1978 to over 70 per cent in 1983, though traditional trade with Japan and western European states continues. The extension to Afghanistan of the Soviet Central Asian system of military infrastructure was marked by the extension of military air bases and the opening in 1982 of the first road and rail bridge across the river Oxus (Amu Darya), and the southward extension of a railway line capable of military as well as trade movement.

It is Soviet airpower which has been used to striking advantage against the lightly armed resistance, with a force of some 400 Mi 24 helicopter gunships proving especially deadly and effective. Air strikes have been the preferred method of engaging the enemy: the majority of some 110,000 Soviet troops are installed as garrisons in towns and air bases, and guarding communications

lines, and they only rarely engage with the Mojaheddin. This strategy has certainly lowered the casualty rate of Soviet troops, which was estimated by the end of 1983 at 15,000, a third of which may have been fatal.

The series of recent Soviet-Afghan offensives since this spring seems to mark a significant change in tactics, aiming to break the stalemate in the five-year-old guerrilla war by dealing body blows to key centres of resistance. Some reports claim that the Panjshir offensive has been a costly failure, with heavy casualties inflicted on Soviet troops. It is probably too early to assess its success, but in resistance circles in Peshawar the shift in Soviet tactics is being taken very seriously indeed. Estimates speak of 30,000 fresh combat troops, many from elite commando units trained for hand-to-hand fighting. By training and often in equipment, Soviet troops taking part in recent offensives are said to be much better suited for the anti-guerrilla war than Soviet reservists who normally guard military bases or do convoy duties. Many resistance commanders anticipate that Soviet commando forces will act in future as a highly mobile strike force, hitting selected targets, often dropped by parachute, and mounting surprise ambushes in the heart of areas the Mojaheddin regard as safe territory.

The resistance is led by a large number of local groups and regional fronts, mostly affiliated to the seven established Afghan parties based in Pakistan's border city of Peshawar. The basic function of the exile parties has been to receive and channel to the internal resistance supplies of weapons, ammunition and cash provided by foreign sympathisers and backers of the resistance.[6] Though captured arms from convoys or Afghan army posts inside Afghanistan provide important supplies, it is the regular flow of external aid which ensures effective resistance, as in other guerrilla movements of modern times. Considerable quantities of small arms are now available to many of the Mojaheddin; they have learned quickly to use these to advantage since 1980, when even automatic weapons were uncommon. The main sources of supply, via Pakistan, are the United States, China, the Gulf states, Iran and probably Britain and West Germany, with a range of infantry weapons distributed through the party system.

As far as organised, systematic guerrilla training is concerned, there is little evidence that more than a small number benefit. Numerous foreign reporters have described the casual manner in which the Mojaheddin fight, and the almost complete lack of appreciation of modern guerrilla tactics. It is after such experiences that jaundiced but seasoned observers of guerrilla warfare have commented that the Afghans live in unrivalled guerrilla country which they do not know how to exploit. However, there are a few good centres of guerrilla training inside Afghanistan, notably two camps established in the Panjshir valley for volunteers from many different regions. In Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, close to the border, some small training camps have been established, with ex-Afghan-army officers teaching recruits weapons skills, and sometimes also guerrilla tactics. There is said to be increasing demand for

[6] A perceptive recent analysis is John Fullerton, *The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan* (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983).

rom volunteers, due to their growing realisation that such skills are
ınd not known by everyone who has handled a gun. One problem
esistance commanders is the low level of education of most of the
lin—a problem shared by the regular Afghan army, incidentally.
nd numeracy are uncommon attainments, making training in ac-
ng of mortars or other complex equipment difficult.
ırging western help for more efficient and more widespread military
resistance spokesmen are at the same time often bitter about the
western states, especially the United States, to supply them with
ted ground-to-air missiles such as Sam 7s. Without the ability to
Soviet airpower, thereby greatly increasing the cost to the Soviet
occupying Afghanistan, few of the commanders imagine it will be
o break the military stalemate. Bitterness and frustration were
in January this year by Commander Massoud in the Panjshir valley:
l the Americans of exploiting the Afghan war for their own ends,
ing Afghans to die needlessly because of a failure to deliver anti-
:apons.
ıre several explanations for what does look like a cynical western
ıy obvious American military involvement in delivering sophisti-
pons so close to the Soviet border would probably provoke the
ion into a more aggressive policy in Central America. Pakistan's
ɔvernment is often reported to have defined strictly the nature of aid
ill permit to be given to the Afghan parties based in Peshawar, and
led out Sam 7s. Certainly, Pakistan would have good reason to fear
quences that such an escalation of the guerrilla war right on its
stepped-up training, together with delivery of Sam 7s to Afghan
would produce from the Soviet side.[7]
rom sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, the resistance by and large
:tter supplied with infantry weapons, even though effective training
ce. In a forceful plea for a change of policy by western states, *The*
. recent editorial urged that it was time to help the Afghans by pro-
ining as well as arms: 'This is something which the Russians never
ualms about providing for those "liberation movements" that they
t is surely time for those who claim to support the cause of Afghan
to take a leaf out of their book.'[8] Whether this advice will be heeded
› be seen.
; clear, however, is that leaders of the Afghan resistance itself are
: of its deficiencies than in the past, and they are keen to rectify them.
ng inside many regions of the country reveals the increasing ability at
level of local commanders to cooperate well with guerrilla groups of
ies, and sometimes also to coordinate attacks. The petty rivalries
ıe parties and leaders based in Peshawar, which have so far prevented

: Pakistan unrest and the Afghanistan problem', Amin Saikal, *The World Today*,

es, 13 March 1984.

a united opposition—or even an umbrella organisation representing the resistance—are now often ignored inside the country by the guerrilla groups who do the fighting. Many of the problems within the resistance arise from the persistent failure of one party, the fundamentalist Muslim Hizb-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to make a common cause with other elements of the resistance. There have been serious clashes between Mojaheddin groups, especially in the northern provinces, which are variously attributed to this rivalry for influence and to the intrigues of agents of KHAD. Secret police agents undoubtedly do exploit the long-standing tribal and ethnic differences which divide Pushtun tribes and clans, and complicate relations between Pushtuns and the other ethnic minorities—Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Baluch and Nuristanis.

But the Afghan opposition has important assets which are highly relevant to its long-term aim of frustrating the Soviet occupation. The Mojaheddin appear to be able to retain the support as well as the respect of the great majority of the Afghan people, in villages, towns and refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. Their morale and self-confidence impress all observers, while better leadership and heavy weapons have improved guerrilla effectiveness in recent years. Not only in ambushes and attacks on isolated military posts, but by raids into all the cities and by urban guerrilla strikes, the Mojaheddin have proved their ability to extend the war, and take it even into the heart of enemy territory. Even in the big towns, resistance pressures have been strong. Herat and Kandahar—the two biggest Afghan cities after Kabul—have been bombed from the air repeatedly since 1980 in attempts to regain control for government forces and also to intimidate the local people from collaborating with guerrillas. Large areas of the cities remain in the control of the Mojaheddin despite the presence there of large Soviet and Afghan military forces. This summer, intense fighting has been reported between guerrillas and troops from Herat in the west, Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and Ghazni in the south.

It is noteworthy that six years after the revolution, a curfew is still imposed in the capital and other cities from 10 pm to 4 am, when government control is challenged by the opposition. The continuing defection of senior civil servants, diplomats, doctors, engineers and officers as well as humble army conscripts must also encourage the resistance, suggesting that the regime it is fighting is nowhere near the success it claims against the 'counter-revolution'. As long as the resistance can preserve popular support inside Afghanistan, and continue developing its military effectiveness, it will remain a piece in the Afghan puzzle which cannot be ignored—let alone dismissed as a mere 'counter-revolution'—whether in wartime or whenever negotiations towards a peace settlement once again get under way.

Nato: a two-step approach to Deep Strike

JAMES MEACHAM

THE Western alliance has within its grasp the beginnings of a revolution in conventional warfare. The improvement in accuracy of weapons that modern technology makes possible is so great that it constitutes an entirely new capability, not merely a normal and expected improvement on what we can already do. Weapon range has been increasing throughout history. However, these increases have usually been accompanied by a loss of accuracy, and the enemy could largely neutralise their effects by merely moving his essential elements further away. However, two factors make today's set of improvements something really new.

The first is that modern weapons are guided to their targets not by a setting made to their launcher, but by giving the projectile itself the ability to find the target and home in on it. Unheard-of accuracy, near to the theoretical limit, is now available at great distances. Thus, accuracy has been more or less divorced from range to the target. Weapons can hit not only a given target, such as a tank, but a specific part of that tank.

The second factor is nuclear weapons. When the great step-changes in accuracy have occurred before in history—for example, when the rifled gun replaced the smoothbore—there were no nuclear weapons to contend with. Now, the presence of such weapons on the battlefield forces a potential enemy into formations and procedures from which he cannot escape if he is ever to bring his ground and air forces to bear on the front-line fighting, but which make him extemely vulnerable to the revolutionary new systems. These systems have come to be known collectively as 'deep-strike' or ET (emerging technologies).

These buzz-words have, unfortunately, taken on lives of their own, and have blurred rather than defined the nature of the new capabilities that are available. There are many types of 'emerging technologies'. But everything that is 'emerging' is not deep-strike, and all of the deep-strike material is not brand-new. Many of the critically important bits are new, but it is the coming together of all these elements now which forms probably the most important military event of the last half of the twentieth century. In order to understand the nature of the revolution and what it may mean, it is helpful to strip away the peripheral hardware and concentrate on essentials.

Deep-strike has three main components: sensors, information and control systems and weapons. The new sensors—mainly high-performance side-looking radars—can detect, locate and identify targets up to 300 kilometres

The author has been *The Economist's* Defence Correspondent since 1974. He has made a close study of new military technologies.

behind the front lines. These will be deployed mainly in fixed-wing aircraft flying over friendly territory. Other forms of intelligence collectors, such as electronic listening and analysing equipment, shorter-range radars and electro-optical devices such as infra-red cameras, will be deployed on a variety of platforms, including drone aircraft (remotely piloted vehicles, or RPVs) to add to the information produced by the radars.

All this information will be fed into the second component, the fusion centres, mostly by means of digital data-links direct from the sensors themselves. Here, modern high-capacity computers, products of the microelectronics revolution, will provide a picture of the enemy's back yard in real time, thus helping commanders to make their decisions. Up to now, this fusion element of deep-strike has received far less attention than have the detection systems and the weapons. However, it is probably crucial. Never in history, until recently, has there been enough good intelligence for military commanders. Now there is almost too much. One of the great breakthroughs of the later part of this century is that enormous quantities of high-quality information on the enemy can now be collected rapidly. Sorting it out, putting it together, even deciding which bits to deal with first, now take so much time that the information can be badly out of date by the time it is assembled into useful form. Not only will the new fusion centres be able to do much of this work (until now done largely by hand), but computers will be able to do it fast enough to make it worthwhile. Indeed, even the decision-making process now involves so many individual decisions that a wholly human process is too slow. Therefore, computers will take part in the decision-making process. At first they will be making many predetermined, almost mechanical, decisions. Later on, they will probably take over some tasks that are now thought to be forms of reasoning.

The third element of deep-strike is the strike part: the weapons. Two types of new technology have combined to increase the potency of new weapons. First, microelectronics: these have made it possible to build into warheads tiny, inexpensive and reliable sensors which will pick out targets and then guide the warheads to direct impact with them and even to specific parts of those targets. Before long it should be possible to build inexpensive weapons that can be sprayed at the enemy in large numbers, knowing that they will find their own targets, avoid targets picked by other weapons, and then attack on their own. The second aspect of the weapons technology breakthrough is the new warheads. Before the Second World War, the main technique to improve the performance of warheads had been, with only a few exceptions, simply to make them bigger. Then came the shaped-charge warhead, which literally melted its way through heavy armour by chemical energy rather than by sheer brute-force blast effect. These warheads themselves have been refined, and their performance has been further improved by matching them with accurate guidance systems which can point them so as to strike the surface of the target at the optimum angle, or in an especially vulnerable place.

Another new type of warhead is the 'self-forging fragment'. The ideal shape

for a munition tucked into its delivery vehicle is not usually the ideal shape in which it should strike its target. The self-forging technique allows the penetrator to be formed originally into a small fat cylinder. But when it is fired the propulsion charge partially melts the cylinder and blasts it into something closer to the ideal shape for penetration: a long rod. This reshaping is done, literally, while the penetrator is flying through the air on the way to its target. Thus, large numbers of highly potent warheads can be packed into a relatively small dispenser or delivery package.

A third new warhead is the earth (or concrete) destructor, which aligns itself after it is launched, usually by means of a parachute, and then blasts vertically downwards through an airfield runway before exploding in such a way as to heave the surface up and make it unusable for aircraft.

The usefulness of such a detection-fusion-attack system depends to a degree on how the enemy operates. But, at least in any confrontation between Nato and the Warsaw Pact, the presence of nuclear weapons will force the enemy to avoid heavy concentrations of forces on the front itself. He must therefore have second-echelon units ready to move into place as the thinly spread front-line units are ground up. Obviously, these follow-on forces must be formed into fighting dispositions, and therefore bunched into worthwhile targets, before they enter the fighting. However, there are limitations on how far back they can be formed. For example, tanks tend to develop mechanical problems in only a few hundred kilometres of road travel, so they must be brought near to the front by rail or on some sort of transporter. The form-up distances for various ground-force units vary between about 100 and 300 kilometres from the front lines, well within the range of the accurate weapons that are now being developed.

The benefits to Nato of fielding deep-strike systems are enormous. Although the Warsaw Pact outnumbers the Alliance in conventional forces, the dispersion which the presence of nuclear weapons makes necessary means that commanders cannot bring more than about 15 per cent of their combat power to the actual front-line battle. Nato's defences can contain attacks by this 15 per cent. Thus, the Warsaw Pact must depend on repeated hammer-blows, delivered by fresh follow-on units, to blast through the Nato forces which will have been debilitated in the initial battles, and which do not have the same numbers of fresh units to bring on. However, if Nato can attack entire Warsaw Pact units behind the lines, before they can be committed to battle, it can, in effect, fight a 'two-front war': one to be fought by its conventional forces opposing a breakthrough at the front, and the other by its deep-strike forces against the oncoming waves. This sort of war can be fought today, but only by using nuclear weapons against the second-echelon forces. The central strategic point of deep-strike is that it would free commanders from the awful choice between releasing nuclear weapons and seeing their ground forces broken through and overrun. With deep-strike systems, Nato could bid fair to fight a successful defence of western Europe by conventional weapons alone.

An important variation on the second-echelon attack theme of deep-strike

is airfield attack. It is beyond doubt that attacking airfields is a much better way of putting aircraft out of action than shooting them out of the air one at a time. However, airfields differ from second-echelon ground forces in three important ways: first, their locations are precisely known; second, they are extremely hard targets to damage, but are fairly easy to repair quickly; and, third, they must be struck in the first few hours—or minutes—of a war so that the enemy's air forces would be stopped early, at least after the first attacks. Thus, the tasks involved in finding them and putting them out of action are much simpler than those involved in attacking ground forces. On the other hand the munitions and timing requirements are more stringent.

In spite of all the advantages which integrated deep-strike systems hold for Nato, not much progress has been made towards fielding them. The chief reason for the delay is that the United States, the technological engine of the alliance, has not been able to make up its mind on which particular systems it wants. There are two reasons for this apparent lethargy.

First, under the Reagan Administration, the Pentagon (the Department of Defence) has come almost full circle since the days when systems analysts, under Mr Robert McNamara, ruled the roost. Under the present system—the author oversimplifies slightly for emphasis—the individual services make their individual arguments to the Deputy Secretary of Defence, and the best arguer, not the best set of numbers, wins. This means that interservice squabbling continues at high pitch for a long time. Deep-strike systems are not of great interest to the navy, but of intense interest to the army and air force.

For example, Martin-Marietta and Vought are competing to provide a ballistic missile to attack second-echelon enemy formations. Both missiles were based on proven, tested designs (Vought's on its Lance; Martin-Marietta's on its Pershing). Thus there was no great technical risk, and development times would have been short. Either missile would have worked well from a land launcher, and either one could have entered service within a few months if production decisions had been made two or three years ago, as they could have been. However, the air force, at least the tactical part of it, would prefer a smaller, shorter-range missile which its aircraft could carry in greater numbers even if it had to carry them into enemy territory to launch. The long-range part of the air force had no wish to penetrate enemy air-space, but preferred a cruise missile to either of the ballistic ones.

Superimposed on the problem of interservice rivalry was the inevitable competition among contractors, which made itself felt in many ways, chiefly through advocates in Congress. Cruise-missile builders and their sub-contractors weighed in against ballistic missiles; air-frame builders advanced numerous reasons why short-range, air-launched weapons were a better buy than long-range, land-launched ones. As a result of the ensuing debate (which is still going on), and the seeming inability of the Pentagon to make any decision at all, no deep-strike missile of any kind is likely to be available for several years.

Similar horror stories abound with respect to other elements of a deep-strike package: the sensors and the command, control, communications and intel-

ligence systems that would have made up the fusion centres, even the submunitions that the missiles might have carried. In some cases, officials and congressional committees were sincerely searching for better, more cost-effective solutions. But it appeared at times as if these decision-makers believed they were composing a piece of music which must be good but could equally well be performed this year, next year or the year after; rather than choosing a weapons system which was needed now, and which would be enormously useful even if it were not the very best possible. At other times the only possible explanation for the delay seemed to be sheer bureaucratic inertia and a fear of taking up a position. The undeniable result of the delay has been a paralysis in decision-making in the face of a real need to make one.

The wavering in Washington has added to the worries about deep-strike that America's European allies have had all along. It has sown a good deal of doubt about whether the potential of the deep-strike system is up to what its proponents have claimed. If deep-strike is so good, it was legitimately asked, why is it so difficult to decide on a simple framework system and get it into the field and start working with it? Cost is another worry. Some unofficial American statements and, indeed, some sophisticated investigations, claimed that a workable deep-strike system could be fielded for only a few billions of dollars. There is widespread scepticism about this claim. The scepticism has grown with time as even more sophisticated technologies are developed and put forward as potential new elements which might improve a deep-strike system.

And apart from the feeling that deep-strike could turn out to be very costly, there is in Europe a reluctance to get involved in any new system at all. Most European Nato countries have their forward-spending plans filled up for years to come, with no provision for any new deep-strike weaponry. Even if some money could be found by cancelling something else, there are no deep-strike systems to spend it on except those which must be bought from the United States, and most European Nato countries have had enough of buying from America. A related problem is that deep-strike does not replace anything. Even the nuclear weapons, less likely to be used if deep-strike were operational, would still be needed to force a wide dispersion on the Soviet forces. And the Americans pay for most of the nuclear weapons anyway.

A more fundamental reason why many Europeans mistrust deep-strike is that they are not at all sure they want to replace nuclear weapons as the second line of defence. Europe has sheltered under the American nuclear shield for years, and would face the prospect of a long conventional war with little more equanimity than a short nuclear one. Many Europeans also believe—and the argument has more merit than is normally acknowledged by American observers—that to prepare to fight a long conventional war is to invite such a war, which could easily become nuclear if calculations about what deep-strike can deliver have been made incorrectly. In other words, anything that dilutes nuclear deterrence is dangerous.

Partly because of these worries, there has grown up in Europe a half-way-house theory of deep-strike, which may be called the airfield-attack option.

: follows:

ılem of striking them with long-range missiles is radically different t of attacking ground forces, and particularly the most difficult of those forces, armoured formations on the move. Deep-strike is · in reality two different problems—ground-force attack and air-ıck—which have been artificially and unreasonably lumped to-

ction and identification requirements for airfield attack are vir-n-existent, because the locations are precisely known.

ıitions for airfield attack are available now.

e the costs of a specialised airfield-attack system would be much the costs of a comprehensive deep-strike system that was designed ground forces as well.

'stem would in no way signal to the Warsaw Pact that Nato was away from the idea of blasting its ground forces with nuclear if they appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough, hence it ɔt dilute the potency of pure nuclear deterrence.

ıd logical first step towards the unknowns of deep-strike would to field a force of a few hundred long-range missiles with runway-nitions in their noses, ready, at the outbreak of hostilities, to ll the Warsaw Pact airfields within range of the East-West German effect of deploying this sort of system would be to make Nato a potent conventional force than it is now. If Nato deployed an anti-:m as it could do within a couple of years of a decision to do so, it fford to wait a while to see if the ground-force-attack systems really dvertised.

n of an airfield-attack system is something Europe could do on its ıt waiting for the machinations in Washington to run their course. ıin and West Germany all manufacture highly effective runway-munitions. At least four companies in the United States are ready ure missiles that could carry those munitions to their targets much y and reliably than manned aircraft—which European countries ın to use for the anti-runway missions—could do. These com-ld almost certainly be willing to enter into co-production with European companies to build all or parts of the missiles ıis would probably not be the most economical way to produce

Nato members have developed the airfield-attack theory of deep-should not expect the United States either to accept it or to act ver, if Nato Europe believes what it says—if this theory is really ıore than special pleading to avoid the undoubted financial bur-ering the nuclear threshold by tagging along with the Ameri-ıey at last make up their minds on what sort of all-up deep-strike want—then the way ahead is clear: go it alone—now.

State-sponsored international terrorism: the problems of response

PAUL WILKINSON

ANY serious and prolonged terrorist campaign has implications for the international system. If it succeeds, alone or in combination with other methods of struggle, in overthrowing a regime, then foreign policy, alignment and the international balance of power will all be affected. Even when the challenge to the regime is unsuccessful the terrorist movement and its target regime inevitably seek moral and diplomatic support, resources or even military aid from potential allies abroad. Today, as a result of modern revolutions in communications and technology, serious domestic terrorist conflicts almost invariably spill across international borders or catch foreign citizens in the cross-fire.

For the purposes of the present discussion, however, terrorism is defined as international when it is directed across international frontiers or when the targets are foreign citizens or property located in the terrorists' country of origin. Using these crude criteria, the figures show a 30 per cent rate of increase in international terrorist incidents between 1980 and 1982 and an even higher rate of increase in 1983. More worrying still is the fact that since 1980, taking domestic and international terrorist incidents together, there has been an annual increase of 13 per cent in the number of deaths caused by terrorism.

Roughly 25 per cent of these incidents are either state-sponsored or state-directed. The sponsorship involvement of these rogue states in international terrorism ranges from moral and diplomatic encouragement to material assistance by such means as weapons, training, funds and sanctuary. A smaller number of these terrorist states resort to using directly controlled hit-squads to undertake bombings, assassinations and other missions abroad. But the more usual method is to employ proxies, such as a client terrorist movement already based in the country, or expatriate volunteers.

States resorting to international terrorism are in most cases simply exporting the violence which they routinely use as a weapon of internal repression and social control. The present article will not be addressing the huge and important subject of domestic state terror. There is an extensive historical and social science literature on this field. However, as Richard Falk and Michael Walzer,[1] among others, have pointed out, it is much harder for the inter-

[1] Richard Falk, 'Responding to severe violations', in *Enhancing Global Human Rights*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez *et al.* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), pp. 207–56; and Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (London: Allen Lane, 1978).

Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations at the University of Aberdeen and author of several books on terrorism. His article on Armenian terrorism was published in *The World Today* in September 1983.

national community to evolve any effective humanitarian intervention or constraints against this internal regime terror. The very framework of international law and organisation is designed to preclude international interference in the domestic affairs of states, even in cases of the most flagrant and massive violation of human rights.

It is also important to note that state-sponsored international terrorism is not a novel phenomenon. Stalin sent his agents abroad to murder those he judged to be enemies of the Soviet Union. Trotsky was perhaps the most famous victim of Stalin's international terrorism. There were scores of others. The fascist states also used international terrorism between the wars. For example, fascist Italy and Hungary provided money, shelter and training centres for the Croatian *Ustasa* terrorist movement, dedicated to establishing an independent state of Croatia. A member of VMRO, a Macedonian terrorist organisation working in league with the *Ustase*, succeeded in assassinating King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, in Marseilles in 1934. Indeed, this event triggered the first unsuccessful attempt at an international convention to combat terrorism.[2]

The present international situation is clearly conducive to the increasing use of state-sponsored international terrorism. The Soviet Union has always been prepared to use this weapon on a very selective and opportunistic basis, wherever it thinks that this will serve Soviet strategic interests. It has encouraged its Communist allies to take a major share of the burden of assistance to client movements. Ideologically, the Soviet Union justifies this as fraternal help to national liberation struggles and giving history a push towards the inevitable victory of world communism. At another level, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have also used the weapon of international terrorism as a means of silencing and intimidating exiled dissidents and hunting down those alleged to have betrayed the Party.

State-sponsored terrorism, along with all the other modes of unconventional warfare, is particularly attractive in an age of nuclear strategy. It does not carry the degree of risk of escalation to superpower involvement and the nuclear threshold which accompanies full-scale conventional war. It is cheap. It can also bring high yields. The Khomeini regime in Iran was able to inflict a crippling psychological blow on the American Administration by the most daring act of state-sponsored terrorism in recent history, the seizure of the entire American diplomatic mission in Teheran in 1979. It was a blow from which the Administration never really recovered, and undoubtedly ensured that President Carter would not be re-elected. The massacre of 241 American marines in Beirut by a truck bombing was another dramatic instance of the impact of terrorism on the policy of the world's strongest military power. In the wake of this horrifying event, President Reagan had no real choice but to succumb to the chorus of domestic demands for American military withdrawal from Lebanon. There is still some debate as to whether this attack was instigated or abetted by the Syrians or the Iranians. What we can be sure about

[2] League of Nations Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism (Geneva, November 1937).

is that other hostile states will be tempted to emulate this method c intimidating and coercing rival regimes and their citizens. Not least of i attractions is that the true identity of the state behind the attack can b disguised. If the terrorist action proves abortive, the state sponsor avoids th humiliation of a conventional and public military defeat.

Features of state-sponsored terrorism

The major characteristics of this method of unconventional warfare can b briefly summarised as follows:

- State-sponsored international terrorism is always conducted clandestinel Even though terrorist states such as Libya and Iran have frequently uttere general threats of exporting violence against alleged enemies, they naturall avoid any precise reference to the timing, targets and nature of the attacks, fc this would rob them of the advantage of surprise, and could enable the victir state to take necessary measures to prevent the atrocity.
- Terrorist states always deny responsibility for specific international terrori acts. This places the onus of proof on the victim state. It also thwarts an concerted international legal sanctions against the rogue state. Terrorist state unlike terrorist movements, do not need to leave their signature on the crime They do not resort to international terrorism to become known to the world Their generalised public threats are enough. The real purposes of state sponsored international terrorism are somewhat different: the hunting dow of exiled opponents and dissidents, the waging of surrogate war against a adversary state, and the export of revolution by means of supporting clien terrorist groups abroad.
- State-sponsored international terrorism invariably involves the use o specialist intelligence and security agencies. These recruit and fund th assassination teams or client groups used to carry out missions. On occasion they carry out the attacks themselves. Almost invariably, they operate with th full knowledge and cooperation of their diplomatic missions in the targe country: this provides them with an invaluable cover, the guarantee o diplomatic immunity, and the use of diplomatic premises and the diplomati bag for obtaining and storing weapons, ammunition and explosives.
- State-sponsored terrorists almost invariably have access to more advance weaponry and greater firepower than autonomous 'freelance' groups. Fo example, states have made available rocket launchers, Sam 7s and a whol range of modern automatic weapons. In addition, many of the terrorist states such as Libya, North Korea, South Yemen and Iran, offer intensive training i weapons, explosives and tactics, in camps within their own borders. They ca provide much more substantial funds to support terrorism than the ordinar freelance terrorist group could ever command. And, last but not least amon their advantages, rogue stat● can also provide the necessary sanctuary an protection for the members of the terrorist cell after the mission has bee completed.

• To an even greater extent than with domestic terrorist groups, the state waging international terrorism has the tactical advantage of surprise. It can use its superior resources and communications to hit the target state at any point of its choice, not only within the boundaries of the victim state, but also against its diplomatic personnel, embassies, business premises, aircraft, ships and expatriate personnel and families anywhere in the world. In messages sent to American, British and French embassies in Cairo and Jakarta recently, the Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad threatened attacks of this very nature against what it called 'imperialist' countries which had participated in the multi-national force (MNF) in Beirut. And in 1980 Colonel Qaddafi sent his hit squads into seven different countries. They carried out 14 separate attacks abroad against Libyan exiles in 1980 alone, murdering 11. British and international outrage and condemnation following the shooting of the policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, by an armed member of the Libyan People's Bureau in St James's Square has not brought any apparent shift in the behaviour of Colonel Qaddafi. In a speech at Miaitiqah air base in June, Qaddafi stated:

> 'We are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. . . We are also capable of physical liquidation and destruction and arson inside America. If we have to export, then we shall export terrorism to America.'[3]

• A common feature of all state-sponsored international terrorist incidents is the strong psychological reaction among the people of the victimised state. Almost invariably, and with the encouragement of government and media, the blame is attached to the state which sponsored or directed the attack. The people will direct their outrage and desire for retribution against the rogue state, its representatives and its regime. Thus, however much the perpetrator tries publicly to deny any responsibility for a specific crime, the public in the victim state will demand some immediate and forceful punitive action. This immediately worsens formal relations between the countries, heightens tensions, and places the victim government under enormous pressure to act to avenge the attack in some dramatic way. This psychological effect was vividly demonstrated after the shooting in St James's Square on 17 April 1984.

Problems of response

State-sponsored international attacks are undoubtedly presenting the western democratic states with the most difficult problems of response. On the one hand public and media outrage is creating pressure for urgent forceful action. On the other, governments which take seriously their responsibilities under international and domestic law are severely constrained by the limitations of the law and legal processes. It is by no means always a straightforward matter for the police and the authorities to obtain the necessary evidence to establish the precise identity of the perpetrator of the crime. It is still more difficult to obtain the necessary legal proof of the role of a foreign

[3] *Daily Telegraph*, 13 June 1984.

power as instigator and abettor. The terrorist state will, for reasons that have already been mentioned, do its utmost to hide its fingerprints. Where diplomatic immunity and the inviolability of diplomatic premises is exploited, as in the case of the London Libyan People's Bureau, the victim state is hamstrung by the requirements of the 1961 Vienna Convention.

Even if these severe handicaps to judicial response against state-sponsored terrorism are disregarded, there are other major obstacles to forceful punitive action. First and foremost is the fact that the victim state is likely to have diplomats, businessmen and perhaps a whole expatriate community living in the territory of the rogue state. From day one of the Libyan Embassy siege last April, the British government was acutely aware of this dilemma. It knew that British people could be taken hostage in a Teheran-type action, with all the agonising consequences suffered by the Americans in 1979–80. Qaddafi's reputation for unpredictability and fanaticism is certainly comparable to that of Ayatollah Khomeini. One could not gamble with the lives of the British people at the mercy of such a regime.

A second major constraint is that even where circumstances may permit a forceful unilateral response against the terrorist state, strong international action against the offender, even by friendly western countries, is almost impossible to obtain. Other states will instinctively place other considerations above any general concern about terrorist threats against the innocent and the rule of law. All the western democracies generally make a ritual condemnation of international terrorist outrages, but they are apparently unwilling to put at risk potentially lucrative trade links or to close the door to what are possibly valuable commodities and markets. They fear that if they take any strong stand to boycott or sanction the offending state, commercial competitors will simply move in to take over their share of the market.

A sad but vivid illustration of the western states' failure to take effective combined action against state-sponsored international terrorism occurred in 1980. America, western Europe's major ally and protector, was looking to the European Community states to join in firm economic sanctions to bring pressure on the Iranian regime to release the American hostages. After much hesitation and evasion, the EEC foreign ministers did, rather to their own surprise, hammer out an agreed package of European trade sanctions. But when the British Foreign Secretary brought the proposed measures to the British Parliament for approval, they were sabotaged as a result of a well-timed back-bench revolt led by the Labour MP for West Lothian, Mr T. Dalyell. Because the British would not implement the package, the whole effort at a European Community stand on the issue was undermined. Should anyone be very surprised that there has been a similar absence of concerted western response following the St James's Square outrage?

It is more realistic and sensible to concentrate on trying to learn the appropriate lessons from the Libyan People's Bureau affair, and to try to minimise the chances of any similar abuse of diplomatic privileges in future. It is to be hoped that the government's understandable insistence on keeping

their inquiry into the affair confidential will not mean that it is any less rigorous and searching in its investigations. Why, in view of the Libyan Embassy's known activities in 1980, was the so-called People's Bureau allowed to continue in London? Why was there not more stringent control over the accreditation of diplomats and the granting of diplomatic immunity? What is the truth about the transfer of American intelligence about Qaddafi's instructions to London? Was it passed on to London? When? And why was no counter-action taken?

The Summit declaration on terrorism

It was largely because of the insistence of the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that the subject of international terrorism appeared at all in the discussions of the London Economic Summit, 9–10 June 1984.

It might have been expected that the inclusion of international terrorism would be supported by all the major participant states. Almost half of all international terrorist attacks in recent years have been directed at American personnel and facilities abroad. No less than 17·6 per cent of all bomb attacks against diplomatic targets in the period 1977 to May 1983 were directed at the United States. It may also not be generally realised that the United States was the second most popular venue for terrorist explosive bombings in this same period, with 122 attacks. The most favoured venue was France with 126 international terrorist bombings compared to Britain's mere 64 in the same period. Yet France was reportedly totally against including a discussion of terrorism at the Summit, and the French were apparently the major obstacle to any more binding and effective commitment to international action on the subject. The French Foreign Minister, Mr Claude Cheysson, argued that the Summit was designed exclusively for economic matters, and had no remit to deal with 'political' subjects. On the specific matter of sanctions against terrorist states, the French candidly stated their opposition to taking any steps that would damage French economic interests in these countries.

The final Summit declaration on international terrorism[4] was, therefore, patched together with considerable difficulty. There are general complaints that it is not sufficiently precise and that it fails to issue any binding resolution on collective sanctions against states engaging in international terrorism. Nevertheless, the declaration does combine some eminently sensible general statements which together amount to a viable overall policy for western response.

The Summit viewed with serious concern the increasing involvement of states and governments in acts of terrorism, including the abuse of diplomatic immunity. Apparently it was unable to secure unanimous approval for a set of anti-terrorist measures, but it reported that the following proposals 'found support in the discussion':

'Closer cooperation and coordination between police and security organi-

[4] *The Times*, 11 June 1984.

sations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
Scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists;
Use of powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;
Action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism;
Consultation and as far as possible cooperation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.'

The Summit did not unanimously endorse the idea put forward by Britain of an international blacklist of diplomats found guilty of involvement in terrorism, although this idea was welcomed by the Council of Europe meeting in Madrid. Even so, its final proposal does come quite close to accepting this idea. The Foreign Office will no doubt be pursuing this in the forthcoming European Community discussions, and in other international bodies.

What has been entirely overlooked by many commentators is what the declaration does not say. It does not make any reckless commitments to a policy of totally militarised response against terrorist states. Yet there were some strident voices in Washington demanding what was misleadingly called 'proactive' measures against such states, by which was apparently meant the bombing of terrorist training centres and bases, or even the removal of the regime by force. If such dangerous policies were ever implemented they would not eradicate international terrorism. They would only succeed in substituting the greater evil of full-scale war, with all its attendant death and devastation and dangers of escalation, for the lesser evil of terrorism.

To the great credit of the Summit leaders such false panaceas were discarded. The policy of response contained in their declaration is, as it must be, entirely compatible with the preservation of the democratic values and the rule of law which they had so strongly proclaimed earlier in their proceedings.

Perhaps the most practical and urgently relevant of all their proposals for action on international terrorism is their commitment to scrutinise and strengthen their national measures. These are, after all, the building blocks of any effective response against terrorism and the real test of political will to grapple with the problem. Without the political will to act to protect the innocent, all the conventions and Summit declarations are not worth the paper they are written on.

Peru: democracy under siege

RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

IN May 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President of Peru. Belaúnde's party, Acción Popular, won 45 per cent of the vote and a plurality in 21 of Peru's 25 departments. Given Peru's multi-party system (15 parties had presidential candidates), it was a sweeping victory which ended 12 years of military rule. Belaúnde campaigned on a broad platform of economic and social reform, including increased foreign investment and a return to private hands for the plethora of state-run enterprises. He promised emergency public works programmes to create a million new jobs within two years and more money for health, education and housing. He also promised to open new lands to cultivation through the irrigation of arid areas and the construction of new roads in Amazonian Peru.

Belaúnde's victory had important regional and international ramifications, especially for the United States. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the United States dominated most aspects of Peru's economic and political life. Today, it is an important voice but hardly the exclusive external actor. The Soviet Union, for example, recently had more military technicians in Peru than the United States had in all of South America. This precipitate decline in American influence is part of a regional deterioration in political and economic hegemony which is causing the American policy-makers much concern. Belaúnde's election was seen by some of these policy-makers as an opportunity to increase American prestige and thus reverse this trend.

Belaúnde was born in 1912, the scion of an old, politically active Peruvian family. His great-grandfather was President of Peru, his grandfather a Finance Minister, and his father a Prime Minister. His faith in the future of Peru is coupled with a concern for the well-being of the under-privileged and a conviction that the country is best served by democratic political institutions and a free-market economy.

The background

This is Belaúnde's second presidential mandate. He was first installed in July 1963.[1] The early years of his first term attracted considerable international attention. Belaúnde fits closely the Kennedy Administration's specifications for democratic, socially progressive political leaders expected to carry the torch of the Alliance for Progress. Unfortunately, Washington's promise of low-interest-rate loans with easy repayment terms never materialised. Long-

[1] For another account of this period, see George Philip, 'The Peruvian tightrope', *The World Today*, December 1977.

Dr St John, an affiliate at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, is at work on a book about Peruvian foreign policy.

standing controversies over fishing rights, the International Petroleum Company, and arms supplies came to a head in the 1963–68 period. In the end, Peru faced a full or partial suspension of American aid for four of Belaúnde's five full years in office. President Belaúnde was eventually ousted by the armed forces in a *golpe de estado* on a damp, cold October morning in 1968. He spent most of the subsequent decade teaching at colleges and universities in the United States.

For the next 12 years, known in Peru as the *docenio*, the armed forces ruled Peru. A review of this period is essential for an understanding of Belaúnde's current problems—and opportunities. Actually, the *docenio* can be divided into two phases of similar duration in which a radical military government was followed by a much more conservative one. The radical regime attempted fundamental socio-economic and political changes. Traditional landed families and their financial institutions lost much of their influence. The major Lima dailies like *El Comercio* and *La Prensa*, which had long set both the agenda and the limits of public debate, were silenced through nationalisation. The government also nationalised numerous foreign firms and sought to regulate foreign investment. Its programme of agrarian reform was the most sweeping in Latin America outside Cuba. Even the visibility and influence of the Catholic Church was greatly reduced.

During the *docenio*, the presence and influence of the American government, American business corporations and other American institutions like the Ford Foundation were sharply reduced. The military government expanded its political and economic relations with Soviet-bloc countries, diversified its trade, and sought an active role in third-world diplomacy. For the first time, Peru established diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and Cuba. Moreover, the Peruvian armed forces pursued a military build-up in which the Soviet Union was a major supplier of armour, aircraft and artillery.

This is not to suggest that the military government was pro-Communist, as its continuing campaign against domestic Communism made clear. Peru's recognition of the Soviet Union and its purchase of Soviet as well as western European armaments merely paralleled the policies of its neighbours. Over the last two decades, military relations between the United States and much of South America have gradually deteriorated as the latter criticised American arms transfer policies as being both restrictive and interventionist.

Ironically, the military regime which came to power determined to reduce Peru's external dependency left power 12 years later with the country further than ever from autonomy. The state greatly reduced the power of private capital and itself assumed primary responsibility for the nation's wealth, but it did so without a concomitant increase in state revenues. Moreover, the solutions adopted by the military rulers required a dynamic, sophisticated entrepreneurial group and a competent, experienced state. Neither of these existed. By 1980, the agricultural sector was stagnant, unemployment was acute, and the external debt had increased tenfold. Peru had joined a grow-

ing number of third-world states facing serious problems in meeting their external debt-service obligations.[2]

The legacy of the *docenio* has hung over Belaúnde's second administration like the *garúa* which normally blankets Lima in an invisible drizzle for much of the winter. While major institutional changes occurred in the 1968–80 period, Peru's basic problems have persisted. It is heavily dependent on international trade, particularly the vagaries of commodity export prices, over which Peruvians have absolutely no control. It is also dependent on the outside world for the technology and development capital necessary to modify this dependency. Consequently, Peru's pursuit of the universal goal of economic development remains paradoxical. It has depended in the past on the industrialised states, especially the United States, for the resources it needs for economic development. But it is with those very same states that it is struggling to break the existing relationship of economic dependence.

Belaúnde's economic programme

Often referred to as 'El Arquitecto' because of his architectural training at the University of Texas, Belaúnde is keen on the economic development of Latin America in general and Peru in particular. In a long interview last summer at the Palacio de Gobierno, he gave this writer details of the results of his first three years in office, particularly of progress made in improving housing, education and basic services, despite Peru's economic difficulties.[3]

Belaúnde's plans for infrastructure development remain ambitious. His development plans include energy projects, especially for hydroelectric power; rural electrification programmes; and housing projects to accommodate the nation's growing population. The showpiece infrastructure project continues to be the Marginal Forest Highway, an inland transport route running parallel to the axis of the Andes Mountains on the margin of the Amazon basin. It is intended to be a primary communications route as well as opening large tracts of virgin land to agricultural development. Belaúnde's emphasis on long-term development projects is criticised by some Peruvians who feel he should spend more time on Peru's short-term social and political problems.

Throughout this Administration, Belaúnde has tried to increase exports and move Peru in the direction of a free-market economy. Tax and tariff reforms have tried both to improve the local business climate and to increase government revenues. The government has promoted large-scale capital investment in mining, oil and other industries. The industrial law enacted in mid-1982, for example, enhanced the dividend remittances of foreign-owned companies while also including new tax incentives for investment in outlying areas. But

[2] Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), especially pp. 39–61 and 415–30. For the broader Latin American picture, see Roland Dallas, 'Democracy and debt in Latin America', *The World Today*, April 1984.

[3] Statement by Fernando Belaúnde Terry, personal interview, 11 July 1983. Also see Fernando Belaúnde Terry, *Peru's Own Conquest* (Lima: American Studies Press, 1965), pp. 144–5 and 151–78.

Belaúnde's attempts to divest the nation of a portion of its some 140 state industries have been throttled by old-fashioned pork-barrel politics.

Peru's emphasis on export promotion follows a trend in Latin America, but the degree of Belaúnde's commitment to free trade has distanced him from his neighbours. His approach to sub-regional cooperation and integration exemplifies his strong commitment to a free-enterprise system. In the early days, Belaúnde reaffirmed Peru's commitment to the 1969 Andean Pact while suggesting that changes in major Pact programmes would be desirable. Since then he has called for modifications in the foreign investment code and for lowered tariffs, making a common external tariff virtually impossible. He has also opposed the sectoral industrial programme—or at least a rigid interpretation of that programme—which calls for integrated industries throughout the bloc, and has objected to the Pact's earlier tendency, which was largely unsuccessful, to take political stands on non-Pact issues.[4]

International economists generally give the Belaúnde Administration high marks for anticipating economic problems, but lower marks for dealing with them. The government has not been able to reduce inflation, which was recently estimated to be running at a rate of 130 per cent per annum, to an acceptable level; and the foreign loan ceiling has increased each year. The balance of payments remains a major concern, and unemployment continues to increase. The primary cause of Peru's economic problems remains the nation's dependence on mining and oil exports for foreign exchange and economic growth. Both sectors have been hit hard by the world recession which reduced demand—and prices—while increasing interest rates. Floods in the north and a drought in the south have exacerbated Peru's economic difficulties.[5]

Early on, President Belaúnde made clear his intention to resist encroachments against the country's territory. Mounting tensions between Peru and Ecuador led to a five-day war in January 1981, from which Peru emerged diplomatically and militarily triumphant. The clash had centred on a disputed stretch of border in the Cordillera del Condor region. The larger boundary question dates back to the independence era and was thought to have been resolved in the 1942 Rio Protocol guaranteed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States. Peru asserts the viability of the Rio Protocol. Ecuador searches for a modified solution which will give it an Amazonian outlet. In the south, land-locked Bolivia seeks a corridor to the Pacific Ocean through Chile or Peru. Any attempt to address Bolivian aspirations must involve Peru. The Treaty of Ancón which ended the War of the Pacific (1879–83) provides that neither Peru nor Chile can cede to a third state any of the territory over which it gained sovereignty without the agreement of the other.[6]

[4] *El País* (Madrid), Edición Internacional, 23 April 1984; *El Comercio* (Lima), 26 July 1983; *Business Latin America*, 9 February 1983.

[5] *International Herald Tribune*, 28-9 April 1984 and 4-5 June 1983.

[6] Ronald Bruce St John and Stephen M. Gorman, 'Challenges to Peruvian foreign policy', in *Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation*, ed. Stephen M. Gorman (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 179–96.

The period of military rule did not change Peru's political system, but it did change the balance of political forces. Both labour and the left emerged from the *docenio* strengthened. Belaúnde's electoral strength in 1980 rested with the middle classes and the provincial electorate. He also appealed to the inhabitants of the *barriadas*, the slums which circle Lima. He was weakest among organised labour which was controlled by the moderate opposition party APRA or the extreme left. As soon as he was installed, the trade unions challenged the new Administration asking for wage increases. Union activity and union demands have both increased over the last four years, culminating in a general strike on 22 March 1984. Protesting against the Administration's austerity policies, laid down by the International Monetary Fund, the strike was a major contributing factor in the resignation of Belaúnde's entire cabinet in April 1984.[7]

Four months earlier, municipal elections had been held for some 1,600 mayoral and city government posts. A triumph for democracy, they were a disaster for the Administration. Largely because of Peru's economic problems, a heavy voter turnout rejected Belaúnde's Acción Popular party. It was the first real defeat for the party which had propelled him to the Presidency twice. The victors were centre-left parties and the United Left, a coalition of Socialist and Communist parties. The leader of the United Left, Alfonso Barrantes, was elected mayor of Lima, making him the first freely elected Marxist mayor of a Latin American capital.[8]

The armed forces remain the decisive actor in the Peruvian political process. In a news conference the day after his election in 1980, Belaúnde offered the soldiers an olive branch, saying that Acción Popular held no spirit of revenge and expected to have fruitful relations with the armed forces. That expectation has been fulfilled. In late 1982, the army joined the national police forces in their efforts to crush a terrorist movement; and in January 1983, Belaúnde appointed military men to all posts related to security. The extent to which the President can retain the support of the armed forces depends on his ability to walk the narrow line which separates political pressures for social improvements and the military leaders' desire for stability.

This is not to suggest that a military coup is imminent or even likely. Despite western newspaper reports to the contrary, the situation in 1984 is very different from that in 1968. As Víctor Villanueva, a specialist on the Peruvian army, has emphasised to this writer, after the *docenio* the army as an institution is no longer interested in trying to govern. Perhaps an individual could seize power as a *caudillo*, but Villanueva knew of no officer with sufficient power and prestige. Equally important, the *docenio* destroyed the people's belief that a military government could do a better job than a civilian one. Consequently, there appears to be little civilian support for a return to military rule.[9]

[7] *International Herald Tribune*, 23 March 1984 and 11 April 1984.
[8] *ibid.*, 15 November 1983.
[9] Statement by Víctor Villanueva, personal interview, 14 July 1983.

The terrorist challenge

Violent opposition to the government is centred in the activities of th Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, terrorist movement. It takes its nam from the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui, the famous Peruvian revolu tionary, who called the road to a new economic and political order 'the shinin path'. The movement describes itself as a new type of Marxist-Leninist-Maoi party, but its ideology remains unclear. In any case, it is probably a mistake t apply a western ideological label to such an indigenous movement. As Juli Cotler, research director of the Institute of Peruvian Studies, has indicated the Sendero Luminoso is anti-western, anti-industrial, and anti-modern and the contradictions between its policies and those of Mao are cons derable.[10]

The strategy of the Sendero Luminoso, according to captured documents, to seize control of Peru by encircling the cities from the fields in a prolonge revolutionary war. Apparently, the movement has developed a relativel sophisticated organisation consisting of independent, parallel comman and a cellular base similar to that employed by the Marxist-Leninists in Sout Vietnam. The nucleus of the Shining Path is a group of former teache and students from the San Cristobal de Huamanga National University i Ayacucho. The centre of their operations is one of the most isolated and im poverished areas in Peru. While President Belaúnde has suggested they a receiving external aid, no one has furnished conclusive evidence of foreig assistance. Furthermore, it is hard to conceive of external support which woul be ideologically acceptable.[11]

The violence in Peru is Latin America's major armed conflict south of E Salvador; nevertheless, the Sendero Luminoso is not now a serious milita threat to the Belaúnde government. It is a radical fringe movement wit minimal support among the polyglot groups making up the Peruvian left. Fo the first three years of Belaúnde's Administration, terrorist activities we largely confined to the department of Ayacucho, several hundred miles fro Lima. The tempo of violence increased in the summer of 1983 when the te rorists succeeded in dynamiting power installations near Lima, blackening th capital. They also attacked the Lima headquarters of Acción Popular an severely damaged the Bayer industrial works, Peru's largest single exporter o non-traditional goods. Sporadic terrorist acts in Lima and its environs con tinued into 1984. Such acts have had a limited impact on the economy, bu they suggest the terrorists appreciate the power of the press. As Presiden Belaúnde complained to this writer, a terrorist bomb makes headlines in th world's press, but a ton of dynamite detonated to build a road or divert a rive receives no notice.[12]

At the same time, the Sendero Luminoso has raised a question vital to a nas cent democracy: how to combat a terrorist campaign without compromisin

[10] Statement by Julio Cotler, personal interview, 15 July 1983.

[11] Ronald Bruce St John, 'Peru's strange Shining Path', *Washington Post*, 31 January 1984.

[12] For a penetrating analysis of western media coverage of Peru, see Mario Vargas Llosa, 'Lati America: a media stereotype', *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1984, pp. 20–4.

democratic principles? Belaúnde's treatment of the problem has generated a chorus of criticism from religious and human-rights groups and thus tarnished his image as a supporter of democratic values. When Peru's Congress refused to act, the government decreed a tough but controversial anti-terrorist law called Decree Law 46. Many viewed it as a threat to basic freedoms of press, speech, and free association. Its tone suggests a governing party with an embattled mentality. The interrogation and confinement practices of the security forces have also drawn strong criticism.[13]

Radical nationalism is today a powerful political force in Peru as well as elsewhere in Latin America. Such nationalism is naturally anti-foreign, and its favourite target is the United States. With very little long-term presence in Latin America in general or Peru in particular, the Soviet Union has never been a comparable target. Belaúnde has maintained the historical anti-Communist element of Peruvian foreign policy and even added an ideological element arguing that Communism is antithetical to the Inca culture of Peru. On the other hand, he agreed to the exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet Union which was implemented by the military government, and he has moved slowly to redress the Peruvian dependence on Soviet arms and advisers which developed during the *docenio*.

Conflict and cooperation with the United States

The United States-Peruvian relationship is characterised by an ambiguity which has existed since the end of the Second World War. For the most part, this ambiguity arises from a conflict between the demands of post-war Peruvian nationalism and the need for Peru to cooperate with the United States to achieve many of its foreign-policy goals. Recent manifestations of Peruvian nationalism include the decision to diversify arms suppliers, Peru's insistence on a 200-mile territorial sea, and its strong support for Argentina in the Falklands conflict with Britain.

In 1981, Washington supposedly earmarked Peru for special attention under the guidelines of the Cancún Summit. Since that time, Peruvians feel they have been given short shrift by the Reagan Administration. Peruvian officials were especially offended when their country was excluded from the agenda of President Reagan's visit to South America. Relations reached their nadir at the end of 1982 when President Belaúnde cancelled, at the last moment, an official visit to the United States. The immediate issue was Washington's refusal to cancel or delay the imposition of countervailing duties on Peruvian textiles which were scheduled to go into effect during Belaúnde's visit.[14] Because textiles earn Peru some $230 million a year in overseas sales, representing 40 per cent of total non-traditional exports, the visit would have become very embarrassing politically for Belaúnde.

The reasons for the deterioration in Peru's relations with the United States

[13] Aníbal Quijano, 'Notes on human rights in Peru', *LASA Forum*, Summer 1983, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 5–8; Fernando González Vigil, 'More on human rights in Peru', *ibid.*, Winter 1984, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 24–6.

[14] *New York Times*, 4 November 1982.

fit into the broad pattern of relations between the two countries. What American textile manufacturers object to as subsidisation of Peruvian exports, the Peruvians see as help to increase non-traditional exports and reduce dependence on raw materials for foreign-exchange revenue. Consequently, Latin Americans are very concerned with what they see as a growing trend towards protectionism in the United States. There is support in the American Congress, for example, for moves to increase the duty on imported copper and copper products to protect the domestic copper industry.

Important political issues are also at stake. American support for Britain in the Falklands war damaged Washington's relations with Latin America. This was especially true in Lima. Belaúnde called the American position 'blind' and 'anachronistic'. Peru was one of Argentina's most strident defenders throughout the war, often lambasting the United States in international forums for its support of Britain. At one point, President Belaúnde even suggested ousting the United States from the Organisation of American States.[15]

The last year of Belaúnde's term will undoubtedly be a time of testing for him—and for Peru's relations with the United States. Much will depend on the state of the economy and Belaúnde's domestic performance. If the economy does not improve, he will face a further erosion of popular support. This could lead to increased social unrest and expanded terrorist activity, possibly forcing him to choose between a compromise of the democratic process and the increased likelihood of a military takeover.

In any case, an important key to improved relations between Peru and the United States is a more mature understanding of the debilitating effects of economic dependency. Every key economic indicator in Peru has deteriorated alarmingly since this author first visited the country 16 years ago. While many factors have contributed to Peru's problems, including a population which has almost doubled since 1968, the overriding one continues to be its dependent position vis-à-vis the industrial world. Until that relationship is modified, it is unlikely that Peru and most other third-world nations can do more than slow their descent into debtor status.

In the words of the American Economic Consul in Lima, Peru can influence its economic fate in negative terms, but not in positive terms. It can set the stage, but it cannot say what will be played on it.[16] Peru is only one of many developing countries in this position, but it is one of the few seeking to improve the quality of life of its citizens through purposeful social and economic changes. Moreover, it is one of an even smaller minority addressing its problems with democratic, free-enterprise solutions.

[15] Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, 30 November 1982, p. 2.

[16] Statement by M. Gordon Jones, personal interview, 13 July 1983.

New Zealand: the battle for the middle ground

MICHAEL PUGH

THE New Zealand general election on 14 July is likely to mark the end of an era in New Zealand's political history. The period since 1975 has been dominated by the personality and political intelligence of the National Party leader, Sir Robert Muldoon. Under his dynamic authority, the party gained a landslide victory over the ruling Labour Party in 1975 and went on to win the elections of 1978 and 1981, though by narrowing margins and without a majority of the popular vote. Since 1981, Muldoon has operated in Parliament with an effective majority of only one. The state of the parties was: National 47 seats (including the Speaker), Labour 41, Social Credit 2, Independents 2. However, in mid-June 1984, a government backbencher withdrew her support and the Prime Minister decided to precipitate an election before the three-year term ran out in November. Accused by opponents of abusing power in the past nine years, Muldoon will be hard pressed, now, to withstand the economic and political forces which have been withering National's grass-roots support.

The election issues

There is little doubt that a major election issue will be the country's struggling economy. In 1975 Muldoon, an accountant by profession, impressed large audiences with charts purporting to show that the Labour government was mismanaging the economy and mortgaging the country by borrowing heavily from overseas. Since then, the external debt has multiplied and the budget deficit has reached massive proportions. New Zealand has been one of the worst economic performers in the group of countries that belong to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Real per capita income fell by 11 per cent between 1974 and 1980, and in the past five years the average yearly increase in gross domestic product has been 0·5 per cent. In January 1984, the Treasury revised its growth projections downwards from 4 per cent to between 1 and 3 per cent for the next 15 years. Also in January, registered unemployment reached a record 10 per cent of the work force. The government has blamed the oil crises, the world slump, and protectionism among trading partners. There is some validity in this, for New Zealand has a developing economy reliant on a limited range of exports and vulnerable to international trading conditions. Muldoon, who is Minister of Finance as well as Prime Minister, has championed free trade, has advocated a new Bretton Woods agreement to stabilise the world monetary system, and

The author is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Adult Education Department of the University of Southampton. From 1962 to 1969 he studied at Auckland University and he was Lecturer in History at Massey University, New Zealand, from 1970 to 1975.

has protested bitterly against the 'economic lunacy' of the European Community's common agricultural policy.[1]

Nevertheless, both the International Monetary Fund and the OECD have argued that New Zealand's infrastructure requires overhauling, and that some of its economic ills are domestic in origin.[2] Indeed, New Zealand has its own long-established system of protection. Farmers, though extremely efficient, are cushioned by cheap loans, tax allowances, subsidies and, during Muldoon's term, by price support. In 1983 the government spent $NZ 150 million on price support for sheepmeat.[3] Manufacturing is safeguarded, not by a highly visible tariff wall, but by rigid exchange and import controls; importers and local manufacturers are normally able to charge what the domestic market of 3·2 m people will bear. To National's credit, exporting has been diversified, notably in regard to timber, horticulture and beef. Japan, China and Pakistan are now major trading partners. Iran is New Zealand's largest sheepmeat customer, and it is worth noting that New Zealand did not join the trade boycott arranged by the United States during the hostage crisis. There is clearly an element of risk, however, in relying on cash payments from a country locked into a war with Iraq, and in fact payments were disrupted in 1981–2. In spite of a diplomatic break with the Soviet Union lasting from 1980 to 1984, New Zealand continued to sell 25 per cent of its meat exports to that country, and more wool than to the United Kingdom. National has also placed export hopes in a Closer Economic Relations Agreement with Australia, which came into effect at the beginning of 1983.

However, as an economic historian, John Gould, points out, a steady and substantial decline in the terms of trade since the early 1970s has remained an intractable problem.[4] It has been reflected in the fall in the value of the New Zealand dollar—by 22 per cent against major currencies since 1979. The next government, of whatever complexion, could well undertake further devaluation. Muldoon's long-term answer has been a bold but risky one. In 1979, the Cabinet decided to launch a restructuring of the economy to make it less dependent on agricultural exports, to exploit natural resources (especially energy), and to promote large-scale industrialisation. For example, steel capacity was to be quadrupled by exploiting littoral iron sand. As Gould remarks, after years of drift, Muldoon's 'Think Big', as it was called, at least had the merit of being an economic strategy. The risks arise from the requirement for massive government spending and foreign loans to establish capital projects which might never repay the investment. Some schemes, including a second aluminium smelter which relied on overseas investment, have already been cancelled. An extension to the Marsden Point oil refinery in Northland

[1] *Financial Times*, 17 May 1983.

[2] *ibid.*, 18 March 1980; 7 March 1981; *The Times*, 10 October 1983.

[3] Economic statistics in this article are derived from the London financial press and from official figures issued by the Department of Statistics, Wellington. In June 1984 the exchange rate was approximately $NZ 2·15 = £1.

[4] John Gould, *'The Rake's Progress'?: The New Zealand Economy Since 1945* (Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982).

and the construction of a pipeline from Whangarei to Auckland are among the projects which threaten greatly to exceed estimated costs. The budget deficit has risen to a record $NZ 3·2 billion in 1984. Overseas indebtedness has also risen dramatically, from $NZ 233 million in 1979 to a forecast $NZ 1·6 billion in 1984. A debt-service ratio of about 25 per cent does not put New Zealand in the same class as Brazil, but is above the level considered potentially dangerous by international bankers. Seemingly unconcerned about the financial aspects of Think Big, Muldoon's Keynesian strategy will take time to yield results and cannot be expected to impress voters who seek immediate alleviation from economic hardship.

Nor have the government's short-term policies mollified the electorate. Between June 1982 and the beginning of 1984, Muldoon imposed price controls and a wage freeze. This effectively reduced inflation from 16 per cent to 4 per cent, but employees have not been fully compensated for a fall in real income. In April 1984 they were offered a flat-rate general wage order which amounted to a 2·9 per cent increase on the average wage. The offer was promptly rejected by the Federation of Labour. This is not to say that the FOL can mobilise political resistance. Unemployment, anti-union legislation, and deep public fear of union militancy and disorder have conspired to weaken the industrial wing of the labour movement. The government has the power to de-register unions, thus removing their legal status; strikes judged 'political' are illegal; and since February 1984 the closed shop has been banned and strikes over union membership outlawed. Muldoon has been on fairly safe political ground in dealing with the unions. In 1981 some 30,000 people marched through Auckland to protest against union militancy, and on several occasions Muldoon threatened to call a snap election to test union support. For its part, the FOL avoided an industrial conflict which would strengthen the government's electoral chances. Nevertheless, the incomes policy has contributed to the sense of economic malaise which can only benefit the other political parties.

Moreover, Muldoon's economic *dirigisme* seems to have alienated erstwhile National supporters who subscribe to the ethos of economic individualism, in a country where half of the farms are less than 200 acres, industrial enterprises are small-scale, and there are as many retailers per 1,000 of the population as there were in France at the time of the Poujadist revolt in the 1950s (about twice the ratio for the United Kingdom in 1980s).[3] There is no 'Poujadist' bloc vote but the Think Big strategy promises less protection for small enterprise and yet more government interference in the economy. Muldoon's opponents have been quick to make political capital out of this antagonism.

A second, perhaps unspoken, issue in the election campaign will revolve around Muldoon's style of management. Nine years ago Muldoon correctly sensed the electorate's desire for a tough-talking father-figure and reached

[3] Roger Eatwell, 'Poujadism and neo-Poujadism: from revolt to reconciliation', in Philip G. Cerny, ed., *Social Movements and Protest in France* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); A. Aburn, 'Structural characteristics of the New Zealand retail economy', *Pacific Viewpoint*, May 1977, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 93–103.

well into Labour's traditional blue-collar support for votes. According to an independent observer, Muldoon had drawn on 'the latent authoritarian and intolerant instincts of his fellow-countrymen'.[6] The Commissioner of Police expressed the view, widely held, that the 'sludge of social anarchy was being trampled into New Zealand lives on the boots of less-than-justified-liberalism'.[7] Muldoon seemed to revel in disconcerting those who held liberal assumptions. Elected in November 1975, Parliament was not called until June 1976. Soon afterwards, during a Parliamentary cross-fire, the Prime Minister cited police files to accuse an Opposition MP of homosexual conduct. The churches and the press were accused of coming under 'socialist influences'. Opponents of sporting contacts with South Africa were alleged to be engaged in activity bordering on treason. Critics of a Bill which brought the Secret Intelligence Service under the Prime Minister's direct control and extended its powers were said to be 'comforting the enemy'. Writing for the *Financial Times* (26 March 1980), a New Zealand political scientist indicated that critics of the Prime Minister or his government's policies were liable to suffer personal denigration, sometimes aimed from 'behind the safety curtain of Parliamentary privilege'. It is impossible to say how many of the 100,000 people who left New Zealand within five years, thereby contributing to a net migration loss, departed not only for a better standard of living but also for a more congenial political climate. The government's combative approach to politics certainly created widespread dismay. A storm of protest broke in 1976 when Pacific Islanders in Auckland, suspected of overstaying their entry permits, experienced dawn raids by police with dogs. The spectacular demonstrations which accompanied the 1981 South African rugby tour of New Zealand were neither new (there had been violent outrage on a smaller scale during the Vietnam War) nor surprising to those aware of the political tensions which lay beneath the country's placid exterior.

Within National Party circles a feeling grew that the Prime Minister's combativeness, though useful in helping to keep the Opposition in disarray, would no longer win votes. During his absence overseas in 1980, Caucus members attempted a coup; but without a forceful alternative leader it was crushed on Muldoon's return. Since then, the Prime Minister has displeased members of the legal establishment by alleged circumvention of constitutional norms and public criticism of individual judges. In 1982 he was also confronted by a rebellion among young party activists after he had sacked the Minister of Works, Mr Derek Quigley, for openly opposing the Think Big strategy. Quigley represented party members concerned about the government's illiberal image as well as its interventionist economic policy. Muldoon responded by extolling the pragmatic social virtues of state intervention and welcoming a new party president from among the ranks of the rebels.[8] In April 1984, the Caucus also elected as deputy leader a low-ranking Cabinet Minister with a reputation for liberal views, Mr James McLay.

A new management style, with Muldoon adopting the image of a pragmatic

[6] *Guardian Weekly*, 8 January 1977. [7] *The Press* (Christchurch), 31 October 1977.
[8] *Evening Post* (Wellington), 2 August 1982; *The Press*, 3 August 1982.

senior statesman, could be significant for courting an electorate which, in a general sense, may feel the need for national reconciliation after the traumas of the Springbok tour. In this regard there may be doubts about the Prime Minister's capacity to handle increasing militancy and unity among Maoris. A trek to Waitangi in March 1984, to protest at the loss of tribal lands, drew together educated radicals, underprivileged urban Maoris, and elders from traditionally conservative tribes. The land has a great symbolic significance, but the unrest involves wider social issues and questions the concept of integration in a multi-racial society. Although only a tenth of the population is Maori, half the prison inmates are Maoris, and a third of the unemployed are Maoris. Pakeha (white) politicians can no longer assume that Maoris will continue to accept the rules of racial integration. Reconciliation of Maori and Pakeha interests will prove a stringent test even for a consensus politician. To appease social unrest, National's campaign will focus on its administrative experience and the promise of an economic breakthrough into prosperity. However, defections to a brand-new political body, the New Zealand Party, have reduced National's popular support as expressed in opinion polls. National cannot enter the campaign too confidently with the New Zealand Party poised to attack a large number of marginal electorates, several of which National holds by fewer than 250 votes.

Muldoon's new challenger

There is little love lost between Muldoon and the Wellington property speculator, Mr Bob Jones, who founded the New Zealand Party in 1983. Formerly a National Party stalwart, Jones now criticises the Prime Minister for becoming a dictator and the National Party for stifling individual freedom.[9] His break with National seems to have been occasioned by an income tax Bill of 1982 which removed tax concessions for horticultural enterprises. Irrespective of this, the new party's founders were clearly offended by the level of state intervention which the Think Big policy entailed. The first objective in the New Zealand Party's manifesto is:

> To promote a nation in which individual freedom, self-determination and self-reliance are encouraged, free from undue government interference and without impediment from those with differing views. . .

It is not a new doctrine and finds political expression whenever the economy fails to respond to management by 'conservative' interventionists. But unlike earlier, ill-starred, free-enterprise parties, notably the Democrat Party of 1935, the New Zealand Party is monetarist, openly anti-egalitarian, and has substantial financial backing.

It advocates incentives for entrepreneurs through state assistance and tax concessions, and incentives for others through removal of state assistance and the enactment of coercive legislation. Tax rates and the limitations on state functions would be part of a new written constitution, and the economy would

[9] *The Dominion* (Wellington), 9 February 1984.

be subjected to the rigours of market forces The exchange rate would be allowed to float downwards by as much as 25 per cent to promote exports; strict monetary control would be imposed to control monetary inflation; and local industry protected against low-cost imports. The economy would be stimulated through the abolition of death duties and capital gains tax, and there would be a range of concessions for such enterprises as ski-field development, commercial advertising and horticulture. A flat-rate income tax of 30 per cent on earnings over $NZ 10,000 would replace the current graduated system. Government expenditure would be slashed, especially on welfare. Unemployment benefit would cease and the party would introduce legislation 'making it a criminal offence liable to imprisonment for breadwinners who fail to provide adequate support for their children'. A job guarantee scheme would prevent overcrowding in prisons. The already small defence budget of $NZ 700 million would be cut by 90 per cent. The party takes a 'little New Zealander' stance and would withdraw from the Anzus Pact, relying on an elite civil defence corps. By contrast, government spending would increase on education (as a measure of economic investment), public works employment, tourism and an enlarged police force (to combat the burgeoning crime rates).

New Zealand Party activists are land speculators, businessmen, managers and professionals, notably from the Bay of Plenty and the Volcanic Plateau, areas which would stand to gain from assistance to tourism and horticulture. Muldoon has called it 'the rich man's party'. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Party attracts support from the whole lower-middle-class spectrum, and received 18 per cent of the 'votes' in a December 1983 opinion poll. Jones has already halved support for the Social Credit Party, which traditionally captured the conservative protest vote. He appeals to the Poujadist dislike of state regulations, taxation and industrialisation. The New Zealand Party hopes to win seats at National's expense, and Jones himself is standing for Ohariu, the Wellington seat held by Mr Hugh Templeton, Minister for Trade and Industry. He accuses both National and Labour of socialist policies, but regards the middle-class wing of the Labour Party as the more dangerous competitor.

Labour's deep divisions

Over the years the Labour Party has had to cope with shrinking membership, a declining share of the vote and a slackening of trade union support. Since Mr David Lange became leader in February 1983, its fortunes have revived slightly and it has been running neck and neck with National in the opinion polls. An Auckland lawyer and Methodist lay preacher, the son of a doctor from a blue-collar suburb, Lange is in his early forties and attracts support with his debating skills and oratory. His rise, like that of other New Zealand political leaders, has been rapid. He was first elected to Parliament in a by-election in 1977. His deputy, Dr Geoffrey Palmer, a former professor of constitutional law, has been an MP only since 1978. Novelty and charisma have been important electoral factors since the early 1970s. But the party is far from united and has not really been able to pose an alternative strategy to National's

Think Big policy. There is a suspicion that behind Lange's rhetoric lurks indecision and woolliness. He represents the middle-class wing of the party and is backed by a faction of Auckland MPs who see the role of the state as 'helping private enterprise to make a bob or two'.[10] Ranged against them are South Island MPs and the president of the party, Mr Jim Anderton, who is contesting a seat at this election. This group values traditional Labour policies of protection for nascent industries and the use of taxation to redistribute wealth.

Labour's divisions extend into foreign policy. Lange attempted to qualify its 1983 conference decision to ban the visit of nuclear submarines, and has favoured both the Anzus Pact, which ties New Zealand to the American strategic security net, and the Closer Economic Relations Agreement with Australia. None of this has been wholly acceptable to the more radical elements in the party and the official manifesto indicates support for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone and renegotiation of the Anzus Pact.

Labour also has to shake off the loser image. Since 1949, it has held office for only two terms of three years each. Its main hope is that desertions from National, either to the New Zealand Party or into non-voting, will outnumber defections from Labour. Given its internal problems and the competition it faces for lower-middle-class allegiance, an election victory will be almost as uncomfortable as a fourth consecutive defeat.

The uncertain prospect

The struggle for the large and volatile middle ground in New Zealand politics has become so acute that ideological labels of the left and right variety are meaningless. The National Party, traditionally supported by private enterprise and the wealthier sections of the community, is pursuing massive state intervention. The Labour Party protests at the distortions this creates, but is itself divided between traditionalists who emphasise protection for the poor, and those who seek to satisfy the aspirations of the predominantly lower-middle-class electorate. The New Zealand Party represents right-wing radicalism and a commitment to reverse egalitarian measures, but it leans to the left on education, defence and the re-establishment of political tolerance.

Out of this confusion, compounded by boundary changes and an increase in the number of seats from 92 to 95, it seems unlikely that any single party will emerge with an overall majority. Much will depend on how many seats the new party wins and whether it gains them at the expense of Labour or National. If Labour's vote holds, then Labour could win unexpected seats, as it did in 1935 when an earlier businessmen's party split the conservative vote and added several rural electorates to Labour's tally. No one can discount Muldoon's chances of becoming the only twentieth-century politician to win four elections in a row, but the odds against him dominating New Zealand politics after July have lengthened. Now in his mid-60s, even if he survives the election he may well yield the leadership to a less embattled colleague. The end of an era in this country's politics seems to be in sight.

[10] *The Times*, 10 October 1983.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Notes of the month

OPEC'S DEEPENING SPLIT

THE squabbles over prices and oil production quotas that marked the Opec meeting in Vienna on 10 July were merely the outward manifestation of a deepening split inside the organisation. The main task of the 13-member Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) is to protect the oil price at a time of stagnant or falling demand. The prime mover in all this has been Saudi Arabia. Last March, the Saudis persuaded the organisation to cut oil prices by an average of $5 a barrel and since then have assumed the prime role in defending the new, lower price in an unfavourable market. It is this role as price setter that has brought Saudi Arabia into growing and bitter conflict with many of its Opec partners, and in particular with Iran.

During the 1970s, as oil prices rose in nominal terms at a rate of 26 per cent a year, many Opec countries became accustomed to constantly rising prices for their main export commodity. Their expectations rose further between 1979 and 1980 when official prices for oil more than doubled in the wake of the fall of the Shah and the subsequent precipitous drop in Iranian production. This windfall gain for the other Opec producers was greeted with understandable enthusiasm. In this enormous price rise, however, lie the roots of Opec's present difficulties: namely the growing split between Iran and Saudi Arabia over how oil should be priced. This rift has become all the more dangerous now that the two countries find themselves on opposite sides in a war.

The Saudis can hardly be said to have engineered such a confrontation deliberately. The main aim of their foreign policy up to 1978 had traditionally been to maintain a low profile and to avoid aligning themselves strongly with any regional or international grouping. In 1979, however, under pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia agreed to increase its oil production to make up for the huge shortfall in Iranian output and, in so doing, to assuage the panic-buying in the oil market during the first six months when in some cases official prices rose by over 60 per cent. The tactic failed and the price of Iran's main crude oil, Iranian Light, rose by another 38 per cent in the second half of the year.

The events of late 1979 had two significant results. Saudi Arabia, alarmed at the rapidly rising oil price, determined to try and moderate the rises as much as possible in order to protect the market for oil in the longer term. Iran determined to keep production levels low and support a continuing rise in the oil price. At the beginning of 1980 the official price of Iranian Light was $30·37 a barrel, whilst the Saudis' similar quality Arabian Light was 14 per cent cheaper at $26.

What started as a difference of opinion over oil pricing policy rapidly developed into a major foreign policy issue which even now underlies the major tensions within Opec. What served to sharpen these largely commercial dis-

agreements over oil selling tactics and prices was the rising t
Persian Gulf during 1980, which forced the Saudis to defend t
and take a more vigorous line than they had previously.

Early that year the United States had called for economic san
Iran following the seizure of the American Embassy whilst,
time, Iran and Iraq were moving closer and closer towards war.
Arabia's efforts in the direction of price moderation, supported
production whilst Iran's output remained depressed—partly as
American-led embargo on Iranian oil—led to accusations by
Saudis were trying to destroy the Iranian economy.

Saudi Arabia's cheaper oil prices certainly attracted many of
customers. Despite a 7 per cent fall in world consumption betw
1981, Saudi production rose by 3 per cent whilst Iran's plumm
58 per cent. The Iranians responded with higher prices. By the
however, it was clear that the extra Saudi production had help
world market, and prices were now under pressure. Iran respond
cutting prices and increasing production. This threatened the
pricing structure, and forced the group in March of that year to a
duction ceiling of 17·5m barrels a day. Because the Saudis had be
at high levels in the months preceding the March conference, Sh
was able to argue for a high quota for his country, reflecting Sa
current share of Opec's total output. Thus he obtained a qu
barrels a day or just over 40 per cent of the full Opec quota. Iran
whose share of Opec's production had been declining, was allow
only 1·2m barrels a day or 7 per cent of the full quota. In 1978,
hand, the last full year before the revolution, Saudi Arabia's O
been only 28 per cent, whilst that of Iran was 17 per cent.

In March 1983 the Iranians gained agreement for a doubling
quota—but only at the expense of a Saudi-led move to cut the pri
average of $5 a barrel.

Since 1979, therefore, Saudi Arabia has consistently found it
sition to Iran on pricing and production policy. At the same time
tical situation in the Persian Gulf has deteriorated, these once
differences have come to mark a major point of conflict in fo
Moreover, the outlook is set for a growing confrontation betw
countries.

In 1979 Opec accounted for 48 per cent of the world's oil proc
year the proportion is just over 30 per cent. World demand has fall
impact of higher prices and Opec has found itself being pushed i
tion of supplier of last resort. This has occurred as the main cons
tries look to countries such as the United Kingdom and the Sovi
their baseload supplies and turn to Opec only for supplies that c
from these new sources.

Thus, radical measures are needed if Opec is to regain its fo
shares and, again, the choice is largely between Saudi-inspired p

those of Iran. The Saudis want a price freeze until at least the end of 1985. Thereafter, when market conditions improve, they would like to see oil prices rising roughly in line with inflation in order to keep oil competitive with other fuels. Production, meanwhile, should remain close to 17·5m barrels a day and quotas should only be increased as general market conditions improve. The Iranians, of course, would still like a rise in their own quota, but Saudi Arabia appears to have pre-empted this by agreeing that Nigeria should have priority in any raising of output levels.

Iran's position is quite the opposite. An immediate increase in oil prices is sought—back to their general pre-March 1983 level of $34 a barrel—as well as an increase in Iran's quota to at least 3·2m barrels a day. The latter would have to be largely at the expense of Saudi Arabia. The higher price would be supported, according to Iran, by a reduction in Opec's production as a whole.

So far, the Saudis appear to be winning the argument, especially since they are able to support their case by altering their own production levels in order to balance the supply and demand for Opec oil as a whole. This is because they have never consented to being given a production quota like the rest of the Opec members. Their position has been as 'swing producer', which enables them to go above or below their nominal 5m barrels a day allocation in order to keep the oil market in balance.

The world oil market, however, is not really susceptible to this kind of fine tuning and the Saudis risk the wrath of their cash-short partners if events get out of hand and oil prices begin to fall dramatically. In addition to this, most producing countries fear a major collapse in prices if the Gulf war should come to an end, since this would allow both Iran and Iraq to increase production and exports following the pacification of the Gulf's shipping lanes.

The ending of the Iran–Iraq war, however, will not mean the end of the Saudi–Iran conflict. Assuming that the war did not end in total defeat for Iran, it is safe to assume that the Iranians would press their case for higher prices and lower Opec production with renewed vigour. Following a steady fall in oil prices in both nominal and real terms since 1982, the Iranians could find themselves with enough allies amongst the radical states, such as Libya, or those like Nigeria with large populations and ambitious development programmes, to defeat any Saudi moves towards moderation. The Saudis would then have to make probably their most important policy decision so far: whether to use their power as the swing producer to overproduce and thereby torpedo any move to raise prices, or to yield to Iranian pressure and consent to a rise in prices.

The long-term consequences of an Iranian victory on prices would on the whole be unwelcome to Opec. High oil prices would encourage new production in areas outside the organisation, particularly in the third world. At the same time, the leading industrialised countries would seek to substitute oil by other fuels. Oil's share of world energy consumption has already fallen from 45 per cent to 40 per cent between 1979 and 1983, and a further decline would undoubtedly follow. Western Europe, in particular, would find Soviet gas

increasingly attractive, thus reopening recent controversies with the Unite States on east-west energy trade. For third-world debtor nations such a Mexico, an oil price rise would be a welcome—though temporary—relief, bu non-oil-producing countries—including many east European and Africa countries—would be plunged further into debt.

On balance, both Opec and the rest of the world would be better off withou higher oil prices. Whether this is achieved or not depends largely on whethe Saudi Arabia can continue to hold the price line in Opec and this means, i effect, that the Saudis may have to modify their desire to maintain a low pro file in their foreign policy. Whether the Kingdom likes it or not, its domesti oil policy is now a major factor in Middle Eastern diplomacy. A new, mor assertive foreign policy is now needed if Saudi Arabia is to continue its rol as the leading moderating influence in the world market.

PAUL McDONALD*

* The author is Senior Oil Analyst for Shearson/American Express Ltd.

JAPAN: NAKASONE AND THE FACTIONS

OF the participants at the London Economic Summit in June, Yasuhir Nakasone was probably the most concerned about political developments a home in his absence. His comments at his press conferences before returnin to Tokyo showed that quite clearly. Already, in mid-April, he had reluctantl decided to abandon a proposed European tour after the Summit as well as a Australasian visit planned for late July.

For Nakasone, who had laid great emphasis on his role as an internationa statesman since becoming Prime Minister in November 1982, to give suc priority to domestic political considerations was a measure of the seriousnes with which he is approaching the coming battle for the presidency of the rul ing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Nakasone had been disconcerted by th larger-than-expected losses which the LDP had suffered in the December 198 House of Representatives elections, primarily because of the Lockheed briber conviction of the former Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka. Yet, by engineer ing the coalition with the small New Liberal Club (NLC), originally a splinte group from the LDP, he was able to weather the storm, and now has his eye firmly set on breaking the recent run of two-year premierships and being re elected as party leader, and consequently Prime Minister, in November.

Tanaka himself has not lost his influence over the largest of the LDP fac tions, which together with the faction of the preceding Prime Minister, Zenko Suzuki, provides the 'mainstream' backing for Nakasone and his own smallish faction. As a result, Nakasone makes little positive effort to distance him self from Tanaka while his re-election remains in doubt. Despite criticism

ie 'anti-mainstream' factions of Takeo Fukuda and Toshio Komoto, ointed one senior member of the Tanaka faction to the vacant LDP :sidency in April and retained another in a restructured Cabinet post by the administrative reorganisation at the beginning of July.

ough the strength and institutionalisation of these five major factions › make the LDP seem like a coalition of parties-within-a-party, the pact e NLC has produced the first real coalition government for 35 years. s worked out well for the LDP in general, and the Nakasone faction cular. Relative stability has been restored. The LDP continues to con- icial Diet committees. The opposition parties have been split. The nfluence on policy decisions has been limited and has, if anything, de- For the NLC, on the other hand, the experiment has been less success- as been subjected to a flood of criticism from the other opposition par- rticularly from the Buddhist-backed Komeito party, which had—and —visions of leading a coalition of the four centre parties. The NLC has little influence—apart from an early success in pushing through a : for the public disclosure of Cabinet Ministers' personal assets. It has a delicate line between preserving its independence and avoiding be- ›sorbed into the LDP (a fate clearly anticipated by some LDP leaders), one hand, and disrupting the coalition and facing possible electoral ı, on the other.

'arious ideas being floated about coalitions have only served to split and the opposition parties. Without any notable change in LDP policies, of the opposition parties seem to be changing their line so as to draw › the LDP. Not only has the gap between the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), ın Communist Party and the centre parties widened, but even among :r differences are becoming more visible. Significantly, the new chair- the JSP, Masashi Ishibashi, is trying to create for his party a new image ›re 'realistic' party. This is shown by his April trip to the United nd the intra-party debate over whether or not the Self-Defence Forces :onstitutional but legal' and his attempt to move more towards the ;round.

:he stability of Nakasone's own base is more apparent than real. ıe was persuaded to limit his overseas trips during the summer months irtually compulsory attendance at the London Summit because of the ensure the passage through the Diet of several Bills to which the party l importance. Failure to secure their passage would bring strong intra- essure on him. It even could bring about a realignment of the party fac- ch as to deny him the presidency in November. The measures that ıe wishes to push through the Diet include three important items: ›ns to the health insurance system, the establishment of a commission ational reform, and the next phase of administrative reform legislation ily the 'privatisation' of two government monopolies). This means a ted process of bargaining with various interests both inside and out- party. Late last year Nakasone managed to secure the passage of several

Bills covering the first phase of administrative reform, but did so at the price of calling an election.

Though the Diet session has now been extended till into August, doubts still persist about whether the Bills can be passed in the time available. A fourth Bill, redrawing several Diet constituencies, has already been effectively shelved, and Nakasone is coming under further factional pressure over the budget plans for next year. Japan's deficit-ridden finances required a particularly austere budget this year, with a margin of overall growth in general account spending being limited to 0·5 per cent. Social welfare and education expenditure suffered, but defence and official development aid received bigger appropriations. Nakasone seemed to regain some of his self-confidence with the establishment of the LDP–NLC coalition and, in last-minute interministerial haggling over the budget, personally directed that defence spending should be increased by a symbolic fraction above that in 1983.

No sooner had the budget been passed in April than the Finance Ministry fired the opening salvo in the 1985 budget battle by demanding that ministries should produce budget proposals below the 1984 levels and cut general expenditure by 10 per cent. Some leading LDP politicians have criticised these 'negative' budget ceilings for the third consecutive year, but the business community has been favourable, and after some wavering Nakasone has reiterated that the government will have to be 'quite strict' in applying these ceilings if it is to carry out the rehabilitation of the nation's finances without net tax increases. Nakasone's retrenchment policy has been criticised by two politicians with their eyes on the November party elections. Toshio Komoto has argued for a more expansionist economic policy. Kiichi Miyazawa, heir-apparent to the Suzuki faction, announced in June a rather grandiose 'asset-doubling plan' for the coming decade. In fact, economic growth has been speeding up. In 1983, real gross national product grew by 3·7 per cent, and this year according to officials in the Economic Planning Agency, it is likely to grow by 4–5 per cent.

Nakasone had reckoned with less diplomatic activity this year than the last, and yet the fact that for domestic political reasons he has had to curtail his overseas activities, limiting himself to trips to China, the Indian sub-continent and the London Summit, has been galling to him. Since becoming Prime Minister, Nakasone has gradually built up an image in Japan and, even more, abroad of a leader more capable and effective in diplomacy than his predecessors. He made serious efforts to improve relations with the United States and South Korea; he visited the members of Asean (Association of South-East Asian Nations) to reassure them about Japan's intentions; and he worked hard for the success of the Williamsburg Summit. However modest, his moves to increase Japan's defence capability and open up financial markets have earned him the grudging respect of the Americans, even though his early excursions abroad and robust comments he made while there did little for his popularity inside Japan. His 'high profile' foreign policy, which included bringing on visits to Japan in the autumn of 1983 a succession of 'star' foreign

dignitaries, could not prevent the Tanaka issue from doing damage in the December elections. This year Nakasone's diplomacy has had to be played in a lower key.

Recent public opinion polls suggest that Nakasone's popularity is on the rise (a Kyodo poll in mid-June showed support for his Cabinet at a record high of 53 per cent). The other factions' so-called 'new leaders' do not yet seem able to outshine him. Yet, in many ways, with the partial exception of the more internationalist Miyazawa, these aspiring leaders are much more in the traditional mould of Japanese political leadership than Nakasone himself. Now that the budget has been passed and Nakasone has come back from his last overseas trip of the summer, the factional manoeuvring in the LDP has become more open and intense. Whatever the general public's view, the November LDP election will be decided by the party faithful, and ultimately, by the handful of faction leaders. Despite his confidence in public, Nakasone is well aware, in the words of the Japanese political aphorism he quoted in his Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London in June, that 'in politics, one inch ahead it is pitch dark'.

BRIAN BRIDGES*

*Dr Bridges is a Research Associate at the Royal Institute of International Affairs specialising in Asia. He was in Japan in April and May this year.

The widening Atlantic: Nato at another crossroads

DONALD NUECHTERLEIN

FOR those who live in free societies, George Orwell's gloomy predictions about the nature of existence in 1984 have proved to be unfounded. When he wrote in the early post-1945 period, he had good reason to be pessimistic: Europe lay in ruins, Britain was the only democracy to survive Hitler's massive onslaught on western civilisation, and the political mood in western Europe bordered on desperation. In Italy and France, Communist parties came close to achieving dominant power through the electoral process and general strikes; Britain, Orwell believed, would eventually succumb to an authoritarian mode of government led by the far left of the British Labour Party.

Three and a half decades later none of this has occurred, and western

The author is Professor of International Affairs at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia. He has published several books on American foreign policy. His forthcoming book, *America Overcommitted: US National Interests in the 1980s*, is to be published by the University Press of Kentucky. Professor Nuechterlein contributed an article on convergence and divergence in the North Atlantic relationship to the May 1983 issue of *The World Today*.

Europe's democracies are probably stronger than at any time in the twentieth century. The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain have renounced fascism in favour of parliamentary democracy, and no nation in western Europe has seriously contemplated turning over political power to an indigenous Communist party. All of them have become more prosperous economically than at any time in their history. Why, then, are Europeans pessimistic about the future?

At root, Europe's unease and foreboding result from a perception that people and governments are not in charge of their destiny and that a major war will occur and destroy the gains made since 1945. This is a relatively new phenomenon. During the 1950s and 1960s, Europeans believed there was little likelihood that war would occur because the United States held a clear superiority of power—especially in the field of nuclear weapons—and it was therefore assumed that the Soviet leadership would not risk its own destruction by launching an attack westward. Even in the 1970s when there was nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, Europeans did not fear war because the superpowers had concluded a strategic arms limitation agreement and were launching an era of détente in their political and economic relations. Movement towards détente between the superpowers had begun in the late 1960s and seemed to be firmly established in the Helsinki accords of 1975. This feeling of confidence about the future came to an abrupt halt in 1979, however. Five years later we find deep concern on both sides of the Atlantic about the possibility of war and the use of nuclear weapons.

There are three reasons, I believe, for the sharp change of mood since 1979. First, the Iranian crisis led the European and American governments to draw different conclusions about the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf area, and what should be done about it. Second, Soviet deployment of theatre (intermediate-range) nuclear missiles (SS-20s) aimed at west European cities caused European governments to worry about nuclear intimidation by the Kremlin. They therefore asked a sceptical United States to build and thereafter deploy similar weapons in western Europe.[1] Third, American political leadership was criticised in western Europe for being either inept in dealing with the superpower relationship (during the Carter Administration) or too bellicose and thus dangerous in managing European security (during Ronald Reagan's tenure). Let us examine these factors.

The fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979 had a profound impact on the regional power balance in the Middle East and South-West Asia. Some Europeans and Americans thought the Carter Administration could have prevented the collapse of the pro-western government there and its replacement by a hostile Islamic regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. Others believed that even if the Shah were ousted, there remained a good possibility that a moderate government might emerge that would be nationalistic but not anti-western. The central issue, however, was the policy of the United States government after the Khomeini regime accepted responsibility for imprison-

[1] For background, see David S. Yost, 'START, INF and European Security', *The World Today*, November 1983.

ing 52 American Embassy personnel in November 1979, and after the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan a few weeks later to put down a recalcitrant Marxist government.

Europeans and Americans drew different conclusions from these events. European governments, by and large, urged the Carter Administration to show restraint in dealing with Iran and the Soviet Union. From a European perspective, the taking of American hostages by a revolutionary government in Iran was unfortunate, but no cause for war or other military action. The invasion of Afghanistan could be understood, many Europeans said, as a Soviet attempt to deal with an unstable country on the Soviet Union's doorstep and constituting a security threat to 50–60 million Soviet Moslems living across the border. Political and some economic pressure, not a military buildup in the Indian Ocean, was the way many European political leaders thought Carter should respond to the Soviet military move into Afghanistan.

President Carter ruled out a military response to the Iranian seizure of American diplomats and adopted severe economic and political sanctions against the Khomeini regime. He also imposed an embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union to show displeasure over the invasion of Afghanistan. Europeans were reluctant to adopt economic sanctions because of their need for Iranian oil and exports to Iran. They were also unwilling, particularly the government in Bonn, to agree to trade sanctions against the Soviet Union and eastern Europe; but they went along with political gestures such as withdrawal from the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980. President Carter, under increasing pressure at home to exhibit toughness instead of prayers on behalf of the hostages and military power instead of political posturing in response to the Soviet buildup in Afghanistan, decided on a military rescue mission in Iran and a naval show of strength in the Indian Ocean. The ill-fated rescue mission in April 1980 caused great unease in Europe because it demonstrated that Mr Carter had become desperate for an end to the hostage crisis and might therefore use force against Iran.

The expansion of American military power in the Indian Ocean was not criticised by European governments, but neither was there much inclination to identify with growing American concern for the deteriorating political situation in South-West Asia, for example, by sending European naval and air units there. Indeed, President Carter's declaration in January 1980, in his State of the Union Message to Congress, that the Persian Gulf area was a 'vital interest' of the United States and would be defended by American forces if necessary, caused great unease in European capitals because it raised the prospect of war in the Middle East and the likely interruption of Europe's vital oil supply. American official opinion, on the other hand, was moving steadily in the direction of tougher measures, including military moves, to deal with the Iranian government and warn the Soviet Union not to be tempted to use force in the Persian Gulf region. European fears were heightened in the summer of 1980 when Ronald Reagan became the Republican nominee for President and promised to rebuild American prestige around the world after what he described as its ruinous decline during the 1970s.

The second factor which changed the generally optimistic mood of Europeans about their security situation emerged in 1981-2 when the time approached to implement a 1979 decision of Nato to deploy theatre nuclear weapons. This triggered a massive and sometimes a violent response from European 'peace' groups and great unease among a majority of the people. It is useful to recall that the proposal to match the Soviet SS-20 deployment with a Nato Euromissile was initiated by European leaders (specifically West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt) out of concern that an American President could not realistically be expected to counter a Soviet missile threat to European cities with strategic weapons launched from the United States. Although American military planners were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack on western Europe would be met with a submarine-launched nuclear retaliation on Soviet territory—thus maintaining nuclear deterrence—President Carter agreed to build Pershing II mobile missiles for deployment in West Germany and to install ground-launched cruise missiles in Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium as well as West Germany. European and American leaders agreed that actual deployment of these theatre nuclear weapons would depend on the outcome of further talks between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit, and perhaps reduce, the number and types of nuclear weapons each side would build in the 1980s. There was an assumption that the SALT II treaty, negotiated by the Carter Administration, would be ratified by the American Senate.

When it became clear to Europeans in 1981-2 that a new arms limitation agreement between the superpowers was unlikely to be achieved and that the United States would go ahead with deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, the reality of the 1979 Nato decision burst upon Europeans like a thunderstorm. Instead of feeling more secure in the knowledge that the deployment of Euromissiles would diminish Moscow's ability to intimidate their governments with the SS-20, the projected deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in the autumn of 1983 brought forth protests from people in all European countries except France (which has its own nuclear deterrent and decided not to use American missiles). The massive anti-nuclear movements in Germany, Britain and Holland were aided by skilful Soviet propaganda which painted Soviet missiles as benign self-defence weapons, while depicting similar American weapons as war-like and dangerous for European security. Left-wing and some moderate opinion in Europe viewed the United States, not the Soviet Union, as the principal threat to peace because of its intention to implement the 1979 decision to match Soviet deployments. The anti-nuclear movement in West Germany succeeded in March 1983 in electing a small block of representatives (the Green Party) to the Bundestag, and by the end of the year the German Social Democratic Party had decided to shift its pro-defence policy and adopt an anti-nuclear statement as part of its platform. Similarly in Britain, the peace movement caused the Labour Party to change course and adopt an anti-nuclear programme—directed not only against American nuclear forces in Britain but also against Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.

Reaction in the United States to these events was one of bewilderment. Although a nuclear-freeze movement (not abandonment of nuclear weapons) had gained considerable support in 1982–3 and resulted in Bills being considered in Congress, there was little public support for an abandonment of the nuclear deterrent policy and the weapons to support it. Even American Roman Catholic Bishops, who came close to calling for the scrapping of nuclear weapons in a pastoral letter in 1983, received little public support for their view. In American conservative and moderate circles, however, the impact of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe had an unsettling effect.

On the one hand, Reagan Administration policymakers seemed dismayed that the United States was being painted by Europeans as the villain threatening their homeland with destruction, while they saw the United States as reducing the likelihood of war because the Euromissiles would improve Nato's deterrent capability. Many American political leaders were astonished in 1983 to find the Soviet Union making inroads into the moderate European thinking and nudging it toward neutralism and pacifism. Belated efforts by Washington to show flexibility on the number of Pershings and cruise missiles it might be prepared to deploy, in exchange for Soviet concessions on the number of SS-20s deployed, lowered the temperature of public debate only marginally in Europe. That debate also strengthened the American conservatives' belief that western Europe was 'going soft' and was no longer interested to oppose the Soviet threat. Even moderate American opinion, especially west of the eastern states, wondered whether it was worthwhile to keep 350,000 American servicemen and their equipment in Europe if the Europeans preferred to accommodate to Soviet power.

The third factor—negative European views of American political leadership—was already apparent in the late 1960s and 1970s; but it became a serious political issue after the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in November 1980. Whereas Americans voted in that election for stronger leadership in foreign policy than that exhibited by President Carter, Europeans were astonished that a man who had never served in Washington and held what they believed to be extreme views would now exercise the power of life and death over them. The image of Reagan as a 'trigger-happy Hollywood cowboy' was carefully nurtured by Soviet propaganda, and his strong speeches to conservative political groups were taken as policy statements about American government intentions. Little was reported in Europe about his eight years as Governor of California, the largest state in the union, during which he displayed remarkable skills for compromise and seeing the reality of situations—despite his conservative rhetoric. Many thoughtful Europeans failed to recognise that the United States had neglected the modernisation of its defence forces during the 1970s and that Ronald Reagan's election signalled a public recognition that national security depended on a strong and confident United States. This is not to say that many Americans, like Europeans, were not surprised by some of the strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist speeches made by Reagan and some of his key lieutenants; but Americans more than Europeans recognised the distinction between the President's rhetoric and his

actions. For example, during the crisis in Poland, where the Soviet Union felt its security was threatened, Reagan did not press this issue to the point where revolution might have broken out and spilled into other east European countries.

The real problem in Atlantic relations today is the correct European assessment that President Reagan is not interested in détente with the Soviet Union on the basis of conditions that prevailed in the 1970s. There may be a fundamental divergence in American and European views on this issue, and if not resolved soon this erosion of consensus in basic Allied interests could result in a withering of the North Atlantic alliance. Stated bluntly, a majority of the American people are not willing to accept a military and political accommodation with the Soviet Union if this means Moscow has a free hand to support revolutions throughout the world and to use political intimidation and trade to undermine the resolve of the west to maintain a strong military alliance. Conversely, a new generation of Europeans has emerged since the Second World War that is simply not prepared to limit its postwar economic and social gains either by spending more on defence or by risking Soviet displeasure over Nato's policies. American opinion across the board has hardened since 1979 in its view of the Soviet Union while European opinion has tended towards accommodation with the Soviet Union—at least on maintaining trade and cultural ties.

Disagreements over American policy towards Iran, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of Euromissiles are, therefore, not the main issues in the Nato relationship; the fundamental issue is whether to confront the Soviet Union over its arms buildup and aggressive behaviour or, instead, accommodate Soviet superiority in military power and influence in Europe. Nato very likely would have faced this problem today even if Jimmy Carter had been re-elected American President, because the American policy during the last year of his Administration was moving towards a large American defence buildup and a much tougher policy towards the Soviet Union. It should be remembered that Carter had an even more ambitious programme than Reagan for building and deploying the huge MX missile as a means of matching Soviet gains in land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The central problem in the transatlantic relationship, then, is not the specific President who occupies the White House but the growing divergence in American and European public attitudes about how to deal with the Soviet Union and maintain the security and freedom of western Europe.

The outlook for the Atlantic alliance is, therefore, not as favourable as it was five years ago. Indicative of the trend was a proposal made in the American Congress by Senator Sam Nunn in June to cut American troop strengths in Europe if the European governments do not provide more conventional arms for Nato defences. Although defeated, the measure won wide support among American lawmakers. Unless European and American leaders are able to reduce the growing divergence in public attitudes on Nato defence policy, 1985 may present the alliance with a crisis that could shatter 40 years of peace, prosperity and confidence in the future.

The Christian churches and the pacifist temptation

RICHARD HARRIES

ARE the Christian churches sliding into pacifism? Pacifism has always been a minority view within the church. Now, however, there are signs that official church bodies are slipping almost unwittingly into a crypto-pacifism. One reason for this is that they are trying to take up a more critical attitude to the state. In part this is a guilt-ridden reaction against a too close identification with it in the past. It is often said now that the church has moved into a new phase of its existence.[1] There was a pre-Constantinian period when the church was a small, persecuted sect within the Roman Empire, divorced from public life. Then there was the Constantinian phase, which lasted from the fourth century until the First World War when the churches and the secular power walked iron hand in white glove. Now, it is alleged, the churches are once again in a minority group, stripped of power and devoid of much of their traditional influence in high places. They are, therefore, free to point to a distinctively Christian life, withdrawn from the fallen world of power politics.

The Church of England has experienced this pressure in a way that is peculiarly its own. Since John Keble's Assize sermon at Oxford in July 1833 denouncing undue state interference in church affairs, the Catholic wing of the church has had more than a touch of 'bolshiness' about the establishment. This has been the obverse of a vision of the Church of England as part of the one, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church depending for its authority not on the state but on Christ's commission to his Apostles. The Catholic wing, with its high doctrine of the church, has a built-in suspicion of the state. Amongst Evangelicals, the sense of distance from the state is more recent, more sudden and not yet complete. Traditionally, 'low' Anglicans have been strong church-and-state men. In the last decade, however, there has been a welcome revival of Evangelical social ethics. Evangelicalism, which predominantly confined itself to the salvation of individual souls and which was content to be a spiritual snatch-squad within the comfortable embrace of the state, has now thrown down its cap in the social and political arena.[2] Many young Evangelicals have taken up radical political stances. Even some of the older Evangelicals have shifted. John Stott, former Rector of All Soul's, Langham Place, London, and the doyen of Anglican Evangelicals, is a nu-

[1] See, for example, Lesslie Newbigin, *The Other Side of 1984* (Geneva: The World Council of Churches, 1984), p. 31.

[2] There have always been outstanding exceptions, such as Wilberforce.

Rev Richard Harries is Dean of King's College, London. He has written, lectured and broadcast widely on the subject of ethics of war and peace and is currently serving as Vice-Chairman of the Council for Arms Control.

clear pacifist. The reasons for this distancing from the state are a complex of historical, social and theological factors, some healthy, others simply inevitable. One result (or is it partly a cause?) is the changing socio-economic background of the Church of England clergy. Whereas once the clergy (the higher clergy, anyway) were unmistakably gentry, whose large Georgian houses aptly symbolised their status, now their backgrounds are much more varied, and the small red-brick vicarages which have sprung up everywhere reflect this new modesty. There is no natural kinship with, or sympathy for, those who wield political or financial power.

In other churches there are different patterns. Non-conformists have always been suspicious of Christian involvement with the state and the current post-Constantinian mood accentuates this tendency. On the other hand, English Roman Catholics, with an unconscious sensitivity to the old suspicion that to be Catholic was un-English and almost unpatriotic, and with a new more English, more middle-class hierarchy may paradoxically be more cautious. Official Roman Catholic church pronouncements take care not to be wildly anti-government. There is, however, the strong sense of belonging to a world-wide communion, transcending nationality, which in many of its parts is very radical.

Allowing for distinctive variations within each denomination, there is today a greater sense of the church as a distinctive body, separate from government, than has existed since Constantine. Inevitably, this new mood and sense of apartness is reflected in church statements on war and peace. Much of this is a healthy corrective to the past. But one result is a fundamental lack of understanding of those who soil their hands with power.

Within this wider cultural shift pacifism, with its perennial attraction for Christians, gleams more brightly than for some time. The reasons for its appeal to the Christian conscience in every age are easy to understand. Christians are taught to be nice to others and to think that there is some hidden goodness in everyone if only it can be found and touched; to make sacrifices themselves rather than asking them of others; to love their enemies; to trust God's power rather than man's might; and above all there is the sign of the cross, not as for Constantine a sign of victory in battle, but of a willingness for self-sacrifice even to death.

Pacifism was subjected to a devastating critique by the American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, in the 1930s. Although there have been a few serious attempts by pacifists to meet Niebuhr's criticisms, in my judgement they do not succeed. In relation to the creeping crypto-pacifism of today three of Niebuhr's points seem particularly pertinent. First, much pacifism is based on an over-optimistic view of human nature and an equation of Christianity with the law of love alone. Niebuhr wrote:

> 'Christianity is a religion which measures the total dimension of human existence not only in terms of the final norm of human conduct, which is expressed in the law of love, but also in terms of the fact of sin. It believes

ugh Christ is the true norm for every man, every man is also in some rucifier of Christ.'[3]

behind much pacifism is an illegitimate attempt to treat the behates in terms of the behaviour of individuals.[4] Third, there is the › think that one system is as bad as another and that we cannot veen them. In a recent issue of *The World Today*, Jeane Kirkpatrick he present widespread feeling that there is no moral difference beuperpowers.[5] Niebuhr fought a similar attitude in American pubin the 1930s over the struggle in Europe:

he churches close their eyes to suffering, they drug their consciences that they may not be able to make significant distinctions between ing political forces. The discovery, and obsession with, the fact that ons which have been forced by fateful necessity and moral decision against the worst tyranny which has ever threatened Europe, are erialistic and nationalistic and do not come to the struggle with ands", is supposed to be a great Christian contribution of Chrisitivity to the political and international problem of our day. As ever came to any significant issue in history with "clean hands"! y nation which enforces peace within its boundaries had clean

believed that Christianity gave us an absolute standard in the light l human policies were shown up as flawed, uneasy compromises. place for self-righteousness. Nevertheless, Christianity also enables discriminate judgements. We can and must choose which is the the options open to us in the light of total Christian understanding it is, his inclination to injustice as well as his capacity for justice:

ot possible to express a moral preference for the justice achieved in tic societies, in comparison with the tyrannical societies, no historirence has any meaning.'[7]

would undoubtedly have stressed, more than Mrs Kirkpatrick, the interest in the American policy on Central America; but he would ged that we can and must choose between the options available and dgements with effective means.

btful if there is a higher percentage of avowed pacifists in the day than in the 1930s—perhaps less. What has happened is that d pacifist considerations lurk around in the Christian subnfluencing present debates on the nuclear issue at crucial points, onfusion and inconsistency.

Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York: Scribners, 1940), p. 2.
Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribners, 1932).
Kirkpatrick, 'The superpowers: is there a moral difference?', *The World Today*,

ty and Power Politics, pp.34-5. [7] *ibid.*, p. 28.

First, there is the widespread, hardly articulated, feeling of many Christians, 'Of course, I'm not a pacifist myself but if I was a proper Christian I would be.' This often goes along with an admiration for the Quakers. There is an example from my own experience. When I did my morning broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on 11 February 1983, the morning after the General Synod of the Church of England had rejected unilateralism, Brian Redhead, the presenter, told me how disappointed he was with the result. I expostulated with him that he himself was very far from being a unilateralist. He agreed, but argued that the church (of which he is a member) ought to speak with another voice. This dualism is a sorry confusion. It springs from a lack of theological education, from false attempts to isolate the New Testament from the Old, from a neglect of natural law thinking and the accumulated wisdom of the churches' teaching about war over the centuries. Secondly, there is a desire amongst some Christians to be 'prophetic' without too much thought about what might or might not qualify for such a high vocation. When in Geneva late last year, I asked Dr Philip Potter why the World Council of Churches, of which he is General Secretary, used such extreme language at its Vancouver Assembly in the summer. I suggested that to describe the possession of nuclear weapons as 'a crime against humanity' would undermine the long-term credibility of what the church might want to say. Dr Potter replied that he wanted 'a strong prophetic statement'. But prophecy is not identical with extremism, nor is it likely to be found in bodies swept by prevailing fashions. This desire for prophecy almost inevitably leads to a neglect of the arguments against pacifism and to a lack of clarity and balance in church statements on war and peace.

In addition to the cultural shift already mentioned, the distancing of the church from its historic relation to the state, and the perennial appeal of pacifism, there are three specific reasons why the churches appear to be slipping into a crypto-pacifism. First, they are preoccupied with the nuclear issue. The main concern at many large church conferences is to add momentum to the movement for nuclear disarmament. At a conference in Uppsala last year on 'Life and Peace', there was a motion offering the support of the churches for conscientious objectors. I proposed an amendment so that the proposal would offer the support of the church for those who could conscientiously serve in the forces of their country as well as those who could not. The amendment was rejected by the platform. It is not hard to understand why. It would have blunted the edge of the anti-nuclear stance that the conference wanted to take up. Although most, but by no means all, of those who were present would have denied that they were pacifists, nowhere in a conference much given to issues of war and peace was it affirmed that all countries (including the many from the third world there represented) have legitimate security needs.

Second, in calling for less reliance on nuclear weapons the churches are not always ready to face the possibility that this policy might require stronger conventional forces. To their credit, the Roman Catholic Bishops in the United States did take notice of this. In their 1983 pastoral they affirmed the traditional right of self-defence and also said this:

'It may well be that some strengthening of conventional defence would be a proportionate price to pay, if this will reduce the possibility of nuclear war.'[8]

The Church of England, which called for a policy of 'no-first use' at its General Synod in February 1983, failed to distinguish between a declaratory and an actual policy. The members of the Synod certainly failed to address themselves properly to the question whether, if they wanted an actual policy of no-first use or even of no-early use, it might involve more spending on conventional defence. The unspoken assumption underlying much Christian feeling was made explicit at the 1984 Baptist Assembly in Britain. After massive votes in favour of 'no-first use', a nuclear freeze, withdrawing cruise, no Trident and phasing out all British nuclear weapons the Assembly was asked to vote on the following proposition: 'We do not accept that the phasing out of nuclear weapons requires a compensatory buildup of conventional weapons.' The voting was 487 in favour, 137 against with 126 undecided.

The wording of the statement was significant. How would the voting have gone if the members had been asked to vote on a positive statement 'We accept that the phasing out of nuclear weapons requires a compensatory buildup of conventional weapons'? Or, even, 'We accept that the phasing out of nuclear weapons requires the maintenance of adequate conventional forces'?

Much is made in some church circles of the possibilities of mass civilian resistance, non-cooperation with an occupying power and so on. There is certainly far more to these forms of resistance than conventional wisdom has so far allowed. Nevertheless, there are still too many Christians who assume that what worked for Gandhi against the British and for Martin Luther King in the United States, would work against a Stalin or Hitler. Or, if they concede that such techniques could hardly work, they argue that submission to a foreign power would be less evil than a major war, conventional or nuclear. They reveal at this point what Niebuhr so often detected and exposed—a hidden preference for submission to tyranny rather than resistance to it. It is, of course, true that many powers now and in the past have had no option but to submit and make what they can of their situation. But the churches are still too prone to think that submission on principle is 'the Christian' thing to do. The out-and-out Christian pacifist firmly believes that submission is the only Christian option. But he chooses this knowing the likelihood of failure and trusting God for ultimate victory, not for the guarantee of a politically successful programme. The crypto-pacifism now abroad in the churches is very different from this. It accepts the necessity of resistance, but then at the critical point chooses submission. It is difficult to see how this half-hearted, one-hand-tied-behind-the-back resistance with its built-in readiness to submit is of any use whatsoever. Indeed, it is positively dangerous. The first imperative of a government is to be so determined to resist and to make it clear to others that it is so determined

[8] *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and our Response* (London: CTS/SPCK, 1983), p. 62.

that it will never be forced into positions where the only choice is suicide or surrender. Crypto-pacifism only encourages and hastens the day of that terrible option.

Third, is the predominantly anti-nuclear stance of the churches in fact sustainable without slipping into full pacifism? Many good Christian minds obviously think that it is. They argue that any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate the principles of discrimination and proportion. Undoubtedly, many conceivable uses of these terrible weapons would certainly violate those principles, and for those who stand in the 'Just War' tradition of thinking this would be a crucial factor. Nevertheless, this is different from stating in advance that every conceivable use would so violate them and that, therefore, there are no circumstances in which they could morally be used.[9] However well-intentioned this latter view might be, what would be the effect on any potential adversary? It can only give the impression that if the stakes are raised high enough he will obtain what he wants.

A key consideration in judging the morality of nuclear weapons in the light of the criteria of the Just War tradition is the risk of escalation. An assumption underlying many church reports is that escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange would be virtually automatic. There is clearly a very serious risk that this would happen. Nevertheless, it is not the only possible scenario. It is also possible that, if nuclear weapons were used, both sides would recoil in shock and horror and make cessation of hostilities an overriding priority. From a moral point of view there is an even more important point. Should the risk of escalation, however serious, be allowed to paralyse all response to aggression? The governments of the world are agreed that in relation to international terrorism the risk of hurt to innocent people, even when it is very high as in the case of the hijacking of a civilian airliner, must not inhibit the attempt to apprehend the terrorists. Governments know that any submission to moral blackmail would lead to an even greater anarchy than we have at the moment. The principle is no less vital in the maintenance of international order. On moral grounds we must resolutely refuse to allow a situation to occur in which there is even a hint that if a potential adversary only raises the stakes high enough and is ruthless enough, he can get what he wants.

Some pacifists today (illogically and inconsistently) do allow coercion—up to a point. They allow police to apprehend criminals—but only if they are unarmed. Or they allow coercion within the state—but not between the states. Nuclear pacifism is another example of this use of force—up to a point. It is difficult to see how it can be sustained in either logic or practice.

Andrew Wilson, a tank officer in the Second World War, was for 16 years the Defence Correspondent of *The Observer*. In 1981 he came to the conclusion he could no longer justify a policy of nuclear deterrence because one day it might fail and the weapons would have to be used and this, he judged, would be immoral. He then came to the conclusion that he had to go even further:

[9] I have argued that not every use would inevitably violate the principles of discrimination and proportion in, for example, *The Cambridge Review*, Vol. 104, no. 2274.

'I cannot see how one can reject nuclear weapons and still accept the morality of modern war fought with today's huge array of indiscriminate non-nuclear weapons, of which we recently saw a limited demonstration in the Lebanon.'[10]

Andrew Wilson's personal pilgrimage to pure pacifism poses the question whether the churches can continue to rest in their present half-way house. Perhaps they have to go with Andrew Wilson, or face the fact that it is immoral to allow the most devastating weapons to be solely in the hands of the most ruthless powers; and that if it is a moral matter to try to achieve some kind of *pax-ordo-iustitia* in civil society, it is no less a moral imperative to try to achieve that in international order, despite all the well-known difficulties and terrible risks. The states system has always been a tempered anarchy: but it could hardly be a moral act to hand it over to total anarchy. This is what nuclear pacifism entails.

[10] Andrew Wilson, *The Disarmer's Handbook of Military Technology and Organisation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 307.

The 1984 Euro-elections: a damp squib?

JULIET LODGE

ON 14 June 1984, some 22½ million people in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland went to the polls to vote in the second direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). On 17 June 1984, 96 million French, Greeks, Belgians, Italians, Germans and Luxembourgers voted in the same elections to elect 434 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Only when the last polling station had closed on Sunday evening, 17 June, could counting begin throughout the Ten. As the election results and turnout figures began to come in, European Community Commission President, Gaston Thorn, pronounced them a catastrophe: for the European Parliament's aspirations; for the fate of the draft treaty on European Union; and for all those who had hoped that the European Parliament would gain extra democratic legitimacy from its direct election, and that thus its repeated claims for an increase in its powers would be vindicated.

Dr Juliet Lodge is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Hull and the author of several works on the European Community and the European Parliament, of which the most recent is: *Institutions and Policies of the European Community* (London and New York: Frances Pinter and St Martin's Press, 1983). She wishes to acknowledge the support of The Nuffield Foundation for her study of the European Parliament and the European Community.

A low turnout

What seemed particularly disastrous in Gaston Thorn's eyes was the level of turnout across the European Community compared with the first election for the European Parliament in 1979. The drop in turnout in Luxembourg, Greece and Italy ranged from 1·9 per cent to 2·1 per cent. In Belgium, where voting is obligatory, it rose slightly. In Denmark turnout rose by 4·5 per cent, while remaining almost as low as in 1979 in the United Kingdom. However, this did not compensate for the significantly lower turnout in countries widely believed to be the most pro-European in the European Community. Turnout in the Federal Republic of Germany fell from 65·7 per cent to 56·8 per cent, and in the Netherlands from 58·1 per cent to 50·5 per cent. In Ireland and France, it fell by six and four per cent respectively. Across the European Community turnout had fallen to 59 per cent from 62·5 per cent in 1979.

It is fair to argue that turnout was disappointing to all those who had hoped to see turnout rise (including many MEPs and European Parliament President, Piet Dankert, who had been campaigning since 1982 for a higher electoral turnout in 1984). They had argued convincingly that the Parliament's credibility and its claims for an increase in its powers would be undermined by a poor turnout. Yet at no point was a figure placed on what would constitute a satisfactory level of turnout. It was simply hoped that between the first and second direct elections, the Parliament's visibility and intelligibility to the electorate would increase sufficiently to persuade voters of the usefulness of turning out to vote. But this hope rested on a number of presuppositions that were not met. Most of these were based on the assumption that more people would turn out to vote if there was greater media coverage of the Parliament. The expectation was that media coverage of elected MEPs' activities would increase; that people would begin to associate positive developments in the European Community and benefits derived from it with their elected representatives; and that the latter would themselves develop a career-ladder in the EP, seek re-election and campaign on a record of achievement that meant something to the voters. All this presupposed that the Parliament's image would improve and that public awareness of and support for it would increase rather than remain static or fall after the first elections in 1979.

In 1977–9, European Election Information Programmes (EEIPs) had been launched by the European Commission in Brussels and the European Parliament through their national press and information offices. These had been designed to make people—notably 'opinion leaders'[1]—aware of the Parliament's existence, organisation, composition and functions. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the various EEIPs, they were seen as a one-off exercise for the first Euro-elections. It was expected that, thereafter, while the institutions would continue their normal information activities, they would have less of a role (or perhaps none at all) in the elections to the Parliament. It was assumed that the political parties would be the chief actors in the second

[1] See Juliet Lodge and Valentine Herman, *Direct Elections to the European Parliament: A Community Perspective* (London and New Haven: Macmillan and Humanities Press, 1982).

elections to the Parliament and that they would take on the task of mobilising voters that is normally associated with political parties in elections. Indeed, the political groups represented in the Parliament had insisted that they would assume these functions and had sought finance accordingly. Nevertheless, there were limited EEIPs in 1984, and some media advertising was undertaken by the national European Parliament offices. Yet, as before, this was not sufficient to counteract negative press and television coverage about the Parliament in the pre-campaign and campaign periods. Nor was it enough to make those who were unaware of the European Parliament and its Members conscious of them, their record, performance, manifestos and aspirations.

Eurobarometer findings on the level of public awareness of the Parliament and the impending elections were, therefore, as in 1978–9, good indicators of the state of play. Eight months before the elections, *Eurobarometer* found that on average only 14 per cent of those interviewed mentioned the elections spontaneously. This compares poorly with the situation in October 1978, before the first elections to the Parliament, when twice as many people seemed aware of the impending elections. Awareness of the 1984 elections ranged from 62 per cent in Belgium, 44 per cent in Denmark, 40 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany and Ireland, to 32 per cent in France. It was under 22 per cent in Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom.

The fall in awareness of the elections can perhaps be explained partly with reference to the context of the 1979 and 1984 elections. Eight months before the 1979 elections, the European Parliament was generally mentioned in terms of the impending (but postponed from 1978) first Euro-elections, and there had been a good deal of public and sometimes hot party political debate in the member-states about proposed electoral provisions governing those elections. In 1984, on the other hand, the absence of a common electoral procedure had been taken for granted given the member-governments' neglect of the Parliament's draft proposals for one and the publication of the Seitlinger Report in 1982.[2] The Parliament and the elections were not an issue even in those countries, like Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, that were altering the details of their Euro-electoral laws amidst some local protest.

The extent of controversy over electoral procedures alone cannot explain widespread ignorance about the elections. As in 1979, so in 1984, the context of the run-up to elections is important. In 1978–9, knowledge about the European Parliament was presumed to be low. In 1983–4 it still had to be reinforced selectively, but there was the additional problem that the negative image of the European Parliament had to be countered at a time when the whole Com-

[2] See Report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on a draft uniform electoral procedure for the election of members of the European Parliament (Seitlinger Report, Parts A and B/C), *European Parliament Working Document*, 1-988/81/A (10.2.82) and 1-988/81/B-C (26.2.82). See, also, Juliet Lodge, 'The 1984 Euro-Election Tour: The Quest for Uniformity', *The Parliamentarian*, LXIV, 1983, pp. 204–12; and C. Sasse *et al.*, *The European Parliament: Towards a Uniform Procedure for Direct Elections* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1981).

munity had proved itself incapable of responding to pressing crises. The problems, then, of improving interest in and dispelling myths about the European Parliament, as well as mobilising the electorate, proved formidable.

Further factors that help to account for relatively low awareness levels about the elections in autumn 1983 concern individuals' perceptions of MEPs, the European Parliament's powers and role in the EC. *Eurobarometer* found that in the Ten a majority regarded MEPs as being too remote from the electors. Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, in view of Britain's repeated claims that even the mega-Euro constituencies provided a better link between MEPs and voters than any system of proportional representation could do, more respondents from the United Kingdom (78 per cent) than anywhere else in the Community felt that MEPs were too remote.[3] Whether or not this perception of remoteness would be mitigated were there to be a common system of electing MEPs or were the Parliament to be given a single seat remains to be seen. However, the psychological impact of a common seat and other more tangible signs of a symbolic identification with the Community were accepted by member-governments at the Fontainebleau summit shortly after the elections.

As in 1978–9, in 1984 propensity to vote in the Euro-elections was influenced by four main factors: first, views of the Parliament and its future role; second, nationality; third, attitudes towards European unification and the Community; and fourth, 'cognitive mobilisation' (interest and involvement in politics, level of information about the Parliament, and political awareness). Other variables including age, sex, ideology and level of education, 'have only a slight bearing on marginal propensity to vote in European as compared with national elections'.[4] *Eurobarometer* predicted that the highest turnout levels would probably be in Greece, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and France (excluding Belgium and Luxembourg where voting is compulsory);[5] and concluded that the most reliable indicator of intention to vote was the importance attached to the election measured against hopes for the role the European Parliament would assume rather than its actual perceived role. As in 1979, *Eurobarometer's* findings in 1984 on the inclination to vote proved a useful indicator of expected turnout levels. A poll conducted in April 1984 indicated that turnout might be lower than in 1979.

Reasons for apathy

It was against this background of opinion trends highlighted by *Eurobarometer* that the political parties' campaigns were conducted. Why was it that they seemed unable to persuade a substantial proportion of the electorate to vote? Several explanations can be offered. The first follows from opinion poll findings of a lack of understanding of what was at stake in the elections. How voting in Euro-elections would influence policy initiatives and outcomes, and how it would affect the fortunes of the voters, was unclear. Furthermore, the all-pervasive media characterisation of the European Parliament as an impotent talking-shop was not calculated to overcome public indif-

[3] *Eurobarometer*, No. 20, 12/1983, p. 72. [4] *ibid.*, p. 80. [5] *ibid.*

ference. Such an image was likely to deter the disinterested from voting in large numbers as well. The cumulative effect was to undermine voters' sense of political efficacy.

A further explanation for failure to mobilise more of the electorate perhaps lies with the impact of the political parties' attempts to interest the public in the elections by means of gimmicks. This tactic may, ultimately, have been seen as a trivialisation of elections. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Frau Katharina Focke's 'circus' was certainly open to misinterpretation as was the series of less well-publicised events with celebrities held by the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

It would be wrong to imply that there were no Euro-issues that transcended national boundaries. There were, but, as in 1979, in their general presentation they did not help to distinguish the major transnational political parties and political party groups in the European Parliament from one another. As in 1979, so in 1984 there was condemnation of unemployment, commitment to combat it, to uphold human rights, to promote peace and security, as well as equality, to combat pollution, to reform—whilst retaining—the common agricultural policy, to rectify regional disequilibria and to improve relations with the third world. Laudable sentiments were widely shared and expressed in the various manifestos and programme documents of the European People's Party (EPP), the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSP) and the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community (ELD).

In addition, there was little uniformity in the use made by individual party members of a given federation or group. The trappings of transnationalism, the symbols of belonging to a Euro-party group in the Parliament were insufficient to make either party elites and activists in the member-states or the public identify common problems susceptible to a common policy remedy. Instead of a continual debate on Euro-issues by political elites of different persuasions, the Euro-elections provided an opportunity for political parties to test their relative popularity with the electorate at home. This could be done far more effectively by reference to highly visible and divisive issues of domestic national politics than to obscure Euro-issues.

Thus, neither the achievements of national MEPs as individuals nor those of their European Parliament party group were accorded a high profile. Moreover, in so far as Community membership itself was not an issue between major political parties, the national orientation of the Euro-elections seemed more pronounced. Media coverage of the campaign reflected this and meant that in those states where well-known politicians neither stood nor regularly campaigned in the elections, the public lacked recognisable reference points.

Even in Greece, where a fierce and sometimes violent Euro-campaign was waged and where there was substantial television reporting of party rallies (but without editorial comment), the campaign was very much a national contest between the political parties. Of course, it may be premature to expect Euro-elections to be a contest for power by the various transnational forces comprising the Parliament's autonomous political parties. But unless they do deve-

lop distinctive programmes and profiles independent of national politic considerations or coalition politics, the Euro-elections will lack that ele ment of political controversy that beguiles the media and public. However controversy alone would be meaningless. Therefore, the expansion of th Parliament's powers and role in the European Community, as well as th development of credible party campaigns and records are essential.

Election results

As the results of the elections were announced, political commentato quickly analysed them in terms of 'winners' and 'losers' at the national level Government parties across the Community tended to lose votes to the op position. In some cases, an inability to surmount a fixed electoral threshol reversed positions among minor political parties. In the Federal Republic c Germany, where in 1979 the Greens had failed to win over five per cent of th vote and so failed to secure seats in the Parliament, in 1984 they won 8·2 pe cent of votes cast and seven seats in the Parliament. The Free Democrati Party (FDP), with 4·8 per cent of votes cast (compared with 6 per cent in 1979 lost its four seats in the Parliament and is the only major political party i government at the national level not to be represented in the Parliament By contrast, in France, some 10 per cent of voters opted for the National Fron list of Monsieur le Pen and, thereby, gave his party 10 seats in the Parlia ment. In the United Kingdom, again the most glaring distortions aros as the Social Democrat/Liberal Alliance won 19·5 per cent of votes cast, bu was deprived by the electoral system of even one seat in the European Par liament.

Had a 20 per cent electoral threshold been operating in other membe states, several major governing parties would have been eclipsed from th European Parliament. The exclusion of the Alliance in Britain highlights con tinuing significant discrepancies in the cost in terms of votes per seat for dif ferent political parties. In Italy, 0·5 per cent of the vote was the minimun necessary to win a seat; in Greece the minimum was 2·3 per cent and i Belgium 3·9 per cent. The consquences for the Parliament's balance o political forces are significant. Compared with the first elected Europea Parliament, more minor parties or protest parties have secured seats this tim and from this claim a legitimacy that they may not necessarily enjoy at home Not only has the balance of power shifted, numerically speaking, from th Christian Democrats to the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, bu the strength of component parties may adversely affect the relative cohesion o the groups despite the countervailing influence of more than 200 re-electe MEPs. The Labour Party gains mean that it has only one seat less in the Socialis Group than the former dominant pro-Community SPD. This change, alon with the change in the Liberal group consequent upon the exclusion of th previously highly influential FDP, as well as the increase in 'new' MEP (Greens, and the Right) may make for difficulties.[6]

[6] See Juliet Lodge (ed.), *Direct Elections to the European Parliament 1984* (London: Mac millan, 1985).

The future prospects

However, before MEPs can begin to deal with problems facing the Parliament, they must organise themselves into political groups, elect their president and other officers, and allocate chairmanships of the European Parliament's influential standing committees. Since the priorities for the next six months include contentious issues like the Community's financial needs for 1984 and 1985, enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, the new Lomé Convention, majority voting in the Council and institutional reform, and new policies in biotechnology and telecommunications, competition among the political groups for committee posts will be as intense as ever. Indeed, well before the new Parliament's constitutive session in July 1984, the party groups had begun internal discussions over which MEPs from which states and parties should be nominated for which posts. Inter-party talks on the Presidency also took place.

However, the results of the second Euro-elections did not simply confirm the party alignments of the first elected Euro-parliament. The major party groups' composition did not alter radically from the 1979–84 period. Thus, the Socialist Group assumed 132 seats (+ 8), the EPP 109 seats (–8) and the Communists 43 seats (–6). The European Democrats (mainly British Conservatives and four Danes) secured 50 seats (13 less than in 1979), but there was speculation that some European Democrats might join the Liberal group which won 32 seats (six less than in 1979). In addition, the European Democrats and the Liberals argued over their positions relative to the centre in the European Parliament's hemicycle. The European Progressive Democrats (ex-Gaullists and Chirac supporters plus Ireland's Fianna Fail) were considering realigning themselves between the Socialists and Liberals in view of Fianna Fail's increased representation within the European Progressive Democratic Group (from 5 to 8 seats) and its interest in alliance with the Liberals. The success of the Greens meant that theoretically they could form a new party, but internal divisions appeared to militate against this. Similarly, an alliance of neo-Fascists seemed possible but was widely denied after the elections. This meant that the number of non-aligned MEPs could rise to 40, of which 10 were expected to form another group for technical purposes only. The overall effect seemed to imply a more fragmented Parliament, on the one hand, and a shift in the ideological centre, on the other hand.

Yet, all such divisions must be resolved. Within months, the Parliament will have to react swiftly and competently to a number of immediate issues. Most important, it must take up the first elected Parliament's legacy to it—the draft treaty on European Union[7]—without which the Community will not be changed sufficiently to permit it to respond effectively to the challenges of the 1990s, nor will the European Parliament's powers be augmented. Between now and the third elections to the Parliament in 1989, it must gain greater

[7] For a discussion of European Union, see Juliet Lodge, 'European Union and the First Elected European Parliament: The Spinelli Initiative', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, XXII, 1984, pp. 377–402; and Juliet Lodge, 'European Union and Direct Elections 1984', *The Round Table*, No 289, 1984, pp. 57–68.

legislative powers and combat growing disillusionment (notably in pro-Community states like the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Ireland).

It is true that turnout in the 1984 Euro-elections was in some ways surprisingly high in view of the EP's poor image and it is still respectable by comparison with falling turnout levels in American presidential elections. Yet, an undistinguished turnout level in 1989 would reflect badly on the European Parliament's and the enlarged European Community's democratic legitimacy. Newly elected MEPs seem to have a heavy responsibility for the future.

Malta: backing away from Helsinki

A CORRESPONDENT

IN the discussions and negotiations leading to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and in subsequent meetings at Belgrade and Madrid, Malta's active participation was out of all proportion to its size or to its potential contribution to security and cooperation in Europe. Taking advantage of the effective veto given to each participating state by the rule of consensus, Malta managed to hold up agreement at each conference until it obtained what it perceived to be the maximum from the negotiations. This tactic, frequently described as blackmail by the other participants, was used to introduce a Mediterranean dimension to a conference whose main concern was and is security and cooperation in mainland Europe.

Significantly enough, Malta did not take an active part in the discussions and negotiations on the human rights aspects of the Helsinki Final Act and its follow-up meetings. The Maltese non-involvement in the human rights aspects of 'Helsinki' reflects the lack of priority that the government of Dom Mintoff has given to human rights both at home and abroad since it was elected to office in 1971.

The slide into authoritarianism

This was manifested at an early stage when the government failed to constitute Malta's Constitutional Court from 1972 to 1974, in order to bring pressure on the opposition Nationalist Party (NP) during negotiations on constitutional amendments that were taking place between the two sides. While Malta retains the structure of a democratic government, since 1971 the power of the executive has become overwhelming. There has been a growing and

---

The author, who is a specialist in Maltese political and economic affairs, has based this article on his on-the-spot research in Malta.

systematic tendency to enact enabling legislation which gives Ministers the discretion to allow or disallow, without giving the courts or other independent bodies the power to review the exercise of ministerial discretion. This has been accompanied by a decided trend towards regulation of activities that in most western countries would be regarded as ordinary. A small state where most activities require at least one permit granted by a Minister at his absolute discretion is bound to suffer a steady erosion of freedom. In Malta, this has been intensified by extreme and irrational partisanship which oftens reminds people of its sister Mediterranean island of Cyprus: while Cyprus is divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Malta is split between Socialists and Nationalists, the latter deriving their name from the movement which they led to obtain independence from Britain in 1964.

Up to 1981 the steady growth of state control over ever wider areas of activity was defended by Mintoff himself by arguments which confused democracy with the dictatorship of the majority. Malta's electoral system, which is similar to that of the Republic of Ireland, provides for proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. In the elections of 1971 and 1976, Mintoff's Socialist Party (SP) obtained 51 and 52 per cent, respectively, of the popular vote, and a corresponding majority of parliamentary seats. It was the government's argument (and daily practice) that its majority gave it a right to implement highly controversial and divisive policies and that the opposition had only the right to be tolerated.

However, the elections held in 1981 under the same electoral system gave the opposition NP 51 per cent of the popular vote and the SP an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. There were several irregularities in addition to gerrymandering: the state radio and television monopoly was unashamedly partial; in one marginal constituency the inmates of a large government-run old people's home were taken to vote by hand-picked nurses; in another violence prevented some opposition supporters from reaching the polling booth. In addition, the population statistics for 1981, published two years later, showed that there were 11,000 fewer adults of voting age than there were names on the electoral register; however, the figures were subsequently revised upwards.

Mintoff has refused repeated NP demands for new and free elections. Since 1981 the confrontation between the two parties has become more intense, with the NP organising monthly mass meetings and protest demonstrations and the government implementing increasingly radical policies. The situation has been complicated by other factors. Since 1980 the country has been in a serious economic recession: the lack of private investment induced by the government's socialist policies was aggravated by a fall in exports and tourists (due both to the international recession and the overvalued Maltese pound) and the general ecomonic malaise has been compounded by political uncertainty and instability. The struggle for succession within the ruling SP has quickened as Mintoff approaches his seventieth birthday and his health is occasionally seen to be failing. In addition, Mintoff has assured himself of internal

security by signing a treaty with North Korea which is almost identical to the former treaty between North Korea and Grenada and which provides for North Korean arms, ammunition and military instruction to the Maltese police and armed forces.

There has been a marked increase in political strife in 1982–4. The majority NP has felt cheated of an electoral victory and has consistently challenged the government's legitimacy. The government has embarked on more doctrinaire left-wing policies, both domestic and foreign, mainly to assert its right to rule but also because Mintoff's age seems to have inspired him with a greater sense of urgency; moreover, he has probably realised that he can no longer retain absolute power and save the appearance of democracy as he did prior to 1981. In turn, the various groups and institutions which are encroached upon by the government feel more embittered and occasionally put up a stiff and spirited resistance.

The vicious circle has led the government to direct serious threats and warnings at the independence and the very existence of most non-governmental institutions. The courts have been threatened with replacement by people's tribunals. The few remaining private entrepreneurs have been warned that the government would not hesitate to opt for total nationalisation if they did not follow government directives. The trade unions which do not belong to the government-dominated General Workers' Union (GWU), already subdued in the 1970s, have been further threatened with dissolution and are being worn out by constant struggles for recognition. Repeated and regular threats are directed at the independent *Times* newspapers. Most of the Catholic church's property was nationalised in 1983, and in 1984 legislation was passed making the continued operation of Catholic schools dependent on any condition that the government may wish to impose. Last but not least, the government has openly spoken of the possibility of setting up a one-party regime, suspending freedom and democracy, and making future elections conditional on some ill-defined circumstances.

While the general situation in Malta can be described as one of 'cold civil war', the government's intolerance of dissent and pluralism can be illustrated by the state of broadcasting and by the so-called 'Foreign Interference' Act of 1981, both of which directly contravene the chapter on Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields of the Helsinki Final Act, in particular the section on Information.[1]

Broadcasting

The American State Department's publication *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* for 1983 states that:

'the broadcast media are completely controlled by the government and

[1] For the full text of the Helsinki Final Act, see *Selected Documents Relating to Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1959–77* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977), pp. 225–82.

make no pretence of evenhanded coverage of the Opposition. The Mintoff government has gone so far as to seek to apply this policy extraterritorially, by insisting that the Italian government close down a Nationalist Party station broadcasting from nearby Sicily. The issue of evenhandedness in broadcasting is probably the single most divisive issue in Malta today. It is responsible for much of the political tension which characterises this island'.

The Malta Constitution provides for the setting up of a Broadcasting Authority:

> 'to ensure that, as far as possible, in such sound and television broadcasting services as may be provided in Malta, due impartiality is preserved in respect of matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to current public policy and that broadcasting facilities and time are fairly apportioned between persons belonging to different political parties.'

However, this provision is more followed in the breach than in the observance. In 1975, Malta's only private radio and television station was nationalised and the Minister responsible for it stated that it should be used to create a Socialist generation. Several employees were dismissed and replaced by persons closely identified with the ruling SP. The members of the board of directors are appointed by the government and hold office at its pleasure.

In 1979 the head of the government's Department of Information retired and was immediately appointed general manager of the radio and television monopoly. In June of that year the NP applied for a licence to operate its own radio station, but permission was not granted. In November 1981, shortly before the elections, the NP started operating a small radio and television station from nearby Sicily, but most of the transmissions were jammed by the Maltese government. After the elections, Mintoff prevailed upon the Italian government to close down the Sicilian station.

Television played a key role during the long wake prior to the announcement of the election results in December 1981. Early in the morning, before any results were transmitted, television announced that the SP had won and that 'thousands of Socialist supporters had already gone out into the streets to celebrate their victory'. This was the signal for SP supporters to occupy the streets and main arteries of the island. NP supporters, stunned by the 'news', stayed in front of their television sets. A programme of victory celebrations then followed, including repeated singing of the *Internationale*, showing of SP pre-election rallies and personal insults to the NP leader, Fenech-Adami.

Early in 1982 the Broadcasting Authority informed the NP that it was placing local broadcasting at the disposal of the SP and that it could not ensure impartial broadcasting before the NP undertook not to transmit from overseas. The NP ordered its supporters to boycott products advertised on the media and withdrew its instructions only in January 1984 in the hope of initiating a solution to the festering political crisis. As a result, the broadcast monopoly

withdrew its total ban on reporting of NP activities, which it had maintained throughout 1982–3, but not its heavy-handed bias. This bias is not limited to the opposition party. The last three years have been marked by successive disputes between the government and most other institutions, including the Catholic church, the free trade unions, the parent-teacher associations, the bodies representing small traders and private entrepreneurs and foreign ambassadors to Malta. In each case radio and television have been used to promote the government's case, often to the exclusion of the opposing viewpoint.

In May 1984, the government-run media again distinguished themselves by gross partiality in their coverage of SP and NP activities and a virulent campaign against the Catholic church. In response to a comment that the Archbishop's statements were never reported on radio and television, the general manager of the broadcasting monopoly wrote that they could be 'on condition that statements by the Prime Minister and by the government are broadcast from church pulpits'. In the meantime, after the signing of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in March 1984, the government media increased the anti-western and pro-Soviet bias of their coverage of international affairs.

The 'Foreign Interference' Act

It was Mintoff who first gave an international dimension to Maltese party politics. Relations between his ruling SP and the British Labour Party have been close since the 1940s. In the 1950s the SP joined the Socialist International and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). Prominent European Socialists addressed key SP public rallies before elections, including the Swede, Tage Erlander, in 1971; the German, Willy Brandt, in 1976, and the Italian, Bettino Craxi, in 1981. In addition, in 1976, Libya's leader, Colonel Qaddafi addressed an SP rally and encouraged Maltese voters to support the Mintoff party.

The NP joined the European Christian Democratic Union in the 1960s, but it was only after Fenech-Adami was elected to the leadership in 1977 that relations became close, especially with the Italian and German Christian Democratic parties. The participation of the NP in European forums particularly irked Mintoff who by then had got used to being equated with Malta. At the same time, the realisation abroad that another strong party existed in Malta and offered a credible alternative to Mintoff undercut the latter's tendency to promote himself as the only person with whom foreigners had to deal.

Already in the 1970s, the travels and speeches of NP leaders abroad were described as anti-national incitement and treason by Socialist spokesmen. On one occasion, an international meeting of Christian Democrats in Malta had to be hastily cancelled when its German chairman was declared *persona non grata* and expelled from the island. The treatment of foreign journalists and government reaction to criticism in the foreign press also revealed a strong streak of paranoia. This was further nourished by a rowdy reception given to Mintoff by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1978, financial and

material aid from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation to an NP educational foundation, the radio and television broadcasts from Sicily, and the invitation by the NP of European Christian Democratic politicians to Malta to speak from its platforms.

After the 1981 elections, Mintoff felt obliged to give his supporters a plausible explanation for the results, which were recognised within his own party as a defeat and broke his spell as a leader with an unfailing popular appeal. He thus blamed 'foreign interference' as the factor behind the NP's majority. The 'Foreign Interference' Act of 1982 became a means to ratify that view and further to hamstring the international relations of all organisations except the government party.

The Act does not define foreign interference but it describes as 'foreign activity' anything

> 'done by or sponsored, promoted or in any manner whatsoever assisted or encouraged by, any foreign person and includes in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the provision of money, equipment or other material or thing whatsoever'.

Such foreign activities 'shall not be lawful. . . except with the permission of the Minister' who 'may impose such conditions, limitations and restrictions as he may deem appropriate'.

The American government does not recognise the application of Malta's Foreign Interference Act to its diplomatic and cultural activities, and the United States Information Agency has continued to sponsor lectures by American visitors and study tours to the United States by leading Maltese citizens without requesting any permission. However, the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation stopped its aid, and broadcasts from Sicily have also been effectively discontinued, though in both cases it was more as a result of pressure by the Mintoff government than of Maltese law.

Under the Act, the activities of foreign journalists in Malta require the government's fiat. A church organisation decided not to invite a foreign cardinal to its annual meeting because the organisers were not prepared to request a permit. In April 1983, about 20 prominent members of the NP were summoned to the police headquarters and interrogated about a planned visit to West Germany where they were to attend a seminar on the German elections. The police asked questions about air fares, hotel fees and the reason for the visit and justified their questions by the need to ensure that the Foreign Interference Act was not being broken. The group of NP members eventually left for Germany.

On the other hand, there has been no harassment of members of the SP or of the small Communist Party before their departure on foreign missions. For example, seminars in Prague have been organised specifically for members of the official union, the GWU, and financed by the Czechoslovak trade union without any apparent objection by the government.

The effect of the Act has been to discourage activities by persons and orga-

nisations who resent having to request a permit. However, in March 1984, th European Democratic Union (EDU) of which the NP is an observer member requested permission to hold a committee meeting in Malta, while express ing its disagreement with the Act itself. The EDU was informed by the Mal tese government that it could hold the meeting, but no permit was issued i writing. During the meeting, the executive secretary of the EDU was sum moned to the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he was orally warne against contravening the Foreign Interference Act. In the end, the meetin came to an end without any incident, but the surrounding pressure and harass ment are bound to discourage further meetings of foreign politicians in Malt unless they are invited by the government side. In the meantime, the SP ha not neglected its international relations: in April 1984 a six-member delega tion from the Communist Party of Rumania visited Malta for bilateral talk with the SP and the GWU, and Rumanian delegates stood next to Mr Mintof at one SP rally. It is not known to have requested a permit or to have been th object of harassment.

The government's attitude was revealed more clearly in January 1983 whe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to all diplomatic missions in Malt strongly objecting to any kind of contact on their part with members of th NP. The note was provoked by Mintoff's annoyance at the publication in th NP newspapers of photos of Fenech-Adami receiving courtesy calls fro foreign ambassadors. The contacts which were prohibited included atten dance at receptions, and the Australian mission promptly cancelled a sche duled reception in protest. Many other foreign countries communicated thei strongest objections to the Maltese government. The American Embassy, i particular, wrote that after consulting the State Department it found n legitimate grounds for the ban, which contravened the Vienna Convention o diplomatic relations and was 'not in conformity with the spirit of the Helsink Final Act (Principle VIII), which condemns the kind of anti-opposition discriminatory activity normally associated with totalitarian regimes'.

Shortly afterwards this diplomatic note was tacitly withdrawn by the govern ment, but it had dramatically conveyed to foreign governments the totali tarian tendencies of the Mintoff regime. These have been evident to Mal tese citizens ever since Mintoff became Prime Minister in 1971. Up to 1981, the gradual erosion of freedom took place behind a well-kept façade of demo cracy, but since the elections of that year the façade itself has not remained intact. The degree of freedom and democracy in Malta is higher than in the Communist countries of eastern Europe, but it is decidedly lower than in the parliamentary democracies of western Europe to which Malta has been naturally linked for centuries. The greatest cause of concern is the fact that the process of erosion of freedom and democracy has gone unchecked since 1971. It is unlikely to end as long as Mintoff is in power.

•

The Contadora approach to peace in Central America

ESPERANZA DURÁN

ONE of the most serious international crises facing the world at the moment is the upheaval in Central America. An escalation there could lead to a major armed confrontation. It is urgently necessary to find a way out, though a viable solution is not easy to envisage in view of the complexity of the situation.

There have been numerous peace initiatives. Among these the so-called Contadora process stands out as perhaps the only promising avenue for a negotiated overall settlement. At the same time its importance goes beyond the concrete objectives of achieving a diplomatic solution to the crisis. It signals new directions in the foreign policies of an important group of countries which might have significant implications for the future, not least for Latin American regional cooperation.

The converging roads to Contadora

In January 1983, the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama met on the island of Contadora in the Gulf of Panama to review the situation in Central America, to discuss all the peace proposals launched till then, and to propose their own plan for bringing about a negotiated peace to the region. These countries' common interest in the stabilisation of the volatile situation in Central America because of internal security considerations was evident. What came as a surprise was the Contadora group's leaders' explicit condemnation of foreign intervention in Central America and their stated conviction that the roots of the problem were indigenous social and economic inequalities and that, therefore, these problems should not be placed in the context of the east-west conflict. This position, taken by four leading countries in the region, was a heavy blow to Washington's search for regional consensus on its policies and approaches to Central America.

For three of the countries involved in Contadora (Colombia, Venezuela and Panama), this stance marked a shift from a previous position of support for American policies in Central America. For Mexico, too, Contadora marked a departure from previous positions, at least in style and strategy. What were the causes of these changes?

Mexico's stand towards Central America during the López Portillo Administration had already been radical for some time. This was reflected in the French-Mexican communiqué on El Salvador in August 1981 which recog-

The author is a Research Fellow at Chatham House specialising in Latin America. She is the editor of a multi-author volume on Latin America and the world recession to be published by the Cambridge University Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1985. This article appears simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

nised the legitimacy of the insurgent forces in El Salvador; in Mexico's decision to side with Nicaragua and Grenada against a resolution adopted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) to welcome El Salvador's announcement of elections in March 1982; and in Mexico's decisive moral and material support of the Sandinist regime. This radicalism had not only meant clashes with the United States but had also resulted in isolating Mexico from its Latin American neighbours.

Two developments marked a shift from Mexico's posture towards Central America: first, the financial crisis of the summer of 1982, in which the United States promptly bailed Mexico out; second, the inauguration of a new President, Miguel de la Madrid, whose Foreign Minister, Bernardo Sepúlveda, had a more sober and 'classic' diplomatic style than his predecessor. Though the new Administration declared that the financial crisis would not alter Mexico's Central American policies, some differences could be noticed. From a radical, almost aggressive, policy Mexico moved to a more discreet approach; from a solo leadership role it gravitated towards a collective one; and from the search for legitimation from extra-regional powers (such as France) it moved to a rapprochment with its Latin American regional peers.

There is, however, an important element of continuity in the two Administrations: Mexico's role as 'communicator' between the United States and what the latter regards as the sources of subversion in Central America, namely Cuba, Nicaragua and the Salvadorean opposition. Mexico has continued to play this important role under de la Madrid. In fact, the new Administration has scored several successes on this count. The latest were the visit of Secretary of State, George Shultz, to Managua in the wake of President de la Madrid's trip to Washington in May and, more recently, the talks held at Manzanillo between the special American envoy to Central America, Harry Shlaudeman, and the Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister, Víctor Tinoco. Both initiatives were negotiated by de la Madrid as part of his attempt to bring about an improvement in American-Nicaraguan relations.

For its new, less explored role in Central America, Mexico needed to find like-minded partners. By 1983 it had found them. The time was ripe for Contadora to emerge. Several developments had pushed Venezuela, Colombia and Panama towards the Mexican approach.

In Venezuela, the democratic nature of its system had been the major source of change in foreign policy. Under the Social Democrat Presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez, Venezuela had actively helped the Sandinists to power through political and economic aid. When Herrera Campins replaced Pérez, aid was diverted away from Nicaragua to the government of the new President's personal friend and fellow Christian Democrat, Napoleón Duarte, in El Salvador. Campins threw in the additional component of military assistance and training for the Salvadorean army. It was during the Campins Administration that Venezuela started backing American policy towards El Salvador and towards Central America in general. Venezuela played a leading part in the opposition to the French-Mexican communiqué and it supported and became an observer

in the Central American Democratic Community (CDC), whose formation was inspired by the United States.

Two external events brought about a change in Venezuela's Central American policy. First, the defeat of Duarte in the March 1982 elections cooled Venezuelan support for El Salvador; hence the personal and partisan element which accounted for the good relations between the two nations was no longer present. Shortly after, the South Atlantic conflict erupted, and the role of the United States as a staunch supporter of Britain made Venezuela think twice about helping the United States achieve its aims in Central America.

The first signal of change in Venezuelan attitude came in September 1982 when Venezuela joined Mexico in launching a peace initiative in which both countries offered their mediation to avert an armed conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras.

Until then, Mexico and Venezuela, backed by their oil wealth, clearly were the most important Latin American political and diplomatic actors taking major initiatives with respect to Central America. But the emergence of a new active and independent participant in Central America took place in mid-1982 with the election of Belisario Betancur to the presidency of Colombia.

Under Betancur's predecessor, Turbay Ayala, Colombia had supported Reagan's policies in the area. Colombia had agreed to become the fifth member of the Nassau Group and to contribute to this initial multilateral form of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI);[1] it had endorsed the CDC; and had also participated as a founding member at the Forum for Peace and Democracy in San José. Colombia's alignment with the United States was not only based on Turbay's and Reagan's shared views on Central America, but also on the fact that Colombia had received substantial military aid from the United States. Even more important, the Reagan Administration had backed Colombia when the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua revived its claim to sovereignty of the Colombian islands of San Andrés and Providencia, off the Nicaraguan coast.

This pro-Washington trend was reversed on Betancur's taking power. The new Administration introduced big changes in internal and foreign policy. For example, it offered amnesty to all the guerrilla groups in Colombia. It sought to improve relations with Cuba, applied to join the Non-Aligned Movement, and adopted a high profile in foreign affairs. Contadora offered a good opportunity to put these aspirations into practice.

On the face of it, Panama's participation in the Contadora group might seem rather unexpected. Panama had traditionally adopted a flexible attitude in foreign policy in general, and in the Central American conflict in particular it had remained relatively quiet. However, just as was the case with Venezuela, it was the Falklands conflict and the position taken by the United States towards it, that contributed to a reassessment of Panama's own role in the region and its relations with the United States.

[1] For background, see Ramesh Ramsaran, 'The US Caribbean Basin Initiative', *The World Today*, November 1982.

Panama became active in Central America in the summer of 1982, putti forward a peace plan proposing a system of non-aggression pacts betwe Nicaragua and the United States and between Nicaragua and the CDC; negotiated solution to the civil war in El Salvador; and the start of a process détente between the United States and Cuba. The Panamanian proposal al included guarantees for territorial sovereignty for all the Central Americ nations in order to prevent armed incursions from neighbouring countrie Although this peace initiative was supported by Colombia, Costa Rica, Hon duras, Venezuela and Nicaragua, it made no further progress.

Two other attempts by Panama to contribute to the pacification of the ar failed. One in November 1982, when President de la Espriella toured Mexic El Salvador and Nicaragua, offering to act as a host for negotiations betwee the government of El Salvador and the opposition. The other was de la E priella's suggestion that Felipe González, the Prime Minister of Spain, shoul become involved in contributing to the peace plans of the region.

It was evident that Panama's stature in international affairs was insufficie to rally support and to carry enough weight to be taken seriously. Contado offered the best alternative to act more effectively.

Contadora at 18 months

Since its establishment in 1983, the Contadora group has offered new hop for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Central America. Its region credentials were impeccable and its wish to act impartially was accepted.

The Contadora group sought to establish a framework within which negot ations could be conducted and also to offer a permanent forum for dialogu among the Central American countries. A number of key isues were selecte on which it was felt negotiations could get started. These included: the wit drawal of all foreign military advisers, the cessation of arms sales and freeze on the existing level of arms, the implementation of a plan for economi revival and the resolution of domestic problems by democratic means, with th inclusion of all political groups in each country.

During 1983, Contadora's efforts were hindered by a number of obstacle including the Reagan Administration's bellicose attitude towards the San dinist regime in Nicaragua; the distrust among the Central American state and a real lack of will to proceed with negotiations. Honduras, El Salvador an Costa Rica distrusted the genuineness of Nicaragua's professed intentions no to export revolution, its pledge to demilitarise itself and its promise of de mocratisation and the holding of free elections. For its part, Nicaragua wa sceptical of its neighbours' readiness to dispense with foreign military advise and the military aid they were receiving from the United States.

The seventh meeting of Contadora in September 1983 saw the establish ment of three working groups to cover security, political and socio-economi issues. From this meeting derived the most important achievement of Con tadora in the first year of its creation: a 21-point programme to ensure th 'peace, security and stability of the region'. The programme, whose key ele

ments included a freeze on arms imports and the size of armies, a cut in the number of foreign military advisers, and a non-aggression pact banning national territories from being used for attacks on other countries, was endorsed by the five Central American countries. President Reagan agreed that the 21-point document was the best basis for a lasting solution to the problems of Central America.

The intention was that the 21-point programme would form the basis for a peace treaty, binding on all five nations of Central America and to be signed in December 1983. But the meeting to sign the treaty had to be postponed, because of opposition by Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica to additions to the Contadora blueprint demanded by Nicaragua. These countries feared that if these additional Nicaraguan demands were accepted they would leave Nicaragua's military capability untouched while at the same time forcing the elimination of the military bases the United States has in other countries.[2]

In spite of this setback, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora group plus those of the five Central American countries, reconvened earlier this year and reached a preliminary agreement to prepare for a final peace treaty within six months.

At that stage, after 15 months of negotiations, meetings, proposals and counter-proposals, and the toning down of certain issues to achieve agreement, the success of Contadora and even its continued existence seemed in doubt. At a meeting in Panama in April to assess their progress, the Foreign Ministers of Contadora noted that irregular forces were supported and supplied by neighbouring countries; that certain activities, such as the mining of ports, were taking place to disrupt trade and the freedom of navigation; that tension had intensified and mistrust was on the increase as a result of the growing presence of foreign troops and foreign military advisers; and that there was an increase in the level of arms and proliferation of military manœuvres. In short, Contadora's appeals had failed to make an impact.

Contadora has survived, however, and has reached the culmination of its peace-making efforts with the drafting, early in June, of the so-called Act of Contadora. It is a peace plan, drawn up in the form of a treaty that would be binding on its five Central American signatories. (Its text has not yet been made public, but this author has learnt its contents.)

The Act of Contadora represents an effort to harmonise all the proposals that have emerged since the process started. It stresses the need for détente in Central America and the importance of confidence-building measures. It lays

[2] The Nicaraguan proposal, which had been rejected by Washington, was for the signing of four treaties: two between the United States and Nicaragua, banning the establishment of foreign military bases in Central America and the guaranteeing of free passage for vessels and aircraft of the United States through Nicaraguan waters and air space; a regional treaty for the five Central American states, prohibiting the traffic of arms as well as overt and covert actions aimed at the overthrow of established governments (including logistic support for the irregular forces in the region); and a treaty on El Salvador, which would involve all the parties and countries in the resolution of the conflict there.

down the rules for the conduct of military manœuvres, bans new foreign military bases or training establishments, and proposes the elimination of the existing ones within a year of the treaty's signature; affirms the need to put an end to arms sales, support for irregular forces and the arms race in the area; and, most important, proposes the setting up of a mechanism for control and verification through a permanent and autonomous commission.

To help with coordination, the Act envisages the creation of rapid communication channels between governments and military authorities and the setting up of mixed security commissions, particularly between Honduras and Nicaragua, and El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the strengthening of existing ones, such as the Costa Rica-Nicaragua commission (re-established in May 1984 under Contadora auspices).

On the political side, the Act of Contadora upholds the principles of pluralist democracy with full freedom for different currents of opinion, national reconciliation and dialogue, which would include guarantees for opponents and amnestied. A political commission is envisaged, along similar lines as the military one, to receive and assess information about the implementation of political, electoral and human rights obligations undertaken by the signatories.

Contadora's prospects

What are the chances that a comprehensive peace treaty of a juridical character—such as the Act of Contadora—will be accepted and ratified by the five Central American republics? Before assessing the prospects of the Central American countries agreeing to such a treaty, it would be useful to look, however briefly, at the two main countries outside the region that would inevitably have to play a leading part in any serious peace process in Central America, that is Cuba and the United States.

Cuba has played a significant role in the region but has done so in a rather subdued manner. Apart from occasional pronouncements of not much significance and a formal endorsement of the Mexican position before and after Contadora, Cuba has kept out of the limelight. This may be a reflection of Cuba's general retrenchment after its military adventures in Africa and the more recent diplomatic loss of face in the Grenada affair.[3] However, its indirect role cannot be underestimated. Nicaraguan intransigence, mistrust and suspiciousness can all be traced back to Cuba.

Similar feelings have characterised the Reagan Administration which blames instability in Central America on Soviet and Cuban expansionism. The 'domino theory' has captured the minds of the Administration's policy-makers.[4]

Reagan's line towards Central America has not softened but there has been some tactical flexibility. There has, for example, been increased military pressure on the Salvadorean rebels and the Sandinist regime on the one hand, but also diplomatic initiatives such as talks with the guerrillas in El Salvador or

[3] See Tony Thorndike, 'The Grenada crisis', *The World Today*, December 1983.

[4] Gordon Connell-Smith, 'The crisis in Central America: President Reagan's options', *ibid.*, October 1983.

support for the Contadora process on the other. When difficulties with Congress have put in danger the flow of funds for pursuing a belligerent policy, the Reagan Administration has resorted to such moves as the establishment of the Kissinger Bipartisan Commission, the appointment of special Central American envoys or, more recently, the Shultz visit to Managua. Critics of the Administration cannot accuse it of intransigence, at least in appearance.

The conduct of American policy towards Central America has also depended on which part of the Administration has been having the upper hand in its formulation: the hard-line ideologues such as Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick and those concerned with Central America in the White House, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the pragmatists of the State Department.[5] It seems that, until recently, it was the ideologues who had had the upper hand. However, as the November election approaches, there has been increasing pressure on Reagan to show that the United States has the Central American problem under control.[6] This consideration may have led to the dropping of the policy of keeping Shultz out of Central America. The Shultz visit to Managua on 1 June was an important departure from traditional American policy. Shultz was the first high-ranking American official to vist Nicaragua since the Sandinist victory in 1979.

But the establishment of a dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua through the Shultz visit to Managua and the Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks in Manzanillo could have had other reasons apart from Reagan's election needs. The international and, more important, the domestic reaction to the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the United States may have led Reagan to realise that this could lead to trouble with Congress and put in jeopardy the whole aid package for El Salvador, so powerfully argued for in the Bipartisan Commission report.

The Sandinists in Nicaragua have particularly strong reasons for showing some flexibility before the November election in the United States. They now have some leverage over the Reagan Administration and could go for a compromise with the United States before November. Alternatively, they could make a strong bid for the signing of the Act of Contadora. After November the Sandinists will have no bargaining power left. If Reagan is re-elected, which looks quite likely, his Administration may harden its line, this time with electoral legitimation, and have four years to implement with greater freedom policies in strict accordance with its ideology, where the Sandinists have no place.

The role of the other Central American countries is, of course, also crucial for the success of any lasting peace agreement. They share certain interests and have a common perception. It is that Nicaragua's military strength is a serious threat to their own security. On this point they see the need to find a bulwark against it and thus they rely on Washington's military aid. It is the fear of

[5] Barry Rubin, 'Reagan administration policymaking and Central America', in Robert S. Leiken, *Central America. Anatomy of Conflict* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), pp.299-318.

[6] Mark Falcoff, 'The apple of discord: Central America in US domestic politics', in Howard J. Wiarda, *Rift and Revolution. The Central American imbroglio* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), pp. 360-82.

Nicaragua's militarisation, and pressure from Washington, which led Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala to revive the 1965 military pact called Condeca (Central American Defence Council) after the Contadora process had been started.

Another shared concern of Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala (not to mention El Salvador) was the possibility of a military victory of the insurgents in El Salvador, which they regarded as an unmitigated disaster. For these countries, one positive element which contributes to the stability of the region is Duarte's recent victory over his extreme right-wing opponent, Roberto d'Aubuisson, in the two-stage election in El Salvador. With Duarte firmly in power now, any aid to the government of El Salvador either from the United States or elsewhere, should the guerrillas pick up their strength, is now respectable and will guarantee the impossibility of a military success for the insurgents. Perhaps this will be an element in favour of full endorsement of the Act of Contadora, in order to consolidate the gains in El Salvador.

Costa Rica's role in particular, is especially important at this juncture. Its lack of army, its neutrality, and the new active role assumed by President Monge in the pacification of the region make Costa Rica the ideal agent for persuading the more inflexible nations in Central America—Honduras and Guatemala—to opt for a diplomatic solution. President Monge's recent European tour to rally support for peace in Central America and the meeting Costa Rica will host in September of the Foreign Ministers of the main European countries, the Contadora four and the Central American five are clear indications of Costa Rica's intention to pursue the road to a diplomatic solution.

Contadora: success or failure?

The Contadora process has achieved some results, though not its basic aim: the diplomatic solution to the Central American conflict. Some have argued that after 18 months Contadora has little to show in the way of concrete results. However, it would be unfair and premature to judge the relative success of Contadora in this way. Rather, results should be measured against the odds it has faced since its inception.

Its role looks a good deal more constructive if some 'intangibles' are taken into consideration. First, it succeeded in defining key issues which are essential preconditions for the stabilisation of the region. Second, despite substantial differences among its members, Contadora has managed to achieve a regional consensus on the form and means of tackling the most urgent problems. Third, it has brought together the five Central American nations directly involved to air their mutual grievances. Although no real progress has been made in eliminating mistrust among the countries in the region, the advantages of the establishment of a dialogue and a basis for discussion are undeniable and can be of great value in the future. Fourth, though this cannot be proved yet, Contadora may have helped to defuse and contain tension in the region at a time of serious instability, verging on large-scale conflagration.

The Yemens: conflict and coexistence

FRED HALLIDAY

THE two Yemens entered into contemporary politics in dramatic form on 26 September 1962, when a coup led by nationalist officers overthrew the Imamate in North Yemen. This upheaval led not only to the protracted civil war in North Yemen but also to the guerrilla war in the South against British rule, and to the war in the Dhofar province of Oman. For the inhabitants of southern Arabia, the 1962 revolution initiated a period of conflict and war that can only be said to have ended 20 years later, in 1982, with the reconciliation between North and South Yemen on the one hand, and between South Yemen and Oman on the other. Yet the outside world, including the rest of the Arab world, tends only to take notice of the affairs of the two Yemens when these acquire broader international significance. The Egyptian intervention in North Yemen from 1962 to 1967, the turmoil and suffering attendant upon the British withdrawal from South Yemen in 1967, the growth of Soviet influence there after the British departure, and the strategic implications of conflict between the Yemens—these have provided focus for external concern and attention. Yet even when external forces become involved, political conflicts in south-western Arabia have been to a considerable degree a product of local issues and changes. The outside world looks very different from Aden and Sanaa, where these local tensions are seen to have a dynamic that is largely of their own making.

The Twenty Years' War

Three general considerations may help to place the two Yemens, North Yemen (The Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), in context. In the first place, the Yemens, for all their political divisions, form a geographic and historical unity, a region of settled agriculture and civilisation, that has existed for over two millennia and which, like the Nile Valley and the plains of Mesopotamia, forms one of the demographic nuclei of the contemporary Middle East.[1] This is often understated by undue attention to the divisions which recent history has generated, be they those of tribal society, of colonial rule, when Aden existed in virtual separation from the hinterland, or of the post-colonial era in which

[1] The term 'Yaman' appears to have originated at the time of Islam and has, in some classical Arabic usage, covered a wide range of the west and south of the Arabian Peninsula, from the region south of Mecca and Medina to what is now Oman. In pre-Islamic times the settled south-west Arabian region was known named after the Kingdoms, Saba and Himyar, that were established there.

Mr Halliday is Temporary Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is the author of *Arabia Without Sultans* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974). This article is based on a talk he gave recently at Chatham House.

two separate and often hostile states have competed to represent Yemeni legitimacy. On the other hand, contemporary nationalists overstate this unity. They not only play down the local and tribal divisions that still divide the two states from within, but also understate the degree to which since the 1960s two separate and unassimilable states have now arisen in this single cultural-historical region.

The practical implications of this historic unity are significant: not only is there a deep popular sense of what the Yemenis are, a people with a single history and cultural identity, but there is also a sense of what they are not: and, in particular, of the fact that the Yemenis feel themselves to be separate from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[2]

The second important general factor in evaluating the external relations of the two Yemens is oil. No oil in commercial quantities has yet been found in the two Yemens and, despite the great differences in the way the two Yemens are organised, both depend to a considerable extent on income from the oil states.[3] Both are in an economic sense tributary of the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula. This bond is maintained in two ways. One is through official aid to the two Yemens, a vital factor in the economy and state finances of North Yemen, and a significant one in the budget of the South.[4] The other means by which the wealth of oil-producing Opec states flows to these states is through emigrants' remittances. The emigrants comprise large communities in the other Peninsula states and their earnings make up much of the foreign exchange income upon which the imports of the two Yemens rely.[5] But if this proximity and link to the oil states has some economically welcome effects, it also has negative consequences: workers needed at home are lured away by the higher wages available abroad, and so sections of the economy become dependent upon either foreign income or foreign consumer imports to the detriment of other priorities and of local production.[6]

This link is also closely related to the third common and distinctive feature of the two Yemens, namely the fact that, in a Peninsula of six monarchies, the two Yemens are republics. They are republics because in the 1960s both

[2] The issue of relations with Saudi Arabia is fuelled, in part, by the disputed nature of the frontier between the Kingdom and North Yemen. Under the 1934 Treaty of Taif three districts previously claimed by the Imam of Yemen—Jizan, Asir and Najran—were allotted to Saudi Arabia. A substantial section of Yemeni nationalist opinion refuses to accept the continued validity of this treaty.

[3] Oil deposits have been found in South Yemen by the Italian firm AGIP. Brazilian and Soviet teams are also prospecting. Whether oil exists there in commercial quantities has not yet been announced. For details on South Yemen's oil, see Nigel Harvey, 'South Yemen's Oil Excites Western Interest', *Middle East Economic Digest*, 6 April 1984.

[4] The Arab oil states account for around 70 per cent of total aid to North Yemen. Of total aid to South Yemen amounting to $499 million, disbursed by 31 December 1980, $118 m came from the Arab states.

[5] Virtually all of North Yemen's foreign exchange earnings in 1981 were emigrants' remittances, as were 80 per cent of South Yemen's.

[6] Jon Swanson, *Emigration and Economic Development: the Case of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

Yemens went through revolutions—that of 1962 in North Yemen which overthrew the Hamid ad-Din monarchy, and that of 1963–7 in South Yemen, when the guerrilla movement of the National Liberation Front (NLF) emerged as victor in the three-cornered independence contest between it, the rival nationalist grouping called Flosy (Federation for the Liberation of South Yemen) and the British-supported rulers of the South Arabian Federation.[7] No revolution makes a clean sweep of the old order and its culture: much of the old Yemen survives in North and South. But, despite such continuities, profound political and social changes did occur, involving significant parts of the people in both states.

As nearly always occurs, these revolutions acquired an international character. On the one hand, they sought to encourage like-minded political forces elsewhere in the Peninsula: Abdullah al-Sallal, the first North Yemeni President, opened in 1963 an Office of the Arabian Peninsula and called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarch and the creation of a 'single socialist Arabia'; his Republic gave indispensable support to the guerrillas in South Yemen. For its part, the NLF came to power in the South committed to encouraging the guerrillas in neighbouring Oman, and to supporting the radical republicans in the North who were opposed to compromise with the royalists and with Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, the opponents of these revolutions were equally concerned to internationalise them: by aiding the opponents of radical change, in North and South, and by seeking to divert the republicans from their commitment to aiding other radical forces in the Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has sought to contain and, on occasion, reverse the upheavals in the two Yemens. But, while it strengthened nationalist sentiment, this internationalisation of the Yemeni revolutions also had a powerful divisive effect. The two independent Yemeni states grew apart politically during the period after 1967 and ended up by fighting two wars with each other, in 1972 and 1979.

The main feature of the two Yemeni revolutions, the creation of two republican states in south-west Arabia, has not been reversed. Both countries are now involved in a slow and long-term process of creating central states and changing their economy. Yet since 1982 it can be said that for the first time in 20 years the two Yemens are at peace.

The North Yemeni revolution of 1962 set off a process of political and social conflict in south-west Arabia that spread from the North to the South and then to the Dhofar region of Oman. It was only in 1982 that this 20-year war came to an end, with the cessation of the guerrilla war in North Yemen, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and South Yemen. The current foreign policies of the two Yemens can therefore be seen as being guided by a consciousness of the Yemens as a distinct and regional entity, of a

[7] I have discussed this in more detail in my *Arabia without Sultans* (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1974). See also Joseph Kostiner, *The Struggle for South Yemen* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1984).

difficult and yet inescapable dependence on the oil-producing states, and of a recent revolutionary past that has, at least temporarily, given way to a period of peace and consolidation.

North Yemen: the view from Sanaa

In the past few years, North Yemen appears to have emerged from a period of political conflict that has persisted throughout the 1970s. The end of the civil war in 1970 produced a coalition in which elements from the royalist camp joined with the republicans. But there was conflict within the republican camp, as some left-wing groups refused to accept the peace and others thought that the government was going too far in enforcing central control of the tribes. President al-Iryani was ousted in 1974, his successor al-Hamdi assassinated in 1977, and al-Hamdi's successor al-Ghashmi killed, by a bomb sent from South Yemen, in 1978. The left-wing forces fought a guerrilla war from 1971 to 1973, and again, after the death of al-Hamdi, from 1978 to 1982.[8] Al-Ghashmi's successor, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a former artillery officer from a minor sheikh family has, however, been able to consolidate his power, using the army and his own tribal group, the Sinhanis, to build a more workable central state and a stronger central army. This process of strengthening of the state, and defeat of the left-wing National Democratic Front (NDF) has, however, been offset by a serious economic problem, as foreign revenues have fallen. The crisis of October 1983, when a new Cabinet was installed and stringent import controls imposed, has apparently signalled the end of North Yemen's easier times of reliance on wealth from the oil states.[9]

Saudi Arabia's economic strength is the basis of the influence which it wields within North Yemen, and on its foreign policy. The Saudis have in the past suspended payments to North Yemen governments when these have pursued policies of which the Saudis disapprove. But the Saudis have another source of influence: their direct links to the northern tribes, and in particular to the Hashed group of Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar. These links represent one alternative source of influence to that of pressure upon the government itself. But the Saudis are aware that overt pressure antagonises the North Yemenis, and so their influence has been consistent, but indirect.

Their primary aim is to keep a friendly government in power in Sanaa, and to prevent this government from establishing too close relations with either the Soviet Union or South Yemen. But Saudi Arabia has also to contend with other Arab influences in North Yemen—Egypt in the past, and more recently, Iraq and Libya have sought to win influence within the armed forces. No political parties are permitted in North Yemen, but shadowy political coalitions involving military, tribal and urban intellectual elements have

[8] The National Democratic Front was founded in 1976, and initially comprised five radical parties operating in North Yemen. In March 1979, these then fused into a single organisation, the Yemeni Popular Unity Party in the Yemeni Arab Republic. A number of groups of military officers have also, at one time or another, affiliated to the NDF.

[9] The October 1983 austerity measures have, however, led to a substantial increase in smuggling from Saudi Arabia.

existed since the days of the civil war and even before. Thus, pro-Iraqi Baathists are still believed to have some influence. The National Democratic Front is supported by South Yemen. In recent years, however, a grouping close to the Muslim Brotherhood and known as the Islamic Front has gained strength under the influence of the 23,000 Egyptian teachers in the country. While not necessarily under the control of Saudi Arabia, this has constituted a new political force generally friendly to the Saudis and hostile to South Yemen and its sympathisers in the north. Four of the Ministers in the Cabinet of October 1983 were believed to be sympathetic to the Islamic Front.[10] The Saudis must see in it a new channel of influence, complementary to the tribes.

North Yemen has been careful to cultivate relations with the various factions of the Arab world. It has been critical of the initiatives taken by Egypt, but has never joined the 'rejectionist' camp that severed all ties with Cairo in 1977. It has, from the start, supported Iraq in its war with Iran, and is believed to have supplied some of its Soviet equipment to the Iraqis in return for payment. But it has also taken note of the growth of power of the Gulf states, and has received substantial aid from Kuwait and the Emirates. North Yemen is not, however, a candidate for membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the grouping of six Arab oil-producers of the Peninsula set up in May 1981. As one high-ranking government official put it to this author:

> 'There are three reasons why we will not be allowed to join. First, we are a republic. Secondly, we are poor. And third, if they let us in, then they would have to let the Iraqis in as well.'

One of the most curious aspects of North Yemen's foreign policy is its enduring relationship with the Soviet Union. Moscow first established diplomatic relations with Sanaa in 1923, and during the 1950s arms were supplied to the Imam. The Republic received substantial supplies of arms, directly and via Egypt, and in 1964 a 20-year Treaty of Friendship was signed. Although links weakened in the 1970s, the Soviet Union and North Yemen never clashed publicly, and the North Yemen armed forces remained reliant upon Soviet weaponry.[11] It was in 1979 that the Soviet Union pulled off its greatest coup, offering $600 m worth of cheap weapons to North Yemen just after the United States offered $380 m worth at much higher prices. Soviet arms deliveries in 1979 and 1980 helped North Yemen's army to re-equip itself and launch the counter-offensive against the NDF guerrillas. And in October 1981 President Ali Abdullah Saleh visited Moscow where he voiced support for a range of Soviet foreign policy positions, on Camp David, the Red Sea, and the arms race.[12] Sanaa has evidently decided that this Soviet supply line assists it in keeping a degree of independence from the Saudis. On its

[10] These were believed to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ahmad Mohammad Abd al-Malek al-Asbahi, the Minister of Finance, al-Khadem Wajih, the Minister of Local Government, Mohammad Abdullah al-Jaifi, and the Minister of Education, Abd al-Wahed al-Zendani.

[11] See Mark Katz, 'Sanaa and the Soviets', *Problems of Communism* (Washington), January 1984.

[12] *Soviet News* (London), 3 November 1981.

side, Moscow appears to place greater value upon the maintenance of this historic tie with the North Yemeni government and the support of a counterweight to Saudi Arabia, than upon endorsement of the NDF's revolutionary programme.[13]

The west seems, on the whole, content with recent developments in North Yemen. The growth in central government strength, and the deft use of traditional political skills by the President have reassured the western powers after the uncertain beginnings of his presidency in 1978 and 1979. The majority of North Yemen's trade is with the west; a significant number of aid programmes are under way in North Yemen. American military personnel are training the airforce. But the west has proved less welcoming to Sanaa's increasingly insistent demand for increased economic aid.

South Yemen: widening of contacts

The post-independence history of South Yemen has involved complex, and at times violent, interconnections of domestic and foreign policy, even if not on the scale found in North Yemen. The first President, Qahtan al-Shaabi, was ousted in the 'corrective move' of 1969, which brought the left of the NLF to power and initiated a period of radical internal reform and closer alliance with the Communist world. His successor, Salem Robea Ali, was executed in 1978, after failing in a coup attempt against the majority in the Central Committee who opposed him, and with whom he clashed on economic policy, domestic political organisation and foreign policy. The third President, Abdul Fatah Ismail, pursued an orthodox pro-Soviet line; in October 1979, he signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and established a system of party and state organisation closely modelled on Soviet theories of the 'national democratic' phase.[14] But his excessive reliance on the Soviet Union failed to produce the economic benefits anticipated, and he himself remained remote from the everyday affairs of government. The result was that in April 1980 he was voted out of office by the Central Committee and exiled to the Soviet Union.

While these leadership conflicts involved a whole range of issues, and cannot be reduced to foreign policy disputes, let alone foreign manipulation, foreign issues certainly played a part in them. Qahtan al-Shaabi wanted to keep open South Yemen's links to the Arab world, albeit its more radical parts, which in his day included Egypt. Salem Robea Ali wanted to balance the alliance with the Soviet Union with continuing friendship to China, and after diplomatic relations between Aden and Riyadh were established in 1976 he seems to have believed that Saudi Arabia would also help to balance the ties to Moscow. Abdul Fatah's strong sympathy for the Soviet Union was, in fact, his undoing, since the Russians, cautious about the prospects of socialist transformation in a poor and vulnerable society such as the South Yemen were in no

[13] The Soviet Union has never endorsed the NDF's policies, nor granted it formal recognition in any way, despite NDF attempts to gain such recognition, and explicit backing for the Soviet Union in the Popular Unity Party's programme.

[14] Text of the Soviet–South Yemen Treaty in *Soviet News* (London), 13 November 1979.

mood to provide money for development projects on a scale many Yemenis apparently expected.[15]

President since 1980, and Prime Minister since 1971, Ali Nasser Mohammad has pursued a more shrewd and comprehensive policy than his three predecessors. He has maintained and developed relations with the Soviet Union and has made clear that South Yemen is not interested in breaking with the Soviet Union in the way that Somalia and Egypt did before. He has, however, improved relations with China, and in 1983 China unilaterally rescheduled the debt which Aden owes to it. In common with his predecessors, Ali Nasser Mohammad has also sought trade and financial links both with the conservative Arab oil states and with the west: indeed throughout the post-independence period, South Yemen has continued to conduct the majority of its trade with the west and Japan, and the percentage of imports from Britain has remained more or less at the level of colonial times. This broadening of contacts has led to a sustained economic improvement in South Yemen in the past few years.

Where Ali Nasser has sought to break ground most is in his country's relations with North Yemen and Oman, neighbouring states with which Aden has been in conflict since independence. North Yemen started the 1972 inter-Yemeni war, but South Yemen launched the one in 1979 and suffered the consequences of having its offensive blocked. Subsequently, the two Yemeni states signed an agreement on unifying the two states. The National Democratic Front, backed by Aden, tried to gain a position within the Sanaa government. An agreement between it and Ali Abdullah Saleh was negotiated in January 1980. But this broke down as a result of resistance to it from pro-Saudi tribes, and by the spring of 1982 the NDF had been defeated, its strongholds in the southern part of North Yemen overrun, and around 2,000 of its guerrilla fighters forced to flee, with their families, to South Yemen. South Yemen was thus forced to accept the need to negotiate with the Northern government alone, and the 1979 agreement between the two states to unify in principle matured in 1982 into a broader consultation and coordination in the field of foreign policy.

Unity in the sense of a merger of the two states is almost inconceivable. Both are too suspicious of each other, and have too great an investment in their separate state structures, to risk that. But the 'unity process', a series of continuing negotiations, does bring some concrete benefits to each side. First, it brings peaceful coexistence (in the sense of non-belligerency) between the two governments, and a reining-in of the elements within their own states which seek to overthrow the government of the other. The NDF remains an organised force exiled in South Yemen. The National Coalition, a gathering of Flosy and other exiles from the South, maintains a position in the North. But, after 20 years of conflict, coexistence between the two Yemeni states does

[15] Particular irritation was caused by long delays in the completion of the al-Hizwa power station outside Aden: initially promised in 1972, it was still being constructed 12 years later. A Japanese firm, contracted to build another power station, completed the job in less than two years.

seem to have become reasonably durable. Secondly, unity involves certain forms of cooperation—in joint companies for tourism, shipping and insurance, and in collaboration between the educational ministries and writers of the two countries. A Yemeni Council, composed of the Presidents of the two states and selected ministers, meets every six months to discuss 'unity', and a 136-clause draft Constitution has been prepared. However, the meetings of the Councils have yielded no specific publicised decisions and the text of the Constitution has not been published, but is being 'studied' by the two Presidents.

The other neighbouring state with which South Yemen has normalised relations is the Sultanate of Oman. South Yemen gave substantial and public support to the guerrilla movement in the Dhofar province of Oman that fought there until 1975, and even after the effective end of the Dhofar war Aden continued to back the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and criticise the Oman government for granting facilities to foreign powers—first Britain and Iran, and later the United States, which has received greater access to Oman than to any other country belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council. This sustained opposition to the Sultanate lost South Yemen the goodwill of other Gulf states, and Aden was long urged by both other Arab countries and by the Soviet Union to resolve this dispute. After GCC mediation, the two sides met in October 1982 and some issues were settled rapidly. But while the two sides have accorded each other diplomatic recognition, and a number of unannounced visits by officials to each other's capitals have occurred, ambassadors have not yet been exchanged.

The receding of the wave of south Arabian revolutions has allowed South Yemen to resolve a number of major problems in its foreign policy, while the rise of other radical states in the region has created some new opportunities and problems. South Yemen has tried to maintain good relations with both Iraq and Iran, in part by blaming each for its share in the war. While it now refines considerable quantities of Iranian oil, it favours Iraq in so far as it urges an immediate ceasefire. Its relations with Libya, to which it is bound by the Tripartite Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemen Treaty of 1981, have deteriorated, as a result of Aden's refusal to back either Libya's anti-Arafat stance on the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or its position on Chad. Libyan aid was suspended in early 1984 as a consequence. The one revolutionary state in the region with which South Yemen does have good and apparently smooth relations is Ethiopia: South Yemeni troops fought against Somalia in 1977–8, and there is substantial military and economic cooperation between the two. It would, therefore, appear that despite its improved relations with a number of Arab states, and in particular with its neighbours in the Arabian Peninsula, South Yemen continues to balance these with ties to friendly states lying beyond the Arab world itself. Its ability to pursue its radical, and unique, path of socio-economic development within the Arab context depends to a considerable degree upon continued support from further afield.

Security dilemmas of small states

JONATHAN ALFORD

HOW 'small' is small? Does the qualifying adjective apply to area? Or to population? Or to resources and wealth? Some states, like Singapore, are tiny but hardly weak. Others appear large, rich, populous and powerful but turn out to be so politically fragile that a small group of determined men can effectively hijack the state, just as with the small and weak, as with Iran.

The problem, therefore, is that the upper end of the small-state band is very hard to define. We all think that we know what we mean when we talk about micro-states and there are some candidates for everyone's list, but a definitional approach—even a complex one which takes account of size, population and wealth—is probably unproductive, at least in a predictive sense. Yet even if we have the greatest difficulty in agreeing what a small state 'is', we do have some sense of relative weakness and so of the security problems created by that weakness. It doesn't make much sense to begin at the other end, however, and say that a weak state is a state that needs external security support. In that sense, west European states are weak states for we feel the need to invoke the power of the United States to offset the power of our Soviet neighbour.

External threats

It is necessary to establish a calculus of risks for small states in which threat —internal and external—is measured against potential resistance to threat. External threat is much more likely to be a function of geography than anything else. Nobody hijacks a small state just because it seems a good thing to do, not least because many of the states are 'hijackable' precisely because they are poor (and cannot afford to maintain adequate defences) and the acquisition of this poor state will almost certainly add a burden to the economy of the hijacker. Larger powers generally seek to take over control of small, weak states because of where they are—and not just because they are small, weak states. They must offer some geographical advantage—whether in war, in a liberation struggle, in the east-west competition or, in defensive terms, to preempt a potential military opponent and prevent him from gaining a position of military advantage. Often micro-states are islands, and islands offer stepping stones to other places. This was also George Quester's view in his *International Security* article 'Defending the micro-states':

> 'All too easy to seize, the islands still today offer advantages for projecting power onward elsewhere.'[1]

[1] *International Security*, Fall 1983, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 167.

Colonel Alford is Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. This article is a revised version of an address to the Royal Commonwealth Society 1984 Annual Conference.

In a sense, we have to explain Grenada, but it has to be done in a way which makes clear why it was Grenada and not St Kitts or St Lucia that was hijacked. Perhaps the airfield was important after all. Nor should we immediately conclude that every small state is about to be gobbled up by some great metropolitan power or even relatively powerful neighbour. I do not think that we are about to see a new wave of colonisation take place even if, paradoxically, that might improve the external security of small states. The boring thing about this way into the problem is that it rejects theory and demands a case-by-case approach which must, to a very large extent, involve a careful analysis of historical claims, deprivation and affinity in order to see who might push things to the point of violence, and whether violence will succeed. On that score we have to admit that the American Administration was anxious about Grenada long before the crisis of 1983, but few could have predicted the attempted hijacking of the Seychelles by mercenaries from South Africa.

I am not sure whether the external threat is what we have to worry about most or whether it is the takeover of the micro-states by revolution from within. Certainly it is the internal takeover which would seem to worry leaders in the West Indies. 'The category of threat which is of most concern in the Eastern Caribbean is that of an attempted coup d'etat.'[2]

There are plenty of inhibitions against an external takeover and one can in practice record only a very few cases in the postwar world where a micro-state has been swallowed by a larger state. One can list a few colonial and post-colonial disturbances—Goa, the Falkland Islands (before Argentina was forced to disgorge), perhaps Chad, the Spanish Sahara, Kuwait (the Iraqi threat of 1961). Foreign Offices worry about a few other historical claims—Guatemala and Belize,[3] Venezuela and part of Guyana, Ethopia and/or Somalia and Djibouti—but it is encouraging to note how few of these small and apparently non-viable states have actually been taken over by direct conquest. This would lead one to argue that the inhibitions and disincentives against the permanent acquisition of a micro-state by an external power are still rather strong and that we ought not to worry too much about it.

Internal threats

Much more likely is the thing which it is far more difficult to prevent and that is the deliberate takeover of the levers of power in micro-states by a small group acting against the wishes of the majority. Quester, in the article referred to, concluded that 'a ratio of controller-to-controlled of perhaps one per 2,000' might be sufficient, which led him to argue that some 50 determined men could control Grenada. Bernard Coard may not have had many more than this. In 1979, the New Jewel Movement disposed of only 46.[4] Quite how one discovers what the wishes of the majority are, I do not know. Reverting to

[2] Graham Norton, 'Defending the Eastern Caribbean', *The World Today*, June 1984, pp. 256–7.

[3] See George Philip, 'Belize: the regional context', this issue, pp. 370–6.

[4] Graham Norton, *ibid.*, p. 257.

: of Grenada, it seems just as likely that Eric Gairy 'hijacked the state' Maurice Bishop or Bernard Coard. Our only valid criterion for support- ikeover, or working to prevent it, is to adapt Emperor Franz Josef's question: 'Is he a patriot for me?' Do we like their politics? Do we ir human rights record? Whose side are they on? The French in Chad, nple, have been marvellously inconsistent (or pragmatic) in whom they :o back at a particular moment. This, as we saw in Grenada, is likely to ne very awkward questions in attempting to decide what is or is not a iate' regime and so whether it should be supported or removed if pos- or at least isolated and made to bear the weight of our disapproval. t, of course, seems quite likely to ensure that the regime concerned will e approval of the Communist camp.

npossible to begin to address the security problems of small states with- ifying the question of regime legitimacy because, at least in the western acies, that will determine whether calls for assistance should be met or and it is to calls of assistance that I now turn. Forget for the moment r and under what circumstances it is 'right' for outside powers to in- . Concentrate instead on what security assistance outside powers can both to preserve the regime against domestic threats and against inva- a hostile power.

isis assistance

ng first with non-crisis conditions, it is reasonable to suppose that one iings that a micro-state cannot do is adequately to train its own security vhether police, para-military or military. They will need help and this rovided either by training abroad certain key members of the security oolice or armed forces) or by training in place by means of training nd secondment. Outside powers can also provide physical security in f guards, bodyguards and technical advice and assistance, either on a nental or non-governmental basis. All this, one has to assume, is on re- id paid for either from overseas assistance budgets or by local contribu-

id, there is the provision of arms and specific technical training in their maintenance. If a micro-state thinks that it has a security problem, in- r external, it will need the appropriate level of appropriate arms and ll have to come from outside. Deciding how to interpret 'appropriate' :ase will hardly be easy.

, and increasingly for island micro-states, there is a growing problem igement of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and the prevention of perations—whether fishing, piracy, smuggling or drug-running. Sur- : is not an easy task, whether electronic, air or sea surveillance, and it iable to assume that EEZ policing, even at a minimum level, will tend nd assistance from outside.

y, under this non-crisis provision but still well within the security ere is a large area of information and intelligence gathering and pro-

cessing which will—again by definition—be hard for small states to manage. Certainly advice and probably provision, training and management in this field will be needed. Not much of this would count as military intelligence but much of it would be very relevant for regime security.

Crisis assistance

Turning to crisis, I shall deal first with internal crisis management, which is a severe threat to regime longevity. Police imported can often deal rather effectively with a breakdown in law and order, but cannot easily deal with armed insurrection. Reserves of police power are very unlikely to be available in a micro-state unless much planning has been done and no police force in a micro-state is likely to be permanently established to deal with a major crisis of government confidence. Unfortunately, uncommitted reserves of police power are not often available anywhere else either. We have not hitherto thought in terms of globally mobile police forces. The former metropolitan powers can usually scramble a scratch force together in a crisis and the sight of British bobbies wading ashore in Anguilla or French gendarmes in the New Hebrides is not unfamiliar but if there is real anxiety about the breakdown of law and order in micro-states, a regional police solution may be the best answer. There would be much to think about, not least the funding, but some potential concentrations of vulnerable micro-states (like the Pacific or the Caribbean) might move to build a system of on-call police reinforcements. Things which would have to be enshrined in a regional police reserve include earmarking, organisation, legality, training, transport, logistic support, intelligence, liaison and language. It could work, given thought, political will, encouragement and a sense of urgency.

If there is armed insurrection, armed forces may be needed and that means peacekeeping albeit on a small scale. One cannot generalise on this point because it will depend on the size and loyalty of the armed forces maintained by the micro-state and the size of the insurrection. There seems a rather high probability that very isolated micro-states who believe themselves to live in a benign environment will maintain only very small armed forces or none at all. Thus there will be little additional state power available to draw on in an internal crisis and external armed support could quickly be needed. Again the question is whether that should be regional power or former metropolitan power or some other source of power, such as the Commonwealth. There would be much in favour of regional force but the difficulties of combining disparate elements of regional force under a coherent command structure would, *prima facie*, seem to be very much greater than with police forces. It has always seemed so with the United Nations and experiences of other regional peacekeeping groupings, such as the OAU, have not been wholly felicitous. Thus, if there is a single external military power under obligation to stiffen a regime, it might be better to use that power in the short run (i.e., in a crisis) giving way to regional forces again in the longer run when the crisis has been defused. That was very much what happened in Grenada, however it was dressed up,

and it is in practice very hard to imagine the other Caribbean states being able to muster the force necessary to overturn Coard, backed as he was by a substantial military force of Cubans, and doubtful, too, whether they would have had the transport to move forces quickly to the island.

Let us therefore assume that the former metropolitan powers or some other large power with the ability to insert force at short notice may have to come to the aid of a regime facing a substantial armed insurrection which the micro-state does not have the forces to deal with. How best is that done? The answer is through sound contingency planning. It is very much easier to have a plan in the drawer, even if it has to be modified in a hurry due to circumstance, than to have no plan at all and only vague undertakings. The military commanders will, of course, ask for political guidance. Where are we likely to be sent? And in what strength? An open-ended commitment to rescue micro-states is hardly helpful, but political guidance can be given to prepare certain plans on the basis of some descending scale of likelihood multiplied by vulnerability. Plans mean only an appropriate shopping list of units, transport, suitable route-activation plans, modest intelligence requirements, maps, communications plans and logistic support. The point is that if this is well done, all concerned with the provision of forces in a crisis have a common starting point and reaction-time can be greatly reduced. The common element in my own experience of contingency planning is for the political departments to be reluctant to admit the need for a plan at all and for the armed forces to ask for far more concrete detail than can be given. It is not enough to say 'have forces, will travel'. Some expenditure of imagination is necessary to translate that vague willingness to help a micro-state into something which not only gives the regime some self-confidence that help will in practice be forthcoming but may also serve as a deterrent to those who might challenge the regime.

Types of external threat

Finally, I would turn to the external threat to micro-states. I indicated earlier that I do not see other states as simply waiting around to gobble up micro-states. In practice most are islands and gobbling up islands is still quite a lot harder than mounting a land invasion. One can hardly imagine a replay of Hassan's 'Green March' in the Western Sahara against an island. Amphibious forces are quite expensive to maintain. Some islands are vulnerable, as we know to our cost, but it is a long voyage from anywhere to Ascension, St Helena, the Seychelles or Bermuda. So we should not worry too much about external threats to the security of most micro-states. We do not in fact live in as anarchic a world as all that: every potential whale thinking of swallowing a sprat has to weigh up what it would tell the rest of the world about the nature of the whale. Not often would it be worth it, and we only need to worry about when it might seem to be worth it. In large wars, of course, all bets are off and great powers at war will seek to take or to defend small states if it is in their strategic interest to do so, but that is a quite different calculation and not really relevant to this discussion.

In so far as there are external threats to small states from regional neighbours we need to be very specific. We need to pay particular attention to the symbolism of external garrison forces for states like Belize (threatened by Guatemala), Chad, Djibouti and possibly some of the smaller Gulf sheikdoms (perhaps threatened by Iran). The reason why small states that feel themselves under threat seek the reassurance of stationed forces is precisely because there is the hope of invoking much greater forces from the external guarantor power. The guarantor is forced to think about his exposed and potentially vulnerable garrison which will give an urgency to reinforcement plans which would otherwise be absent. This, of course, is precisely why large states are reluctant to enter into security relationships with small states and seem to spend most of their time trying to wriggle out of them.

The conclusions

There may in practice be not very much to say about this vexed and difficult subject. It is outside the scope of this article to discuss residual colonial responsibilities because these are hardly 'states'. I have chosen at least to imply that I have been considering very small--i.e., 'non-viable', whatever that may mean—states or micro-states of which there are no less than 38 with populations of less than one million. My conclusions fall into three main groups.

The first is that, generally, external security problems of micro-states are manageable but that where a threat is palpable, some element of stationed forces may be a permanent necessity, whether from a regional grouping under regional security arrangements (such as Caricom in the Caribbean or the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Gulf) or from a former metropolitan power (Britain or France). The UN and the Commonwealth must be at least theoretical candidates, but agreement in the Security Council may be hard to obtain and the Commonwealth is a very far-flung organisation. However, whales do not often swallow sprats. One could even argue in the South African case that whales sometimes give birth to sprats.

The second set of conclusions relate to a domestic crisis with which the micro-state cannot cope. An almost infinite variety of circumstances might be envisaged but, almost by definition, domestic forces hostile to a legitimate regime could easily become unmanageable. This is the greatest danger that micro-states face in all its complexity. I would argue that the most appropriate response is additional policing and that it is in this area that something concrete can and should be done. Soldiers do not make very good policemen, but violence can obviously reach the point where armed insurrection rather than extensive disorder is at issue. My preference then is for the military reinforcement by a single power even if there is some window-dressing or legitimisation by small regional contingents. After all, Anguilla, the New Hebrides and Grenada all 'worked'. After the immediate crisis has been defused, it is certainly possible and probably desirable for regional forces to hold the ring for reconstruction, but I would remain extremely sceptical about forceful regional solutions to major internal security problems unless an unusually high degree

of regional homogeneity exists, as perhaps in the GCC or the Eastern Caribbean. However, it is encouraging to note that there are developments in the direction of prior cooperation in the Eastern Caribbean. According to Graham Norton:

> 'There is a possibility that a single Regional Defence Force will be established under united command. More likely, however, is an ever-increasing degree of cooperation between island defence and para-military forces.'[5]

This is to be welcomed as is the good sense of what Norton calls the 'Adams' Doctrine', named after the Prime Minister of Barbados who in 1979 emphasised the importance of very rapid intervention indeed:

> 'The lesson is thus underlined that, in most coups, the first 24 hours are decisive.'[6]

Finally, there is steady-state security assistance. Micro-states are unlikely to provide much or even any of the logistics, training, intelligence and infrastructure normally associated with internal or external security. To the extent that this is sought by a legitimate regime, others must try to provide it and generally do so when it is requested. My own view is that this is, if properly regulated, just as much a part of developing assistance as is aid and trade. 'Nothing has ever been made until the soldier has made safe the field where the building shall be built; and the soldier is the scaffolding until it has been built, and the soldier gets no reward but honour'—in this case, convert to 'soldier and policeman'.

I would certainly have no difficulty in agreeing with George Quester's conclusion:

> 'Above all, the amount of serious thinking assigned to the international problems of such states needs to be increased, in place of comic-opera relaxation, in the national capitals of the world, as well as in its international organisations.'[7]

[5] Graham Norton, 'Defending the Eastern Caribbean', *The World Today*, June 1984, p. 256.
[6] Graham Norton, *ibid.*, pp. 258–9.
[7] George Quester, 'Defending the micro-states', *International Security*, Fall 1983, p. 175.

Belize: the troubled regional context

GEORGE PHILIP

WITHIN the next 12 months, some of the uncertainties about Belize's current status will be resolved. Internal elections (due in or before February 1985), the renewal (or otherwise) of Britain's military commitment to Belize, and the American elections in November (with their implications for American policy towards Central America) will all have their effect within the next year. Belize is the prisoner of external events over which it has limited control, but the composition and outlook of the Belizean government itelf is easily underestimated as a factor in these international manoeuvrings.

Belizean independence from Britain in 1981 gave the government of Mr George Price an increasing freedom of manoeuvre in its foreign relations. Yet the essential limitations on Belizean policy have not changed. Belize is a small country with a population of 150,000 facing a territorial claim from an aggressive neighbour, Guatemala. It is thus forced to look for an external source of military support. Belize is also on the border of the various civil and international conflicts in Central America—a border position which offers both danger and opportunity. Finally, Belize's democratic political system, its ethnic composition and its economic structure impose further limits on what the county can do.

The Guatemala factor

One development which could conceivably bring about a complete change in Belize's position would be an agreement with Guatemala. In this event, British troops would almost certainly pull out of Belize, satisfied that their role had been fulfilled. Mr Price has indicated that under these circumstances he would ask for an inter-American defence force to police the border for guerrillas, drug traffickers and so on. There would then be little to prevent Belize enjoying the best of both worlds, maintaining its Caribbean links, its non-aligned foreign policy and its alliance with the United States. The United States, too, would prefer a negotiated settlement between Belize and Guatemala. Although American diplomacy has in the past been pro-Guatemalan on the issue, it has tilted towards Belize since 1980. The United States is now the most important giver of aid to Belize and has just begun extending military aid on a small scale.

Agreement with Guatemala still seems unlikely, however. A breakthrough did appear to have been reached in March 1981, when Britain, Belize and Guatemala signed the Heads of Agreement. These would have preserved Belizean territorial integrity and secured recognition by Guatemala. In return, Guatemala was to be offered the 'use and enjoyment' of certain parts of

The author is Lecturer in Latin American Politics jointly at the London School of Economics and the Institute of Latin American Politics, London.

Belize's Caribbean coastline. Further negotiations did not lead to progress, however: both parties, and particularly Guatemala, seemed to back off from the concessions which this formula implied. The result was that Belize came to independence without recognition by Guatemala which reiterated its territorial claim.

There are important political forces within Guatemala, notably the far right, which would strongly oppose—and might eventually be in a position to repudiate—any recognition of Belize without territorial concessions on the part of the latter. Under these circumstances, the military government now in power may see no compelling reason to settle with Belize. It may calculate that American policy towards Guatemala will be determined more by fear of insurgency and by congressional attitudes towards human rights than by non-settlement with Belize. It may also feel that, in the long run, an external source of conflict may be helpful to the political role and self-image of the Guatemalan army. Moreover, by refusing to make a settlement with Belize, the Guatemalans can guarantee that foreign troops will remain in Belize indefinitely, which would help meet some Guatemalan counter-insurgency concerns. In the event of Belize being left undefended at any point, Guatemala would of course be in a position to impose terms. Some influential Guatemalans have talked about keeping the claim open well into the next century without pursuing it with any great urgency until international conditions become opportune.

For these reasons, there seems little possibility of a quick settlement of the border issue. In July the Guatemalans went to the polls to elect an Assembly to draw up a new Constitution. Rather surprisingly, the moderate elements did well in the election, which means that the door at least remains open for further talks. From the Belizean standpoint, electoral considerations, if nothing else, make the possibility of territorial concession to Guatemala unthinkable.

It is interesting in this context to consider how much regional opinion will weigh on the Guatemalan government. Originally Guatemala's territorial claim (which does have some historical foundation) was supported by almost all of Latin America. Gradually, however, Price's government persuaded other countries of the desirability of Belizean independence with its territory intact. Price first won the support of the Caribbean countries and then, after 1977, the Latin bloc at the United Nations began to break up. Panama and Mexico, opposed to the Guatemalan government on ideological grounds, were the first to change position and were soon followed by the Cubans and the Sandinistas (still fighting for power) in Nicaragua.

British diplomacy began to respond to this changing situation in 1978. Early in the year the British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, discussed with George Price the possibility of a small territorial concession in return for Guatemalan recognition. Price rejected this emphatically. Subsequently, Britain offered aid to Guatemala for a major road project and various forms of access to Belize's Caribbean coast, without any transfer of sovereignty. These proposals, too, were rejected. However, in December 1978 Guatemala suffered a major

diplomatic setback when the United Nations General Assembly voted 128-(for Belizean independence. Twelve countries, including El Salvador, Nica ragua, Honduras and the United States, abstained. Since then, Guatemala' diplomatic position has continued to weaken. In 1980, the United State finally switched its support to Belize, the Sandinistas reversed Nicaragua' pro-Guatemalan policy and, in February 1984, George Price paid a brie official visit to Honduras, a visit which drew strong protest from Guatemala

In diplomatic terms, therefore, Price has outmanoeuvred the Guatemalar government, which is now practically without allies in its territorial claim What remains to be seen, however, is whether this will bring about a softenin of the terms which it is willing to accept. This must be doubtful.

The British connection

In the absence of a Belizean-Guatemalan agreement this year, the Britisl government will have to decide in 1985 whether or not to maintain its troo presence. This presence amounts to some 1,800 men with Harrier and ligh armoured support. Although this is a very small force, it serves the purpos very well. It is certainly enough to discourage Guatemala from any thought o invasion; since the surrender of Port Stanley in 1982 the Guatemalans hav studiously avoided provoking any kind of border incident. While in all pro bability a small British force could not indefinitely hold up the entire Guate malan army, the consequences for Guatemala of a defeat would be so horren dous that its leaders are unlikely to risk anything on the outcome of armec conflict. At the same time, a small British military detachment can have othe functions in Belize beyond border defence.

Although it is officially denied that British troops have any kind of interna function (beyond training the Belize Defence Force), their border patrols dc place some check on certain forms of crime, of which the most important i drug smuggling. Apprehended smugglers and other criminals are turned ove to the Belizean Defence Force (which act as both police and army) which thu gains an enviable reputation for efficiency. The only fatality to have resultec so far from the British troop commitment was a drug smuggler who unwisel drew a weapon when troops discovered him crossing the border. What the political consequences would have been in Britain if the smuggler had killed a soldier is an interesting thought. Such considerations help to explain the strong official denials that British troops have more than an external role in the country. A further advantage enjoyed by British troops is their relative acceptability in the region.

This stems from the fact that they are largely detached from other conflicts in the area, in a way that American or (less plausibly) Cuban troops plainly would not be. The Belizean government contrives to maintain reasonably friendly relations with Nicaragua and Cuba, although it has diplomatic relations with neither. Indeed, the Marxist left has shown far less sympathy with Guatemalan territorial aspirations than has the Central American right. Perhaps for this reason—and also because the most active insurgency move-

ment in Guatemala is currently in the Quiché (near the border with Mexico) rather than the Peten (near the border with Belize)—there has been no real attempt by the left to portray Britain as being in close alliance with the United States or Belize as a 'pawn of American imperialism'.

Despite these apparent advantages, however, it is by no means clear that Britain will want to keep troops in Belize for very much longer. The troop commitment does represent a budgetary drain which is small in overall terms but somewhat more significant in terms of the defence budget as a whole. More important, British policy-makers feel that the country is over-committed in the western hemisphere and Belize is less pressing as a concern than the Falklands; there is also the fear of a second war with a Latin American country and some British policy-makers believe, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, that whereas one war in Latin America may be regarded as a misfortune, a second would indicate carelessness. The British government has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to interest both Mexico and Canada in sharing a responsibility for Belizean defence. More important, the matter appears to have been raised between Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan in September 1983. Since then, Britain's confidence in American policy in Central America and the Caribbean has noticeably diminished and the Foreign Office may now be less inclined to bear any extra cost in a region which is plainly not at the centre of Britain's own security interests. Yet the lessons of the Grenada invasion may be drawn differently. However little real stake or interest Britain may have had in Grenada, the government could not avoid political embarrassment as a result of events in that country. Can Britain really afford to risk sending another signal (to the Caribbean countries as well as to the United States) that its interest in the area is now virtually at an end? Can it, moreover, easily take the risk that another Commonwealth country, abandoned (like Grenada) in the midst of serious difficulty, may at some time in the future become the centre of international controversy in which Britain will have effectively disqualified itself from taking an active part?

The comparison with Grenada is misleading in one important sense. Neither in its internal politics, nor in its foreign policy, are there obvious signs of trouble even though Belize's geographic position remains difficult. Although Belize's ruling party's foreign policy has at times been attacked by critics at home as too radical, Price is essentially pro-American. He has described his foreign policy as 'non-aligned but with a special relationship with the United States'. Domestic political constraints would, in any case, make it difficult for him to be anything else, but American aid is also increasingly important to the Belizean economy (which, like others in the region although to a lesser extent, has suffered from the world recession). The Price government has welcomed the Kissinger Report on Central America and, like other governments in the region, is looking forward to a further increase in aid over and above existing levels. He is able to make the occasional gesture of independence (for example, opposing the invasion of Grenada) without compromising this relationship. This is partly because he is known to be under

pressure from a (very mild) left-wing within his own party—which would support, for example, the recognition of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Whether he could strike the same balance in the event of a British troop withdrawal is a more difficult question. It is probable, though not certain, that American troops would be sent in as a replacement for the British but this would clearly undermine Price's efforts to retain a foot in the non-aligned camp. The opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) is far more uncritically pro-American and would not have the same difficulty, although it may not yet have considered seriously all of the consequences of unconditional support for the United States in Central America. These must include the possibility that an American troop commitment might influence Belizean politics in some very unexpected ways. Would it, to take one possible example, drive the People's United Party (PUP) in opposition sharply to the left? Or would it lead the Marxist countries to shift their support towards Guatemala away from Belize? At best, it is hard to see how such a commitment would improve Belize's present position. At worst it may create as many problems as it solves.

The direction of Belizean politics will be greatly influenced by elections which are due to be held no later than February 1985. The ruling PUP has won every general election since these were first held in 1964. In 1979, it won 13 seats out of the 18, although the elections—held under a British-style 'first past the post' system—were a good deal closer that this might suggest. The opposition UDP, formed in a merger between three opposition parties during the 1970s, won local elections in Belize City convincingly in December 1983 and is very confident of being able to take power next time. The UDP is, however, an inexperienced party, a fact which the PUP will try to turn to its advantage. The UDP originally opposed Belizean independence, fearing that the country might one day be left unprotected, and was strongly opposed to any concessions to Guatemala. On the whole, it now appears to be more right-wing and pro-American than the PUP, although its present foreign affairs spokesman, Dean Barrow, is not entirely opposed to current foreign policy. The most plausible model for a UDP government in Belize is Seaga's Jamaica.

The race question

Race is at present only a latent issue in Belizean politics, although it could easily become more important. The two most important racial groups are blacks and 'Hispanics'—although this is to oversimplify as there is a considerable degree of racial mixing and there are minority groups which fit into neither category. What is significant, however, is that the racial balance is changing. Since 1970 there has been a clear process of 'Hispanicisation'. According to the 1980 census, the blacks (Creole and Garufina) were still the largest single group at 47·3 per cent of the population (compared to Mestizo and Maya combined at 39·9 per cent), but were no longer in a clear majority. By the same token, only a bare majority of the population (50·6 per cent) is English-speaking, a clear majority (61·7 per cent) is Roman Catholic and a decreasing proportion is from Belize City. Many Belizeans, mainly blacks,

leave every year either to study (since Belize has no university but does have a good secondary education system) or to work in the United States. At the same time, Belize acts (not always willingly) as a refuge for those fleeing the violence in Central America.

The immigration issue

The topic of immigration or, as Belizeans themselves say, 'aliens', is an important one both as a domestic issue and because it demonstrates the close connections between Belize and Spanish Central America. Immigration, mainly from El Salvador, began on a significant scale in the late 1970s. At the beginning, many of the refugees were reasonably well-off and able to buy farms or small businesses in the country. Not all of them stayed, however; many saw Belize (as many later arrivals still do) as a stop on the way to the United States. When large-scale violence began in El Salvador in 1980, however, Belize became a refuge for thousands of desperate and destitute migrants. In 1980, also, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) began to provide aid to the Belizean government for the settlement of immigrants from Spanish Central America. So far, the Belizean government has agreed to settle 200 or so Salvadoreans, together with their families, whose presence was officially known to the authorities. Estimates of illegal immigrants vary from 2,000 (the government estimate) to 5–7,000 (the UNHCR estimate). In addition, there are Hondurans and Guatemalans who have traditionally entered Belize for harvest or seasonal work and who are not generally recognised as immigrants; yet some do find jobs and stay.

The numbers involved do not seem large in absolute terms, but they are considerable when set against the small size of Belize's population. It is true that Belize has a surplus of potentially cultivable land and that the immigrants, who tend to prefer distant rural areas, are economically compatible with the blacks' preference for city life. There are, nevertheless, political implications. Belizean politics has never suffered seriously from a racial element but there are now indications that some urban blacks are beginning to feel threatened and (to coin a phrase) 'swamped'. There is some suggestion that the PUP is winning a disproportionate share of the Hispanic vote while blacks are drawn to the UDP. It would be perhaps too pessimistic to suggest that Belize will necessarily move in the direction of racial polarisation, but the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. Meanwhile, the UNHCR is pressing the Belizean government quite hard to accept further settlers from Central America, but the government itself remains reluctant.

One unwelcome development for which 'aliens' are generally blamed is the growth of a narcotics trade in the Orange Walk area of the country. Orange Walk is the centre of Belize's sugar industry and has traditionally relied upon cross-border seasonal labour during the cane-cutting period. Much of the same labour is also involved in marijuana harvesting and smuggling. Since the Orange Walk economy depends upon seasonal labour, this is a problem which is difficult to solve. However, during 1983 a major anti-drugs

effort, involving the governments of the United States, Mexico and Belize led to the dropping of large amounts of paraquat on all marijuana-growing areas of northern Belize. This may well have achieved its objective.

The uncertain prospect

Some of these concerns may seem trivial and local but they underline the fact that Belize's long-term identity is by no means secure. Belize is well aware of its international vulnerability. The dispute with Guatemala, important though it is, is now on the whole less pressing than the desire of almost all Belizeans to avoid being enmeshed in the conflicts now racking Spanish Central America. This certainly rules out any kind of alliance with the Marxist countries of the region but it also makes the present Belizean government reluctant to cast in its lot too whole-heartedly with the Americans. At the moment, Belize is well placed to enjoy substantial American aid while still being able to afford the occasional gesture of independence. In some ways it is still able to enjoy the best of both worlds. This time next year, this may no longer be the case.

In broader terms, a British withdrawal from Belize and its replacement with American troops would further accelerate a tendency already advanced by the invasion of Grenada. The Commonwealth Caribbean, instead of defining itself in relation to Britain, is increasingly having to define itself in relation to the United States.[1] As reactions to the Grenada invasion showed, this is a divisive process. It is also a dangerous one to the extent that the smaller countries survive and prosper only according to the degree of interventionism and success of American policy in the area as a whole. One does not have to be reminded that this policy is bitterly controversial in the United States and more than usually subject to inconsistencies and sharp reversals. Meanwhile (as British reaction to the Grenada invasion showed) no British government will be happy with the marginalisation which these developments imply. For distant powers, however, influence is bought only at the price of a consistent willingness to live up to commitments of the kind with which Britain is involved in Belize.

[1] See Graham Norton, 'Defending the Eastern Caribbean', *The World Today*, June 1984.

ua New Guinea: a south Pacific ıocracy

! GEORGE, MP, and PATRICIA MILLETT

ning by Prince Charles this month of the new National Parliament in 'esby, will draw world attention to Papua New Guinea for the second : year, after the visit of Pope John Paul II in May. It is a country which udy in its own right, as its experience of post-colonial development .h perspectives on the problems of modernisation. This article will ate on the twin subjects of Papua New Guinea's political institutions oreign relations. Papua New Guinea is an interesting example of a ıster-style parliamentary democracy operating in a third-world con- the same time, it demonstrates the process of nation-building in a agmented society. Papua New Guinea lies at the junction of south- , Australasia and the south Pacific, an area that is feeling the impact of ional (Australia and Indonesia) and emerging superpower rivalries. :asing strategic importance of the Pacific region and a growing interest reign and defence policies of small states —highlighted by the 1983 ıwealth Heads of Government meeting and the Goa Declaration ne further to demonstrate the relevance and value of an analysis of the ; foreign relations.

ed about 500 miles north of Australia, Papua New Guinea comprises :rn half of New Guinea Island (the Indonesian territory of Irian ıpies the western half), the islands of Bougainville and Burka, the : and Louisiade Archipelagos, the Trobriands, and the D'Entre- Islands. Papua New Guinea is one of the largest countries in the south ontaining 80 per cent of the region's land mass and 60 per cent of its on. Its population of 3,006,799 (1980 census) includes more than a l different tribes, mainly Melanesian. Over 700 languages and dia- spoken; English, Pidgin and Hiri Motu are the official languages. 0 per cent of the population live in scattered villages and follow a al way of life, relatively untouched by the world around them.

ɪf Papua New Guinea's colonial history was spent under Australian e country's transition to independence was singularly peaceful, ɪy cooperation between the colonial and national leaders.[1] Papua

process of Papua New Guinea's transition to independence, see Keith Suter, 'Papua :a: from colony to country', *The World Today*, March 1981, and Edward Wolfers, v Guinea on the verge of self-government', *ibid.*, July 1972.

---

eorge, Labour Member of Parliament for Walsall South since February 1974, is a the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence. He visited Papua New Guinea ıber as part of a six-member Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK branch to Papua New Guinea and Singapore. Patricia Millett is a politics student at the ɔf Illinois and is at present working as a researcher in the House of Commons.

New Guinea was fortunate in that the development of a nationalist consciousness coincided with a reassessment by Australia of its colonial position. Thus, the calls for decolonisation were met with a willingness to negotiate and cooperate on Canberra's part. Consequently, respect rather than distaste developed for the governmental institutions established during colonial rule and, as the country's new leaders had been allowed to operate within the governmental system prior to independence, they were comfortable with the Westminster system—one good reason for the success of parliamentary democracy in independent Papua New Guinea.[2]

It is the intention of Papua New Guinea's Constitution that a model of parliamentary democracy derived from Westminster, via Australia, should be practised in the country. The governmental system is theoretically unitary; the responsibilities of the different branches of government, especially of the executive and the legislative, are fused; the chief executive officers—the Prime Minister and other Ministers—must concurrently be members of the legislature, and are collectively responsible to it; decision-making is dominated by the Cabinet (the National Executive Council); and there is party competition. Legislative power is vested in the unicameral National Parliament, whose members are elected from 20 provincial and 89 open electorates by universal suffrage.

Westminster in translation

Although the governmental institutions established in British colonies had been modelled on Westminster, after independence many of the new governments abandoned or modified Westminster-style parliamentary democracy for various reasons. In contrast, the national leaders of Papua New Guinea stuck to Westminster-style parliamentarianism on the grounds that it was eminently relevant to the requirements of their newly independent state. Still, parliamentary democracy in Papua New Guinea today is not an exact replica of the British government: the Westminster system has been adapted to accommodate the particular needs and requirements of government in a rural and culturally pluralistic society. Paradoxically, rather than the essential components of British parliamentarianism, it is the successful modifications in the system which account for the success of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy in Papua New Guinea.

Westminster-style democracy usually features an adversarial, two-party system, but in Papua New Guinea the diversity and character of the population have precluded its development. National party organisation is still developing in Papua New Guinea and, consequently, the heterogeneity of the population is reflected in the large number of political parties. There are a plethora of regional parties, such as the Papua Party, the Mataungan Association and the Bougainville Pressure Group, as well as a variety of national parties—Pangu Pati, United, National, People's Progress. Independents

[2] For a detailed political history of Papua New Guinea, see James Griffin, H. Nelson and S. Firth, *Papua New Guinea: A Political History* (Victoria, Australia: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1979).

hold a number of seats in the National Parliament and have often held the balance in government coalitions. No single party has yet gained a majority of seats in the Parliament and as a result governments have been based on coalitions of from three to five parties.[3]

The country's voters, like most electorates in the developing world, view politics in a parochial context and, consequently, evaluate legislators on their local achievements. For as long as legislators in Papua New Guinea must make local concerns their first priority, party discipline will remain weak, and party membership and loyalty will remain fluid: 'We [Papua New Guinea legislators] are there representing those 25,000 to 30,000 people, and we are not there to represent a particular party. When we find out which way they [the electorate] want us to vote, that is the way we vote. It does not matter which way our parties want to vote.'[4]

There is a distinguishing aspect of the Melanesian character, *sana,* which seeks compromise and consensus in problem resolution; this 'Melanesian Way' (as Prime Minister Michael Somare calls it) has tempered the adversarial aspect of Westminster-style politics in the country's parliamentary democracy. Dissension and conflict still arise, but the Papua New Guinea political response is to seek discussion and to bridge differences, rather than to perpetuate political disagreements. (This approach to politics is reflected in the semi-circular design of the Parliamentary Chamber and the presence of cross-benchers.) Were it not for this readiness to compromise, five-party coalitions in Papua New Guinea would have been incapable of functioning, let alone of implementing such major policies as rural development and decentralisation.

The national composition of the country, with its geographical, linguistic and cultural divisions, makes for an unavoidable tendency to disunity; but this tendency has been checked by the government's decentralisation programme. This is another factor which modified the original Westminster vision of unitary government.

Papua New Guinea's decentralisation programme has been described as 'quasi-federalism'[5] in that the provincial governments have substantial local autonomy. The national government, however, retains the power to suspend a provincial government in the event of mismanagement, maladministration, or endemic corruption—as occurred in February 1984, when the Enga provincial government was suspended for misusing funds.[6] In spite of this kind of incident, Papua New Guinea's programme of decentralisation has been largely successful.

[3] For more information on the development of political parties in Papua New Guinea, see P. Loveday and E. P. Wolfers, *Parties and Parliament in Papua New Guinea: 1964–75* (Madang: Kristen Press, 1976).

[4] Glaimi Warena, Papua New Guinea delegate, address to the 25th Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in New Zealand, 1979.

[5] D. Conyers, 'Papua New Guinea: Decentralisation and Development from the Middle', in W. B. Stohr and D. R. Taylor, eds., *Development from Above or Below* (New York: Wiley, 1981), p. 220.

[6] *Niugini Nius,* 10 February 1984, p. 1.

The nurturing of legitimacy

Whilst the government is still very young, parliamentary democracy has taken root in Papua New Guinea's political culture and, since independence this Anglo-Saxon / Melanesian hybrid of a governmental system has steadfastly avoided the numerous pitfalls which have terminated experiments in democracy elsewhere in the developing world. Thus, the late date of Papua New Guinea's independence was beneficial: it gave the country an opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of post-war decolonisation. The policy of the country's political leaders has therefore been to nurture the legitimacy of the young governmental system by cultivating grassroots support for and participation in it; to prevent the emergence of praetorianism by ensuring civilian control of the army; to involve back-benchers in the work of Parliament through the creation of a committee system; to make proper use of democratic institutions to resolve constitutional disputes; and to permit the Opposition to participate legally and fully in the governmental process.

The regularity of political life so far has helped to build trust in the governmental system. MPs are drawn from all over the country and are elected through universal suffrage; they are popularly viewed as representative. The consistency with which Parliament meets and with which its activities are reported in press and radio further endows the system with popular legitimacy. This legitimacy, in turn, allows the National Parliament to help resolve conflicts and act as a force for national unity by providing a forum for merging regional and national concerns, as well as allowing for closer contact among the regions.[7] The mosaic entrance to the new National Parliament building reflects the role that the legislature plays in national integration, by interlinking designs from the provinces, and interspersing quotes from the national Constitution. While different tribal and regional allegiances remain, centrifugal forces have been curbed, and significant progress has been made in the Herculean task of uniting over a thousand disparate and geographically dispersed tribes. In the words of former Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan: '... [The] call for a divided country has subsided and we are working more closely for a united country.'[8]

The influence of the army is checked by firm, two-fold, civilian control: first, the Defence Force is very small (3,500 recruits and decreasing) and, second, there is no overall office of Commander-in-Chief. Instead, the army is under the direction of the National Executive Council, through the Minister of Defence; but the Minister has no independent power of command within the Defence Force. The top military post is that of Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, and tenure of this post is limited to one three-year term.

[7] For more on the role of legislatures in the third world, see Michael Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1979), p. 225; also Michael Mezey, 'The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 8, 4 November 1983.

[8] 'Papua New Guinea: the bird of paradise spreads its wings', *The Courier*, no. 67, May/June 1981, p. 16.

Major constitutional disputes have been resolved by using the institutions of democracy. In 1980, the despatch of the Defence Force to Vanuatu to help suppress a secessionist movement precipitated a heated constitutional debate between the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, and then Leader of the Opposition, Michael Somare. But the submission of the dispute to the Supreme Court, and Somare's acceptance of its verdict, which upheld the constitutionality of Chan's actions, demonstrated the two leaders' commitment to the principles and the methods of democracy.

Changes of government in the newly independent state have been orderly and constitutional. In March 1980, Prime Minister Michael Somare accepted defeat on a no-confidence vote and surrendered power to his constitutionally selected successor, Sir Julius Chan. As Somare was the only national leader the country had known, the smooth transition was remarkable. Following the 1982 election, Somare was returned to power and Sir Julius Chan peacefully relinquished power. In other words, a tradition of constitutional and orderly changes in government is being formed.

Non-alignment with a pro-western bent

In spite of its small size and limited economic, military and human resources, Papua New Guinea has practised an active foreign policy. It participates in numerous international organisations and it has assumed a regional leadership role in the south Pacific. Relations with its two powerful neighbours—Indonesia and Australia—represent perhaps the most critical aspects of Papua New Guinea's foreign policy.

In the early years of independence, Papua New Guinea's foreign policy was described as 'Universalism', meaning that Papua New Guinea sought relations with all friendly nations, except those practising racism. During Prime Minister Chan's term, the policy was changed to 'Active and Selective Engagement', which emphasised Papua New Guinea's own national and economic interests in its relations with other countries.[9] At the moment, the official foreign policy of Papua New Guinea, as enunciated by Prime Minister Michael Somare in an address to the UN General Assembly on 13 October 1983, is one of 'Purposeful Direction', defined as peacefully working to establish international equity and order. Considering that Papua New Guinea is surrounded by more powerful neighbours, its military vulnerability, and its limited financial resources, these policies differ more in emphasis than in substance; Papua New Guinea's political and strategic circumstances provide little scope for change. Thus, Papua New Guinea has consistently followed a path of non-alignment, even though its historical and contemporary ties to Australia have given its policies a pro-western bent.

Papua New Guinea's cautiousness in its relations with the Communist world is reflected in the absence of any east European diplomatic representation in Port Moresby. Relations with China, however, have been more cordial,

[9] *Papua New Guinea: Foreign Policy*, Second Edition (Government White Paper), Papua New Guinea Government Printing Office, September 1982.

because of the relevance to Papua New Guinea of some of its developme policies, especially agricultural, its potential as a market for exports and i position of relative proximity. Consequently, China has a resident diplomat mission in Port Moresby and a programme of Chinese technical assistance h been negotiated. Papua New Guinean sympathy for Peking's claim to Taiwa and a shared perception of an aggressive Vietnam have helped to strengthe ties between Peking and Port Moresby.

Papua New Guinea is a member of the Commonwealth, the United Nation the Group of 77, of various international economic organisations (e.g. Inte Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries, International Coc Organisation and International Coffee Organisation) and it holds visitor stat in the Non-Aligned Movement. Papua New Guinea's involvement in the international forums provides opportunities for diplomatic contact with oth governments. As Papua New Guinea is not a wealthy nation,[10] it can finan diplomatic representation in only a limited number of countries. Membe ship of international bodies provides an important means of diplom tic contact with most members of the international community and b passes the expense of establishing individual embassies and high commi sions. Moreover, the Papua New Guinean leaders recognise the country strategic vulnerability and, by participating in regional and internation organisations, they hope to safeguard national interests.

Papua New Guinea is vehemently opposed to racism—it has no diplomati ties with South Africa—and it supports national self-determination for all re maining colonial territories. The still-continuing colonisation of New Cale donia by France has caused it special concern. Papua New Guinea has con demned the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam and o Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. It recognises the right of the Palestinian to a homeland but, at the same time, acknowledges the right of Israel to exis as a state.

The emerging superpower rivalry in the south Pacific[11] is one of Papua Ne Guinea's gravest foreign policy concerns. It fears the region may be trans formed into a superpower chessboard. '[We] . . . are part of the great strategi game. Our fear is that we may cease to be players . . . and become the pot.'[1 Papua New Guinea has learned from the experiences of other ex-colonies afte independence to be acutely aware of the political instability and economi vulnerability that east-west competition can engender in developing coun tries. Consequently, it has campaigned to make the south Pacific a nuclear free zone and to prohibit the dumping of nuclear wastes in the region; and it has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the London Convention prohibiting the dumping at sea of radioactive wastes.

[10] The total government budget for 1984 is 875·4 million Kina (Market rate March 1984: 1 Kina = £1.23).

[11] John C. Dorrance, 'Coping with the Soviet Pacific Threat', *Pacific Defence Reporter*, July 1983.

[12] Papua New Guinea Prime Minister, Michael Somare, address to the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific, 12 October 1983.

The south Pacific region and its politics are another major concern. Papua New Guinea is a member of all the major south Pacific organisations: the South Pacific Forum (SPF), the South Pacific Commission (SPC), the South Pacific Conference and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). It also holds special observer status in Asean, a political reflection of its geographical position linking the south Pacific and south-east Asia. Papua New Guinea's south Pacific policy aims to strengthen regional unity and cooperation in confronting common needs and problems. A south Pacific shipping line, and fisheries agreements, have resulted. Papua New Guinea has campaigned to replace the SPC and SPEC with a single regional organisation, and thus eliminate the expense and duplication of effort incurred by maintaining the two separate bodies. A ministerial committee of the SPF is considering this proposal. Papua New Guinea has threatened to withdraw from SPC and SPEC altogether if the plan is not implemented.

The small countries and micro-states of the Pacific are acutely aware of their inability adequately to guarantee their own defence and security.[13] Prime Minister Somare noted recently, 'We who are small have . . . to endure as best we can the jostling of our big brothers and avoid being trodden upon.'[14] The economic, technical and manpower resources necessary to produce an adequate defence capability are simply beyond the means of these countries. Papua New Guinea therefore advocates the creation of a Pacific Peacekeeping Force to guarantee regional security by protecting the area from internal disorder and external threats, and the formulation of a collective security agreement. The country's military involvement in suppressing the 1980 Vanuatu secession revolt demonstrated its willingness to play a leading role in regional security.

Papua New Guinea's own single-service Defence Force is composed of about 3,500 recruits: most of these are land forces, but there are small air and maritime elements.[15] The Australians have historically played and continue to play a major role in the development of the Defence Force. They provide military equipment, training and funding under the Defence Cooperation Programme, and more than 80 military advisers and seconded officers. But in spite of this assistance, a large-scale invasion could only be defeated with external—i.e. Australian—help.

[13] George H. Quester, 'Trouble in the islands: defending the micro-states', *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 2, Fall 1983.

The distinction between a 'micro-state' and a small state is ambiguous at best. In terms of population and land area, Papua New Guinea would appear not to be a 'micro-state'. Yet, the small size of Papua New Guinea's Defence Force—in proportion to the country's population it is smaller than the defence forces of such 'micro-states' as Oman, Guinea-Bissau, Brunei and Botswana—confronts Papua New Guinea with much the same security difficulties as those of 'micro-states'.

[14] Address to the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (see note 12).

[15] For a more in-depth look at the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, see Bruce George, MP, and A. Butfoy, 'Papua New Guinea: defence and international relations', in the July 21 issue of *Jane's Defence Weekly*. Our thanks to Mr Butfoy for his assistance with this section of the article.

There is no formal security agreement between Australia and Papua Ne Guinea, yet it is widely believed that Australia would support Papua Ne Guinea in the event of a military crisis, because Australian interests would b in jeopardy. Historically, Papua New Guinea has been in effect an Australia buffer state, crucial to Australia's forward defence. Australia is still con- cerned to *maintain its security zone, and a friendly*, stable Papua New Guinea remains an essential element of Australia's contemporary regional strategy.[16] The absence of a formal security treaty may be attributable more to Port Moresby's wish to avoid alarming Indonesia and appearing to be too dependent on Australia than to Australian doubts about supporting its former colony.

Australia also provides a great deal of technical and economic aid to Papua New Guinea, through such agreements as the Papua New Guinea/Australia Technical Cooperation Programme and the Agreement on Trade and Commercial Relations, as well as Canberra's original commitment to provide economic assistance for Papua New Guinea's first 30 years of independence. Grants from Australia account for 27 per cent of governmental revenue in Papua New Guinea, most of it in the form of unconditional grants.[17]

The Indonesian factor

In contrast, relations with Indonesia represent one of Papua New Guinea's most difficult areas of foreign policy. The border with the Indonesian territory, Irian Jaya, is long and poorly demarcated. Both governments seem genuinely committed to resolving differences peacefully and to preserving good relations: the mutual cooperation on a border survey, a recent agreement to allow the traditional movement of Papua New Guineans across the border and the technical cooperation agreement are evidence. But in spite of mutual assertions of friendly intentions, anxiety persists in Port Moresby over the threat that a potentially expansionist Indonesia might pose to Papua New Guinea, although this anxiety is firmly suppressed at the official level.[18] Recent Indonesian military exercises near the Papua New Guinea–Irian Jaya border—and especially the rehearsal of an amphibious landing at the end of May—have made Papua New Guinean officials even more apprehensive.[19]

These apprehensions have been exacerbated by the activities of anti-Indonesian rebels along the Papua New Guinea–Irian Jaya border, the so-

[16] For Papua New Guinea's potential role in Australian defence, see Richard Yallop, 'Row on Australia's war plan leak', *The Guardian*, 31 March 1984; also Tony Dubondin, 'Cabinet nuclear report leak embarrasses Hawke', *The Times*, 31 March 1984.

[17] For more on Papua New Guinea's economic development, see *Papua New Guinea: Foreign Policy* (White Paper); 'Papua New Guinea for beginners', *The Times*, 1 March 1984, p. 33; and *Papua New Guinea: Country of Challenge and Opportunity*, published by Coopers and Lybrand, 1983.

[18] Defence Minister Epel Tito was sacked for indiscreet comments suggesting an Indonesian expansionist tendency.

[19] For details of the military exercises mentioned, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 June 1984.

:e Papua Movement (OPM).[20] Although the common Melanesian
and concern about Indonesia's transmigration policy evoke sym-
the OPM among a proportion of the population, the government of
w Guinea cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the rebels' activities
: Indonesia's military superiority. Port Moresby has therefore taken a
l against the rebels, arresting (as illegal immigrants) and deporting
d country) known OPM activists, including Seth Rumkorem, its
ader. The border fighting has created a serious refugee problem;
ugees fled to Papua New Guinea during the first half of this year
iis influx further strains relations with Indonesia, as some of the
are OPM members and deserters from the Indonesian army, and it
in unbearable burden on Papua New Guinea's fragile economy.
New Guinea has been equally resolute on the subject in its relations
onesia. Port Moresby has denied Indonesian troops the right to cross-
ursuit of the rebels and has protested vehemently to Jakarta about
l instances of such border violations, and, further, Papua New
as neither extradited OPM rebels to Irian Jaya, nor succumbed to In-
pressure for joint border patrols.
the probability of a direct Indonesian attack on Papua New Guinea is
e—Indonesia is preoccupied with consolidating its present territorial
is and resolving its domestic problems (e.g. East Timor)—the OPM
ains contentious and potentially destabilising, and has undeniably
Papua New Guinea's relations with Indonesia.
New Guinea's foreign policy and diplomatic strategy is moulded by
realities. In recognition of its limited independent political in-
Papua New Guinea has become involved in numerous international
ions. Closer home in the south Pacific, where events affect Papua
nea directly, the government has played a leading role in promoting
cooperation while politically recognising its geographical position as
ween Oceania and Asia. In its relations with Australia, Papua New
as been careful not to appear too dependent upon Canberra, and, in
ns with Indonesia, the government has recognised the need to ensure
n a potentially turbulent area, but not to do so at the expense of com-
g its national security and territorial integrity.
New Guinea has existed as an independent state for less than a
ts political institutions, policy-making processes and the policies
es are still in the process of evolving. Yet parliamentary democracy
ished itself in Papua New Guinea's political culture and consistency
ctability have become features of its foreign policy.

obert Trumbull, 'Ethnic conflict in Indonesia strains relations with Papua New
ew York Herald Tribune, 3 May 1984, p. 5; for a critical look at Indonesian policy in
West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, published by Tapol, 1983; and for a broad
ie problems of indigenous peoples worldwide, see a forthcoming work by Bruce
', Olivia Bosch and Michael Woodward.

Book article

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s: VIEWS ON THE REAGAN REVOLUTION

James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982).
Robert C. Gray and S. J. Michalak, Jr, eds., *American Foreign Policy Since Détente* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *The Reagan Phenomenon—and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C., and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983).
Kenneth A. Oye, R. J. Lieber and D. Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1983).

TWO decades ago, in his famous address at American University in Washington, D.C., President John Kennedy issued this appeal:

> 'Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.'

Throughout much of the 1970s, American policymakers seemed to take their cues from Kennedy's admonition. They focused on the need to exercise the nation's military and economic strength in a world that in many ways had become increasingly resistant to the application of hegemonic power. Notions like complex interdependence, a new international economic order and resource vulnerability crowded the international agenda. Accommodation and restraint were emphasised along with an acknowledgement, albeit grudgingly, of diversity, limitations and narrowed commitments. In the strategic realm, détente reflected the attainment and acceptance of essential parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Policymakers concentrated more on managing the cold war than on winning it.

Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan had a decidedly different view of the state of the nation's foreign affairs. He regarded these strategies of adjustment to new international realities as manifestations of a regrettable and unnecessary American retreat from power. The Reagan presidency so far has fairly consistently reflected the desire to restore American economic and military predominance and to repudiate many of the central features in the Nixon, Ford and Carter foreign policies. There has been no acceptance of the idea that the changing role of the United States reflects a natural pattern of hegemonic decline.

While many Americans, feeling guilty over involvement in Indochina, suf-

ı what was called 'the Vietnam syndrome', Reagan proclaimed early
:dency that the self-doubting must end, and, furthermore, there was
ɔ feel guilty about anyway. On numerous occasions, Reagan has
ɛed détente as nothing more than a front for Soviet expansion and a
western retreat.

gan, the erosion of American power and restraints on assertiveness
causes and effects of setbacks for the United States, particularly in
'enas and international organisations. 'Losses' in Vietnam, Angola,
ıue, Iran, Ethiopia and Nicaragua were viewed as manifestations
ıg American power and influence. In the Conference on the Law of
ıe United States presumably acquiesced too readily to third-world
and in the United Nations the west was being assailed daily.
of Arab sheiks effectively brandished the oil weapons, and young
licals for 444 days were able, as ABC News reminded us throughout
'to hold America hostage.'

'ld as Reagan sees it is not so much complex as it is hostile. In classic
/e fashion, Reagan has looked to the past to uncover the roots of this
Conjuring up images reminiscent of the world of George Kennan's
egramme' and the Truman Doctrine, Reagan has found an ag-
tpansionist and uncompromising Soviet Union as the source of most
in the world. While many might argue that this view represents a
ıssessment of the Russians, the Reagan Administration has taken it
ı early 1983, for example, Reagan said that the confrontation with
Union represented 'the struggle between right and wrong, good
As it has throughout much of the cold war, this Manichean outlook
led policymakers with a convenient and narrowly focused lens
'hich to scan the international landscape. Consequently, policy
/e been radically simplified: friends of whatever stripe must be iden-
maintained—no more overzealousness about pious notions like
hts—and enemies aggressively opposed.

ore than simple nostalgia has prompted Reagan's backward look. In
ıe nation back to the posture of the late 1940s and 1950s, he offers
easons for present troubles but a blueprint for remedying them.
pre-eminence reigned in the early postwar decades. The United
ıyed strategic superiority, dominance in the global economy, un-
l leadership of the western alliance and a supportive domestic con-
ıgan sees this era as a lost ideal to be recaptured; not as a historical
m. His policies for the 1980s have been aimed quite simply at
he present with a restored past.

:ess of restoration has so far stressed heightened rhetorical warfare,
lefence spending, and a willingness to employ military force exten-
the period from 1983 to 1987, Reagan has called for real increases in
ending of over 10 per cent a year with total outlays of more than $1·5
ıe development or deployment of new hardware, including strategic
Trident submarines, aircraft carriers, tactical, intermediate and

strategic nuclear delivery systems, nuclear warheads, anti-missile systems and nerve-gas weapons, has been vigorously promoted. The Administration's decision in 1982 to send the marines into Lebanon marked the first time since the Vietnam war that a significant contingent of American combat personnel was sent abroad. Skirmishes in Lebanon, Syria and Central America, along with the invasion of Grenada, have directly involved American forces. The human cost of this activism has been high. In a period of less than six weeks in the autumn of 1983, nearly 300 American soldiers lost their lives.

The debate between Reagan protagonists and antagonists over the wisdom and consequences of Reagan's worldview has been spirited. The books by Jeane Kirkpatrick and James Fallows and the collections edited by Roberts C. Gray and Stanley J. Michalak, Jr, and Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild are recent contributions to this debate. Of course, these works assess more than just the Reagan phenomenon, but speculation about what Reagan will do and judgements about what he has already done dominate the various analyses, traversing a wide spectrum from staunch support to unabashed scorn.

Upon assuming the presidency, Ronald Reagan assembled a team that shared his views about the world. Jeane Kirkpatrick's now famous article in *Commentary*, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards',[1] attracted Reagan's attention and helped convince him to appoint her United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Mrs Kirkpatrick's clear mind and extensive knowledge quickly made her the resident intellectual of the Administration and a leading lieutenant in the Reagan revolution.[2] As further testimony to her influence, she has remained in office while Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, and national security advisers, Richard Allen and William Clark, have left their posts.

In *The Reagan Phenomenon*, Mrs Kirkpatrick describes Reagan's election as 'a victory for those who rejected the idea of the inevitability of America's decline. In this respect, President Reagan's election was a watershed that marked the end to a period of retreat' (p. 310). Presumably, the United States, devoid of will and confidence, foolishly acquiesced in the relentless growth of Soviet military strength and the acceptance of third-world leaders hostile to American interests. While this diagnosis of the plight of American foreign policy in the 1970s is familiar, Mrs Kirkpatrick's presentation of it is unusually vivid and concise. The essay entitled 'The Reagan Reassertion of Western Values' is as good a summary of the Administration's assessment of the world as can be found.

Mrs Kirkpatrick articulates the disdain for the days of détente and the fond embrace of the cold war that have marked the Reagan Administration's foreign policy approaches:

> 'Some critics of American foreign policy look back with dread on the "dark years of the cold war" and express morbid fear lest we reenter such a period.

[1] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', *Commentary*, November 1979.
[2] See, for example, her article 'The superpowers: is there a moral difference?', *The World Today*, May 1984.

I must say that I have reservations about this view. In the context of the twentieth century, a century filled with horrors on a scale quite literally unprecedented in human history, the years of the cold war were a relatively happy respite during which free societies and democratic institutions were universally secure' (p. 28).

Ambassador Kirkpatrick shares the popular Reagan Administration view of the Soviet Union as on the verge of both conquest and collapse. On the one hand, the Soviet Union has been portrayed as an expansionist, aggressive and formidable force. The Soviet Union is strong militarily, indeed stronger than the United States, and it possesses the will to wield its enormous power. On the other hand, the Administration just as forthrightly stresses what Mrs Kirkpatrick asserts is the 'irreducible fact that the Soviet empire is decaying at its centre' (p. 34).

The Administration's assessment of the Soviet situation has led it to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to an aggressive programme of military buildup, proxy competition in peripheral areas and selective sanctions. The Administration's suspicions about a hostile international environment have extended to numerous multilateral institutions. The United Nations, for example, has not been perceived as a positive vehicle promoting mutual interests. Consequently, American involvement has been reduced largely to condemning the actions of others, as was done after the downing of the South Korean airliner in September 1983, and to defending what are increasingly unpopular and minority positions. The Administration's dissatisfaction with the UN was reflected in the decision to cut the United States' contribution to the UN by $45 million in 1984 and 1985 and to withdraw financial support from Unesco. On the whole, one can hardly blame Mrs Kirkpatrick for paraphrasing W. C. Fields and lamenting, 'Altogether I think I'd rather be at Georgetown' (p. 155).

The most obvious distinctions between Mrs Kirkpatrick and her immediate predecessors, Andrew Young and Donald McHenry, have been in their respective attitudes. The Carter representatives were more inclined to adjust to the reality of a strong third-world voice in international forums. They tried to anticipate and steer around areas of clear disagreement while aggressively promoting common pursuits, primarily in the educational, economic and cultural work of the UN. This strategy assisted the United States in garnering widespread support for some key, although admittedly largely symbolic, initiatives such as condemnation of Iran for the seizure of American Embassy personnel and of the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan delegation, in contrast, has been decidedly more combative. The more confrontational tack is understandable given the fact that so many of the policies endorsed by United Nations bodies have been incompatible with Reagan's desires. Regrettably, however, disagreements over policies have soured the climate for productive negotiations of any kind. For their part, American representatives have demonstrated an unfortunate and obvious disdain for spokesmen from many third-world nations. The commentaries

included in the Kirkpatrick book are laced with these attitudes. M patrick, for example, devotes an inordinate amount of energy to alt lecturing to and scolding the Nicaraguan delegation. Her exchan the Nicaraguans are classics of condescension and represent uncom relics of a colonial mentality.

Although Mrs Kirkpatrick is very clear about the problems she s fronting the nation, she is less forthcoming in suggesting specific cc action. In answering the crucial question, which she herself poses, 'Ho proceed?' she can only supply the thin answer, 'Very carefully' (p. 3 taking great care in these treacherous times is a sound idea is indisputa such advice does not constitute a policy. Indeed, this admonition s have been violated on several occasions by the Reagan Administrati with its loose talk about 'winnable nuclear wars' and 'nuclear warnin Furthermore, it simply won't do to devote as much energy as the Rea ministration has to voicing ceaseless and unproductive complaints tha has radically changed since the first two decades of western predomi

American Foreign Policy Since Détente, edited by Robert C. G Stanley J. Michalak, Jr, contains nine original essays encompassing agenda of issues: American policies towards the Soviet Union, Ch Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Afr policies regarding arms control, the United Nations and the world ec The emphasis of the commentaries is on careful summaries of policies proaches in the 1970s and the first few years of the Reagan Adminis The major dilemmas facing American policymakers in the 19 elucidated, including: (1) managing the delicate triangular relations the United States, China and the Soviet Union (discussed in an excelle by Michael Baron); (2) seeking ways to balance strategic, econor political interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; (3) mai military strength without jeopardising serious attempts at arms cont (4) promoting an open international economic environment while at t time addressing persistent calls for protectionist measures to assis domestic industries.

The tone of all the essays in the Gray and Michalak volume is cautic descriptive accounts give a broad summary of key issue areas, but the are short on bold criticisms, probing inquiries, and thoughtful poli natives.

In contrast to the Gray and Michalak book, *Eagle Defiant: Unite Foreign Policy in the 1980s* contains selections that are clearly cr Reagan. As in the Gray and Michalak volume, the articles begin wit summary of American policies since the Second World War with re selected issue areas or geographic regions. Focus then shifts, howev more direct and critical look at recent policies, concluding with sugges improving them.[3]

[3] For a similar assessment of the Carter Administration and its predecessors, see K Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign I Complex World* (New York and London: Longman, 1979).

As an example of an informative review of the policy since the Second World War none better can be found than the essay by Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus on Soviet-American relations. The authors properly note that dealing with the Soviet Union has proved to be the primary and perennial problem facing American policymakers—a fact that Reagan's predecessor, Jimmy Carter, never fully grasped. The major challenge has been to devise policies made up of the proper mix between containment and accommodation. The advice of Dallin and Lapidus is similar to that of United States Senator Charles McC. Mathias in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article.[4] It is that in areas where fundamental differences over principles and purposes exist between the two countries, eg the treatment of Soviet dissidents and the continuing military action in Afghanistan, the west must stand firm. In a host of areas, however, where problems are less intractable, avenues for mutually desirable accommodations should be endlessly explored.

As Miles Kahler superbly chronicles in his examination of the United States and western Europe, the effective management of relations with foes is not the only area in which the Reagan Administration has encoutered difficulties. Differing views on issues like the Soviet-European gas pipeline deal, sanctions against Poland, responses to various trade and monetary challenges, nuclear proliferation policies, the pace of arms control talks, strategies for assisting developing countries, the invasion of Grenada and, most recently, covert military actions against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua have led to some disarray. Kahler wonders whether this disarray marks a temporary 'conjunctural dispute' or a deeper 'structural shift' (p. 275). With several qualifications, he concludes that the crisis is more the former than the latter. While this assessment is convincing, at least for now, one must wonder how many times the structure can bear further patching and still remain sound. The maintenance of stable structures must take into account the vast changes that have taken place within the western alliance in the last two decades. Reagan's preoccupation with an idealised past has meant that significant alterations in the relationship with Europe based on factors like the achievement of east-west nuclear parity and heightened European economic independence have not been duly considered. Indeed, many west Europeans have demonstrated a proclivity much like Reagan to look to the past. The past to which they appeal for guidance, however, predates the decades of virulent east-west animosity and instead focuses on periods when close contacts on a variety of fronts existed among the family of European nations.

Reagan's policies on security issues have elicited an especially broad-based and passionate outcry from several sectors of the European public.[5] It is still difficult to determine the motivations and political clout of the anti-nuclear protesters, but one thing is clear: not since the end of the Second World War

[4] See Charles McC. Mathias, Jr, 'Habitual Hatred—Unsound Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 5, 1983.

[5] The broad range of issues focusing on the issue of nuclear force policies in Europe are ably discussed in William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freedman, Paul Warnke and Karsten D. Voight, *Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984).

have western leaders' judgements on security matters been exposed to such powerful challenges. Further divergence between leaders and led may be a pivotal factor influencing the shape of the alliance.

Anti-nuclear activism in the United States has also grown during the Reagan years. The American public mind, like the European, however, has been difficult to read. William Schneider in his review of trends in foreign policy opinions from 1974 to 1982 notes that ambiguity more than anything else has typified the public's assessment of Reagan. For example, in 1980 a majority of the public seemed convinced that Reagan would do the best job in bolstering America's strength, matching Soviet military expansion and standing up to the Russians. For Reagan supporters this was good news and taken as an endorsement of his foreign policy positions. The bad news was that the public feared that Reagan would be more reckless in the exercise of military power and the one most likely to lead the United States into another war.

Virtually everyone is in favour of both 'strength' and 'peace'. Reagan clearly has stood for the renewal of United States power and the development of a formidable national defence, and Schneider notes that this stance has been politically appealing. The line between perceptions of strength and provocation, however, is narrow. Fears that some actions might be reckless and thus threaten a peace all hold dear have haunted many Americans.[6]

Any assessment of American foreign policy in the 1980s must consider means as well as ends. James Fallows's book, *National Defense*, is particularly useful in helping to understand the heated debate over the size, composition and duties of the armed forces. In his short book, Fallows comments on a broad array of topics: the development of ever-changing managerial philosophies in the Defence Department (the section on Kennedy's Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara's ideas is a gem); the manner in which systems are tested, selected, deployed and endlessly altered; the utility and performance of specific weapons; and the strengths and shortcomings of various strategic doctrines.[7]

Beyond reviewing complicated material, however, Fallows contributes several intelligent insights and criticisms. He, for example, takes issue with the common and simplistic tendency to view the defence budget's size as the primary measure of the adequacy of defence capabilities. More money does not necessarily ensure a stronger defence.

Fallows demonstrates that inefficiency and poor judgement have chronically plagued the defence establishment. In this context, Reagan's stated commitment to a 'war on waste' is welcome. The exercise of powerful bureaucratic self-interests and the creation of 'a culture of procurement' (p. 57), however, have made the Pentagon highly resistant to change.

Fallows decries the fact that defence planners and developers have stressed

[6] For additional commentary on public opinion regarding Reagan's foreign policy, see John E Rielly, 'American Opinion: Continuity, Not Reaganism', *Foreign Policy*, 50 (Spring, 1983)

[7] An excellent companion to the Fallows book is Jacques S. Gansler, *The Defense Industry* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1980).

complexity and size rather than versatility and reliability. The case that Fallows makes for austere and workable weapons is strong. The pursuit of ultra-sophisticated weapons and endless alterations of existing systems has been irresistable and costly. Irresponsible acquisition practices have usually resulted in enormous expenditures and interminable delays. In some cases, as Fallows chronicles in his devastating indictment of the testing and deployment of the M-16 rifle, the security of military personnel has been jeopardised by poorly designed or carelessly assembled weaponry.

Another problem has been the wasteful and often risky tendency to search for an appropriate military solution for every conceivable contingency. Certain situations impose serious constraints on the exercise of straightforward military responses, and there is no guarantee that more spending and technological gimmickry can significantly alter this reality. Indeed, these 'solutions' may promote even more insecurity. A more reasonable strategy would focus on establishing political relationships that minimise the risks of disruptions in vulnerable areas. Imaginative diplomacy just as much as imaginative technology can enhance national security. A balance must be drawn between the tendency to overestimate the usefulness of force as the answer to all problems and the similarly alluring tendency to underestimate the judicious use of military force as a partial alternative to an overreliance on moral suasion.

Fallows correctly points out that defence policy must command the attention, just as it calls upon the resources, of the entire nation. Debate cannot be left to the 'experts' because of their clear bias—a tendency to focus on the size and sophistication of military hardware, often without thorough prior assessments of the national purposes for which they had been created. Confusion about the nature of the vital interests that warrant enormous expenditures, sacrifices and risks have motivated growing concerns about the defence and nuclear weapons policies of the Reagan Administration. After many years in Vietnam, the lack of clear reasons for continued American involvement with its attendant physical and human costs prompted disillusionment and anti-war activism. Similarly, the Reagan revolution in the realm of foreign affairs may suffer from the Administration's inability to supply more than rhetoric and slogans as justifications for dangerous and costly undertakings.

The Reagan Administration in its first term has been guided less by Kennedy's sentiments cited at the beginning of this essay than by Woodrow Wilson's earlier challenge:

> 'The world must be made safe for democracy. . . We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts . . . the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth . . . God helping her, she can do no other.'

For the time being at least, defiance is in and accommodation is out. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in a vitriolic exchange of threats, and the major casualty has been the continuing process of communication between the two superpowers. Both the strategic arms reduc-

tion talks (Start) and negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) are suspended, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States have not met since June 1979, and the Soviet Union is boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympic Games.

In an essay which examined the direction of American foreign policy William Diebold, Jr, concludes his inquiry by stating:

> 'The basic question is by what view of the world will we be guided? That view was clear in the 1940s and perhaps has never been so clear since then.'[8]

Reagan's response to this crucial question has been to clarify international politics in the 1980s by relying on a vision very much akin to that of the 1940s. It is certain that the usefulness and consequences of this approach will continue to be hotly debated for years to come.

PAUL WATANABE*

* The author is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science of the University of Massachusetts at Boston.

[8] William Diebold, Jr, 'New Directions in American Foreign Economic Policy', in George Schwab, ed., *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* (Westport, Conn., and London: Greenwood Press, 1982).

: of the month

ZALAND: LABOUR IN POWER

; a snap election for New Zealand on 14 July, Sir Robert Muldoon took
)le that he could rally support for his ailing National Party adminis-
uring the four-week campaign. He miscalculated. The Labour Party
with a clear mandate to govern; the Muldoon era came to a close.
'on 56 seats; the National Party 37; Social Credit 2.
:gree, the result represented as much a vote against the National Party
ent and its leader as a vote for some inspiring future under Labour.
surveys indicated that unemployment was the dominant issue, re-
'ears about the parlous state of the economy.[1] Labour's leader, David
ffered prudent economic management. He also promised consensus
iliation, sensing the electorate's reaction against 10 years of 'naked
' in the political atmosphere. Labour's victory, however, looks less
an the size of its majority and the 4 per cent swing in its favour would
Labour increased its share of the vote, especially in provincial areas of
h Island, just sufficiently to take advantage of the vote-splitting gift
l by the right-wing New Zealand Party. In existence for less than a
New Zealand Party fielded several former National Party activists as
es, overtook Social Credit in popularity, and gained 12 per cent of the
iled to win a constituency under the country's first-past-the-post elec-
em, but helped Labour to capture eight blue-ribbon strongholds and
few members of the Muldoon Cabinet.
Lange is the youngest Prime Minister this century. He lacks admi-
experience and has occasionally betrayed naivety, but proved to be a
ded campaigner and then passed his first test with flying colours. In
aign month, speculation about a currency devaluation had caused an
of $NZ1·39 billion. This had obliged the Treasury and Reserve Bank
heavily and finally to suspend foreign exchange dealings. In the hia-
e Lange could be sworn in, Muldoon precipitated a crisis by refusing
ie. Heeding official advice and pausing only to accuse Muldoon of
, Lange insisted on a 20 per cent devaluation. He won universal acclaim
:ting the country's financial position.
still faces deep-rooted economic problems. The New Zealand dollar
ied in value since 1979 by about 40 per cent against a basket of leading
s and the latest devaluation provides no long-term guarantee of re-
lew Zealand's trading difficulties. The new government merely has
ng space to increase foreign earnings and reduce demands on the bud-
xport subsidies and price support. Labour will not be able to undo
's costly development projects, but such investment will be curtailed

[1] :hael Pugh, 'New Zealand: the battle for the middle ground', *The World Today*, July

in the future. Instead, the government will continue to encourage fishin tourism, and the export of processed raw materials such as kit-set furnitur Labour also wants New Zealand's agriculture to stop concentrating on tl production of bulk foodstuffs and to move into high-value gourmet item Whether this 'mousetrap-to-Camembert' strategy can generate earnir power on a grand scale is open to doubt. Lange has called a National Econom Summit to reconcile various interests. In part an exercise in consensus gover ment, it also reflects the paucity of Labour's own economic strategy.

Meanwhile, austerity is unavoidable. To the gratification of the financi community, Lange lifted controls on interest rates and, in order to control infl tion, imposed a three-month price and wage freeze. Economists predict th tight money and public expenditure cuts may affect the welfare system.[2] This a far cry from policies normally associated with Labour governments and hard enthralls the Keynesian element in the labour movement. True, Labour pledged to help the low-paid and unemployed, to bring equity to the t system, and to restore education spending (important to the phalanx teachers in the new Parliament). Yet financial control is vested in the affluen middle-class MPs who have pushed the party to the right in the quest for vote The Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, a wealthy accountant-businessma revealed his inclinations in 1980: cuts in corporation and income tax, and abol tion of death duties. Monetary prudence rather than income redistribution wi be the leitmotif of the Cabinet's financial policy.

Foreign policy and defence also threaten to cause friction. Lange holds th foreign affairs portfolio and will be watched closely for any wavering from h commitments to ban visits by nuclear submarines and review the Anzus Pac whose other two members are Australia and the United States. Since attemp ing to qualify Labour's policy in 1983 (to allow nuclear-powered submarin but not vessels carrying nuclear weapons), he has been so categorical about bar ning all nuclear-equipped submarines from New Zealand ports that h credibility is now staked on it. By responding to anti-nuclear opinion he may b hoping to ignore the resolution of the Labour Party Conference of 1 September calling for complete withdrawal from the Pact. Indeed, renegoti tion of Anzus is not one of his top priorities and it is not clear what sort c arrangement he has in view.

However, it is doubtful whether the nuclear and Pact issues can be separatec The July 1984 Anzus Council meeting warned that naval and other faciliti were 'essential to the continuing effectiveness of the Alliance'.[3] Although th Pact does not bind the signatories to take military action, the America Secretary of State, George Shultz, told Lange soon after the election that i would not be much of an alliance without peacetime military cooperation. I addition to being a valued customer and a major source of investment, th United States is the ultimate guarantor of New Zealand's security. Whethe anti-nuclear feeling develops into anti-Americanism, largely depends o President Reagan's reactions. It seems probable that the United States wil

[2] *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 19 July 1984. [3] *Financial Times*, 18 July 1984.

ovocation. Nevertheless, New Zealanders of various political persu-
:lieve that their isolated country has no real enemies other than those
d by the United States.
ıllist stance would accord with the territorial defence outlook which
land has adopted over the past two years. But the Australian example is
more instructive than the French one. Although the Australian Labor
o aspired to non-nuclear autonomy, the Hawke government has en-
eagan's posture of cold war vigilance and would be embarrassed by any
ıland bid for independence. Whilst he might wish to emulate Robert
Lange is less ruthless in dealing with dissent. He probably faces a more
: anti-nuclear feeling because his country's isolation encourages a
/en' mentality. His predicament is eased only slightly by the period of
fore the next Anzus Council meeting in early 1985. In the interim, he
keep the ports nuclear-free.
proposals are more straightforward: stronger links with developing
ch as India; no South African sporting visits; closure of the South
:onsulate in Wellington; and abolition of high fees levied on overseas
. Such policies are likely to make Lange more popular than his pre-
with the rest of the Commonwealth.
is confident that his talented, youthful Cabinet will govern capably.
f its members also seem determined to replace the National Party as the
'am conservative force in a country that is in many respects more conser-
an Britain. Lange still has to evolve a distinctive political philosophy
of arousing positive enthusiasm for Labour. Personality, evangelical
and opportunism may not suffice to retain marginal seats in 1987, by
me the National Party will be reconstituted. Bob Jones, the New
Party leader who used to be a National Party stalwart before breaking
1983, is interested in re-grouping with his old party. He is only waiting
· man he accuses of having operated a medieval 'reign of terror', Mul-
demoted in February 1985.[4] For the time being, Lange's consensus
stimulated a renaissance of goodwill and tolerance in the country as
onfronts its mammoth tasks.

MICHAEL PUGH*

ıthor, a specialist on New Zealand affairs, is Lecturer in International Relations at the
ıt of Adult Education of the University of Southampton.

ealand Herald, 21 July 1984.

North Korea: tilting towards Moscow

MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS

THIS year has been an extraordinary one in the politics of one of the world's mc closed communist countries, the Democratic People's Republic of Kor (North Korea). In January, North Korea announced new proposals for talks the future of the Korean peninsula which would include not only the Unit States and North Korea, but for the first time bring in also South Korea. In Ma President Kim Il-sung embarked on a remarkable 46-day railway odyssey to tl Soviet Union and eastern Europe and in August it was officially announced th Kim Il-sung's son, Kim Chong-il, was to be his 'chosen successor'. The thre linking all three of these events was the growing recognition by the Nor Korean leadership on the one hand of its dangerous isolation, even from mc of the communist world, and on the other an attempt by Kim Il-sung to pr pare the communist bloc for his eventual, and perhaps early, replacement l Kim Chong-il.

The first two events were quite striking and largely unexpected. In the pas North Korea has steadfastly refused to contemplate the idea of including Sou Korea in talks with the United States to conclude a permanent peace treat Likewise, there was little indication or warning of Kim Il-sung's journey eastern Europe. Relations with the Soviet Union and its allies have been prop but scarcely warm. Indeed, the trip was Kim's first official visit to the Sovi Union since 1961. He had pointedly not attended the funerals of eith Brezhnev or Andropov, but had been present at Marshal Tito's funeral in M 1980. Although the North Korean leader visited Rumania and Yugoslavia i 1975, it was his first tour of the eastern bloc as a whole since 1956, almost thr decades earlier.

In its foreign policy, North Korea has pursued a delicate balancing a between the Soviet Union and China for most of its existence. Since the Sin Soviet dispute intensified in the early 1960s, North Korea has managed bett than any other communist government to maintain equidistance between th two largest communist powers. By walking the tightrope, North Korea h preserved its independence and extracted economic and military support fro both Moscow and Beijing, both fearing that Kim Il-sung would fall irrevocabl into the other camp.[1] In recent years, however, it has seemed on balance-

[1] See Donald S. Zagoria, 'North Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing', in Robert Scalapino ar Jun-Yop Kim, *North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues* (Berkeley: University of Califo nia, 1983), pp. 351-71; Gerald Segal, 'The Soviet Union and Korea', in Segal, ed., *The Sovi Union in East Asia: Predicaments of Power* (London: Heinemann, for the Royal Institute of Inte national Affairs, 1983), pp. 70-88.

Mr Williams is a writer on Asian affairs. He was formerly Lecturer in Politics at the University East Anglia. At present he is with the BBC Far Eastern Service. He has recently submitted a doctor thesis on Indonesian communism.

not least because of frequent state visits between the two countries—that Pyongyang was tilting towards Beijing. In April this year, however, when President Reagan was conferring with Chinese leaders in Beijing, North Korea announced that President Kim Il-sung would visit the Soviet Union in May. The timing of the announcement signalled to all observers North Korea's growing unhappiness with Chinese policies in recent years and its acute sense of vulnerability and insecurity if it relied too heavily on China.

Since the early 1970s and the development of its relations with the Unite States and Japan, China has seen its long-term interests in north-east Asia bes served by a stabilisation of the Korean situation with some new formula fo lasting peace on the peninsula. China has believed for some time that a union of North and South Korea is not practicable and has supported instead the idea of a loose confederation, containing two separate ideologies and political systems little more unified than the two Germanies. In April 1975, Mao dong is believed to have made clear to Kim Il-sung during a visit by the latter Beijing that China would not support a military assault by the North on uth Korea in the wake of the American collapse in Indochina. Chinese ıcern to see a settlement of the Korean issue that would drastically reduce the ɔspects of conflict between the two Koreas was strengthened from 1978 by : conclusion of a Treaty of Peace and Amity with Japan and the formal ening of full diplomatic relations with the United States from 1 January 79. De facto, Beijing has even accepted the presence of American forces in uth Korea which the North has always insisted must be withdrawn as a preıdition for any peace settlement. The Chinese media have, compared with : Soviet media, been weak in their denunciation of the internal situation South Korea, and have largely refrained from comment on the question the American military presence there. Since 1980 in particular, North Korea s become increasingly concerned that the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese ɔprochements will lead inevitably to a lessening of support for the Korean nmunist state. At the same time China was forced to cut back on aid to North ırea as a result of its own internal difficulties and shortages of capital in a ficult period of economic readjustment. Pyongyang, for its part, stuck to a id and centralised economic policy in stark contrast to Deng Xiaoping's ɔgramme of widespread economic reforms and opening up relations with the st.

Traditionally, when its relations with one of the two communist giants have ɔled, North Korea has responded by tilting towards the other. It has been table, for example, that since 1980 the North Koreans have placed a new ess on communist unity while China continues to emphasise the impossibi/ of any reconciliation within the international communist movement. The viet Union has not gone out of its way to reciprocate Pyongyang's gestures, viously hoping to see Kim make a more definitive break with China and drop ı irksome attacks on Soviet foreign policy and its allies. The Soviet Union s, however, been willing to give considerable quantities of economic and :hnical aid to North Korea, especially where this involved projects which

were directly beneficial to Moscow itself. Since 1978 the Russians have paid for a new port at Najin, 25 miles from the Soviet border, where the Koreans appear to have given them limited naval facilities, and for a rail link connecting Najin with the Soviet railway system. The Soviet Union has also financed North Korea's largest iron and steel complex at Kimchaek, but appears to have refused to supply Pyongyang with up-to-date military technology and *matériel*. Undoubtedly, Kim Il-sung's failure to endorse the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and his open criticism of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea must have contributed to a restrained Soviet reaction to North Korean overtures. Indeed, Kim has greatly irritated the Soviet Union by allowing Prince Sihanouk, the titular leader of the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea, to use Pyongyang as his main base since 1979. Ironically, the port at Najin has been used by the Russians for shipments of goods to Vietnam and the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.

Despite a notable cooling of relations with China since 1980, high-level contacts were continued between the two countries. In 1982 Kim Il-sung made a state visit to Beijing in return for a visit to Pyongyang by Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang. North Korea also sought to consolidate its ties with radical states elsewhere, notably with Libya and Iran. In November 1982, after a visit by Colonel Qaddafi to Pyongyang, North Korea and Libya concluded a Treaty of Alliance which reportedly included a military clause. In April 1983, the then North Korean Prime Minister, Li Jong-ok, visited Iran. North Korea has emerged as perhaps the most important arms supplier to Iran in its continuing war with Iraq.

While China has, however, continued publicly to support North Korea, even to the extent of implicitly accepting Kim Chong-il as successor to Kim Il-sung, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang received a severe jolt with the October 1983 bombing in Rangoon which left 17 South Koreans dead, including four senior Cabinet Ministers. The arrest of three North Korean army officers for involvement in the attack and Burma's subsequent derecognition of North Korea was reported without comment in the Chinese press. China, which has long-standing and friendly relations with Burma, was reportedly deeply embarrassed by developments. It had repeatedly made it clear that it would like to see a climate of peace and stability develop on the Korean peninsula and had urged the American Administration to make contacts with North Korea. China made its disapproval clear by giving equal coverage in its press to both Burmese and North Korean versions of the events, much to the chagrin of Pyongyang. Moreover, in a visit to Japan at the end of 1983, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, pointedly said China disapproved of all acts of terrorism.[2] North Korean concern at the lack of solidarity by its communist neighbour may have been the reason for an unpublicised meeting in November at the Chinese city of Dalian between Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il-sung.

In the light of the Rangoon bombing, China sought to reassert its standing as

[2] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 December 1983.

stability in north-east Asia by urging restraint on North Korea and act as its principal intermediary with the west. The Chinese have ng conduits for North Korea's efforts to put out its own lines to the tes and for its own proposals, made public in January, for a three-way ith the Americans and the South Koreans. The North Korean pro-ivered in person by the Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang, to President January, were clearly intended in part to help Pyongyang recover in-l prestige lost after the Rangoon bombing and Burma's severance of relations. But the Chinese evidently went further than Kim Il-sung e liked in imposing their own views about détente in the region. The eans were also irritated by American suggestions that China be in-ny talks on the future of the Korean peninsula. Especially galling to Koreans has been China's burgeoning relationship with the South. me, a lively indirect trade has developed between the two countries officials have been allowed to attend conferences in China. In March South Korean tennis team visited China, to be followed by the visit se basketball team to Seoul. Even more upsetting to Pyongyang has nnouncement that a Chinese sports minister will visit Seoul later this end an Olympic council meeting, thus making clear China's inten-ticipate in the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.[3]

Korea has greatly resented these moves by China, and Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow after an absence of almost a quarter of a century l its determination to redress the balance and warn Beijing of the alienating it too much. Kim's May trip to the Soviet Union, which n Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, nd Rumania, was plainly intended to demonstrate North Korea's ss with what it sees as a Chinese attempt to apply undue pressure ch an accommodation with South Korea. The Sino-American rap-nt since 1972, and especially the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty both of which brought China into a closer relationship with 's two traditional foes—have made North Korea insecure. The efection to China in 1982 of eight North Korean army officers, who nsuccessfully to block the installation of Kim Chong-il as his father's nd the refusal of the Chinese to hand them back has been an added o relations.[4] Kim Chong-il's visit to Beijing in June 1983 and appa-ance by China as his father's successor has only partially appeased ea. At one stroke, Kim Il-sung's visit to the Soviet Union and ope demonstrated to China that he cannot be taken for granted.

ndwork for Kim's visit was prepared by a lengthy interview he gave March in a determined attempt to enlist greater support from n the interview, Kim denounced Japan and noted there was agree-een the Soviet Union and North Korea in recognising the dangers of ilitarism. Kim indirectly criticised China's developing relationship

s, 25 February 1984. [4] Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 366.
ee *Korea Today* (Pyongyang), 6, 1984, pp. 7–11.

with Japan by saying that some 'third world countries are seeking something from Japan in fantasy'. The North Korean leader also welcomed the fact that Russia and North Korea were 'on the same ground in struggling against the revival of Japanese militarism and the tripartite military moves among the United States, Japan and South Korea'. Since China has been consorting with all three members of this warlike trio, even to the point of playing basketball in Seoul, this remark was clearly a sideswipe at Beijing.

Kim's visit to Moscow and other east European capitals, which began on 23 May, followed close on the heels of a hurried trip to Pyongyang between 4 and 10 May of China's party leader, Hu Yaobang. The visit was designed to smooth North Korean irritation at the visit of President Reagan to China and the growing unofficial contacts between China and South Korea. But whilst the Chinese leader during his visit spoke of the destinies of the two communist states being linked forever, Kim pointedly referred to the common interests of all communist countries in the struggle against imperialism.[6]

North Korea and the Soviet Union had been sending signals to each other for some weeks before Kim's visit to Moscow. In March, Moscow Radio reminded its Korean listeners that more than 60 major factories had been completed with Soviet aid and eight others were under construction. The radio said that 63 per cent of electricity supply, 42 per cent of steel products and 50 per cent of oil derivatives are dependent on the ouput of Soviet-funded projects. The radio also added that Pyongyang's trade with Moscow today accounted for more than 33 per cent of its total foreign trade.[7] The implications for North Korea , which is reported to be experiencing difficulties with the goals set for its second seven-year plan and technologically falling far behind its southern neighbour, were clear. The Soviet Union remains North Korea's biggest supplier of economic assistance. Several new projects were completed last year, including the expansion of the country's largest steelworks and a fourth power station.

North Korea has responded to these reminders of Soviet economic assistance by stressing the role of the Soviet Union as the leader of the anti-imperialist struggle and acknowledging the aid that the Red Army rendered North Korea in liberating it from the Japanese in 1945—this is something that is rarely mentioned in official Korean histories. On the day the North Korean leader arrived in Moscow, *Rodong Sinmun,* the official party daily, welcomed Soviet denunciation of the American and South Korean military exercises, 'Team Spirit 84', and spoke of Soviet solidarity being 'a great encouragement to our people'.[8] The visit itself was described as 'an epochal event'.

Kim Il-sung was accompanied on his trip by an entourage of 250 ministers, aides and officials, including the Prime Minister, Kang Song-san, the Defence Minister, Oh Jin-u, and the Vice-President, Li Jong-ok, as well as several economic ministers. At a welcoming banquet attended by the entire Soviet Politburo, President Chernenko accused the United States of forging a military bloc with Japan and South Korea to divide and rule Asia and openly berated

[6] *North Korea News* (Seoul), 26 March 1984. [7] *ibid.* [8] *ibid.*, 28 May 1984.

China for its lack of support for the socialist camp. Chernenko said Moscow wished that the Korean people were united into 'one peace-loving democratic state,' but he did no go into detail on how this could be achieved. Indeed, Kim's visit was notable for its failure to win public Soviet endorsement for his proposals for tripartite talks with Seoul and Washington. Moscow made plain its preference for talks without any outside interference. Indeed, Kim's proposals won endorsement on his European trip only from Rumania, Yugoslavia and, surprisingly, East Germany.[9]

In a final communiqué issued after the talks in Moscow, both sides agreed on the necessity of strengthening economic ties and 'security in the Far East and the Pacific Zone in the light of US militarist tendencies and revanchist policies in Japan'. The statement, together with the presence of a bevy of North Korean generals with Kim Il-sung, probably indicates Soviet willingness to bolster North Korea's armed forces. In particular, Pyongyang is known to be concerned about its ageing air force and the growing technological gap with the South in the military field. The Soviet Union has made no new deliveries of aircraft to North Korea since the early 1970s, when it received over 100 Mig-21s despite, it is believed, repeated requests for modern aircraft such as the Mig-23, already delivered to Libya, Syria and India. Although the North Korean armed forces are numerically superior to the South, qualitatively they are greatly inferior. Even with fresh deliveries of aircraft, the North would have no equal to the South's recently acquired American F-16 aircraft.

Kim Il-sung's three days of talks with senior Soviet officials are likely to lead to increased economic and military aid to Pyongyang. Immediately after the talks finished, the Defence Minister, Oh Jin-u, returned home whilst Kim left for Warsaw, the next stop on his trip. A month after Kim's visit, a senior North Korean military delegation arrived in Moscow, and South Korean sources speculated that this would lead to the delivery of 20 to 30 Mig-23 fighters in the next two years.[10] It is possible that the Soviet Union, which has already built up its forces considerably in recent years in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, will seek greater use for its naval forces of the port of Najin.

Within a week of Kim Il-sung's return home, the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party met in plenary session to discuss the outcome of the President's European tour and what was obliquely referred to as 'the organisational problem'. Kim's trip to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe was described as 'a historical visit which brought about a new turn in the external work of our country'.[11] According to the final statement of the meeting, the Soviet and Korean parties reached a full consensus on all problems discussed and expressed determination 'to fight shoulder to shoulder forever in the future against imperialism'. The meeting also laid great stress on the economic content of Kim's trip, noting that discussions took place with the communist

[9] *People's Korea* (Tokyo), 2 and 9 June 1984.
[10] *North Korea News* (Seoul), 2 July 1984; *Newsweek*, 9 July 1984.
[11] *BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter referred to as *SWB*), FE/7602/C1/1–12, 11 July 1984.

countries on economic collaboration and technical cooperation in various domains including the power industry, electronic and automation industry, machine-building and what were termed 'ultra-modern scientific and technical branches'. Prior to the meeting of the Central Committee, Radio Moscow had already reported the arrival of a North Korean economic mission on 19 June for working-level discussions.[12] A long-term agreement on economic, scientific and technological cooperation was also signed with Rumania. It is to be expected, therefore, that there will be a marked increase in economic collaboration with the Soviet Union and its allies and in this respect the North may well move gradually away from the autarky which has been a feature of its economy in recent decades. North Korea has long been concerned that economically it is falling behind South Korea and it is interesting to note that the envisaged solution to this appears to be greater economic integration with the Comecom bloc rather than reforms and cooperation with the west, such as China has pursued.

Since Kim Il-sung's visit, there have been several noteworthy signs that North Korea is making a determined effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union. One of the most striking illustrations of this was North Korea's participation in the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics when the communist countries with which it has been most closely aligned over the last decade—China, Rumania and Yugoslavia—all participated. North Korea has also made efforts to normalise its relations with Afghanistan and Vietnam, both of whom it has sharply criticised in recent years. Ambassadors have been appointed to both countries since May after a long hiatus and an Afghan party mission has visited Pyongyang for the first time since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Articles in the North Korean press have referred to Korean-Soviet friendship as 'indestructible' and Moscow as having given its Korean ally 'invariable and unshakeable solidarity'.[13]

Despite the fact that North Korea seems to be tilting towards Moscow, the Soviet Union is likely to be cautious in its response. In the past, Kim Il-sung has proved an unpredictable and erratic ally. The announcement in late July that Kim's son, Kim Chong-il, is to be his 'sole successor' is likely at the least to be an acute embarrassment.[14] There is no parallel in the history of communist parties for such a transfer of legitimacy from father to son. Whilst Kim Il-sung is known to have sought Soviet endorsement for his eventual replacement by the 'Party Centre and Dear Leader', Kim Chong-il, Moscow has so far avoided any comment or reference on communism's first self-proclaimed 'blood lineage'. Party leadership is likely to be assumed by Kim Chong-il as early as next year when the Seventh Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party is due.

To date, the Soviet Union has allowed the North Koreans to act as the suitors. On the basis of its past experience with Kim Il-sung, Moscow is likely to want to

[12] *North Korea News* (Seoul), 2 July 1984.
[13] *ibid.*, 9 July 1984; *People's Korea* (Toyko), 25 August 1984.
[14] *SWB*, FE/711/B/2–6, 2 August 1984.

see a much more pronounced shift in North Korean foreign policy away from China and towards the Soviet Union before it is willing to respond wholeheartedly to the North Korean overtures. Pressures on North Korea in the coming years may well dictate this shift. Its economy is increasingly hampered by the lack of access to advanced technology and it has virtually no resources of its own to invest in economic development. Externally, the rift with China is unlikely to be healed, as Beijing sees its long-term interests as necessitating a :lose relationship with the United States and Japan. Despite its much vaunted '*uche* (self-reliance) ideology, North Korea may be increasingly forced to turn o the Soviet Union for economic assistance and for higher levels of military nd industrial technology.

South Korea: looking to its friends

BRIAN BRIDGES

PRESIDENT Chun Du-hwan's visit to Tokyo in early September was the first ever state visit to Japan by a South Korean President. The visit was intended to add more substance to talk of a 'new and vital stage' in Japanese-Korean relations on the occasion of the equally unprecedented visit to Seoul in January 1983 of the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. Chun's visit was criticised by opposition groups in both countries as well as, predictably, by North Korea and the Soviet Union. Aware of the precedent of North Korean terrorist action against the presidential entourage in Rangoon in October 1983, when four South Korean cabinet ministers died, the Japanese police mounted security operations on a scale surpassing even that for visiting American Presidents.

Japan's post-war relations with the two Koreas have been characterised by mistrust and discord, a legacy of the bitterness arising from its 36 years of harsh colonial occupation. Of crucial symbolic importance for the success of Chun's visit, at least for the South Koreans, was the phraseology used by Emperor Hirohito in his welcoming speech. By choosing to describe the 'unfortunate past' as 'regrettable', the Emperor pitched his apology at the level of earlier apologies to American and Chinese leaders, but Nakasone himself amplified this into an expression of 'deep regret' for 'great sufferings' inflicted on the Korean people.[1]

The President's accompanying ministers discussed a wide range of bilateral issues with their Japanese counterparts but little concrete progress was made. The South Koreans turned down a Japanese proposal for a joint committee to oversee cultural exchange as being 'premature', but in turn failed to secure definite commitments from the Japanese on the promotion of technology transfer and the exception of ethnic Koreans resident in Japan from certain alien registration provisions. The import-promotion mission that the Japanese have agreed to send in October is unlikely to have any real impact on South Korea's increasing trade deficit with Japan, which is primarily caused by structural differences between the two economies.

It is a measure of the difficulties in these bilateral discussions that Chun altered the agenda so that his two formal conversations with Nakasone were largely devoted to security and broader international issues where there is a wide measure of agreement. Nevertheless, differences of view over the political and strategic situation in the Korean peninsula remain. The South Koreans urged the incorporation of strong criticism of North Korea into the text of the final

[1] *BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter referred to as *SWB*), 10 September 1984, FE/7744.

The author is a Research Associate at the Royal Institute of International Affairs specialising in Asia. He contributed a Note on Japan's internal political situation to the August–September issue of *The World Today*.

joint communiqué, but the Japanese were reluctant to go beyond the repetition of their January 1983 statement that 'the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to the peace and stability of East Asia, including Japan.' Some members of the Japanese Defence Agency do see North Korea as a potential threat but most Japanese government officials still tend to play down this threat. They see it, to use President Chun's own words, as 'a fire across the ocean' and prefer to concentrate, as Nakasone has often told the Americans, on the Soviet Union as the main disruptive factor in north-east Asia. This is a view which the destruction of the KAL airliner by the Russians in September 1983 had only served to reinforce. The South Koreans, nevertheless, continue to think of themselves as a 'bulwark' against North Korean communism, in effect helping to defend Japan.

The North-South conflict

Like his predecessors, President Chun remains deeply distrustful of North Korea. Not unnaturally, in view of the Rangoon attack, the South Koreans have depicted the North Korean proposal in January this year for tripartite talks involving the two Koreas and the United States, as a 'false peace offensive' from an 'unreliable . . . violent and bellicose' government; it represented a change in tactics, not in the basic strategy of 'achieving unification through communising the South'.[2] The South Korean government rejected the tripartite proposal, and while not ruling out the possibility of four-party talks, reiterated that ideally it should be a two-party dialogue, just the two Koreas. In fact, however, there have been no official or substantive relations between the two governments established north and south of the 38th parallel in Korea in 1948 apart from two short series of dialogues, in 1972–3 and 1979–80. The latter of these was halted by the seizure of power in South Korea by General Chun. Conflict and competition that characterise the two countries' relationship are expressed in military, economic and political terms.

A sense of insecurity exists on both sides. Across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) nearly 1·4 million regular troops face each other; if the American forces are excluded from the comparison, the military balance, quantitatively if not necessarily qualitatively, favours North Korea in terms of both manpower and military hardware. Defence expenditure in total differs little between the two sides, although expressed as a percentage of gross national product North Korea has averaged around 25 per cent and South Korea around 6 per cent over the last decade. The South Koreans, acutely aware of the vulnerability of Seoul, their capital, lying only 50 miles from the DMZ, look to the American forces (approximately 39,000 troops, 100 combat aircraft and some tactical nuclear weapons) to compensate for the gap in the capabilities of the two sides. For both sides this level of expenditure is a drain on their economies. South Korea's demand for Japanese economic aid during the 1981–3 period was on the ground that it needed help to compensate for those resources devoted to defence. South Korea's economy has renewed its growth since the disastrous year 1980 when

[2] *ibid.*, 16 January 1984, FE/7541.

negative growth was recorded. For the North, however, this brings the unwelcome prospect of falling still further behind in economic and military-technological terms. Speaking to the press in August, President Chun argued that this shift in the economic balance to the North's disadvantage would make the 'next four to five years' the 'most likely period' for an attack to be unleashed against the South. It was, perhaps, to lessen that danger that Chun offered at the same time direct North–South trade and economic cooperation. Significantly, the offer was not made conditional on a prior apology from the North for the Rangoon incident.[3]

With the military balance probably at a state of near parity if the American presence is included, both protagonists see political and diplomatic legitimacy as important. Here is a political struggle between a totalitarian system trying to arrange a dynastic succession and an authoritarian system slowly and reluctantly moving towards constitutional democracy. The flow of proposals and counter-proposals for reunification and the trading of accusations that the other side is a mere 'puppet' reflect this competition for legitimacy.[4] North Korean President Kim Il-sung's ideas for unification, expressed in their most refined form in the October 1980 proposal for a 'Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo', have been founded on two premisses: the withdrawal of American troops and a change in the composition of the present South Korean government. President Chun, on the other hand, has made several proposals for an exchange of visits or summit meetings between himself and Kim, but, of course, would never accept Kim's preconditions.

While Kim Il-sung has been endeavouring to eliminate domestic opposition and secure tacit endorsement from China and the Soviet Union for his son, Chong-Il, to succeed him, Chun has been proclaiming a 'new era' by purging politicians and bureaucrats and installing his new, more nationalistic, generation in power. He is still sensitive about criticism (three dissidents were arrested in January this year for saying that North Korea had more legitimacy than the South) and has suffered from a succession of financial scandals. These have necessitated repeated cabinet reshuffles and have even implicated close members of his family. Though he has gradually repealed the ban on political activity for most of the former politicians, reinstated some students expelled from campuses and released some political prisoners, his most significant opponent, Kim Dae-jung, was forced into exile in the United States. The parliamentary opposition is effectively muzzled and is unlikely to gain much ground against his own Democratic Justice Party (DJP) in the elections which are likely to be held early in 1985.

In recent years the two Koreas have been diversifying their diplomatic activities towards not only the major powers but also the third world. Despite North Korea's entry into the Non-Aligned Movement in 1975 at the expense of South Korea, the general trend, particularly since President Chun took power,

[3] *Korea Herald*, 22 August 1984.

[4] Byung-joon Ahn, 'Prospects for North–South Korean Relations', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, June 1983, pp. 67–8, 74–7.

ı in South Korea's favour. Chun's overseas tours, the visits by President Reagan, Pope John Paul II and Nakasone, the holding of the 1983 Inter-l Parliamentary Union convention in Seoul, and the decision to grant ·8 Olympics to Seoul have given added prestige. More significant, r, has been the almost universal international disapprobation of North or its involvement in the Rangoon bomb massacre. When Burma, a with impeccable non-aligned credentials, broke off diplomatic rela-th North Korea (and even withdrew recognition from it) in November ʼider diplomatic repercussions followed. A number of countries im-iplomatic sanctions on North Korea, four broke off diplomatic rela-th it and three (including Pakistan) established diplomatic relations uth Korea. All these moves increased North Korea's diplomatic isola-ı a result, the January session of the North Korean Supreme People's ly called for the opening of doors to promote economic ties with third ›untries and even western capitalist countries. However, the range of ıtic options for both Koreas remains limited while the geopolitical situ-and the attitude of the few interested powers—remains unchanged.

nerican involvement

ıe four external powers most directly concerned, China, the Soviet the United States and Japan, are opposed to the Korean peninsula's by one dominant power, and since any new outbreak of war there would ıly involve all of them, directly or indirectly, they have all gradually support the existing territorial status quo.

Jnited States is committed to the survival of South Korea through its treaty and, since the Reagan Administration assumed office, criticism outh Korean human rights record has been de-emphasised and joint cooperation increased. President Reagan's visit to South Korea in No-1983, when he became the first American President to visit the DMZ, ned this sense of solidarity. The joint communiqué described the of South Korea as 'pivotal' to the stability of north-east Asia and in turn › the security of the United States, though the American-South Korean ship does not really compare in importance, for the United States, : American-Japanese one. The United States has no relations what-vith North Korea except for periodic truce-violation talks between erican forces in Korea and the Korean People's Army across the DMZ. 'South Korean objections, the United States has continually refused to to talks with North Korea unless South Korea was also represented, shown intermittent support for the concept of cross-recognition—i.e. ted States and Japan would recognise North Korea, and China and the Jnion would recognise South Korea. The idea was originally put by the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in 1975. It was revived early by the South Koreans after Nakasone's visits to Seoul and Washington :emed to herald the birth of a new trilateral relationship. North Korea sistently refused to consider the cross-recognition concept since it

would mean consolidation of the existing division of the country. There were signs of a marginal shift in American attitudes towards North Korea in the middle of 1983. American diplomats were allowed social contact with North Korean diplomats in third countries. However, these instructions were rescinded after the Rangoon bombing. In any case, North Korea may well have read more into this relaxation of rules than it should have done.

After two attempts in October and December 1983 to start direct talks with the United States, North Korea in January 1984 broadened the proposal into one for tripartite talks involving itself, the United States and 'the South Korean authorities', thereby reversing a long-standing refusal to deal with President Chun's government. The precondition of the withdrawal of American forces (obviously unacceptable to both South Korea and the United States) was dropped; instead it was suggested that the American withdrawal would become one of the subjects of the talks. The tripartite talks would have on their agenda a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement (to which South Korea was not a party), the adoption of a declaration of non-aggression between the two Koreas, and the preliminaries to a dialogue between the two on reunification. By linking these aspects, the North Koreans moved closer to the more comprehensive agenda favoured by the Americans. The immediate response from President Reagan was that he was not interested in a tripartite conference, but that a four-party conference, adding China, would be better ('wonderful' was the actual word he used).

From the American perspective, North Korea is a country that, while initially a Soviet puppet, has made the most of the Sino-Soviet split to gain some leverage over both China and the Soviet Union. Its subsequent tilts and re-tilts are considered to be effectively part of the continuing status quo. Since 1975, however, the North Korean tilt towards China has become more pronounced and it is to China that the United States, and Japan, have looked to provide a restraining influence. The Chinese have invariably replied that they have no control over the North Koreans but that the North has no intention of invading the South.[5] Embryonic Chinese contacts with South Korea have been constrained by the fear that a critical North Korea would move closer to the Soviet Union, at China's expense, but since the hijacking of a Chinese airliner in May 1983 fortuitously led to Chinese officials travelling to Seoul, a limited number of contacts (particularly sporting ones) have taken place.[6]

The hijack incident, in fact, provided the impetus for South Korea's Foreign Minister, Lee Bum-suk, to announce in June 1983 a *Nordpolitik* (northward policy) to 'normalise relations with the Soviet Union and mainland China'. The Russians, however, have been even more reticent than the Chinese in

[5] Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, told the Japanese in November 1983 that he and Deng Xiaoping had met Kim Il-sung twice 'recently' to stress the importance of maintaining stability and avoiding tension on the peninsula. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 25 November 1983.

[6] Even when the hijackers were allowed to leave prison for Taiwan in August 1984, Chinese criticism was directed more at Taiwan than South Korea.

widening contacts with the South Koreans, and all contacts anyway were broken after the KAL airliner incident. Nevertheless, at the end of December 1983 the new Foreign Minister, Lee Won-kyung, emphasised that the 'northward policy' had not been abandoned, even if progress was likely to be extremely slow, and in August 1984 it was announced that, for the first time in over a year, a South Korean citizen had attended a Soviet conference.

A role for Japan?

In public the Japanese have supported South Korean proposals for the reunification of the peninsula, but in practice they have not advanced much beyond vague statements about creating an environment for dialogue on the peninsula. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official did suggest a six-party conference (thereby adding Japan and the Soviet Union), but subsequently Nakasone retreated slightly, saying that the problem was one for the two parties concerned to settle. Indeed, given the potential economic power and latent anti-Japanism of a unified Korea—however unlikely that prospect may be—of whatever political hue, Japan has, if anything, more of an interest in the maintenance of the existing division, provided that a settled regional environment can be ensured. Japan has no diplomatic relations with North Korea but is by far its largest non-communist trading partner (though bilateral trade totals are paltry by comparison with Japanese-South Korean trade). Japan appreciates that its options with regard to North Korea have been further constrained by the Nakasone and Chun visits. The diplomatic sanctions imposed in November 1983 after the Burmese revelations of North Korean culpability in the Rangoon incident remain in force, though the Japanese government is not stopping private-level contacts with North Korean organisations.[7] However, such is the level of Japanese interest and involvement in the South that it is unlikely that Japan will advance too far ahead of South Korean tolerance. The South Koreans do not envisage Japan as a channel for contact with North Korea, but rather as one channel for contacting China. They are keen both to improve their own relations with China and to persuade China to restrain North Korea. When Prime Minister Nakasone visited China in March this year he hoped to persuade his hosts to increase contact with South Korea, but the Chinese countered this by calling on Japan to respond to feelers from North Korea. However, as the Japanese explained to Chun and his delegation, they would not alter their fundamental policy towards the North without a significant change in the regional environment.

Nakasone's efforts to improve relations with both South Korea and the United States have provoked North Korean criticism about a 'rounding off' of a 'tripartite military alliance'. In addition, his stress for the benefit of his American audience on a more positive Japanese defence role even produced some ambivalence amongst South Korean leaders. They have reiterated that while Japan's increased defence efforts were justifiable, they should be limited

[7] The mid-September visit to North Korea by Masashi Ishibashi, Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, is seen by the Foreign Ministry as one way of keeping open a 'pipeline' to North Korea.

---

to complementing American capabilities. Even though the KAL airli
dent and the Rangoon bombing have led to South Korean calls for clos
rican-Japanese-Korean defence cooperation, there is little prospect o
to the present situation in which the main axes of cooperation con
be the separate bilateral relationships of the two neighbours with th
States. Even were constitutional restraints circumvented, it is incon
that emotional legacies would permit Japanese forces to underta
action with South Korean forces on Korean soil. Japan's contribution h
and is likely to remain, confined to the provision of bases to allow A
forces to carry out their commitments to defend South Korea.

Chun showed a certain physical and political courage in going tc
He moved a step nearer the 'community of destiny' between his cou
Japan that he first propounded three years ago. The Americans were
with the visit; even the Chinese gave qualified endorsement. But the
of his northern neighbour remains.

The Carter legacy, Mondale and the Democratic Party

DILYS M. HILL AND PHIL WILLIAMS

ONE of the most striking, albeit not surprising, features of the contest for the American presidency during the early autumn 1984 was the way in which the Republicans adopted what was widely described as a 'memory lane' campaign. President Reagan and other leading Republicans constantly reminded the electorate that the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, had served as Vice-President in an Administration which had not only helped to create a high 'misery index' (i.e., the combined rates of inflation and unemployment) but had also allowed America's international status and prestige to fall to an all-time low. The 'sorry record' of the Carter years was contrasted with the strong, decisive leadership offered by Reagan and the Republicans—so much so that at times the Republican Party seemed almost to be claiming a monopoly on patriotism. In her speech to the Republican convention in Dallas, Reagan's United Nations Ambassador, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, claimed that in the late 1970s 'it was not malaise' the United States suffered from, 'it was Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale'. In other words, Mondale's experience in office—which had been an asset in the struggle against Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson for the Democratic nomination—was in serious danger of being transformed into a liability. Unfortunately for Mondale and his running mate for the Vice-Presidency, Geraldine Ferraro, they have to contend with widespread doubts about the ability of the Democratic Party to provide strong and consistent leadership in foreign and domestic policy. And these doubts will almost certainly prove a rather more formidable obstacle than the controversy over Geraldine Ferraro's finances—a controversy which by early September had more or less abated.

This scepticism is an unenviable and inescapable legacy of the last Democratic Administration. This article assesses the extent to which the Carter Administration deserved its reputation for ineptness. It also suggests that at least some of the problems which confronted Carter in dealing with his own party have had an adverse impact on Mondale's prospects for defeating Reagan.

The Carter legacy

Within 18 months of Jimmy Carter arriving in the White House there were

---

Dilys Hill, Reader in Politics at the University of Southampton, has carried out research in the United States into domestic policy, especially urban problems. Phil Williams is a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He has specialised in the United States Senate and security issues. The two authors are editors, with Glenn Abernathy of the University of South Carolina, of *The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making* (London: Frances Pinter; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

two rival theories circulating in Washington regarding the governability of the United States. The first was that the United States in the latter half of the 1970s had become virtually ungovernable. In this interpretation the problems were essentially structural. The fragmentation of power, which had always been a pronounced characteristic of the American political system, had reached such a level that a workable consensus had become well-nigh unattainable. Furthermore, the domestic political problems of dispersed power and a sluggish economy were paralleled in foreign policy by a decline in American power and prestige. The hegemonial position which the United States had enjoyed in the world arena since 1945 had disappeared, partly as a result of long-term geopolitical developments such as the rise of western Europe and Japan, and partly because of the flagrant waste of American resources in support of a futile containment policy in south-east Asia. Faced with the decline of American power in the world and the diffusion of power in American society, it is understandable that President Carter was unable to mobilise support for either his domestic or his foreign policy. In other words, the structural viewpoint emphasised that the problems were intrinsically unmanageable. So much so that the question of the ability and effectiveness of the chief executive was more or less irrelevant.

The alternative theory was that the problems were neither particularly novel nor particularly unmanageable given the right person in the White House. According to this interpretation, Jimmy Carter was not the right person. His inexperience in governing, his idealism, his openness, his informality, all of which had made him an attactive candidate for the presidency, seemed far less attractive or appropriate once he was actually in the White House. Carter's ineptness rather than any fundamental change in the American political system or in the American position in the world was held to be the root of America's problems in both domestic and international politics.

As so often in these matters, both these competing interpretations encapsulated part of the picture. It was Jimmy Carter's misfortune to come to office in a period which has appropriately been characterised as the age of limits. Yet these limits were reinforced by the limitations of the President himself. Jimmy Carter inherited intractable domestic problems, a rebellious and individualistic Congress, and a foreign policy which appeared to be obsessed with the Soviet-American relationship and oblivious of other issues and problems, especially in the third world. The difficulties were very real—and would have posed a formidable challenge to any President, whatever his background and political persuasion. Nevertheless, in Carter's case the difficulties were intensified by his own personality and style of government. His search for 'comprehensive' rather than piecemeal solutions to problems and his obsession with detail made it impossible for him to provide decisive leadership or to define national priorities.

The Washington outsider

Even more damaging was Carter's stance as an 'outsider'. In the election

campaign of 1976, this was a considerable asset. It was genuine, not contrived. But unless the President was able to transcend the philosophy on which his electoral success had been based and come to terms with the 'insiders' in Washington, he was almost bound to be ineffectual. Indeed, many observers believe that the fatal weakness of the Carter years was the President's committed stance as a 'Washington outsider' untainted by the claims and conspiracies of the old politics. Beginning with the Iowa caucuses, Jimmy Carter had won the Democratic Party nomination as the organisational outsider—a ploy which Gary Hart failed to emulate and one which Walter Mondale studiously avoided in favour of support from the party's traditional power groups such as organised labour—and seemed determined to continue in this role even when in the White House. In the light of this it is hardly surprising that Carter, in marked contrast to his Republican successor, failed to create a 'presidential party for governing', a failure which was to undermine many of his policies and contribute significantly to his political demise.

Indeed, it is in this area that the Reagan Administration—for all its shortcomings elsewhere—has excelled. Carter's reluctance to court major figures in his own party was a weakness which could only have been offset by an experienced team for congressional liaison. In the event, the White House staff charged with this task were themselves inexperienced. Instead of compensating for the President's shortcomings, therefore, they simply added to the problem. It was only with the Panama Canal Treaties that Carter displayed an awareness that presidential power, as Richard Neustadt had pointed out 15 years earlier, was no more than the power to persuade and that there was no substitute for his own sustained personal involvement in the persuasion process.

President Reagan, by contrast, was aware of this need from the outset. And Reagan's willingness to cultivate key Senators and Representatives to win them to his policy was obvious in such episodes as the Awac's deal with Saudi Arabia. Whereas trading favours for votes had seemed anathema to President Carter, Reagan appeared to revel in the face-to-face meetings with legislators. Although this was not the only factor which gave Reagan an extended honeymoon with Congress, it was certainly a crucial element. Indeed, the early success of Reagan's legislative programme revealed even more starkly that the Carter Administration's main failures were in the area of implementation. These failures were attributable primarily to a lack of political understanding on Carter's part. Being President was not like being governor of Georgia. Implementation of policies was something which had to be worked at rather than something which could be taken for granted. Even when Carter realised this, problems of effectiveness and efficiency remained. Policies continued to be bogged down in internal divisions between Cabinet members and White House staff, in extended congressional battles and protracted legislative timetables, and in the interplay of competing interest groups.

This is not to diminish the enormity of the problems facing Carter. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate there had been profound developments in congressional procedure and behaviour. Changes in the number of subcom-

mittees, in the power of chairmen, the influence of senior party leaders, and in the budgetary process all meant that the Congress was simultaneously more assertive and less manageable. Carter's Health, Education and Welfare Secretary even went so far as to describe Washington as a city of 'molecular government', with power fragmented between interest groups and their counterparts in Congress and the government departments. This made Carter's failure to establish Hamilton Jordan in the definitive chief-of-staff role until rather late in his Administration even more inexplicable.

Closely bound up with this managerial failure was the President's inability to project an image of strength and decisiveness—an image projection at which Reagan has proved far more adept—which in turn reflected an ambivalence over the importance and the urgency to be attached to particular issues. It was alleged, for example, that after presenting Congress with the imperative of welfare reform, Carter then 'walked away' from the issue for four or five months and failed to provide the tenacity and continuity of leadership that was necessary.

Managerial problems were equally pressing among Carter's close advisers on both foreign and domestic affairs. The main problem was the President's failure to exert control over his officials. Differences between the members of the White House staff on the one side and Cabinet officers on the other are obviously not unique to the Carter years. Yet they were particularly debilitating as a result of the President's own difficulties in exerting authority and establishing priorities. Carter's rhetoric emphasised a commitment to Cabinet government. Despite this, Stuart Eizenstat, the domestic policy adviser, enjoyed a far closer relationship with the President than did any domestic Cabinet member. Furthermore, by encouraging Eizenstat to take a more active role in economic affairs, Carter merely ensured that there would be clashes with Michael Blumenthal, the Secretary of the Treasury.

Erratic policies

Divided responsibility combined with the President's inability to impose his own preferences had an even more damaging effect on foreign policy. Carter looked to his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to coordinate policy and provide ideas and analyses for the President. The problem here was that Carter also put considerable faith in Cyrus Vance, his Secretary of State, whose views did not always coincide with those of Brzezinski, especially on the fundamental issue of the appropriate policy towards the Soviet Union. Although competing prescriptions can help to define the possibilities for choice, a system of 'multiple advocacy' also has certain dangers and limitations. Indeed, it depends for its success on a strong President at the centre who is able to extract from the competing arguments a clear, coherent strategy. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, thrived on conflict among his advisers. Carter in contrast—at least until after the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979—was unable to resolve the differences between Vance and Brzezinski either in his own mind or in American policy. The result was that

foreign policy became both enigmatic and erratic with conciliatory statements towards Moscow being followed by hard-line pronouncements. Inevitably this created considerable confusion amongst America's allies and adversaries alike. Furthermore, this fundamental flaw in the Administration's approach to foreign policy made it extremely vulnerable to domestic pressures. Vacillation was widely construed as weakness, thereby providing ammunition to the hard-line critics articulating their views through the Committee on Present Danger, the American Security Council and other such organisations.

This impression that the President was indecisive was reinforced by another of Carter's personal traits: his commendable open-mindedness and receptivity to new information and advice. These qualities separated Carter from some of his predecessors such as Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, neither of whom had been comfortable with criticism and dissent. The trouble was that Carter seemed to veer too far in the opposite direction. The details of issues took up too much of the President's attention while his open-mindedness encouraged protracted policy debate and ill-thought-out attempts at implementation. The result was an engineer's approach: rational, thoughtful, carefully detailed, yet allegedly 'passionless' and with too little attention to overall strategy. As President, Jimmy Carter failed to develop an overall strategy and design with which the party and voters could identify. But to concede the limits of the President's personality, leadership quality, and decision-making style is not to overlook the equally important limitations of the times. Increasing conservatism and the success of Proposition 13 (the referendum in the 1978 California state elections which heralded a wave of tax retrenchments) compelled Carter to switch from substantive policy initiatives to curbs against inflation. Similarly, although it is true that Carter's relations with the Democratic Party were unwisely weak and distanced, the old Democratic coalition was itself becoming weaker. The divisions in the party mirrored those in society, between the 'frostbelt' of the old industrial north and mid-west and the 'sunbelt' of the increasingly prosperous south and south-west, between cities and suburbs, and between generations. And Carter's own leadership problems were mirrored in a Congress divided by faction, interest group lobbying, and fears of constituents' increasing antipathy to expansionist economic policies.

Carter's foreign policy faced similar difficulties. Vietnam had precipitated the breakdown of the old foreign policy consensus with its emphasis on bipartisanship, Atlanticism and containment. The result was that Carter had to build ad hoc coalitions in Congress and in the country in support of all his major policy initiatives. Yet the fact that a winning coalition could not easily be sustained from one issue to the next meant that the President was particularly vulnerable to outside pressures and was forced to accept artifical linkages between different policies. The most dramatic example of such linkages was the decision to admit the Shah of Iran to the United States, although all Carter's instincts warned him against such a course, Kissinger, Rockefeller and Nixon campaigned vigorously for his admission. And Carter may have been far more willing to compromise on this issue because of his desire to obtain Kissinger's

support for Salt II, a sequel to Salt I (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed by President Nixon in 1972). The extent to which such a linkage was explicit is uncertain; that it was a consideration in the President's ill-fated decision is almost axiomatic.

The fate of the Salt II Treaty in the Senate was also affected by the Panama Canal Treaties, which were ratified in 1978. Senators such as Russell Long, who had voted for the Canal Treaties despite enormous pressure from conservative interest groups and constituents, were reluctant to repeat the experience by voting positively on Salt. And although the crisis over Afghanistan allowed Carter to defer Senate consideration of the Treaty and thereby avoid a direct test, the debate in the autumn of 1979 revealed how difficult it was for the President to mobilise support when dealing with a fragmented Senate operating in a highly charged political environment. Indeed, the Panama Canal Treaties themselves had only been approved as a result of extensive lobbying by the President, the only issue on which he played such a part. Although such lobbying is a normal feature of presidential-congressional relations, Carter (unlike Reagan who has engineered some brilliant legislative victories by clever personal lobbying) never seemed particularly at ease with this aspect of his role. This is almost certainly one area in which Mondale—should he become President—would have more in common with Reagan than with Carter. The difficulties Mondale faces in his attempt to obtain the presidency are, however, formidable and must now be identified.

Mondale and the Democratic Party

If many of Jimmy Carter's problems were self-inflicted, a result of his style, personality and inability to come to terms with Washington politics, Walter Mondale seems to be a rather different prospect. Although as a candidate he suffers from a lack of charisma, he is an insider with considerable experience in the Senate and a clear understanding of the mechanics of power and influence in Washington. Mondale in the primary campaigns demonstrated a willingness and ability to deal with the traditional power brokers in the Democratic Party. Indeed, one of the ironies of what was probably the most protracted and intense primary contest of recent years was that Carter's former Vice-President was the candidate of the old organisational powers in the party, including the AFL-CIO, and that his main rival, Senator Gary Hart, adopted Carter's tactic in the 1976 contest by opting for a direct populist approach and appealing in particular to the young professional urbanites (the yuppies). An additional irony is that whereas Hart would probably have posed rather more of a threat to Reagan, Mondale—if he were elected—would be in a better position to establish that 'party of government' which is a prerequisite of effectiveness for any President. The outsider may have made a better candidate; the insider would probably make a better President.

Yet even Mondale would face significant problems. Despite his connections to the traditional party organisation, he would find that 'followership' is far from guaranteed. The Democratic Party has never been more than a loose coali-

tion of diverse interests. One of Carter's difficulties was that this coalition was disintegrating. Similarly, Mondale's candidacy has been bedevilled by the tendency towards fragmentation. One of the reasons for the bitterness of the campaign for the nomination was that it was far more than a contest of personalities, involving as it did a battle for the soul of the Democratic Party.

The major problem for the Democrats is that it is no longer clear what they stand for. The Party is deeply divided in terms of philosophy and tactics. As one report noted, 'despite his historic choice of Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate, Mondale represents the triumph of the old guard—party officials, labor and other organised interest groups, who claim to be the political heirs to FDR.'[1] Whereas Mondale and this group believe in government intervention in the economy and the regulation of business, the younger generation of Democrats represented by Hart share Mondale's liberalism on social issues but see a reduced role for government in managing the domestic economy. Complicating matters further is the black vote represented by Jesse Jackson, who has demanded that the party resume the campaign against poverty in American society. Indeed, the Jackson factor encapsulates many of Mondale's dilemmas. Jackson agreed, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to campaign for Mondale in an attempt to moblise the black vote, but this carries with it the danger of creating a white backlash and provoking even more desertions from the ranks of Democratic supporters,

The implication of all this is that at least some of the factors which undermined Jimmy Carter's presidency are also obstacles to Mondale achieving the same position. Should he overcome these obstacles and find himself in the White House, Mondale would have to contend with the expectations that are invariably associated with Democratic Administrations. An inability to meet them would pose even greater question marks about the role and responsibility of the Democrats than currently exist. If, as seems more likely, Mondale loses the election, the Democratic Party's identity crisis would have to be confronted more immediately. Talk of a major realignment in American politics may be premature, but if the Democrats failed to resolve their difficulties and divisions before 1988, their prospects for the presidential campaign would be gloomy. In these circumstances, the Carter years would appear even more starkly as a major turning point in American politics.

[1] 'A Party at War with itself', *Business Week*, 30 July 1984.

Cyprus: the UN tries again

ROBERT McDONALD

CYPRIOT attitudes towards the latest peace initiative of United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, fluctuate wildly—from resignation at its apparent futility to anticipation of a breakthrough as at Zurich and London in 1959. The initiative began tentatively with representatives of the two communities flying to Vienna at the beginning of August to receive so-called 'working points' from the Secretary-General amid acrimonious exchanges about the status of the delegates. The Greek Cypriots were to have sent their Foreign Minister but downgraded their representation to the level of Foreign Ministry Director-General when the Turkish Cypriots sent Necati Ertekun, who is styled as the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), declared last November in the Turkish-occupied northern region of the island, which the Greek Cypriots refuse to recognise.[1] But the initiative gathered momentum as Spyros Kyprianou, the Greek Cypriot President, and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, accompanied by top-level delegations flew to New York in September for 'proximity talks' with the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General cleared two days in his diary for separate sessions with the two leaders to see if enough common ground could be established for a high-level meeting—Cypriot parlance for a summit between the two community leaders.

The working points were supposed to have been kept strictly secret, but versions have appeared in the press which have an air of authenticity. In essence, they suggest that the two sides should consolidate the points on which they have agreed over the past decade of contacts with a view to forming as quickly as possible a transitional federal government, leaving details about the final powers of the central administration to joint technical working teams. This process would be accompanied by confidence-building measures such as a UN-supervised resettlement of the Varosha district of Famagusta by a maximum number of Greek Cypriot refugees and re-opening of Nicosia airport to both communities, and an end by both sides to measures likely to antagonise the other.

The approach appears to favour the Turkish Cypriot view that federal authority should evolve from the two existing regional administrations rather than the Greek Cypriot position that a strong central government of a unitary Republic should devolve power to the regions. But perhaps the fact that the

[1] For background, see Nancy Crawshaw, 'Cyprus: a failure in Western diplomacy', *The World Today*, February 1984.

Mr McDonald is a writer and broadcaster specialising in Greek, Cypriot and Turkish affairs. He is the author of *Pillar and Tinderbox: the Greek Press and the Dictatorship* (London: Marion Boyars, 1983). This article is based on a recent visit Mr McDonald paid to Cyprus.

scheme subtly emphasises federal authority and gives it priority will be sufficient to mollify the Greek Cypriots.

The gulf which, till now, has separated the two communities is profound. The Turkish Cypriots say they want equal, co-founder, partnership status in a bi-zonal and bi-communal state. They claim the Greek Cypriots refuse to treat them as equals but seek to restore them to the status of a minority. They argue that they were driven to declare independence in order to achieve an equal voice at the bargaining table and claim that the failure of the international community to recognise their micro-state is preventing this. They insist that the Greek Cypriots must abandon their insistence that theirs is the sole legitimate government of Cyprus. Until they do, the Turkish Cypriots insist that they are legally justified in maintaining the division of the island.[2]

The Greek Cypriot argument is that the division of the Republic is simply a consequence of an illegal Turkish occupation of the northern 34 per cent of the island.[3] They say that they are prepared to acknowledge equality of status of the Turkish Cypriots in negotiations but also say that this cannot presuppose an outcome whereby the Turkish Cypriot minority will acquire 50:50 representation thoughout a federal administration. They insist that they cannot abandon their claim to be the legitimate government of the Republic because it is their sole political and diplomatic counter to the continued presence of the 18,000 Turkish troops.[4] It is only by this means that they are able to apply leverage on the Turks in international institutions which they have done with great success at the UN and in the EEC, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and even technical bodies governing international transport, posts and communications. While the Greek Cypriots recognise their policy has contributed to the stalemate, they believe that it prevents the mainland Turks from occupying the whole of the island which many Greek Cypriots sincerely hold to be Turkey's ultimate goal.

The Turkish Cypriots advocate a federal state with a boundary which will preserve ethnic separation. They make a gesture towards the idea of integration through education of a new generation of Cypriots who might not think of themselves as Greeks or as Turks. To this end they propose the teaching of

[2] The Turkish Cypriots argue that the Greek Cypriots, in their efforts to achieve *enosis* in the years after independence in 1960, cut them out of the power-sharing constitution. After inter-communal fighting in 1963, they withdrew to enclaves under the protection of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) forming a Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration. This evolved, following the Turkish invasion in 1974, into the government of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris and was transformed last November into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

[3] The area of occupation is a question of dispute. The United Nations refers to 34 per cent of the area of Cyprus actually under Turkish domination with a further 3 per cent in the United Nations Buffer Zone. The Greek Cypriots talk of 36·4 per cent under occupation and refer to the loss of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic.

[4] Precise figures for the number of Turkish forces on the island are not available. At the time of the unilateral declaration of independence the figure usually quoted was 20,000, though the UN said it was closer to 18,000. In January this year, the Turks announced that they were withdrawing 1,500 troops as a gesture of goodwill. But the UN still estimates that there are some 18,000 Turkish troops on the island.

Greek and Turkish as a second language in schools, the establishment of a joint university and the development of contacts through cultural, scientific and sporting organisations. But, fundamentally, the Turkish Cypriots give every impression of wanting to maintain strict separation of the communities.

The Greek Cypriots are resigned to an island divided on ethnic lines. But they insist that any settlement must recognise three fundamental human rights: freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right of ownership of property. They argue that it is impossible to have a state with internal borders requiring some form of *laissez passez*. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has said that he 'concedes the principle' of freedom of movement and settlement—he has been less forthcoming about ownership of property—but has added that 'the special circumstances' must be taken into consideration. He has argued, for example, that unrestricted movement might permit former combatants of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot guerrilla organisations to confront one another again and thus foment renewed hostilities. In guidelines for negotiations agreed with Denktash in 1977, the late President, Archbishop Makarios, recognised 'certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community' in this regard but, as *ethnarch* he was probably the last Greek Cypriot leader who, politically, could have made concessions.

The Greek Cypriots claim that the Turkish Cypriots want to change the demographic character of the island by bringing in settlers from the mainland and by inducing Turkish military men to retire in the north through priority allocation of seized Greek Cypriot lands. The population remained largely static from the time of independence until 1974, with around 530,000 Greek Cypriots and 120,000 Turkish Cypriots. (Greek Cypriot estimates for the population in 1982 put the figures at 520,900 Greek Cypriots, 121,400 Turkish Cypriots and 3,200 others.) But Turkish Cypriot publications, to which the Greek Cypriots are prepared to give credence, put the present population of the north at 153,000 plus the mainland troops. The Greek Cypriots cite this as evidence of the Turkish Cypriots' intention to partition the island rather than to create a federation.

The Greek Cypriots have suggested complete demilitarisation, including the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, the 950-man Greek and 650-strong Turkish contingents stationed on the island under the Treaty of Alliance, the 10,000-man Greek Cypriot National Guard and the 4,500-strong Turkish Cypriot Security Force. They have recommended that these forces be replaced by an international force under the auspices of the UN. Initially the force could even be allocated certain police functions to satisfy both Turkish Cypriot security concerns and Ankara's arguments about Cyprus representing a threat to the mainland. The Turkish Cypriot reaction had been that they can accept no settlement which does not provide for a Turkish military guarantee. Mr Denktash points to the experience in Lebanon to illustrate how ineffective an international peacekeeping force can be if elements of the communities they are trying to police do not accept their presence. He argues that the Turkish army

came to Cyprus in 1974 in a perfectly legal peacekeeping operation under the Treaty of Guarantee. The draft of a new constitution for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus includes transitional provisions to 'regularise the cooperation' of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish forces.

Greek Cypriots believe that the federal tier of government should have substantial authority in matters such as foreign affairs, finance, security, communications, resources and federal justice[5] leaving the regional governments responsible for matters of communal interest such as education and social services. The Turkish Cypriots argue that initially the regions should be paramount in most matters with a constitution limiting the functions of the federal government to foreign affairs and reserve banking and such areas as tourism, posts and telecommunications, coordination of health and veterinary services and standards of weights and measures, copyrights, patents and trademarks.

The Greek Cypriots insist that the constitutional makeup of the federal government and administration must reflect, though not necessarily strictly adhere to, the 8:2 population ratio. For them, a concession is to have 7:3 representation in certain bodies. They insist on a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, with checks and balances to secure the Turkish Cypriot voice. But they are deeply concerned that there should be no restoration of the Turkish Cypriot veto which precipitated the effective collapse of the 1960 constitution.[6]

For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have demanded 50:50 participation at all levels of the administration and annual alternation of the Presidency. This position seems to have been relaxed in a submission on 15 June by Mr Ertekun to the Secretary-General to the effect that 'numerical equality in all organs is not sought', rather the two communities should have 'equal effectiveness' in the confederation.[7] The Secretary-General has noted that in the past the two communities had tentatively agreed on a bicameral legislature with a 7:3 ratio in the Lower House and equal representation in the Senate.

Thus it appears the divergence of views between the communities is almost total. Nevertheless the Secretary-General has soldiered on in his efforts for compromise. At the time of the 'declaration of independence' in November 1983 his representatives thought they were well advanced in laying the groundwork for a summit meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash. He immediately began contacts to see what might be salvaged from this course of action. The

[5] Spyros Kyprianou, 'Framework for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem', presented to the UN Secretary-General on 11 January 1984, Press Release No 1, Cyprus Press and Information Office, 4 May 1984.

[6] President Kyprianou has repeatedly said that if the Turkish Cypriots seek to justify the continued presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus under the Treaties of Guarantee associated with the 1960 Constitution, then they should accept the re-establishment of that Constitution and rejoin the Greek Cypriots in the government of a unitary state.

[7] 'The principle of equality—which is the basic factor between the partners in all federal models—should be the basis for the constitutional solution. Naturally, in the envisaged federated states, numerical equality in all the organs is not sought, but moved by the fundamental principle of political and legal equality, the sides should have equal effectiveness within the federal framework.' *Hurriyet* (Ankara), 5 August 1984.

Greek position has been that there can be no further contacts until independence is rescinded for fear that such contacts might be construed as recognition. The Secretary-General demanded a major goodwill gesture from the Turkish Cypriots sufficient to overcome such reluctance. Relinquishment of the Varosha district of the port of Famagusta has long been seen as the most obvious 'breakthrough' gesture: for a minimal territorial concession by the Turkish Cypriots nearly a fifth of all Greek Cypriot refugees would be allowed to return to their homes.[8] Mr Denktash, when he appeared before the Security Council on 17 November 1983 seeking to justify independence, had offered to hand back Varosha under what he claimed to be generous terms. He also recommended the re-opening of the Nicosia international airport under UN auspices. Mr Pérez de Cuéllar after further consultation with Mr Denktash and with Turkey's President, Kenan Evren, produced in February a new scenario calling for a high-level meeting and resumption of the intercommunal dialogue. As preconditions it said there should be no further efforts by the Greek Cypriots to internationalise the problem while the Turkish Cypriots should 'freeze' consolidation of their state. It demanded that there should be no qualititative or quantitative increase in military forces on the island and it spelled out a timetable for the transfer of Varosha to UN control: within two weeks of acceptance of the plan, a zone east of the Dherinia road would be transferred to the buffer zone and within six to nine months, the balance to the west would follow. The Secretary-General would maintain jurisdiction over the area until a final agreement and he would exercise controls over the process of resettlement. He left aside the issue of the airport.[9]

The Turkish Cypriot response was to declare dates for a constitutional referendum and elections and on 17 April to exchange ambassadors with Ankara. They argue that certain 'organic developments' flew logically from the declaration of independence which had nothing to do with the negotiating process. On April 18, Mr Denktash sent a letter to the Secretary-General which was patently unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots as it made the handover of Varosha conditional on the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the lifting of the economic embargo. It reiterated the demand for talks about re-opening the Nicosia airport.[10]

[8] The Ten-Point Agreement between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash of 19 May 1979, which both sides still accept as one the fundamental bases for negotiation, said that the conclusion of an agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices was a 'priority' consideration and that its implementation could be carried out without awaiting the outcome of other discussions.

[9] Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 544 (1983)', UN Security Council, S/16519, 1 May 1984.

[10] *ibid.*, Annex IV. Mr Denktash said that the sector east of the Dherinia road must first be the subject of a detailed agreement between the Secretary-General and the Turkish Cypriot authorities—implying formal UN recognition of the TRNC—and that Greek Cypriots could only begin to settle after a year in which the Greek Cypriot leadership ceased to represent itself abroad as the sole government of Cyprus and accepted joint representation in international fora. Simultaneously tourists were to be allowed to use Turkish and Greek airports and seaports of their choice. This would mean the lifting of all restrictions on the movements of tourists across the UN Buffer

The exasperated Greek Cypriots, more convinced than ever that the Turkish Cypriots were stalling for time until the international community recognised the existing situation, went, yet again, to the Security Council. Ideally, they sought a resolution containing sanctions but, realising that this would be vetoed either by the United States or Britain, they settled for one calling upon states not to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus nor 'to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity'.[11]

These actions severely increased tension on the island and there was a sense of foreboding as the country reached the 10th anniversary this July of the Greek-backed coup which toppled Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish invasion which then followed. There was a palpable feeling of relief when it was learned that the Secretary-General had launched his new initiative. The Turkish Cypriots postponed their referendum, though they claim that this was only for 'procedural' reasons. The Greek Cypriots have reduced their international efforts to isolate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

However, many Greek Cypriots believe that the Turkish Cypriots will not rescind independence unless they are forced to do so by outside pressure. They are convinced that the pressure must come from within Nato, the key countries being Britain and the United States. But the former continues to take a substantial portion of Turkish Cypriot imports and has frustrated Greek Cypriot attempts to prevent them gaining preferential access to European Community markets under the terms of the Republic's Association Agreement with the EEC. And the Reagan Administration (which abstained in the last Security Council vote) sees Turkey as a bulwark on the south-eastern flank of Nato—particularly when compared with the truculent Greek Socialist regime of Andreas Papandreou—which needs shoring up rather than penalising. Consequently, it has sought to countermand repeated attempts in Congress to cut Turkish military aid. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that efforts to cut aid are

---

Zone. Currently, the Greek Cypriots only allow those landing in the south to cross over into the north on a day pass on the ground that 'if people stay overnight they will be sleeping in stolen beds'. Once resettlement was under way, the Turkish Cypriots would consider putting the sector to the west of the Dherinia road under UN administration provided the Greek Cypriots lift 'all restrictive measures on the Turkish Cypriots in fields of trade, tourism, travel, transport, communication, foreign aid etc.' If the Greek Cypriots did not comply, then the entire area would revert to the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriots. These arrangements would last for five years and would lapse if there was no comprehensive settlement by then (though they could be extended by mutual consent) which perhaps says something about the Turkish Cypriot perspective on the negotiating process.

Mr Denktash repeated the demand for UN re-opening of Nicosia International Airport to 'civilian traffic . . . to the mutual benefit of the two sides'. This is somwhat bemusing since an airport capable of handling international flights is being constructed at Lefkoniko some 12 kilometres from Famagusta at a cost variously reported to be between $500m and $875m. Ostensibly, it is to serve tourist traffic, though some press reports have alleged that Turkish military aircraft will be stationed there and the runway made available to the American Central Command, formerly the Rapid Deployment Force. Also the viability of Lefkoniko as a civilian airport must be called into question so long as the Greek Cypriots are successful in persuading the International Civil Aviation Organisation to recognise only southern airports.

[11] Resolution 550, 11 May 1984.

counterproductive. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in March to withhold $215m in military aid to Turkey unless Ankara agreed that its army, which has physical control of Famagusta, should hand it over to UN control. Mr Denktash's tough letter to the Secretary-General is prefaced with a remark about this 'devastating decision' and implies a direct relationship between it and the hardening of the Turkish Cypriot position. On 8 August, the day after the Secretary-General's first round of contacts, the Sub-Committee of the Foreign Programs Appropriations Committee of the United States House of Representatives approved $540m in aid to Turkey instead of the $755m proposed by the Administration. The difference was said to represent the amount it takes to keep the Turkish forces in Cyprus. What effect this gesture might have on the latest initiative remains to be seen.

On the other hand, there was a welcome among the Turkish Cypriots for President Reagan's carrot in the form of a $250m peace and reconstruction fund, upon which the White House could draw if there was a 'fair and equitable solution' or if 'substantial progress is made to that end'. The Greek Cypriots disapprove, fearing that the fund may be used as a method of providing back-door support.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Cyprus situation is that, while the two communities remain deeply divided ethnically, politically they have cast a majority of votes for parties which favour resumed dialogue. In neither community, though, do these parties form the government. In the House of Representatives, President Kyprianou's Democratic Party is only third in strength, having 9 of the 35 seats, whereas Akel, the Moscow-line communist party, has 12 and the conservative Democratic Rally party of the former inter-communal negotiator, Glavkos Clerides, now has 11. In the February 1983 presidential election, however, Kyprianou ran with Akel support on the basis of a minimum programme agreed with them, and in consequence received a comfortable majority. In August 1983, when it looked as though President Kyprianou was baulking at taking up the Secretary-General's initiative, both the Communists and the conservatives arrayed themselves against him. And similar pressures—particularly from Akel—were applied to get him to accept the present initiative.

In the north, there is even more complex fragmentation. In the last elections in 1981, Mr Denktash narrowly won the race for the leadership of the community on the first ballot, taking 51 per cent of the vote. However, in the Assembly elections his National Unity Party (NUP) did poorly, taking only 18 of the 40 seats while the two left-wing opposition parties took 19: the socialist Communal Liberation Party (CLP) obtained 13 and the Marxist Republican Turkish Party (RTP) six seats. The National Unity Party formed a coalition with the Democratic People's Party (DPP) of Nejat Konuk,[12] and the Turkish Unity Party

[12] Konuk, now described as an independent, is the present 'Prime Minister'. He was appointed in December 1983 immediately after independence was proclaimed, when the evenly divided 40-member Legislative Assembly was abruptly increased by 30 additional members—of whom 10 were nominated personally by Denktash, and the remainder by various named organisations—and turned into a Constituent Assembly.

[UP) which represents mainland Turkish settlers. Both the CLP and the RTP pposed independence yet the vote on the declaration was unanimous. RTP :ader, Ozker Ozgur, has called it 'a vote of convenience'. According to him, to ave voted against would have been like trying to disembark from a plane which ad already taken off. Others, however, have suggested coercion.[13]

Ozgur says that he could not reverse independence but would seek to get to he negotiating table as soon as possible. He also says that the RTP has agreed vith the CLP, which also wants a return to negotiations, to form an alliance at he next election. Ozgur will stand down in favour of CLP leader, Ismail Boz-:urt. The alliance could command some 40 per cent of the popular vote if he last election's allegiances were sustained. This could be sufficient to un-eat Mr Denktash who is planning to run for a third term.[14] There has been some uggestion that this is why the referendum and the election have been post-›oned.

Inevitably, the failure of diplomatic efforts for a solution raises the spectre of ırmed confrontation. The Greek Cypriots have introduced a half-a-per-cent ax on salaries to help refurbish the National Guard. They claim that they have 1o intention of seeking a military solution and that this is merely to improve heir capacity to resist should the Turks decide to try to overrun the whole sland. They also deny press reports that 10,000 Greek regular forces have ›een secretly brought to the island. Greece's Prime Minister, Andreas Papan-lreou, who is also Defence Minister, has said that if there were to be further Tur-kish aggression on Cyprus, Greece would not just appeal to the UN. The im-›lication is that Greece would react militarily (though Mr Papandreou has on ›ther occasions acknowledged that Turkey could take the rest of Cyprus in 48 ıours). Such developments give added urgency to the Secretary-General's nitiative and make a successful outcome even more vital.

[13] 'In the week before the declaration signs that democratic processes might be circumvented in ›rder to facilitate UDI became quite marked. On 10 November a "Draft Law on the Extraordinary Situation", which provided for the banning of strikes, political meetings, "anti-social" publica-ıons, as well as widespread powers for the security forces in line with Turkish martial law provisions, vas rushed through the assembly virtually without debate. . . Within forty-eight hours of its ›assage both the CLP and the RTP, following a meeting with Mr Denktash, voted in favour of JDI. . . ' Kevin Watkins, 'Turkish Cypriot politics and UDI', *Friends of Cyprus Report*, No. 26, Summer 1984, pp. 10-11.

[14] Under the constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Denktash was entitled to stand for only two terms of office. But he argues that the constitution being created for the TRNC is ınother document entitling him to stand for a further two terms. The opposition have complained ›f Gaullist-style emergency powers proposed for the President in the draft text.

Free movement of persons in ECOWAS and Nigeria's expulsion of illegal aliens

JULIUS EMEKA OKOLO

ON 17 January 1983, Nigeria joined three other members of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States)—Ghana, Senegal and Sierra Leone—in the expulsion of illegal immigrants residing within the bounds of their territories. Nigeria's action was significant for three reasons: first, it affected a large number of people (estimated to be in millions) most of whom came from member-states of ECOWAS; second, it was the second act of alien expulsion (the first was the December 1982 expulsion of members of the Foulah community, mostly Guineans, by Sierra Leone) since the adoption of the Lagos Treaty that created ECOWAS in 1975; and third, Nigeria was the mainspring behind the formation of ECOWAS and ever since its guiding light and backbone. For these reasons many have argued that Nigeria's action has undermined ECOWAS and that the future progress of the Community towards integration and cooperation has been blocked.[1]

This article assesses the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons in the light of Nigeria's action. It consists of three parts. The first is a consideration of ECOWAS Treaty provisions on free movement of persons and the attendant protocol and an attempt at their interpretation. The second examines Nigeria's action in regard to its treaty obligations. The third and final part considers the implications of these factors for ECOWAS.

ECOWAS Treaty and free movement of persons

Within a customs area, there is generally in principle to be free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. In recognition of this principle, the ECOWAS treaty signed in Lagos in 1975 contains the only provision that touches the individual in the Community. The citizens of member-states are to be regarded as 'Community Citizens',[2] but the elimination of any obstacles (visitors visas, resident permits, etc.) to their freedom of movement

[1] For background, see Arthur Davies, 'Cost-benefit analysis within ECOWAS', *The World Today*, May 1983; and Julius Emeka Okolo, 'Securing West Africa: the ECOWAS defence pact', *ibid.*

[2] In May 1982, the ECOWAS Authority adopted a protocol which defined the term 'Community Citizen', and set out the procedure for the acquisition, loss, forfeiture and withdrawal of Community citizenship. See 'Protocol Relating to the Definition of Community Citizen', *Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS), English Edition, vol 4 (June 1982), pp. 21-3.

Dr Okolo is head of the Department of Political Science and Dean of the Postgraduate School at the University of Sokoto, Nigeria.

and residence and their desire to undertake commercial and industrial activities within the territory of another state is to be carried out by agreements between the governments concerned (Article 27). Between 1975 and 1978 no further action was taken by the ECOWAS Authority (the Community's highest decision-making body) on freedom of movement, except that the final communiqué of the April 1978 meeting in Lagos stated that the Authority had decided in principle to adopt a multilateral agreement on the free movement of persons within the Community and directed the Council of Ministers to propose a text to be considered at the next summit.[3]

At the May 1979 Dakar Summit, the Authority considered and signed a protocol on the 'Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment'.[4] In spite of its title, the protocol promised very little in terms of immediate action. It grants Community citizens the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of member-states, but it stipulates that free movement of persons will be achieved in three phases: first the right of entry and the abolition of visas, then the right of residence, and finally the right of establishment (Article 2 of the protocol). The three phases are to be spread over 15 years at five-year intervals. In the first phase, the Authority decided to remove visa requirements only in respect of Community citizens intending to stay for a maximum of 90 days in another member-state. Decision on the crucial matters of residence and establishment was postponed. The protocol merely stipulates that 'a phased programme for effecting the Right of Residence and Establishment should be drawn up, taking account of the effects on member-states of the abolition of visas during the first phase.'[5]

The ratification of the protocol made its first phase operative and it was to last until 1984. It meant, therefore, that from the moment of ratification ECOWAS citizens have a preferable right of entry to member-states and to move about freely within the Community for 90 days provided that they possess valid travel documents and international health certificates. Thus, until the second and third phases of the protocol are implemented no ECOWAS citizen is free to enter any member-state in contravention of its immigration laws. If he does enter legally, he is not free to reside and take up employment unless he follows the regular procedure prescribed by the host state's immigration laws.

Moreover, it is not every Community citizen that is allowed to visit or reside in any member-state, even if for 90 days, for a state has the right to refuse admission into its territory to any Community citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrants under its laws (Article 4 of the protocol). Additionally, those admitted do not have unlimited freedom to stay, for they cannot exercise rights higher than those allowed the citizens of their host countries. Thus, where for various reasons they are found to be undesirable, a deci-

[3] ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/1/21 Rev.I.

[4] Full text of the protocol is published in *Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS), English Edition, vol. 1 (June 1979), pp. 3–5.

[5] ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/II.1/Rev.I.

sion could be made either to expel them or to have them repatriated. If they are expelled, the member state is required to notify them, their government and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, bear the expenses incurred in the expulsion, guarantee their security and protect their property. If they are repatriated a similar notification requirement must be observed, except that the repatriated person or his or her government bears the cost of repatriation (Article 11 of the protocol).

What the protocol has done, in effect, is to abolish all discrimination based on nationality for all Community citizens. During the first phase (that is abolition of visas and right of entry) any Community citizen can legally enter any member-state of ECOWAS, unlike aliens coming from non-ECOWAS states. But he has no right to residence and establishment at this phase so that, like aliens from non-ECOWAS states, if he resides or takes up employment without the approval of immigration authorities of a host country his status changes from Community citizen to illegal alien. It is now pertinent to examine Nigeria's immigration laws in the light of the provisions of the protocol.

What Nigeria's immigration law says

As a member of ECOWAS, Nigeria is obliged to admit Community citizens into its territory for 90 days provided that they have valid travel documents and satisfy other requirements of its laws and regulations. The Nigerian Immigration Act of 1963 stipulates the conditions under which a Community citizen could lose the right to stay in the country after entry. First, he shall accept employment only with the consent in writing of the Chief Federal Immigration Officer and he shall not on his own account or in partnership with any other person, practise a profession or establish or take over any trade or business without the consent in writing of the Minister of Internal Affairs (Immigration Act 1963, section 8 (i)). Second, he shall not fall under the category of such prohibited immigrants as paupers, idiots, convicted criminals, prostitutes, etc. (Immigration Act of 1963, Section 17). And, third, he must not overstay the period of 90 days allowed by the ECOWAS protocol without further extension. In addition, he must not violate other entry conditions, for example, having a valid passport in his possession (Immigration Act of 1963, section 17 f (i)).

It follows, therefore, that Community citizens who violate any of these rules fall under the category of illegal aliens, and the Immigration Act of 1963 has stipulated methods of dealing with them. First, they face criminal prosecution in a court of law, and they are liable on summary conviction to a fine or imprisonment or both (Immigration Act of 1963, section 47 (1)). The court, once it is satisfied that the Community citizens have been found guilty of violating Nigeria's immigration laws and sentenced them to imprisonment, will make recommendation for their deportation (sections 47 (1), 20 (1) and 43). Second, the Minister of Internal Affairs may deport them when they have fallen under the category of prohibited immigrants (sections 18, 20 (1)). Third,

any police or immigration officer may arrest without warrant any person suspected to have committed any offence against the immigration law, and after summary trial and conviction the person may be deported to his home country.[6]

The immigration laws considered with the ECOWAS protocol show that while the first phase of the protocol which abolished visas for Community citizens has been implemented, it does not allow them to flout the immigration laws after entering a country. They are not entitled to take any employment or engage in business without first obtaining permission from the appropriate national authority. When they violate the immigration laws or stay beyond the period stipulated by the protocol, their status changes into that of illegal aliens, and they are dealt with under the local laws and regulations of their host country.

The Nigerian expulsion order

Since the end of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria has attracted immigrants from various parts of the world, particularly from neighbouring countries. The reasons for this are not hard to see. Economic prosperity ushered in by the oil boom gave Nigeria the image of a country flowing with milk and honey. The citizens of its less fortunate neighbours, particularly from the drought-ridden Sahelian countries and economically and politically distressed Ghana, looked toward Nigeria for their material improvement. What pushed the citizens of several of Nigeria's neighbours into seeking their fortunes in Nigeria was the relative peace and tranquillity and expectations of political stability in the country brought about by the return to civilian rule in 1979 on the one hand and the inadequate administrative or judicial machinery to protect the lives and property of citizens, high cost of living with very little employment opportunities, political instability, and the existence of a reign of terror among several of its neighbours on the other.

The opportunity came with Nigeria's ratification of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons coupled with the already existing relatively liberal Nigerian immigration policy.[7] By December 1982, Nigeria was overflowing with immigrants whose numbers were put at millions in the absence of accurate estimates. The Ghana Embassy in Lagos, for example, estimated Ghanaians to number more than 1 million. The then Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Ishaya Audu, put the figure at 2 m. Niger nationals were said to number more than 500,000, not to mention the nationals of such other ECOWAS states as Benin, Ivory Coast, Togo and Upper Volta.[8]

On 17 January 1983, Alhaji Ali Baba, the then Nigerian Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, ordered all unskilled foreigners residing and working illegally

[6] For a good summary of some legal aspects of the subject of this article, see R. C. Chhangani, 'ECOWAS and the Immigration Control', *Time International*, 26 January 1981, pp.13-15.

[7] See 'The problem of Alien Migration to Nigeria', *Time International*, 18 May 1981, p. 11.

[8] *West Africa*, 31 January 1983, p. 245.

to leave the country by 31 January. In effect, the unskilled illegal aliens from ECOWAS and other countries had exactly two weeks to leave the country; skilled persons were allowed to stay up to 28 February 1983. In the same order expelling the illegal immigrants, the Minister of Internal Affairs said that from 31 January security agents would inspect commercial and industrial establishments, as well as households, to identify contraveners of his order, and that those detected would be repatriated and their names put on a stop list to ensure that they did not return to Nigeria. All companies found to be illegally employing aliens would be severely dealt with under the immigration laws.[9]

Right to order expulsion

Plainly, Nigerian official views and those of its critics about the action are far apart. Their argument is about the ECOWAS protocol and Nigeria's immigration laws and regulations and ethical issues concerning the expulsion. The Nigerian government's position is that it was acting entirely within ECOWAS protocol since the free movement of persons has so far only been applied up to its first stage of 90-day visa-free entry. Having taken advantage of this provision, the argument continued, only an insignificant number of aliens who entered Nigeria and who were employed in the private sector possessed residence permits or were included in the approved expatriate quota. The vast majority were in violation of these provisions of the Immigration Act of 1963 which prohibits private-sector employment of non-Nigerians without the written consent of the Chief Federal Immigration Officer. 'This flagrant abuse of our laws can no longer be tolerated', Alhaji Ali Baba stated.[10]

Most critics did not dispute Nigeria's sovereign right to enforce the relevant ECOWAS protocol and its immigration laws but argued that the measures had been taken in bad faith because of Nigeria's serious economic problems. When the times were good, so the critics' argument ran, Nigeria accommodated all aliens—legal and illegal—but when the economic buoyancy vanished it looked for scapegoats and found them in the unskilled illegal immigrants who had been doing most of the low-paid menial jobs in Nigeria. The extension of the deadline for skilled aliens, they argued, was an avenue for many to regularise their situation. Moreover, foreign employees of federal and state governments and multi-national companies were exempted, permitting the retention of a large number of teachers, doctors, lawyers, accountants, pilots, engineers and other qualified personnel whose services were badly needed by Nigeria. By exempting foreign employees of federal and state institutions, the expulsion order allowed many Indians who were doing work that should be done by Nigerians to stay.[11]

The Nigerian position on these arguments was simply that the excessive number of immigrants was one of the causes of the country's social problems and that ECOWAS governments should understand Nigeria's predicament arising from its liberal immigration policy. It was pointed out, for

[9] *West Africa*, 31 January 1983, p. 245. [10] *ibid.* [11] *ibid.*

instance, that such illegal aliens as stayed beyond the 90 days allowed by the ECOWAS protocol without regularising their residence had either adopted the professions of begging, prostitution or established business or trade contrary to the Nigerian immigration laws. It was further argued that many were actually implicated in the recent Kano, Maiduguri and Kaduna disturbances in which the whole nation witnessed with dismay the wanton destruction of property and life. The government would not allow such unwholesome developments continually to plague the nation.[12] Approached from another angle, Nigeria's argument is tantamount to saying that its action was not only legally justified but was also socially expedient as a measure to ensure its integrity and promote internal peace and security.

Predictably, most Nigerians and the nation's news media welcomed the expulsion order. They hoped that the departure of the aliens would open up more job opportunities for unemployed Nigerians. One magazine had, for example, estimated that the ratio of alien workers to Nigerians in all construction companies was eight to two.[13] To the argument advanced by some local employees that the unskilled aliens did mainly menial jobs, which Nigerians would not want to touch, many jobless workers replied that they were not given a chance to compete for such jobs. Those jobs were offered to aliens who accepted them at considerably lower wages and poor working conditions which they still considered better than the hard life they led back home.

Be that as it may, from 17 January 1983 till well after the expiry of the deadlines, Nigerian sea and airports were teeming with thousands of illegal aliens who had been forced to go home. The battle to keep them out of Nigeria is still going on. Nigerian news media keep reporting that those who had left still manage to find their way back to the country, thereby showing the continued attraction Nigeria's labour market has for many of them.

The lessons from the expulsions

An important question which preoccupies many people is what the implications of Nigeria's action will be for ECOWAS. Has Nigeria not taken back with one hand what it gave with another, thus setting the stage for the demise of an organisation it had worked so hard to establish? A further question is whether the Francophone states, which have been moving rather slowly in making progress in ECOWAS, seize this opportunity and start building their smaller regional organisations, at the expense of the larger Community? Will the disaffection and frustration felt by those member-states whose citizens were by and large the major victims of Nigeria's action not lead to a withdrawal of support for ECOWAS? In short, has the economic and political bases of ECOWAS not been shaken to its very foundation?

Some critics of Nigeria's action argue that 'there is some serious fence-mending to be done by Nigeria'[14] for this 'barbarism hitherto unknown in

[12] *ibid.* [13] *Time International*, 31 January 1983, p. 4.
[14] *West Africa*, 31 January 1983, p. 243.

Africa'[15] to restore its credibility as a force to be reckoned with in ECOWAS. Such suggestions run the risk of obscuring the real lessons to be learned from Nigeria's action and are doomed to failure.

This writer sees two scenarios as the most likely. Disintegration of ECOWAS is not one of them. The first is that the Community will weather the storm. Nigeria's neighbours, after an initial show of concern, displayed a good deal of understanding. Secretary of Ghana's Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), Dr Obed Asamoah, for instance, stated that 'the global economic situation is such that no country will allow large numbers of foreign nationals living illegally on its economy.'[16] Moreover, a number of ECOWAS officials —the then outgoing Chairman of the Authority, Mathieu Kerekou, Executive Secretary Diaby-Quattara, and Deputy Secretary Jonas Nti— defended Nigeria's action, pointing out that since only the first phase of ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons has been implemented, Nigeria had the right to expel all violators of the rule.[17]

The second scenario involves a close look at Nigeria's position in ECOWAS. The country's interest in the Community has not been doubted: its role in its creation has been well documented.[18] That its economic and military muscle as well as diplomatic and political support are vital for the survival of ECOWAS is also not disputed. In short, its position as leader remains unchallenged. It may well be that it now has the obligation to do more to steer ECOWAS towards further cooperation and integration.

Nigeria has been waging a battle against crime. With a considerable number of illegal aliens implicated in several criminal offences, its government needed to maintain its credibility at home by assuring its citizens that their interest was not submerged in the Community. In this regard, a Nigerian observer had remarked that 'if the influx into Nigeria continues and it becomes clear that Nigeria is merely paying the ECOWAS piper without knowing what tune to call, this is likely further to weaken the already weak domestic support for the Community.'[19] In other words, there was an apparent realisation by Nigerian leaders that any regional policy, no matter how sound it might be, which they pursued without maximum support from its people, was bound to fail.

It is noteworthy that free movement of persons is the only widely known aspect of ECOWAS and that little achievement had been made in other

[15] There was a reaction to the expulsion order by *Jeune Afrique* in Paris cited in *West Africa*, 14 February 1983, p. 389. This reaction was out of touch with recent African history, or else it should have recalled other expulsions in West Africa mentioned earlier and Ghana's expulsion of over 200,000 Nigerians in 1969. It should also have recalled the massive expulsion of Ugandan Asians by the then President Idi Amin in 1972.

[16] *West Africa*, 31 January 1983, p. 243.

[17] *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), 29 January 1983 and 19 February 1983, and *Sunday Times* (Lagos), 6 February 1983.

[18] Olantunde J. B. Ojo, 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS', *International Organization*, vol. 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 571–604.

[19] A. Gambari, 'ECOWAS: Time for National Appraisal', *Daily Times* (Lagos), 6 May 1978.

tors. For this reason, the Authority in May 1982 decided to adopt a public lightenment programme to 'disseminate the results of the different activities of the Community as well as the progress made in the implementation the integration measures taken by the Authority'. This would be done ough the use of a periodical and ECOWAS clubs throughout the Community.[20] Nigeria's expulsion of illegal aliens may help to focus attention on ne of the basic issues facing the Community, such as the inability of some embers to pay up their contributions on time, the foot-dragging by embers in the ratification of a number of protocols, and the slow pace the attainment of the goal of trade liberalisation and common external riffs. It may be argued that in both scenarios depicted above a lot of politics is involved, but integrative regionalism is an exercise in political economy in which progress to a large extent depends on skilful political management.

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that economic unions in developing countries are noted for internal wranglings. Each member-state seeks to maximise advantages from the union no matter how limited its contribution may be. Nigeria's illegal aliens expulsion order has placed ECOWAS in this category, and there has since been speculation that the Community was failing or even collapsing.

This rhetoric ignores the simple fact that ECOWAS is probably the single most potentially successful integrative enterprise among the developing countries, particularly in the African continent. It has brought together the largest integrating grouping in the world in terms of countries which are members.[21]

Consider the history of efforts at creating an economic union among West African states since independence was achieved. In the mid-1960s, special meetings were called by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to discuss the projected economic association and to sign an article of association. Yet, for nearly a decade thereafter, no action was taken. Happily, however, by 1975 the Treaty of Lagos which created ECOWAS had brought the world's most diverse peoples in terms of colonial history and experiences and ethnic and cultural differences into a projected zone of economic prosperity and social peace. This remarkable achievement is now taken for granted. No one who recalls the region's pre-colonial and, especially, post-colonial history can fail to acknowledge the magnitude of this accomplishment.

However, the accomplishment notwithstanding, the fact that the ECOWAS member-states today have broadly the same interests and common objectives does not mean that they will, as one proverb puts it, watch their children collect rats while their houses burn, in order to maintain the Com-

[20] *Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS), English Edition, vol. 4 (June 1982), p. 56.

[21] Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), *Development of the Community—The First Five Years 1977-1981* (Lagos, 1981), p. 18.

munity. There is no reason why member-states cannot insist on strict observance of the provisions of ECOWAS treaty and protocol on free movement of persons along with their domestic immigration laws and regulations. No reason, that is, unless one or more ECOWAS country is foolish enough to maintain that condoning the illegal behaviour of Community citizens is a precondition to or a test of regional solidarity.

Refugee repatriation in Africa

ROBERT GORMAN

THE international community widely recognises voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to refugee situations. However, it is also generally observed among those in the international community who are concerned with refugee problems, that the prospect for voluntary repatriation in many, even most, African refugee situations is not bright. Indeed, the root causes of refugee flight are thought by some to be so intractable throughout Africa that the option of voluntary repatriation is ruled out as a genuine potential solution.

It is easy to be pessimistic about the prospects for voluntary repatriation throughout Africa. Many countries of first asylum there have acted as host to refugee populations for several years already. Some grow restive under the burden that refugees have imposed on their economic and social structures. Throughout the continent, the pressures of drought, economic deterioration and political conflict add to the burdens placed on refugees and their hosts. Regrettably, in some instances the latter have resorted to forcible repatriation.

On the more positive side, governments are searching for durable solutions to the refugee problem. Some have tried to integrate refugees locally. Finally, despite pessimism that it can be realised in any major way, voluntary repatriation remains an option that can be attractive and feasible under some circumstances.

The background

The history of Africa suggests that voluntary repatriation has been a feasible solution to a variety of refugee problems in the past decade. In the past 10

The author, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Texas State University, is currently on leave from his university doing research under a Ford Foundation grant as a Visiting Scholar at Africare, an American voluntary agency involved in refugee and development work. This article, a version of a talk he gave earlier this year at the Oxford Symposium on Refugees in Africa, was written while he was a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow in the United States Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programmes. The views expressed in it are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the American government.

years, about 1·2 million refugees have voluntarily repatriated. The list is a long and varied one. In the wake of Portugal's withdrawal from its former colonies in 1975, 45,000 refugees returned to Guinea-Bissau, 300,000 to Angola and 84,000 to Mozambique. In 1978, 150,000 Zaireans returned home from Angola after the resolution of the Shaba province problem. In the following year, 50,000 Angolans returned from Zaire. Uganda also received back 30,000 repatriates in the wake of Amin's fall from power in 1979. Some 30,000 refugees went back to Equatorial Guinea in the same year. About 250,000 refugees trekked back to their homelands in Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House agreement and the end of the civil war in that country. In Chad, 150,000 refugees returned home after the temporary resolution of the civil war.

Voluntary repatriation, then, should not be ignored as one possible solution to many of the refugee situations that face Africa today. But a word of caution is in order, for repatriation has a Janus-faced quality: it can be the best solution when voluntary and the worst when involuntary. Voluntary repatriation can be pursued over-zealously by countries of asylum, only at the risk that it will become involuntary. Still, an eye can and should be kept open to opportunities where voluntary repatriation can be cautiously explored and properly implemented.

Before proceeding with a specific analysis of the prospects for voluntary repatriation in Africa, it is important to consider, if only in a brief and introductory way, some of the key realities of international law respecting asylum, for the whole debate on whether various recent repatriation efforts in Africa have been voluntary or involuntary and legal or illegal rests on a clear understanding of them.

Asylum in international law

While much progress has been made in the period since the Second World War to protect refugees, provide assistance to them and construct a body of humanitarian law and practice which is advantageous to them, it is still the state and not the individual that is in control of asylum policies and practices. Various legal instruments, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol which broadened the definition of refugee and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, accord individuals the right to seek and receive asylum. But this right is circumscribed by the asylum policies of states. Indeed, no state has a duty to grant asylum where individuals cannot substantiate their claims to refugee status.

Happily for refugees, the African states have adopted rather open policies of temporary asylum in keeping with the principle of the OAU Convention referred to above that the extension of refugee status is a peaceful act. But African states retain the right to revise their asylum policies, should they wish to make them more restrictive. Although the African definition of a refugee has been a liberal one which recognises that refugees may have other than

strictly political motives for flight, there is no legal principle which binds them forever to such an interpretation. Indeed, it is clear that not every person who crosses international boundaries in Africa is a political refugee in the strictest sense of the term. Many are economic migrants, victims of drought, or seekers of a temporary haven from either a man-made or natural cataclysm. Indeed, whether for good or ill, there are signs that many African countries will begin to distinguish between the motives for flight in the application of their asylum policy and in the granting of refugee status.

What is clear under international law is that any state which grants asylum to a refugee has a solemn obligation to respect the principle of non-forcible return, or *non-refoulement*. Whether we like it or not, however, states have the ultimate authority to determine who is a refugee eligible for asylum and thereby protected under the principle of non-refoulement. For those who do not qualify as refugees, the state has an attendant right to deport them as illegal immigrants. In making a decision as to who is a refugee and who is an illegal immigrant, the state owes the claimants, morally and in most cases legally, a fair hearing. Where states fall short of their moral or legal obligations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) may investigate the state's asylum policies and world opinion may be galvanised to press for acceptable reforms.

In all of this, persons who claim to be refugees remain largely objects. Their fate is at the mercy of the goodwill of states. On the other hand, those who eventually gain refugee status clearly have more rights, and fall under the protective umbrella of the UNHCR. Still, in a world that is heartless enough to produce refugees in the first place, even those who obtain refugee status are occasionally refouled, while the international community protests in vain. Until the day when the individual becomes a true subject of international law, rather than a passive object, such unfortunate incidents will continue to occur without truly adequate means of redress.

African nations have for the most part maintained asylum practices which have been favourable to people who have taken flight across international boundaries. The past hospitality of African states has been all the more striking in contrast to the less humane policies we have seen employed at times in Asia. Indeed, refugees in Africa have been insulated from some of the starker realities of the international legal order by virtue of that hospitality. But as African countries face greater hardship, their liberal and open practices of asylum may become casualties of an effort to alleviate the burdens carried by host country nationals.

Voluntary repatriation in Africa

In Africa, as elsewhere, the key actors in the process of voluntary repatriation are the host country, the country of origin, the UNHCR, private voluntary organisations (PVOs), the refugees and various third parties, including donor countries. The prospects for voluntary repatriation in any particular circumstance depend on the motives and policies of each of these actors. Ultimately,

the most important actors are the refugees themselves, who must decide freely to repatriate. The decision of refugees to repatriate depends to a large extent on their perception of the attractiveness of return in comparison to other options. Refugee perceptions of the state of economic and physical security in their country of origin play a large role in this regard. In turn, these perceptions are affected by the refugees' initial reasons for flight. What the country of origin and host country, as well as the UNHCR, do to alleviate these concerns can either lay the groundwork for eventual voluntary repatriation, or promote suspicion that will get in the way of it. Generally speaking, voluntary repatriation is only possible when the country of origin, the country of asylum, the UNHCR and the refugees desire to pursue it as a genuine option.

It is useful to make a distinction between two types of circumstances which may give rise to spontaneous repatriation or permit a planned voluntary repatriation effort to be explored. The first set of conditions that permit voluntary repatriation involves a clearcut political or military change which eliminates the root causes that initially prompted refugee flight. This might involve the end of a colonial war and attainment of national independence, the end of a civil war, or a change in government. These are all easily identified changes of national proportion which could promote voluntary repatriation among refugees. A number of the examples of repatriation in Africa cited above fall into this general category. Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Algeria experienced voluntary repatriation at the end of their wars of national liberation; Uganda after the fall of Amin; and Zimbabwe at the termination of its civil war.

A second type of repatriation can occur under far less dramatic, yet still propitious circumstances, for example when sufficient changes occur in regional conditions so as to allow for the safety of returnees. Under these circumstances, no major national event may have occurred that would highlight the prospects for return. Rather, the emphasis is on regional developments. It is essential, however, that the government of the country of origin see such regional voluntary repatriation as a desirable thing. It should be noted here that such regional return need not be dependent on country-wide stability. If refugees are convinced that they can return safely to their own homes, instability in other regions of the same country may be seen as only a remote disincentive to repatriation. The most obvious example of this type of repatriation is the case of Djibouti. A similar situation has existed in the Arua district of the West Nile in Uganda where about 15,000 refugees have returned home from Zaire over the past year.

It is clear that repatriation under the second set of circumstances, which I will henceforth refer to as Type B repatriation, is more complicated and difficult to achieve than under the first set of circumstances which I will call Type A repatriation. The reasons for this are numerous. First, refugees' perceptions of possibilities for return may not correspond with the actual prospects. In such cases it is necessary to devise means by which refugees can see for themselves

the possibilities in order to reach a more informed decision. Confidence building measures, such as those employed in Djibouti, including refugee delegation tours of potential returnee resettlement sites, guarantees of safety by country-of-origin officials and other figures respected by refugees, and development of attractive assistance packages for returnees may be necessary to arouse refugee interest in possible repatriation.

Second, strong political and personal opposition to Type B repatriation is much more likely than in the case of Type A repatriation. In the absence of a clearcut change in government, many refugees who genuinely fear political persecution or conditions of insecurity at the hands of or out of the control of the government in their country of origin, will resist efforts to promote repatriation on political grounds and for fear that successful repatriation by others may undercut their own asylum claims. The latter, of course, is a valid concern only if one assumes that all refugees have fled a country for fear of political persecution. In reality, some do and some do not. Most governments, the UNHCR and other agencies understand this. Nevertheless, where a government has a history of incidents of forced repatriation, talk of voluntary repatriation can set off waves of rumours among refugees who may assume that a conspiracy is afoot to return them involuntarily. Such was the case in Djibouti, where many of the urban, genuinely political refugees panicked at the prospect of a 'so-called' voluntary repatriation programme to Ethiopia, and where many of them resorted to the exaggerated claims that all refugees had fled Ethiopia on political grounds alone and that none would be willing to repatriate voluntarily. The panic in this case was real enough—indeed, many urban refugees in Djibouti fled to Somalia and other countries in an effort to escape what they feared would be forcible repatriation to Ethiopia—but the previously mentioned claims made by some refugees have not been substantiated.

Third, because of the controversial nature of Type B repatriation programmes, it is important to assure the longer term safety of returnees. Unfortunately, the protection mandate of the UNHCR does not formally extend to returnees. In practice, the UNHCR has an informal monitoring capacity during the life of returnee movements, but it has no legal protection authority. In practice, voluntary agencies often help to implement returnee programmes, and can serve as important monitoring agents not only in the receiving country but in the sending country as well.

Donor countries, as well, are concerned that such programmes remain voluntary in character. Diplomatic reporting is another avenue whereby such programmes can be monitored to ensure that they remain voluntary. If after returnees have returned, they should flee the country once again, *prima facie* evidence exists that a programme is flawed. Such an indicator is one that all monitoring agencies must look for carefully.

Finally, before moving to a consideration of problems that can arise in the mechanics of repatriation programmes, it should be noted that Type A and Type B repatriations can be either spontaneous or planned. More often than not they tend to be both.

Those who have been in the refugee business, often speak of 'magnet' effects or of 'push' and 'pull' factors that contribute to refugee decisions to move. Under ideal circumstances, spontaneous repatriation occurs because conditions in the country of origin have become attractive enough to encourage return. These constitute pull factors. But countries of asylum can also create conditions which encourage refugees to leave, including reductions in refugee food rations, restrictions in movement and in access to social services, employment, business and professional licenses and assignment to marginal agricultural land and other forms of subtle persuasion and not-so-subtle harassment. These are the push factors. Some are more legitimate than others in an effort to stimulate spontaneous repatriation. In some cases it may be very appropriate to reduce food rations, particularly where they may have been so attractive as to discourage efforts to achieve lasting solutions. Nevertheless, this is a ticklish business, and refugees often interpret it as an effort by the UNHCR and host country to 'starve them out'.

Other push factors, such as attempts to conscript refugees into the armed service of the host country, are clearly without legal justification. Often, however, all it takes is rumours of such a policy, and refugees may take flight. In such cases, spontaneous repatriation may not always be clearly voluntary.

Finally, it should be noted that local settlement efforts can promote spontaneous repatriation under certain circumstances. This is especially true in those cases where pastoralists who want no part of the sedentary life that would await them in agricultural settlements may choose instead to resume their nomadic ways. In such cases, spontaneous repatriation can be a wholly unintended by-product of the search for a different lasting solution.

Key problems of planned repatriation

In planned voluntary repatriation movements, one can identify three main stages: identification of returnees, movement of returnees and reintegration of returnees into the country of origin. At each of these stages, logistical and protection problems can arise. The first stage, identification of returnees, which falls primarily to the UNHCR, can involve a host of potential protection and screening problems. The key problem is to determine whether the individual candidates for return have made a free decision. UNHCR protection officers operate under guidelines which promote free choice, and are trained to identify signs of hesitancy or indecision. Where the UNHCR is involved, every effort is made to encourage genuine voluntary decisions. Moreover, where weaknesses appear in its programmes, they will usually come to the attention of voluntary agencies or donor governments, and be corrected. There is little doubt, especially in very large repatriation programmes, that some individuals will 'slip through the cracks' and be involuntarily repatriated. Fortunately, there tends to be only a small number of such cases.

Other questions can arise in the identification of potential returnees. For instance, in Djibouti, heads of families were consulted regarding the desire to return. Individual interviews with each family or clan member were not conducted. Although there is some room for abuse in this practice, in reality

many of the so-called rural refugees in Djibouti made clan decisions to fl[illegible] from Ethiopia in the first place, and it is not at all out of place for them to mak[illegible] similar decisions to return.

In the movement of returnees to their country of origin, logistical problem[illegible] are more prevalent than protection ones, although the latter are not insig[illegible]nificant. Typically, the movement of returnees is done in stages. Dependin[illegible] on the circumstances they may be assembled first at border crossing point[illegible] in the country of asylum, and then transported by available means to reception centres in the country of origin, or they may be transported directly from existing refugee camps to the reception centres. From the reception centres or transit stations, they are resettled permanently in the country of origin. However, if insufficient planning has been done to facilitate smooth transit and settlement, the returnee 'pipeline' can be easily choked. In Djibouti the returnee programme was plagued by inadequate preparation for resettlement even before the attacks on the Djibouti–Addis rail line early this year. Animals and building material for housing that had been promised to returnees were slow in arriving. The returnees refused to leave the reception centres which quickly became overcrowded, thus delaying further movements.

As with any movement of large numbers of people, whether unplanned movements of refugees, or planned movements of returnees, there will always be some difficulties that will arise regarding the receiving country's ability to absorb new arrivals. It is important, then, that sufficient resources are made available to assist countries of return with repatriates. Donor countries need to be sensitive to the fact that returnees are often in as great a need of assistance as refugees.

However, the circumstances that surround repatriation are rarely as dramatic as those that obtain when massive outflows of refugees occur. In comparison to the latter, the needs of returnees can be easily overlooked. It is encouraging, then, that the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, held in Geneva this past summer, focused on the impact of both refugees and returnees on the economic and social infrastructure of receiving countries. Donor countries should be prepared to follow up the work of this conference with appropriate assistance to receiving countries and to the returnees themselves.

The final stage of the repatriation process is the full integration of returnees into the life their country of origin. Although not an easy task, this constitutes the ultimate stage in the voluntary repatriation process and the most desirable outcome of any refugee situation. It is a goal that is well worth pursuing. But integration is neither easily achieved nor without trauma for returnees or the local population. Indeed, that hardship may await returnees in their home country cannot be denied—hardship being a common phenomenon throughout Africa today. But hardship at home, especially if it can be ameliorated through international assistance, may be far preferable to the hardship that they faced as refugees and strangers away from home. Still, there is an additional need for the international community to be assured that

political persecution and harassment are not among the hardships returnees face. Thus, especially in Type B repatriation, it is important for some degree of follow-up monitoring of the status and well-being of returnees. As noted before, the UNHCR has no mandate to do this, but voluntary agencies and the diplomatic community have some capacity to do so. It is important that they be seized with an awareness of this need, and that they take steps to ensure that the status of returnees is not simply ignored—especially in the first year or so after their return, which is such a critical time to successful integration.

Recent trends

The prospects for voluntary repatriation in Africa seem mixed. On the one hand, there has been a recent and worrying rash of involuntary repatriation in the southern tier of the continent. On the other hand, there has also been a marked increase in the past year in the degree of spontaneous repatriation, particularly in the case of Somalia. Some spontaneous repatriation is also occurring from Haut Zaire to the Arua district in Uganda and from Tanzania to Burundi. This is a somewhat more hopeful sign, suggesting that some refugees are returning to a more normal existence. In other instances, the prospects for voluntary repatriation also remain alive. A number of countries have openly invited refugees to return home—including Zaire, Zimbabwe and Angola. Not all refugees from these countries are convinced that they can safely return, but some may seize the opportunity presented.

On the whole, however, it is probably safe to predict that most of the refugees in Africa will be refugees for yet a number of years. Moreover, as the combined effects of drought and civil strife in a host of African countries continue, the prospect that even more refugees will be generated in the future is a real one. They may very well outnumber those who opt for voluntary repatriation over the next few years, leaving Africa with even more refugees than it has now. Hence, it is all the more important that refugees, African countries and the international community at large continue to explore creative solutions to refugee problems as the opportunities arise. In so doing, they should not rule out active approaches to repatriation, so long as they are pursued in a genuine spirit of voluntarism.

PRINTED BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

Notes of the month

ISRAEL'S GENERAL ELECTION

On 14 September, some seven weeks after the inconclusive outcome of the general election of 23 July, Shimon Peres, the Labour Party leader, presented his government of national unity to Israel's parliament, the Knesset. The new Cabinet was the product of protracted negotiations which took place against a background of mounting economic crisis. The twin evils of run-away inflation and a burgeoning budget deficit are the central issues to which the new administration must address itself. In a Cabinet marked by profound ideological differences, the pressing need to impose some form of order in the economic sphere is the overriding priority, beside which many other divisive issues must be held in abeyance.

The general election was precipitated by the departure of the three members of the small Tami party from the right-wing governing coalition of the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir.[1] The atmosphere of the campaign was relatively restrained, in marked contrast to the disturbances and tension that had intruded into the previous contest in 1981. Many external observers argued that the voters were being offered a stark choice between, on the one hand, a vision of society where the nationalist-religious ethos predominated and, on the other, a state characterised by a more secular and pragmatic outlook. The majority of the electorate did not view the contest in these cataclysmic terms; it seemed to take greater note of day-to-day economic interests. But the theme of two competing visions of the Zionist project was highlighted during the early weeks of the campaign by the uncovering of a Jewish terrorist conspiracy, allegedly involving many of the central figures in the Gush Emunim movement, the spearhead of the religious settlement drive on the West Bank.

The campaign was punctuated by labour disputes, with the outgoing Shamir government resorting to 'election economics' to try to buy some calm. The Bank of Israel's annual report for 1983, published during early June, laid much of the blame for the nation's economic ills on the shoulders of former Finance Minister, Yoram Aridor. It also stressed the heavy cost of the continuing occupation of Lebanon.

Opinion polls throughout the campaign indicated a high percentage of undecided or floating voters. Thus each of the two main blocs, Peres's Labour Alignment and Shamir's Likud, sought to appeal to the middle ground, tempering the more strident voices in each camp. In this way, both blocs laid themselves open to being outflanked by more extreme forces. By mid-July, opinion polls were indicating an eleven- or twelve-seat lead for the Alignment over Likud. Prime Minister Shamir was quick to focus his pre-election call on a demand for a national unity government. Despite indications of an

[1] For background, see Avi Shlaim's Note, 'Israel under Shamir', *The World Today*, April 1984.

Alignment victory, it remained clear that the minor parties would agai[n] play a crucial role as king-makers in the political system. One voice was absen[t] from the campaign: that of the former Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, who remained in seclusion throughout the campaign.

The election results indicated signs of a growing fragmentation within the electorate. No fewer than 15 of the 26 slates of candidates that were present on the ballot papers overcame the 1 per cent hurdle and gained representation in the Knesset.[2] The outgoing Parliament had only 10 party lists represented. The Labour Alignment lost three seats and the Likud bloc seven, but these setbacks were to some extent compensated by gains among their potential political allies. Broadly speaking, the religious parties obtained 13 seats in the new Knesset (the same as in 1981), but these seats were now divided among five and not, as before, three competing lists.

The pattern of ethnic voting among the Jewish electorate observed during the last two general elections, with voters from Oriental and European backgrounds displaying markedly different patterns of voting, was again manifest this year. Indeed, July's results indicate a reinforcement of this trend among the 'secular' parties and an extension of the phenomenon into the religious community.[3] The turnout among Arab voters was 77 per cent, compared with 68 per cent in 1981. For the first time ever, a majority of Arab and Druze voters cast their ballots for anti-Zionist parties. The Progressive List for Peace (PLP) and the predominantely communist list, Hadash, took about 52 per cent of the Arab vote. Under PLP's onslaught the Labour Alignment's share of the Arab vote fell by over 6 per cent, and the communists' share dropped from 37 per cent to 34 per cent.[4]

The election results indicated that it would prove extremely difficult for either of the two big blocs to form a coalition government. The election had produced a stalemate; only through the formation of a broadly based government of national unity could the politicians seek a way out of the impasse into which the elections had led and postpone a return to the ballot box. Mindful of the need for prompt action to rescue the economy, President Herzog initiated the search for a new government by calling upon Labour's leader, Peres, to attempt to form a cabinet. The President stressed the magnitude of the internal difficulties facing the country and, urging a quest for unity, left little doubt as to his own preference for a national government. The Labour leader began

[2] With a turn-out of some 78·8 per cent, the number of seats obtained by each party was: Labour Alignment 44; Likud 41; Tehiya-Tzomet 5; National Religious Party 4; Hadash 4; Shas (Sephardi Tora Guardians) 4; Shinui (centre-left) 3; Citizens' Rights Movement 3; Yahad 3; Progressive List for Peace (extreme-left) 2; Agudat Yisrael 2; Morasha 2; Tami 1; Ometz 1; Kach 1 (*The Jerusalem Post*, 1 August 1984).

[3] Some 70 per cent of Likud supporters are of Oriental origin and a similar proportion of Alignment supporters are European in background. Tami is an ethnic Sephardi party, a break-away from the National Religious Party. Tami and Shas, the two Sephardi religious forces took some 60 per cent of the Oriental religious vote.

[4] There are now seven Arab or Druze Members of the Knesset, two on the Labour list, one Likud, one Shinui, two Communists, one PLP. There were five in the outgoing Parliament.

talks with the outgoing Prime Minister, Shamir. At the same time, both leaders conducted parallel negotiations with the smaller parties, seeking to form more partisan coalitions. Likud's hopes were dashed when, one month after the election, the Yahad Party of the former Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman, signed a pact with Labour. A narrow coalition headed by Shamir was impossible. But so was one led by Peres.

After lengthy negotiations, the party leaders agreed on the formation of a national unity government to see out the mandate of the eleventh Knesset. New elections are now due in the autumn of 1985.[5]

Once the ballot papers had been counted, Israel's voters counted the economic costs of the campaign. 'Election economics' had greatly added to the nation's deficit. In July, the foreign currency reserves fell by over $351 million, to stand at just over $2·6 billion, enough to finance only some two months' worth of imports. The reserves have continued to fall since then.

The required economic measures were clear to all, but the big question was whether any government was capable of seeing through the harsh austerity package that was needed. While the politicians talked, the economic situation worsened, prompting the Governor of the Bank of Israel, Moshe Mandelbaum, to warn that economic steps could no longer wait. August wage packets contained a 9·9 per cent cost of living increment, compensating for a rise in the consumer price index of 12·4 per cent. This represented an annual rate of inflation of nearly 400 per cent.

The new government immediately devalued the Israeli shekel by 9 per cent, raised petrol prices and introduced a variety of other interim measures. The centrepiece of the national unity government's economic policy is to be an austerity programme of about $1 billion worth of cuts by the spending ministries. At the same time, there will be a concerted attempt to reach a wages and prices agreements with employers and the trade union federation, the Histadrut. However, the immediate impact of government measures will be to push up the inflation rate. This will make it more difficult to achieve wage restraint. Short-term salvation is likely to be found in the payment of the 1984/85 American aid package in a single lump sum.

The new administration seems to be moving steadily towards extricating Israel's forces from the Lebanese quagmire. The parties' election platforms indicated a difference in time-scale. Labour said it would seek to withdraw Israeli forces within three to six months, whilst making adequate provision for the security of Israel's northern settlements by strengthening the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and possibly extending the deployment in Southern Lebanon of Unifil (the United Nations Interim Force). Likud's proposals were more vague. The national unity government has renounced Israel's prior call for a Syrian pullback and hopes to be ready to withdraw Israeli forces within a matter of months. However, recent incidents have cast doubts on the discipline

[5] The national unity government embraces ministers from the Labour Party, the Likud bloc, Natonal Religious Party, Ometz, Yahad, Shas and Shinui. Peres was to be Prime Minister and Shamir Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. These two will rotate after 25 months.

and motivation of the expanded SLA and continue to underline the necessity for at least some tacit understanding between Israel and the Shiite's Amal leadership.

The question of future settlements on the West Bank is a potentially divisive issue within the new unity government. Likud favours the development of settlements throughout Judea and Samaria to forestall the likelihood of future territorial compromise. As if to underline the point, three new settlements were approved on the eve of the election. Labour favours settlements in strategically important areas such as the Jordan Rift and the Golan Heights, but strenuously opposes settlement in densely populated Arab areas. The national unity government's proposals on settlements are ambiguous. They envisage that five or six new settlements (out of the 28 approved by the previous government) should be built during the new administration's first year.

The big coalition partners also differ in their attitude towards the peace process with Jordan and the future of the West Bank. Labour is ready to negotiate with Jordan within the framework of UN resolution 242 of November 1967, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in 1967 as a quid pro quo for Arab recognition of Israel. Likud favours only limited autonomy along the lines of the 1978 Camp David agreement. Given King Hussein's recent rebuff of Prime Minister Peres's call for talks between the two nations, differences within the coalition are likely to remain academic. It seems hard to dissent from the view that without early progress on negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank, a variety of forces will continue to push almost inexorably towards de facto annexation.

The general elections of 1977 and 1981 were seen as marking a growing bi-polarisation in Israel's party system. This year's results run counter to this trend, emphasising once again the inadequacies of Israel's extreme form of proportional representation, though it remains unclear whether the national unity government will grapple with the highly contentious issue of electoral reform. Some form of effective threshold is needed to limit the fragmentation within the party system and undermine the excessive leverage that the present system affords to highly fractious minor parties. The election saw a disturbing rise in support for political extremism together with the emergence through the ballot box of a strongly nationalist Palestinian Arab voice. The election result again emphasised the ethnic division within the Jewish electorate. The ethnic divide grew as the Oriental Jews, the 'outs' of the system, took electoral vengeance on the 'establishment', i.e., the Labour Party.

Of potentially even greater seriousness is the religious-secular divide that lurks beneath the surface of the Israeli polity. In essence, this is a fundamental struggle between competing visions of society. The national unity government has side-stepped this issue, with Peres temporarily taking the Religious Affairs portfolio himself, and the popular Yitzhak Navon becoming Education Minister. Nevertheless, this dilemma is likely to remain one of the central problems for Israel's political system. That system is in transition; the nation's

political life, for so long characterised by the ideologies and attitudes of the Yishuv (the name given to the area of Jewish settlement in Palestine prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948) must seek to accommodate new forces with some very old tensions. The present national unity government can only secure an interim solution: its most urgent task now is to tackle the country's economic crisis.

JONATHAN MARCUS*

*The author, a regular contributor to *The World Today*, was in Israel for the July election.

ALBANIA'S TORTUOUS OPENING-UP

THE surprise visit to Albania in August by Franz Josef Strauss, the Prime Minister of Bavaria and leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the sister party of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was but one manifestation of a tortuous attempt by Albania's ruling group to change its economic policy. Without a large injection of technology and know-how, the country's economy stands little chance of growing fast enough to cope with the present 2·3 per cent annual population growth.

After 40 years of indoctrinating the people against both capitalism and 'revisionist' Marxism-Leninism—as well as all forms of liberalism—the country's ruling Albanian Workers' Party and its declining 76-year-old leader, Enver Hoxha, are thus under great pressure to find a political justification for a widening of trade relations and a more open acknowledgement of market forces and the inevitable encounter with foreign liberalism. The irony is that their advocacy of just such a policy has put an end to the careers, if not the lives, of many Albanian ministers and other officials these past 10 years.

The significance of Strauss's visit was that it provided a framework for negotiating several industrial contracts with West Germany. For years, the Albanians have held out for about $2 billion of war reparations from Bonn to cover the 1943 occupation of Albania by the German army; this demand has been dropped in favour of a deal in which West German companies will undertake several heavy industrial projects to be paid for, it seems, by the West German government, in lieu of reparations. For a country such as Albania whose annual exports are worth about $600 million, the introduction of perhaps several hundred million dollars' worth of capital and equipment could be most significant.

Potentially, Albania is by far the richest country in the Balkans. It has a good climate, fertile plains, a lot of hydroelectric power and a comprehensive range of minerals, including oil, coal, base metals, chrome, iron, nickel and valuable metals such as cobalt. In 1980–1, it overtook the Soviet Union as the west's largest supplier of chrome after South Africa, a fact that is as relevant to western strategic considerations as it is to the Albanian economy.

Albania's standard of living, starting from a very low level after the war, has slowly improved, though more slowly than in most other predominantly agrarian societies in Europe. The economy's strongest point is its agricultural surplus and the reasonable domestic availability of cereals and vegetables—a stark contrast to much of the Soviet bloc. If the most expensive goods, like televisions, are included, the cost of living, at constant value, has actually fallen by one or two percentage points during the past four years. Wage rates, conversely, have increased by perhaps 5 per cent. An Albanian earning 600 leks a month still has to pay five weeks' wages to buy a bicycle or a good suit, or 3 per cent of his monthly earnings for 1 kg of reasonable meat (when meat is available). An imported enamel lavatory costs five months' wages. But only 4 per cent of the worker's wages is paid to the state for accomodation. Material life is basic, but tolerable, especially in the countryside where private plots can generate produce for private barter or cash. The problem is not so much that Albania is still one of the poorest and, in a material sense, the most backward countries in Europe: it is that economic momentum has been lost. Unless there is a fairly radical change of policy, standards of living will begin to fall.

Chrome ore mining has been in trouble for some time because of inadequate mining techniques: ore is of critically low quality. Oil production from the Qyteti Stalin field has fallen by at least a third during the past two years—again because of totally inadequate technology. (The Algerian state hydrocarbon company has a management contract with Albania, though the Algerians themselves do not have enough know-how.) The Chinese installed factories (the Chinese claim to have spent $5 billion in Albania from 1970–8) which produce too little of too low a quality to provide the wherewithal for further development. Industrial workers, who unlike their rural counterparts cannot benefit much from the unofficial economy, are failing to respond to the party's exhortations to produce more. And agriculture can no longer act as the national economic locomotive, partly because of the high cost of cultivating marginal land, and partly because the party can no longer rely on Albanian patriotism to produce the goods.

Today there is an atmosphere of urgency in Tirana: Hoxha can be expected to die within two years, probably sooner. He is one of the most puritanical and xenophobic leaders in European history, a political dogmatist and wit, and a fanatical admirer of Stalin. But he has wielded enormous power, as was bloodily illustrated on two notable occasions in the past decade. In the mid-1970s a power struggle took place in which the army chief of staff, the director of army political affairs and three ministers were charged with coup plotting and summarily executed (as were hundreds of their suspected supporters). Then in 1981 came the probable assassination of the Prime Minister, Mehmet Shehu, whom Hoxha accused of having worked for an assortment of foreign intelligence agencies. Similarly, hundreds were killed in the aftermath.

The victims of the mid-1970s and of the Shehu affair both wanted more pragmatic trade relations, a goal that Hoxha rejected. The relevance of these episodes to current politics is that Hoxha's successor is most unlikely to have

the power to deal so ruthlessly with proponents of similar change. Resistance to such pressure in future could precipitate a bloody power struggle in which many of the present political ruling group would perish. There are three broad reasons why:

- Shehu, a former Albanian partisan brigade commander in the Second World War, was the army's man. His death, and the purge that followed, dramatically affected the army. Many senior officers, who had been brought up under Shehu's aegis, were killed or relegated to obscurity. Interrogation by Greek security officials of a number of Albanians, including middle-rank army officers who have defected recently, has confirmed that there exists a pervasive undercurrent of disillusion in the army. In an effort to insulate himself from the military 'old guard', Hoxha appears to have established a young praetorian guard. It can be seen on guard duty around the top leaders' residences in Tirana, and similarly, if less obtrusively, around their seaside compounds.
- Educated Albanians, with the means to tune into Italian, Greek and Yugoslav radio and television stations, are increasingly disbelieving party propaganda. Official claims about Shehu's demise were widely dismissed as mischievous, if not ludicrous. Party propaganda urging a need for constant struggle to overcome inferiority and imperialist designs on Albania's sovereignty, is wearing a bit thin. Unrest among the Greek minority in southern Albania has grown noticeably during the past few years. And the country's gypsy population remains steadfastly outside the party's grip.
- Hoxha's expected successor, the 59-year-old head of state,Ramiz Alia, has impeccable credentials as a party man. He was educated at the Higher Party School in Moscow before becoming Minister of Education and Culture in 1955. During the war he reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Hoxha's death will produce high expectations of change. But Alia has neither the personality nor the seniority to counter widespread pressure for it. Unlike Hoxha, he could not simply execute his Prime Minister or send his personal assistants to labour camps. If he disregards the need for a modicum of consensus—and that means accommodating the more technocratically-minded ministers and officials who are battling now with the next five-year-plan—he is unlikely to survive. In order to pre-empt his rivals he may have to allow a degree of reform. Albania is no Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Poland: there are no Soviet tanks to save party hardliners.

There is a lot of speculation over Hoxha's health and the degree of his influence on the affairs of state. He was last seen in public at this year's May Day parade in Tirana, looking gaunt and frail. Since then Albanian officials have had lengthy talks on cultural and trade matters with the Yugoslavs and the Greeks. (A road link with Greece is to be reopened, and a rail link with Yugoslavia is due to be completed by the end of the year.) Negotiations with West Germany, including Strauss's visit, have shown promise of results. Trade arrangements with Italy have been widened. And talks with the Japanese, who

[illegible] of Albania's scheme, will probably result quite soo[n] in the opening of a Japanese trade office in Tirana.

The path for expanded economic relations is thus being paved. It remain[s] now for the talk to be translated into working economic relations. But if i[t] wants to progress beyond the level of crude and unsatisfactory barter trade, the regime will have to give up its total isolation from the international monetary system. This seems to be less of an anathema in Tirana now. The official line is that western trade partners are better and more reliable than 'revisionist' ones in the communist bloc. Before long Albanians may be drinking Coca-Cola like everyone else.

CHARLES MEYNELL*

*The author, a former member of *The Economist*'s financial staff in London and now editor of *Africa Confidential*, has recently re-visited Albania.

East-west trade and technology transfer: the west's search for consensus

ANGELA E. STENT

THE United States and its partners have often disagreed over the economics and politics of east-west trade relations, but in the past few years this issue has played an unprecedentedly divisive role in the politics of the western alliance. The 1982 dispute over the construction of the Soviet natural gas export pipeline—involving American extra-territorial sanctions, European refusal to comply, and eventual lifting of the sanctions in return for an agreement further to examine the issue of commercial ties with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), generally referred to in the west as Comecon, was the latest, and perhaps the most acerbic, of these transatlantic disputes. The passive role of the Soviet Union in this episode, and the continued construction of the pipeline despite the sanctions, reminded the alliance that disputes that were ostensibly over east-west economic ties have in fact become far more of a west-west than an east-west issue.

In agreeing to lift the sanctions, the government of the United States secured from its partners a promise to review the security implications of east-

Dr Stent is Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Russian Area Studies Programme at Georgetown University. Portions of this article are based on a chapter in a forthcoming book edited by Bruce Parrott, *Trade, Technology and Soviet-American Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). This article appears simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn).

west trade and technology transfer through a series of studies. The studies were conducted in four different institutions—Nato, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and CoCom (the committee composed of Nato members minus Spain and Iceland but including Japan which vets strategic trade with the east)—and their first phases have all been completed. However, all of these organisations continue to review east-west economic questions. Certainly, since the lifting of the sanctions, the level of public transatlantic invective over this issue has abated, and all the allies are concerned not to permit east-west trade disputes to disrupt the alliance as they did in 1982. The 1983 Williamsburg and 1984 London economic summits dealt cautiously with the question, in contrast to the more open discord at Versailles in 1982. On the surface, therefore, the dispute has been defused. However, the fundamental issues that gave rise to the pipeline disagreement have not been resolved.

Détente and security

Before discussing the details of east-west economic ties, it is important to examine two basic issues that have divided the United States from its European partners for the past decade.[1] The first major area of transatlantic disagreement is about the nature of the Soviet threat. Washington and its major partners agree more or less on how to assess the nature of the Soviet domestic system. Where they disagree is on how to interpret Soviet foreign policy behaviour and, more important, how the west should respond to Soviet actions. One basic issue is how to explain the rise and demise of détente in the 1970s and whether to continue to seek dialogue with the Soviet Union in the future.

The Reagan Administration is critical of the concept of détente and sceptical about the possibility of achieving durable results on a range of issues through cooperative dialogue with the Soviet Union. As seen by this Administration, the Soviet leaders violated the rules of détente in the 1970s through their expansionist policy in the third world and they betrayed what was seen as a mutually agreed-upon code of conduct to exercise global restraint. Moreover, they increased their military forces while the United States did not. In global terms, therefore, the Soviet Union did not abide by its commitments, as defined in the United States.

The Europeans had more limited, regional expectations of détente. They tend to judge Soviet conduct by how the Kremlin behaves in Europe, as opposed to the rest of the world. Their view is that despite the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, Moscow has behaved with relative restraint towards Europe, even though it may have broken an American-defined set of rules. The Europeans, because of their greater proximity to the Soviet Union, tend to be more conscious than the United States of the effects of the Second World

[1] For background, see Donald Nuechterlein, 'The widening Atlantic: Nato at another crossroads', *The World Today*, August–September 1984. Also Linda B. Miller, 'Energy and alliance politics: lessons of a decade', *ibid.*, December 1983.

War on the Soviet Union, and are consequently more liable to accept the legitimacy of Soviet insecurities. Because of these different evaluations of Soviet conduct, western Europe is more favourably disposed than the United States towards seeking a dialogue with the Russians on a variety of issues and believes that agreements with Moscow are feasible.

A second area of disagreement between the United States and its allies is about what constitutes security and how the security implications of east-west economic transactions are to be evaluated. In essence, this involves balancing the damage to western security interests caused by machinery and technology exports to the Soviet Union that build up the Soviet economic infrastructure against the gain to western security that comes from the increased employment (in precisely those western European industries most affected by the current recession) that the Comecon market provides. In some ways, Europe's economic security is America's military insecurity.

The American concept of security is largely military, not economic, whereas the European concept is both economic and military. Although all the allies agree that high-technology exports to the east pose a potential military threat to western security, they disagree on how to define the boundaries of technology controls. All CoCom members agree that one must control exports that have direct applications to Soviet military power, that is, items that could be used in a war. But the United States is increasingly attempting to embargo all technologies that contribute indirectly to the conduct of war—namely western imports that strengthen the entire Soviet industrial base, including its energy sector.

Exacerbating these security disputes is the asymmetry in the American and European stakes in east-west trade. The United States is not a trade-dependent economy and its interest in economic ties with the Soviet Union lies almost exclusively in the agricultural export sector. Europe is highly trade-dependent and its interest in east-west economic ties lies both in industrial exports and raw-material imports, especially energy. Hence the inevitable transatlantic disputes when America seeks to restrict the flow of European industrial goods to the east, while continuing to encourage its own agricultural exports.

In order to gauge the achievements of the allied studies, it is useful to summarise the attitude of the United States and its allies on two aspects of east-west commercial ties. First, how do both sides view the economic pros and cons of east-west commercial ties, and, more specifically, the question of technology transfer? Second, how do both sides assess the political use of economic relations?

The American position

Since eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are largely irrelevant economically to the United States, America's east-west commercial policy has been determined primarily by political factors. Washington has traditionally regarded commerce with communist nations as fundamentally political, morally questionable and disproportionately beneficial to the east. The

United States pursues a restrictive policy on non-agricultural east-west commerce, has a broad definition of security, a comprehensive set of domestic laws covering the transfer of non-military technology and a tendency to use trade for political purposes. On all of these issues, its policies differ from those of its allies.[2]

Successive American Administrations, with the exception of the Nixon one, have held the view that non-agricultural commerce with the Soviet Union represents a security risk because it builds up the Soviet industrial infrastructure and frees Soviet resources for investment in other sectors, particularly the military. Thus, western industrial imports ultimately enable the Soviet Union to become a more formidable military antagonist and at the same time force the west to increase defence spending. A distinction has traditionally been made between the dangerous implications of western industrial exports and the beneficial effects of grain exports.[3] Whereas the pro-trade east-west business lobby has always been surprisingly weak in the United States, there are powerful anti-trade ethnic and religious lobbies, as well as organised labour, which oppose most forms of commerce with the east.[4]

Unlike its allies, America has always had a well-defined concept of technology transfer, although this is difficult to implement legally. The current definition, embodied in the 1979 Export Administration Act, is based on a 1976 Department of Defense report that differentiates between evolutionary and revolutionary technology for purposes of export controls.[5] The practical result of this research, in domestic terms, is a 700-page classified list of forbidden exports of 'Military Critical Technologies', whose underlying concept the United States would like its allies to accept.

The highly politicised American approach toward east-west commerce is legalised in the Export Administration Act, which has been the vehicle for imposing extra-territorial sanctions. No other western country has legislation similar to that of the United States, because this Act empowers the President to interfere with commerce for both foreign policy and national security reasons. The President can impose export and import controls on reluctant allies through the export licensing procedure and through the adoption of import sanctions against foreign companies that violate American foreign-policy export sanctions. The 1979 Export Administration Act expired in September

[2] For details of the American, German and French positions, see Angela E. Stent, *Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union: A Challenge for the Cohesiveness of the Western Alliance*, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, No. 24 (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1983).

[3] See Angela Stent, *Wandel durch Handel? Die politisch-wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Sowjetunion* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), pp. 107–9, for a discussion of the initial American decision to export grain to the Soviet Union in 1963. At that time, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer commented critically on the American sale: 'Nur die dümmsten Kälber wählen ihren Schlächter selber' (Only the stupidest calves pick their own butchers).

[4] See *AFL-CIO Platform Proposals* presented to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, 1984 (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 12.

[5] See 'An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DoD Perspective. A Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Export of U.S. Technology' (Washington, D.C., 1976).

1983, but its renewal has become such a controversial political issue in the Congress that it has been stalemated in 1984.[6] Whatever the outcome of the conflict between the Senate and House versions of the Bill, any future legislation will retain the possibility for the imposition of foreign-policy controls in the export and, possibly, the import sectors.

The United States has been less prone to use trade incentives in dealing with the Soviet Union, apart from the Nixon-Kissinger years. It prefers the use of the stick rather than the carrot, and is more sceptical about the 'sticky carrot'.[7] Some officials no longer believe that linkage can be effective in altering Soviet conduct, but they believe that the United States should pursue a policy of sanctions in order to express symbolic disapproval of Soviet behaviour.

The European position

Since western Europe regards Comecon as a limited, but nevertheless important market, most European nations view east-west trade as primarily an economic, rather than a political issue. European Community members encourage industrial exports to the east and favour Soviet energy imports, have a significantly economic definition of security, few national laws covering technology transfer and a tendency to avoid politicising trade, unless 'carrots' are used.

All EEC members regard east-west trade as a normal, desirable aspect of international trade and of their relationship with the Soviet Union. They consider these exchanges to be mutually beneficial, and claim that whatever damage is done to their security by strengthening the Soviet economy is more than offset by the benefits that this trade brings to their own economies. Comecon is a particularly good market for the products of European steel and machine-tool industries that are especially hard-hit by the current recession. Moreover, Soviet energy imports have arguably helped increase west European security by reducing dependence on unreliable Opec nations and diversifying suppliers. There is, moreover, an internal consensus in most EEC countries about the need to promote east-west trade.

No EEC country has an autonomous, well-defined concept of technology transfer. Rather, they rely on CoCom guidelines for licensing decisions. But they tend to be more sceptical about the dangers of dual-use civilian technology exports to the Soviet Union and about Soviet ability to absorb and diffuse western technology.[8] It is customary for Europeans to respond to

[6] There are currently two Bills before the Congress. The Senate version is more comprehensive in its application of extra-territorial foreign-policy export and import controls. The House version is less oriented toward extending the reach of American controls and takes European concerns more into account.

[7] Henrich Vogel, 'Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit dem Osten-Sicherheitsrisiko oder Chance zur Aussenpolitik?' *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 23, 1983, p. 717.

[8] For contrasting views, see Jürgen Nötzold and Werner Beitel, 'Die Bedeutung des Technologietransfers in den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit der Sowjetunion', *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 2, 1983, pp. 45–52; Richard N. Perle, 'West-Östliche Technologietransfer: Die strategischen Konsequenzen', *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 1, 1984, pp. 11–16.

American proposals on technology transfer, rather than initiate their own, and this inevitably leads to tensions.

On the link between politics and economics, all European states reject the utility of economic sanctions as an acceptable means of changing Soviet behaviour, arguing that sanctions usually inflict greater costs on the country that imposes them than on the target, particularly if the target is the Soviet Union. On the question of 'sticky carrot' there is more disagreement. Mitterrand's France and Thatcher's Britain remain sceptical about the use of trade incentives to alter Soviet behaviour, and prefer to separate politics from economics as much as possible.

West Germany is in a different category as far as the politics of east-west trade is concerned. It is the only ally of the United States that believes that trade incentives work politically. Given Bonn's unique relationship with East Berlin and the fact that it considers itself responsible for millions of Germans both in East Germany and in other Comecon countries, it is not surprising that it believes that the Soviet Union and East Germany indeed have something to offer in return for trade incentives. The unprecedented outflow of East German emigrants in 1984 is the most concrete proof of the effectiveness of West German trade carrots in eliciting humanitarian concessions.

Given these differing American and European perspectives, one might question how the alliance could indeed achieve a better consensus on east-west economic relations. The allied studies indicate the potential and limitations of agreement under present conditions.

The post-pipeline studies

Although much of the work done by the allies is not in the public domain, it is nevertheless possible to outline the broad areas on which there was agreement and disagreement.[9] Of course, none of the institutions involved in these studies is ideal for coordinating western policy. Japan, although it was informed about the Nato exercise, is not a member of Nato; France, although it cooperated with the IEA, is not a member of that organisation; the OECD has neutral members whose interests differ from those of the American allies; and CoCom is an informal organisation, based on unanimity, where decisions tend to represent the lowest common denominator. Nevertheless, each of these institutions has made a contribution to the debate.

The initial Nato study on the security implications of east-west trade was completed last year; but work on this issue continues. Moreover, Nato is engaged in a separate study on military technology. Officials involved in the exercises stress the positive attitude of all members, particularly the French, towards them. However, apart from a general agreement that the security implications of east-west commerce must be taken into consideration more systematically than before, the studies so far appear not to have resolved the

9 For a detailed description, see John P. Hardt and Donna Gold, 'East-West Commercial Relations: The Western Alliance Studies' (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief No. IB 83036, 1983).

issue of economic versus military security. The United States would like to upgrade the importance of the Nato Economics Committee as a consultative mechanism, thereby emphasising the connection between economic and military security. Other Nato members do not support an upgrading of the power of this Committee.

The major value of various OECD studies on east-west trade, which are now being updated on a continual basis, is the fact that they were done at all. Traditionally, OECD, which has neutral members, has been extremely wary of dealing with the subject of east-west trade. One concrete result of the OECD study on trade and credits was to raise the Soviet Union to Category One (Advanced Recipient) in 1982. This means that the Soviet Union has to pay a minimum 12·15 per cent interest rate on western government credits and loans. Further OECD work on east European and Soviet indebtedness continues. However, the United States and its allies have not been able to come to an agreement on credit subsidies by governments and commercial banks. The United States would like its allies to cease granting government subsidies for credits to Comecon countries. It also views West Germany's Hermes credit insurance as a subsidy. However, its allies will not alter their government subsidy practices, nor will commercial banks reveal in detail their credit dealings. The study on credit issues, therefore, has achieved a minimum new consensus on interest rates, but has not resolved the larger question of subsidies.

A second OECD study on the balance of advantages in east-west commercial ties examined in detail various economic dimensions, in particular the impact of imports and exports of both east and west. However, because of the sensitivities of neutral countries, it did not address political issues. Any assessment of the balance of advantages that omits a discussion of the political dimension can only be partial. These excercises have apparently made non-CoCom OECD members aware of some of the problems involved, but they lack any concrete policy implications because OECD is not designed to coordinate or recommend policy. The OECD studies on east-west economic ties will continue, and will provide useful statistics, but they will not be an appropriate means of coordinating allied policy.

The IEA study on security of natural gas supplies to IEA countries was perhaps the most successful in that it represented a compromise between American and European views, and did come up with some policy recommendations. It warned against excessive European dependence on Soviet natural gas supplies but implied that at the post-Urengoi levels this threshold will not have been reached. The study also discussed alternatives to Soviet gas, but recognised that other sources—for instance, Norwegian Troll gas—may be more expensive than Soviet gas in the 1990s. Indeed, the IEA study highlights the paradox about the whole pipeline dispute. It turns out that the short-term concern of the Reagan Administration in 1982, namely that Europe would become too dependent on Soviet gas, was misplaced because of the currently soft European gas market. The Soviet Union has not been able to sell as much gas as it had originally bargained for, and is losing potential hard-currency

revenues. Currently, it has contracted for only 26 billion cubic metres of new gas exports to western Europe, as opposed to the 40 billion cubic metres it envisaged two years ago. Moreover, it has had to make compromises on price formulas.

In the long run, however, the Reagan Administration's concern may turn out to have been well founded. Soviet gas will ultimately be cheaper than alternative European gas in the 1990s, and current Soviet pricing policies may make the development of Troll gas or other sources uneconomical. In addition, one attraction of Soviet gas pipeline deals to western Europe is the prospect of related equipment sales, and the Soviet Union will continue to be a good customer for these goods in the next decade, whereas countries like Norway will not. Thus, when one examines the import and export side of European-Soviet gas deals, it is quite conceivable that the current alliance agreement not to negotiate with the Soviet Union about a second export pipeline and to keep a maximum dependence level on Soviet gas imports of 30 per cent of consumption may fall apart in the 1990s, leading to further allied disputes.

Of all these organisations, CoCom is by far the most important, because it is an institution specifically charged with coordinating western policy and it deals with the most significant allied issue, namely the transfer of sensitive technology. Given its limited technical function (to develop lists of goods that are embargoed and to decide on exception requests for licences) and the secrecy of its deliberations, CoCom is the one forum where the chances of agreement are relatively good. This is mainly because all of its members are committed to preventing the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union that could enhance its military might.

In terms of concrete achievements, there was initially one special high-level CoCom study on energy technology that was subsequently folded into the continuing list reviews. The most important part of CoCom's work in the last two years has been to draw up new lists of items to be controlled, especially in the computer field, where the last list was drawn up 10 years ago. The process has been laborious and has provoked a great deal of argument because it involves questions of how one determines which civilian technologies can have potential military applications. Both sides have compromised, and the result is that the new list review was finally completed in July 1984. In general, there has been continued agreement not to submit exception requests for the Soviet Union and to adopt far looser criteria for technology transfer to China, although America's allies were at first reluctant to accept Washington's new China policy. Steps are being taken to upgrade the CoCom secretariat, increase its budget and its data-processing equipment[10] and some CoCom members have cooperated with the American drive to stem the illegal flow of technology at home in their own countries. The embargo lists have ben extended to include some types of machine tools, space vehicles, dry docks, electronic grade silicon, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and superalloy

[10] See Perle, *op.cit.*, p. 17, for details.

production technology. The most difficult agreement of all was that on con puters, yet a viable compromise between the American and European pos tions has been reached. Under the new lists, most home computers will b freed from licensing requirements, but some 'super-minicomputers' will b embargoed. For the first time, software will be far more carefully controlle and some software will be embargoed. Finally, CoCom has agreed to stop until at least 1988, the sale to Comecon nations of sophisticated telecon munications equipment.[11]

CoCom has, therefore, reached agreement on some questions and ther has been a comprehensive discussion of all aspects of dual-use technolog On other issues, however, the United States remains frustrated. Washingto would like to create a separate military subcommittee in CoCom to ensu that the military perspective is systematically included in export licensin decisions, but its allies have resisted this. The United States would like t make CoCom a formal organisation, but this is politically impossibl However, CoCom has agreed that third countries must be made more awa of the dangers of technology transfer to the east, and the United States an its allies are now debating the possibility of tighter controls on exports t non-communist states which are not in CoCom to prevent an outflow c technology from these states to the east.

The initial result of these various exercises has been to defuse the allie tensions over east-west economic ties, which is in itself an achievemen More concretely, there has been agreement on moving the Soviet Union int a higher interest rate credit category and on new CoCom lists. The proces itself has facilitated improved alliance dialogue.

Basic issues, however, remain unresolved and suggest that future conflic will arise. The United States and Europe still disagree over the extent t which economic security is part of national security, and, as long a Washington remains suspicious about its allies' true commitment to preven ting the flow of military-related civilian high technology to the east, ther will be voices in the American government arguing for tighter west-wes trade controls. Indeed, this has already begun to happen. There are stil disagreements about how to define which civilian technologies have militar applications, and on whether future natural gas contracts with the Sovie Union should be sought. Finally—and this is admittedly a domesti American issue over which Europe has little influence—American legisla tion, as long as it institutionalises the possibility of extra-territorial controls will continue to irk the allies. The pipeline sanctions have already ensure that the Soviet Union is refusing to sign deals with European companies tha involve American-licensed technology in case there are future embargoes.

The agenda for the future

The allied studies have revealed the difficulties of reaching agreement whe the initial positions of the two sides diverge. Yet, if the will to defuse the east

[11] David Buchan, 'The West Plugs the High-Tech Drain', *Financial Times*, 25 July 1984.

west trade issue is there, the alliance can continue to try to narrow the transatlantic gap. The alliance has three future options in dealing with these issues.

The first is to continue to muddle through, as it has for the past 35 years, occasionally having public clashes over specific projects and otherwise maintaining a strained but workable system. However, muddling through, especially in hard economic times when no country wants to jeopardise even the limited gains from east-west trade, is an unsatisfactory option. The unpredictability of policies, especially American policies, is bound to cause tensions, and the ultimate result may be for Washington to use the extra-territorial lever again.

A second option would be to discuss issues directly and openly, and then to agree to differ. While this would obviate the need for the United States to take unilateral action to force its allies to accept its policies, it would lead to growing transatlantic isolationism and to less west-west trade in high technology.

A third, and most desirable option, would be to intensify current allied discussions, especially in Nato and CoCom, with the aim of achieving a more viable modus vivendi on fundamental issues.[12] A new consensus might involve an agreement to disagree on some issues, but a willingness to compromise on others.

The first major item on the agenda should be a fuller appraisal of the meaning of security, in all its aspects, and a willingness on America's part to concede the legitimacy of European concerns about economic security and the fact that east-west non-agricultural trade is not necessarily of one-sided benefit to the Soviet Union. The Europeans in their turn would have to be more willing to consider the potential military security implications of major industrial and energy transactions. Perhaps these discussions could also include an examination of forthcoming major projects within, say, Nato, so that the security implications of those projects could be evaluated before contracts were signed. Once agreement was reached, however, the United States would have to refrain from retroactively trying to prevent what has been agreed from being fulfilled. It is surely in Europe's self-interest to be more forthcoming about future major industrial projects with the United States, because the alternative may ultimately be a tightening of American export control laws for the allies and a greater American reluctance to share military technology with these allies. One way of diminishing American suspicions about the lack of European concern for security would be to have greater systematic military input into domestic licensing decisions in European ministries of defence.

Another area of greater allied compromise could be on the political use of trade. There could be more discussion about which aspects of economic relations are acceptable political levers and the creation of an inventory of various levers which might be used to encourage or respond to future Soviet and eas

[12] For a more detailed analysis of possible avenues for allied consensus, see Ellen L. Frost and Angela E. Stent, 'NATO's Troubles with East-West Trade', *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 179–200.

European behaviour. Most of these discussions would involve carrots rath than sticks. Yet there must also be some more explicit allied agreement c when it is permissible to use sanctions, even if these do not necessarily alt Soviet behaviour. When the Soviet Union undertakes policies that are cor sidered unacceptable by the west, economic levers are sometimes the only wa to respond, if only for symbolic reasons. It is clearly impossible to separat totally economics and politics in relations with the Soviet Union, and the allie could find more effective ways of coordinating their carrots (and occasionall sticks) for specific purposes, if these are collectively agreed on and if there i consultation before they are imposed. A precondition for this working effec tively, however, would be American agreement to eschew imposing extra territorial foreign policy sanctions on its allies except in extreme emergenc cases. This policy has been endorsed by the Secretary of State, George Shultz who has publicly declared himself against extra-territorial sanctions;[13] but th Congress remains to be convinced.

The odds argue against the allies achieving a comprehensive consensus o either the security-related or the political issues. Yet surely it is worth the effor to push the work of the studies a little further even if only a partial consensus i achieved. The western alliance is democratic and pluralistic, and it is inevitabl that differences of opinion over east-west economic relations will exist. If thes disagreements threaten to cause needless tension within the alliance, as the did in the pipeline case, then the allies must reflect on whether these dispute themselves jeopardise western security by undermining the alliance, irrespec tive of what the Soviet Union does. It would be preferable for the west to plac east-west economic relations in their appropriate context.

[13] See *New York Times*, 6 May 1984. Mr Shultz said: 'Disputes over extra-territoriality coul become a bigger threat to our economic interests than the present concerns about tariffs, quota and exchange rates.'

Canada: foreign policy outlook after the Conservative victory

ADAM BROMKE AND KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

ON 4 September a new chapter opened in Canadian politics. Canadian voters overwhelmingly endorsed the Progressive Conservative Party and terminated the rule of the Liberal Party, which had held power for all but nine months of

The authors are Professors of Political Science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. Professor Bromke has previously contributed articles to *The World Today* on the subject of his native Poland.

the last 21 years. The Conservatives, led by 45-year-old Montreal lawyer Brian Mulroney, won 211 of the 282 seats in the House of Commons, reducing the Liberals from 147 to merely 40. The social democrats—the New Democratic Party (NDP)—held their own, dropping two seats to 30. The Prime Minister, John Napier Turner, managed to win his seat in British Columbia and his deputy, Jean Chrétien, retained his seat in Quebec, but most of the caucus, including numerous Cabinet Ministers, went down to defeat.

The sweep was country-wide, and threatens the Liberal Party's possibilities for regaining a majority in the next elections. West of Ontario, the Liberals won only one seat besides Turner's. Particularly dramatic was the collapse of the traditional Liberal stronghold of the province of Quebec: the Conservatives won 58 of the 75 seats there. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the 1984 elections will mark the decline of the Liberals as a major party in Canadian politics, and their eventual replacement by the socialists—as in Britain in the 1930s. However, such a dramatic realignment is unlikely, if only because the NDP has virtually no support in either Quebec or the Atlantic provinces. But whether John Turner is able to follow the footsteps of his mentor Lester Pearson who, after a similar Conservative landslide in 1958, rebuilt the party and led the Liberals back to power in 1963, will depend largely on whether over the next four years Mulroney squanders his majority as Diefenbaker did a generation ago.

Background to the election

The cause of the Conservative sweep was overwhelming desire for change. The Liberals under Pierre Elliott Trudeau had their achievements, notably defusing the threat to national unity by the separatist movement in Quebec, and patriating the Constitution from Britain.[1] The Prime Minister's 'peace mission' to the capitals of the nuclear powers, conducted in the months before he stepped down as leader on 29 February 1984, was also popular with Canadians. But the voters had clearly tired of the Liberals. They disapproved of the way the Trudeau government had managed the economy. Although the rate of inflation continued to drop in 1984, the country has not begun to recover from the recession of the early 1980s: unemployment still stands at 11 per cent; interest rates are still high; the national debt stands at $152 billion and is increasing from year to year; and the Canadian dollar has fallen to around 75 American cents. Furthermore, the Liberal government was visibly fatigued and devoid of new ideas and new talent, and its popularity in the polls plunged to historically low levels during the winter.

The party hoped that a change of leader would suffice to stem the tide. Delegates at the June convention elected Turner, who had resigned as Minister of Finance from Trudeau's Cabinet in 1975 over a dispute over economic policy, and who in the intervening years had ostentatiously distanced

[1] For background, see Peter C. Dobell, 'Constitutional and political confrontation in Canada', *The World Today*, June 1981; and Frances Morris-Jones's Note, 'Canada: a costly victory?', *ibid.*, January 1982.

himself from the Prime Minister. But Turner, as party leader, did not ta enough time to assert his own leadership. Tempted by favourable opinio polls which showed that after the leadership convention the Liberals ha surged ahead of the Conservatives by 11 points, he quickly called an electio for September.

The early election call proved disastrous. Turner went into the campaign with much of the old Trudeau Cabinet intact, thus linking himself too closely with the former regime. Nor did he allow enough time for the scars of the three-month leadership campaign to heal. The contest between Turner and Jean Chrétien, Trudeau's Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, had left some bitter feelings within the Liberal Party, even though Turner appointed Chrétien as his Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The early election call also meant that a legacy from the Trudeau era that would have subsided with time instead became a central campaign issue. Before he left office, Trudeau had rewarded scores of his supporters in the House of Commons with lucrative patronage appointments to a number of Crown corporations, regulatory boards, Canada's appointed Senate, the foreign service, and even the judiciary. These patronage appointments prompted universal condemnation, but Turner failed to extricate himself from the controversy. Not only was he implicated directly by agreeing in writing to make some of those patronage appointments himself on the day an election was called, but his defence—that he had been coerced by Trudeau to sign the letter—undermined Turner's credibility as a decisive leader.

Finally, the early election call found the Liberal Party either unprepared or over-confident. In Quebec in particular, Liberal incumbents had grown so used to electoral majorities of tens of thousands of votes that they had taken the Québécois voter for granted. In one breathtaking display of hubris, one senior Minister who had received a 29,000 vote majority in 1980 did not bother to campaign more than a couple of days in his riding: his campaign manager claimed that he had more important things to do. In the event the Minister managed to gain re-election, but by a mere 600 votes. And in the western provinces, the party's grass-roots organisation—long neglected by Trudeau—was in disarray, and completely unprepared to wage an election.

As a campaigner, Turner did not live up to the expectations of his party supporters. In the national television debates, held early in the campaign, he came out poorly. He emphasised his experience, particularly in economic matters, but he did not articulate a new coherent policy programme that differed from Trudeau's. When the polls showed a dramatic decline in Liberal fortunes, he shifted gear, fired his campaign manager and turned to Senator Keith Davey, the man who had run Trudeau's campaigns in the 1970s. As a result, Turner's claim to be the man of change rang increasingly hollow, and the Liberals continued to plunge in popularity throughout the campaign.

The causes of the Conservative victory

By contrast, the Progressive Conservatives ran a tight campaign, the result

of careful organisation that had begun when Mulroney was elected leader of the party in June 1983. The West was their domain, though in both Saskatchewan and British Columbia there were a number of tight races with the NDP. In Ontario, the federal Conservatives had the support of the provincial party machine of the Premier, William Davis, a fellow-Conservative. In Quebec, a province that has been a traditional electoral wasteland for the Conservatives, Mulroney successfully exploited his position as a native son. He had carefully selected a slate of prominent Québécois candidates and had in place an election machine that attracted a large number of disaffected Liberals. He had the tacit support of the separatist Parti Québécois government of René Lévesque, which welcomed Mulroney's promises of improved relations with the provinces after a decade of increasing confrontation between Ottawa and the provincial governments. That he speaks Quebec French—contrasting with Turner's elegant French learned in Paris—did not hurt, particularly in the televised French-language debates.

The Progressive Conservative campaign strategy was to avoid focusing on policy. Instead, Mulroney relied chiefly on personal charm, smooth manners and promises of a new tone in government. Mulroney was, as a result, long on generalities but short on specifics. He tried to appeal not only to traditional Tories, but also to Liberal supporters. Conservative election promises ranged widely, but Mulroney presented estimates of how much the changes promised by the Conservative programme would cost to implement merely days before the election so that they could not be scrutinised too carefully.

Mulroney's huge majority brings its own problems, however. First, there are the latent divisions in a party that has traditionally been fractious. Twice in the last 20 years, it has forcibly removed its leaders in bitter fights: John Diefenbaker in 1967 and Joe Clark in 1983. The Prime Minister will have to reconcile often conflicting interests between the national and various provincial wings of the party. And the parliamentary caucus is anything but ideologically homogeneous. Among its ingredients are a right wing of traditional Conservatives in the mould of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and a left wing of moderate 'Red Tories'. And there is a new group now: a large contingent of Quebec MPs. While the leader is fluent in both official languages, his caucus now includes some unilingual anglophones whose outspoken francophobia is a persistent source of embarrassment to the leader, and some francophones who worked on the 'Oui' side of the 1980 Quebec referendum on separation from the rest of Canada. Finally, there is the problem of satisfying the Cabinet aspirations of a huge backbench: even though 40 of the 211 MPs were appointed to Mulroney's first Cabinet, there will be a lot of disappointed backbenchers in the next five years.

The huge majority also represents a mandate for change. With it come high expectations for quick and tangible improvements. But it is by no means apparent that the Conservatives have a panacea for the country's many ills. Indeed, some of their solutions sound very much like a continuation of the ineffectual policies of the Liberals. Thus, if the Mulroney government is unable to fulfil its promises, the inevitable disillusionment will set in.

Friction with the United States

The election also marked the end of an era in Canadian foreign policy. For since 1980, when the Liberals were returned to power after the short-lived Conservative government of Joe Clark, Canada's external relations have been deeply affected by a growing divergence between Ottawa and its other allies.[2]

Canadian-American relations were particularly affected, and by 1982 had deteriorated markedly. Partially this was due to long-standing bilateral disputes, such as a fisheries treaty which had been signed by the Carter Administration but not ratified by the Senate, or the intractable problem of environmental damage in Canada caused by acid rain originating in the United States. But there were also ideological differences over the question of state intervention in the economy. These differences were exacerbated by the election of Ronald Reagan. The 1980 Liberal platform included promises to 'Canadianise' the oil and gas industry, and to strengthen the agency that monitors and regulates foreign investment. Both these initiatives were strenuously—and largely successfully—opposed by the Republican Administration. At the same time, a new wave of protectionism in the United States threatened Canada, which depends so highly on trade with the United States.

No less important were the diverging policies of the two countries over global issues. Canada adopted a distinctly more moderate stance than the United States over the crisis in Poland and the shooting down of the Korean airliner. Moreover, Ottawa visibly distanced itself from Washington's course in Central America and did not disguise its unhappiness over the American invasion of Grenada. Trudeau also moved to improve Canadian relations with the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1982 he personally attended Leonid Brezhnev's funeral, and soon afterwards high-level consultations between the Canadian and Soviet Foreign Ministries, which had been suspended after the invasion of Afghanistan, were resumed.

Despite these differences, foreign policy became a heated political issue in Canada only when the Trudeau government, supported by the Conservatives, agreed in 1982 to an American request to test cruise missiles in northern Canada. The government justified this decision by referring to its Nato obligations, which was not entirely accurate since the cruise missile being tested in Canada is launched from American bombers, not the ground-launched version being deployed in western Europe. The Trudeau government was confronted by unexpectedly strong domestic opposition to this move. Frightened by the bellicose rhetoric of the Reagan Administration—directly accessible in its original to most Canadian television viewers—large numbers of Canadians joined a growing peace movement. In late 1982 and early 1983, there were repeated and well-attended demonstrations against cruise testing from coast

[2] For a discussion of Canadian foreign policy in the early 1980s, see Adam Bromke and Kim Richard Nossal, 'Tensions in Canada's foreign policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 62, Winter 1983–84.

[3] A review of Canadian-American relations may be found in Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge* (Toronto: James Lorimer, for the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1982).

to coast. In the House of Commons, the New Democrats launched a persis[illegible] campaign of opposition.

The Liberals were distinctly unhappy with this situation. They were [illegible] between their undisputed loyalty to Nato and to the United States on [illegible] one hand, and their evident lack of sympathy towards Reagan's hard-li[illegible] approach in east-west relations. In fact, the Trudeau Cabinet split over cruise testing, with several senior Ministers openly opposing it. But Trudeau and his deputy, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, prevailed, and tests began in early 1984.

Trudeau's 'peace mission'

Trudeau's own way out of this political dilemma was his 'peace mission'. In the autumn of 1983, he embarked upon a series of widely publicised trips to initiate, as he put it, a 'third rail' of 'political energy' towards reducing tensions between east and west. He explicitly asserted that his goal was to restore the climate of détente of the 1970s. Internationally, the Canadian Prime Minister's efforts did not amount to much. He was, of course, given a polite reception in the various capitals he visited. But none of the major powers took his advice seriously. Above all, he failed to achieve his major objective of bringing the five nuclear powers to the negotiating table.[4]

In Washington, the Canadian initiative evoked distinctly little sympathy. It was regarded as the meddlesome interference of a middle power in a domain exclusively reserved for the great powers.[5] Indeed, some senior officials in the Reagan Administration hardly disguised their derogatory opinion of the Trudeau mission.

At home, however, the reaction was different. Most Canadians supported the initiative, and many took pride in his efforts. Media coverage of his travels was generally sympathetic, and the Liberals improved their standings in the polls. The Conservatives were careful not to attack the Prime Minister over this issue. Indeed, Mulroney appointed Joe Clark as the party's own peace envoy, a role that the former Prime Minister took quite seriously.

It would be unfair to interpret Trudeau's peace mission as an effort to reverse the sagging political fortunes of his party. His initiative was very much in line with his personal philosophy and stemmed from a genuine concern over the sorry shape of east-west relations. But it was carried out in Trudeau's spontaneous and ebullient fashion. In the end, paradoxically, it contributed to the defeat of his party. Due to the prolonged illness of Yuri Andropov, Trudeau's visit to Moscow—with which he planned to complete his mission—was repeatedly postponed. As a result, it was not until February 1984 that he visited

[4] Trudeau's peace mission is assessed from differing angles in Adam Bromke and Kim Richard Nossal, 'Trudeau rides the "third rail"', *International Perspectives*, May/June 1984, and John Kirton, 'Trudeau and the diplomacy of peace', *ibid.*, July/August 1984. For an excellent step-by-step account of the mission, see Richard and Sandra Gwyn, 'The politics of peace', *Saturday Night*, May 1984.

[5] For an extended essay on the continued relevance of the middle power role for Canada in the 1980s, see John W. Holmes, 'Most safely in the middle', *International Journal*, 39, Spring 1984.

the Soviet Union—to attend Andropov's funeral—and talked to Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov's successor as Soviet party leader. Trudeau stepped down almost immediately, but in the meantime the Liberal Party had lost precious time and momentum in making the transition to a new leader.

Foreign policy and the elections

After all the excitement over foreign policy in 1983 and 1984, surprisingly little attention was paid to it during the Liberal leadership contest and the ensuing election campaign. During the leadership race, all of the candidates routinely endorsed Trudeau's peace mission and pledged to continue it, but none seriously elaborated on how this was to be accomplished.

The only party which during the election campaign took a clear and consistent stand over Canada's role in the international sphere was the NDP. Its position was easier to espouse because the party did not expect to form a government, but nevertheless the New Democrats acted in a circumspect and responsible fashion. They stuck to their demands for an end to cruise testing and embraced a nuclear freeze, but their leader, Ed Broadbent, underlined that, on the latter issue, the NDP position did not differ from that of the Democratic Party in the United States. And in a nationally televised debate with Turner's External Affairs Minister, Jean Chrétien, the NDP's foreign affairs critic, Pauline Jewett, stopped short of explicitly endorsing Canada's withdrawal from Nato (even though this is the party's official platform).

Pressed hard from the left, some of the Liberals moved in desperation closer to the NDP position. The party's president, Iona Campagnola, embraced the idea of a nuclear freeze, as did the Energy Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who was one of Turner's key supporters. The Prime Minister himself quibbled. He stated that in his official capacity as Prime Minister, he had to oppose a freeze because of Nato's position, but intimated that 'privately' he favoured it. Instead, in an eleventh-hour attempt to resurrect the popularity of the peace mission, he revealed that he had written to Chernenko and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, with new proposals to continue a Canadian 'peace mission'. The cacophony in the Liberal ranks that grew as the election wore on did little to enhance the party's position.

The Conservatives, although they avoided an open split over foreign policy, also spoke with different voices. Joe Clark, now Mulroney's Secretary of State for External Affairs, seemed genuinely committed to the peace initiative, while Sinclair Stevens, who had been the external affairs critic in opposition, was less enthusiastic. Brian Mulroney, like Turner, paid lip service to Trudeau's international mission, but never elaborated on how he would pursue it further. Indeed, in a speech to an Estonian convention in Toronto, Mulroney revealed another face. In a harsh attack on the Soviet Union, he recalled Diefenbaker's virulent anti-Sovietism, telling his delighted audience that it was when Diefenbaker spoke at the United Nations criticising Soviet domination of eastern Europe, that Nikita Khrushchev became so angry that he banged his shoe on his desk in response. (Mulroney was, wittingly or unwittingly

perpetuating Conservative mythology: Diefenbaker was not even in New York for Khrushchev's shoe-banging, which was directed against the Philippine delegate.) But Mulroney's call for the liberation of the Baltic states demonstrates that he is capable of anti-Soviet rhetoric not much different from that of President Reagan.

The Conservatives and Reagan

It was on the issue of Canadian-American relations that Mulroney presented a clear alternative. An avid admirer of Ronald Reagan, Mulroney persistently advocated closer Canadian-American cooperation, and has persistently criticised the Liberals for their antagonistic diplomacy towards Canada's southern neighbour. Under a Conservative government, he promised, a new atmosphere of civility in relations between the two countries would prevail.

The Conservative platform, moreover, contained a number of economic policies much sought after by the Republican Administration, in particular changes in the 1980 National Energy Programme so vehemently opposed by the United States. Even more significantly, the Tories have pledged to improve the climate for foreign investment in Canada, and are on record as favouring the negotiation of sectoral free-trade arrangements with the United States.

Last but not least, being a better ally of the United States figures prominently in the Conservative programme. The Conservatives are committed to a continuation of cruise testing in the north; they have promised to increase Canadian contributions to Nato; and they have promised to be less critical about American foreign policy initiatives, such as those in Central America. Thus, while Mulroney has placed emphasis on the peace issue, his pro-Americanism and anti-Sovietism make independent peace initiatives comparable to the Trudeau peace mission virtually impossible.

It is, thus, not surprising that when Mulroney visited Washington in June, his talks with high-level Administration officials, and with Ronald Reagan himself, were cordial and given more attention than those with Trudeau a few months beforehand. Reagan even jokingly endorsed Mulroney as another Irishman aspiring to high office in front of television cameras in the Rose Garden. As he watched the election returns at a party given by the Canadian Embassy, at least one influential official in the Reagan Administration dropped all pretence of impartiality. 'We welcome the situation', said Richard Burt, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State responsible for Canadian affairs.

On the morning of 5 September those who fashion Canadian policy in the Reagan Administration had every reason to welcome the outcome of the Canadian vote. Whether after the passage of time they will regard Mulroney with such pleasure is another matter, however. For the Progressive Conservatives some of their pro-American policies willl be exceedingly difficult to realise, Mr Mulroney's charm and civility notwithstanding.

On bilateral issues, the same questions that exercised the Liberals will dominate the Tory agenda: the intractable problem of acid rain and the century-

Constitutional developments

The elections to the new Parliament in August 1984 were fought against a background of widespread opposition, especially from the United Democratic Front (UDF), an 'umbrella' organisation embracing a variety of social and economic groupings (trade unions, student movements, urban associations and so on), and claiming a non-racial membership of approximately 2 million. The outcome of the election can only be described as disappointing for the government: the percentage poll of Coloured participation was 30·93% and 20·29% for Indian. This happened despite an intense campaign to persuade voters to register and a sustained nine-month effort by the government to convince potential voters of the merits of the new dispensation. The Coloured poll was especially low (4–5 per cent in some constituencies) in the urban areas of the Western Cape where the UDF is strong and correspondingly higher in the more conservative rural areas.

Explanations for the poor turn-out vary: Cabinet Ministers stressed intimidation by opponents of the system and ignorance of how it was intended to work.[2] Apathy no doubt contributed as well as profound scepticism about the good intentions of the state. Indeed, *The Citizen*, a pro-government newspaper, admitted as much.

The government did not help its case by arresting 16 prominent UDF leaders in Natal and the Transvaal on the eve of the election on the grounds that the 'promotion of a revolutionary climate . . . would no longer be tolerated'[3]—an odd claim, incidentally, if 'apathy' was, as alleged, a major factor in the low electoral turn-out. And certainly the hostile reaction of the younger generation to the electoral process was anything but apathetic: boycott of classes at school and universities during the election was widespread, with some 600,000 pupils absent from school during one week alone in August.

In the event, the Labour Party led by the Rev. Alan Hendrikse won 76 of the 80 seats in the Coloured House of Representatives, while the outcome in the Indian House of Delegates was evenly split between A. Rajbansi's National People's Party (18 seats) and J. N. Reddy's Solidarity Party (17 seats). Five seats were split between the Progressive Independence Party (one seat) and four independent candidates.

The new Constitution has, then, got off to an uncertain start, made worse by the fact that in the fortnight before the inauguration on 14 September of Mr Botha as State President with executive powers, violent disturbances broke out in two black townships in the Vaal Triangle in which more than 30 people were killed, the business premises of 20 Indian families were burnt and looted and attacks were made on black local councillors and their property. A sharp rise in rents was cited as the principal motive behind the riots. But Louis le Grange,

[2] See *South African Newsletter*, South African Embassy, London, September 1984, and *Financial Mail*, 31 August 1984.

[3] Statement by the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, quoted in *Financial Mail*, 24 August 1984.

the Minister of Law and Order, argued that the unrest was political and timed to 'coincide with the implementation of the new Constitution'.[4]

Economic crisis and political frustration

These explanations are not mutually exclusive, however. The election coincided with an economic crisis provoked by a fall in the gold price from a March 1984 figure of $400 per oz to $335 by late July, while the dollar value of the rand fell to its lowest point ever. With inflation rising to 13 per cent in 'Black July' and no halt in the demand for credit and expansion of the money supply, the government in August introduced 'the single most restrictive monetary and fiscal policy package in the post-war years . . .'[5] The net effect was a rise by 3 per cent in the banks' prime rates to 25 per cent and a rise in consumer credit charges by between 3 and 5 per cent to a maximum of 32 per cent. Mortgage lending rates were expected to rise to 20 per cent and measures were still required to cut back on a steadily rising public expenditure.

Thus, a sudden increase in rents during a period of high inflation with its attendant impact on black living standards easily combined with resentment at black exclusion from the constitutional arrangements. The attacks on the Indian community probably reflect this resentment, while the fact that strikes by black workers during the January–May 1984 period were three times more numerous and involved five times more workers than in the same period last year[6] clearly points to a severe discontent with prevailing wage levels in a period of high inflation.

Issues for the new Parliament

The prevailing climate of economic hardship and vociferous political opposition is unlikely to dissipate in the short term. Both supporters and opponents of the new Constitution agree that achieving legitimacy for its structures and credibility for the new MPs responsible for its day-to-day operation in the separate Coloured and Indian chambers will depend on how quickly the latter can substantially modify, and even abolish, the more onerous and repressive of apartheid laws by legislative and executive means.

An obvious target for legislative attack is the repeal of Section 16 of the Immorality Act forbidding sexual relations across the colour line. If this were done, logic and morality would dictate the abolition of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 on the grounds that 'a government that proclaims itself to be Christian can hardly legalise miscegenation while prohibiting inter-racial marriage.[7]

A parliamentary Select Committee (old-style) has been considering this issue for some months and the great majority of individuals and organisations who made submissions to the Committee supported abolition. The Commit-

[4] *South African Digest*, 14 September 1984. [5] *Standard Bank Review*, August 1984.
[6] *Financial Mail*, 10 August 1984 (statement by the Department of Manpower).
[7] *ibid.*, 13 July 1984.

tee was instructed to pay 'due regard to continued social, educational and constitutional ordering of communities'. This was an indication that the government was acutely aware of the 'knock-on' effect that repeal might have on several major cornerstones of the apartheid edifice, and in particular legislation defining Group Areas, public amenities and population registration. To which of the three Houses of Parliament would the members of a 'mixed' family look for legislative guidance on their individual social and economic status? Would the principle of the 'lower' caste determining that status still operate? Thus, abolition of sexual apartheid might well have more than 'symbolic' value and provide a telling example of the operation of the 'law of unexected consequences', which the more optimistic supporters of the Constitution see as its chief merit.

This proposition is also used by those who think the new system will provide opportunities for bargain-seeking between the leaders of the three legislative chambers on major political issues. On the face of it, this prospect is not helped by a cumbersome parliamentary structure[8] that effectively operates on a 4:2:1 formula reflecting the size of the white, Coloured and Indian population groups. This formula prescribes the size of the Joint Standing Committees designed to deal with disagreement on legislation affecting 'general' as distinct from 'own' affairs (the province of each individual House) and the President's Council which has the right—in the event of disagreement in a Joint Standing Committee—to decide on which version of a Bill to present to the State President for assent. The assumption is that consensus will be the overriding objective of all the parties represented in the system, but it is significant that joint sittings of the three Houses will largely be concerned with ceremonial or required for ministerial introduction of legislation rather than as forums for debate (which, in any case, can only take place in each of the separate Houses and, presumably, in the Standing Committees).

These ground rules, and in particular the distinction between 'own' and 'general' affairs on such issues as education, housing, and social welfare (three of 14 areas formerly designated as 'own' affairs), are likely to generate demands from Coloured and Indian MPs for greater financial provision. The government will, it is claimed, feel obliged to respond if the new framework is to attain any semblance of credibility among those who voted in the August election, and at the same time convert its many critics in the two minority groups.

The external dimension

There is also an external dimension to be considered. Western governments have given the new Constitution a degree of cautious support following Mr Botha's highly successful visit to their capitals this year. On 17 August both Britain and the United States abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning the new Constitution. No doubt in the last analysis Mr Botha's will-

[8] For an informative survey of the Constitution's provisions, see David Welsh, 'Constitutional Changes in South Africa', *African Affairs*, April 1984.

ingness to translate the promise of reform into concrete measures designed to improve the lot of the Coloured and Indian communities will be influenced by domestic rather than external factors, but the latter cannot be discounted entirely. (One obvious example is the mounting pressure for disinvestment in certain state and city administrations in the United States.)

Yet another instance of the role of external pressure having a direct relevance for the progress of reform of the apartheid system arises from the debate within the Republic over influx control, i.e., the legislation governing the movements of blacks from the rural to the urban areas. The demolition of squatter camps on the outskirts of major cities (Crossroads is simply the best known example of many such), the refusal to provide housing and land to migrants and deportation of those who lack the qualifications for permanent residence have aroused fierce criticism in the outside world, and Mr Botha has himself acknowledged this:

> 'Whether people like it or not, the free Western world is extremely sensitive to large scale removals of peoples who are moved just for the sake of moving them. Also, in South Africa there are more and more people who for various reasons display a sensitivity in this regard. We simply cannot carry on as if we had no need to heed them'.[9]

This statement should be coupled with his admission, in a speech opening the new Parliament on 18 September, that 'the Constitution does not provide fully for the diversity which marks the South African population. . . Democratic political participation must also be further extended among our black communities. . . '[10]

The government thus has in mind to extend the 99-year leasehold property rights to blacks in the Cape which will no longer be designated as an area in which Coloureds are given preference for jobs. If blacks are 'to compete on an equal footing with others in the labour market',[11] the legislation to promote this will be an interesting test of the oft-stated willingness of Coloured and Indian political parties to act as proxies asserting the need for fundamental change in the economic and political status of the excluded black majority. Here the Progressive Federal Party—the official opposition in the 'white' chamber—may have a crucial role to play through informal ad hoc alliances, in the standing committees in particular, with their Coloured and Indian counterparts.

One final constraint might be noted—the persistance of a minority *verkrampte* (right-wing) element both within the Nationalist Party and, more explicitly, in the Herstigte National Party and the Conservative Party, led by Dr Andries Treurnicht. The latter retained Potgietersrust in a recent by-election

9 *The Times*, 27 September 1984.

10 *ibid.*, 19 September 1984. One senior administrator in the Cape Province recently admitted that influx control was breaking down and that the tide of black urbanisation could not be reversed.

11 *ibid.*, 27 September 1984.

and made a respectable showing in Rosettenville, an urban constituency. Th Conservative Party has the advantage of strength in the rural areas which tradi tionally have been over-represented in terms of the ratio between seats an population as well as support in white working-class urban areas. One com mentator, Robin Friedland, has suggested that the 'governing party is beginn ing to suffer significant erosion of the voting base reflected in the referendun results.'[12] If this is so, then debate on modifying and repealing legislation sucl as the Immorality Act will be intense and the Nationalist Party may fin itself pulled in contradictory directions by the forces of traditional Afrikaner dom and those new entrants to the system who are committed to root-and branch reform as the price of their own political survival.

The Nkomati Accord

The signing of the Accord between South Africa and Mozambique in Marcl surprised observers of the region's politics. During the preceding three year the Republic had been accused of 'destabilising' its neighbours through series of military raids on African National Congress (ANC) bases in Lesoth and Mozambique and of providing aid (weapons, training facilities and so on to 'proxy movements' such as Unita in Angola (in support of South Africa operations against Swapo), the Lesotho Liberation Army and the Mozambiqu National Resistance movement (MNR).

The ANC was, of course, also a prime target: its programme of sabotag directed, in the main, at symbolic targets of apartheid such as police stations power and communications systems, and the more dramatic manifestation o the state's industrial and military power (the SASOL plant, the Voortrekker hoogte base, and the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria), was clearly designe as 'armed propaganda' in support of its political strategy of 'mass politicisa tion through demonstrations, boycotts, strikes and confrontations'.[13] Ulti mately the goal was to be a 'mass-based armed insurrection aimed at seizing political power'.[14]

From the South African government's perspective, this level of guerrill activity did not represent a major threat to the security of the state. It did however, contribute to that condition of 'violent equilibrium' which com plicated the efforts of a reform-minded Nationalist government to convince it supporters of the need for change. Hence the significance of Nkomati: the tw governments undertook, in particular,

> '. . . to forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation o irregular forces or armed bands . . . whose objective is . . . to plan or prepar to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial

[12] *Financial Mail*, 10 August 1984.

[13] Thomas Karis in 'The Resurgent African National Congress: the struggle for hearts and minds in South Africa', in T. M. Callaghy, (ed.), *South Africa in Southern Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 192.

[14] *ibid.*

integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants . . . to eliminate bases . . . containing armaments . . . command posts . . . communication facilities. '[15]

In addition, a joint security commission was established to monitor the operation of the agreement.

The Accord clearly has serious implications for the ANC's 'military' strategy. Few guerrilla movements (with the possible exception of Mao Zedong's in China during the 1930s) have been able to operate successfully without external support in the form of a sanctuary for providing bases, supply lines, training camps and so on. There have been a number of sabotage incidents since March 1984, mostly timed to coincide with the election, but a sustained campaign would prove more difficult. But the ANC may start placing greater emphasis on its 'political' role. Its supporters may start seeking key positions in trade unions and other politico-economic associations. This could be backed up by sporadic acts of sabotage to reinforce the organisation's claim to be the vanguard of the arms struggle. Thus, paradoxically, the elimination of the ANC's external support may well encourage an internal political strategy designed to raise black political aspirations still further and render less credible whatever solutions the government devises to meet these expectations.

But there is a more optimistic view which argues that the ANC, if forced 'to operate in conventional politics, will find itself participating in an evolutionary process', thus compelling Pretoria 'to contemplate discussions and ultimately negotiations with a "legitimised" ANC'.[16] This speculation, however, assumes a degree of flexibility on Mr Botha's part which—currently at least—does not exist. Much, clearly, will depend on the success of the new Constitution in breaking down apartheid barriers without at the same time antagonising the majority of its white supporters.

Mozambique has, however, fared less well since the signing of the Accord. MNR attacks on road and rail links between the two countries have continued and supplies of electricity from the Cabora Bassa project have not been resumed—hence the significance of two rounds of talks between MNR representatives and the South African government in August and September respectively, with the latter acting as peace-maker at Mozambique's request. Clearly Mozambique has found it difficult to contain the disruptive activity of the MNR whose leaders presumably still have either 'an excellent stockpile of arms or an efficient supply line—allegedly involving clandestine shipments from South African-backed sources'.[17] As General Jacinto Veloso, the Mozambique Minister for Economic Affairs stated, 'six months after the Nkomati Accord there has still been no practical result. The violence continues [and] seriously endangers the Accord'.[18]

[15] Quoted from the text in *South African Digest*, 23 March 1984.
[16] *Finance Week*, 20–28 March 1984.
[17] *Financial Mail*, 24 August 1984.
[18] *The Times*, 29 September 1984.

Especially at risk are the economic benefits that are supposed to accrue from the agreement. One major incentive underpinning President Machel's signature was the parlous state of his country's economy: severe drought, mismanagement, the failure of the Soviet Union to provide aid, technical assistance and a development model relevant to Mozambique's needs, together with the MNR's disruption of communication links. They all contributed to the President's decision to depart radically from the orthodox view of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) on relations with the Republic. Well before the signing of the Accord, President Machel had made overtures to western Europe for help in reviving the economy, but South Africa with its long history of economic domination of the region was the obvious candidate for assistance.[19]

The Republic stands to benefit too: relatively cheap electricity supplies from Cabora Bassa, tourism and a revival of the rail and road links between the Witwatersrand and the port of Maputo are only three examples of the gains that might accrue to the Republic. But rail, port and transport facilities require drastic improvement before this becomes a real prospect; hence the signing of the August 1984 agreement to develop Maputo's harbour and its rail link with Komati Poort on the Transvaal-Mozambique border. Both governments have recognised that the restoration of order and stability in the disrupted rural areas of Mozambique is essential; hence the importance of the agreement signed in Pretoria on 3 October between the Mozambique government and the MNR which provides for a cease-fire and a monitoring role for the South African army. This was essential to avoid disillusion with the Accord and internal difficulties for the Machel government.

Namibian prospects

A new initiative to reach a settlement on the Namibian issue was launched by Chester Croker early in 1984 and led to discussions in Lusaka on 16 February between representatives of the Republic, Angola and the United States. An Angola-South African Joint Commission to monitor the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola was established and Pik Botha, the Republic's Foreign Minister, indicated his willingness to talk to Swapo at a later stage on the timing and structure of a political settlement. Progress towards this objective has been haphazard, largely because of South African insistence on firm undertakings on the issue of Cuban withdrawal from the territory as a condition for the implementation of UN Resolution 435 relating to Namibia's independence. Nor was the peace process helped by Swapo's continuing military activity in southern Angola.

Hopes revived again with the decision to call a meeting at Cape Verde on 26 July between Dr Willie van Niekerk, Administrator-General of Namibia, and

[19] The most telling index of this dependence is the migration of workers to the gold fields of South Africa although numbers have dropped over the last decade from some 100,000 to a current figure of 44,000. Remittances are paid in valuable hard currency worth in 1983 some 51 million rands.

Nujoma, the Swapo leader, but negotiations collapsed as a result of the African delegation's insistence on Cuban withdrawal as a precondition ettlement and Swapo's demand (backed by the government in Luanda) ie implementation of resolution 435 before the start of Cuban rawal. In August, the Angolan government appeared to modify its posin the Cuban issue and there is evidence that Swapo is under pressure the Zambian and Ivory Coast governments to cease its guerrilla opera- and adopt a political role within the territory. Venancio de Moura, lan Deputy Minister of External Relations, is on record as supporting a al withdrawal of Cuban forces provided all South African troops leave la and logistic support is ended for Unita.

erious obstacle here is, however, the success which Unita has achieved in ding control over much of southern Angola and the fact that it operates mpunity in northern areas as well. Clearly any settlement of the Namisue will have to take account of Unita's political aspirations if it is not to ie role that the MNR has cultivated in Mozambique over the last decade. : meantime negotiations—at the instigation of Dr Croker—have con- l for another round of talks between South Africa, Swapo and 'front- tate leaders.[20]

at incentives does the South African government have for ending a te which has dragged on for nearly 30 years? The domestic constraint t a settlement—the fear of a right-wing backlash—may be weaker, ally in view of Mr Botha's standing at home and abroad following the g of the Nkomati Accord. The Lusaka meeting and the discussions that ollowed have been interpreted as indicating South Africa's belief in the tages of a settlement in which the crucial regional actors would operate endently of the UN involvement in the key negotiations preceding a fire and the subsequent diplomatic moves to establish the outlines of a al settlement. Whether the United Nations can be excluded altogether for example, elections to a Constituent Assembly and the monitoring of ges by which Namibia would be led to independence is open to ques- Swapo can be expected to raise the strongest possible objections to this ne, although its resistance may well weaken under pressure from its onal allies in Lusaka and Luanda. Certainly, a diminished role for the the independence process would be more acceptable to the Republic's electorate, given its traditional hostility to that organisation.

ee other incentives may also be present: first, a belief that even if Swapo pre-independence election, the new government will have little alter- but to accept that its economic development depends on the goodwill h the Pretoria government and the multi-national companies which tly operate there. Secondly, Namibia is by virtue of its terrain and phical position hardly a suitable sanctuary for the prosecution of guer- tivity against the Republic. Finally, the sheer cost of the war may be a in South Africa's calculations. Estimates of this cost vary: the official

figure is cited as 1,143 m rands. One informed commentator has suggested that the true cost is nearer 21,000 m rands; but even the government's estimate represents a considerable drain on resources, especially in a time of economic recession.

Conclusion

South Africa's Nationalist leadership is trying to promote a regional settlement of outstanding disputes partly in order to demonstrate to the west its capacity to play a constructive role in the promotion of peace and economic growth. There is the related expectation that success in foreign policy will give the government freedom from internal criticism to press on with the pace of internal reform. Certainly Botha's success in reaching a negotiated 'public' agreement as distinct from a passive, 'informal' acceptance of South Africa's wishes with respect to the ANC has given him at least the opportunity (and perhaps a real prospect) of white support for a Namibian settlement.

Internally, however, his government is faced with a continuing rumble of black discontent, manifesting itself at a variety of levels in violent confrontation. The recent strike of black mineworkers is symptomatic of what might be expected on the trade union front in a climate of economic recession, while township demonstrations and school boycotts are unlikely to diminish in frequency.

The state is secure but, nonetheless, Botha's task remains a formidable one: how to combine an incentive to reform with the constraint of repression when black expectations appear to get out of hand. The analogy might be drawn with General de Gaulle's aspiration to switch French fixation with a colonial past to a new role in Europe as evidence of the magnitude of the task facing new-style presidential leadership in South Africa. Samuel Huntington's definition of the reformer may also be apposite:

> 'The reform leader must thus be able to inspire confidence and provide some measure of charismatic leadership, while at the same time having the political ability and adaptability to engage in log-rolling and back-scratching, to shift allies and enemies from one issue to the next, to convey different messages to different audiences, to sense the eddies and tides of public opinion and time his actions accordingly, and to hide his ultimate purposes behind his immediate rhetoric'.

[21] Samuel Huntington, 'Reform and stability in a modernising multi-ethnic society', *Politikon*, December 1981.

The Afghanistan crisis: a negotiated settlement?

AMIN SAIKAL

A GREAT deal has been written in the past two years about the possibility of a political solution to the Afghanistan crisis. Some observers, attaching credibility to the UN-sponsored indirect Geneva talks between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan held from June 1982 to June 1983, have expressed optimism that a solution may be in sight. One of them, Mr Selig Harrison, has gone so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union has been serious in its desire to negotiate a settlement and that it is the United States which has been hindering the progress of the talks by 'paying lip service to the goal of a negotiated settlement' and neutralising 'its diplomatic overtures with psychological warfare designed to maximise Soviet discomfiture'.[1] He has also lately claimed that the Soviet Union is doing much better in Afghanistan than 'the prevailing Western image of the war'[2] in that country indicates, seemingly implying that the Soviet government may consequently be more willing to negotiate a settlement.

However, neither Soviet behaviour nor the reality of the situation in Afghanistan lends much credence to such observations.[3] The Geneva talks have hitherto failed to produce any result, and so one must doubt whether the Soviet Union yet faces the necessary incentives in Afghanistan to engage in serious negotiations for the withdrawal of its troops. Given the current Soviet commitment to the Babrak Karmal government, the nature of popular resistance in Afghanistan, and regional uncertainties, it is unlikely that the Soviet leaders would be attracted in the foreseeable future to anything more than a process of negotiation as a mechanism which could serve Soviet interests. This is something that the proponents of a negotiated settlement have largely overlooked.

The background to the invasion

One of the central reasons why the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979 was that the Kremlin had run out of the necessary internal mechanisms of control with which it could protect its long-standing influence

[1] S. Harrison, 'A Breakthrough in Afghanistan', *Foreign Policy*, No. 51, Summer 1983, p. 3.
[2] 'The Soviets are Winning in Afghanistan', *Guardian Weekly*, 27 May 1984.
[3] See, for example, Anthony Hyman, 'The struggle for Afghanistan', *The World Today*, July 1984.

The author is Lecturer in Political Science, Australian National University; and Rockefeller Foundation Fellow in International Relations. Dr Saikal contributed an article on the Pakistan unrest and the Afghanistan problem to the March 1984 issue of *The World Today*. This article is based on a paper presented at the September 1984 Conference of the Australasian Middle Eastern Studies Association.

in the country. The pro-Moscow People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had seized state power in April 1978 and had been fully supported by the Soviet Union as a bridgehead for transforming Afghanistan into a 'Soviet Socialist periphery', had proved to be highly factionalised, incompetent and unpopular. In continuing intra-party fighting, the PDPA's Khalqi faction under Noor Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin had outmanoeuvred the Parcham faction, led by Babrak Karmal—much to the annoyance of the Soviet Union which preferred Karmal and his followers to their rivals for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. At the same time, neither could the Khalqis rule without all-round support from the Soviet Union, nor could the Soviet Union back away from providing such support, given its initial commitment to the survival of the PDPA regime. However, the Khalqis could not progress far beyond instituting a 'Stalinist Khalqi gang rule'. They failed to widen their narrowing power-base. They drove the Islamic-tribal circles into forming armed Islamic resistance forces (the Mojaheddin), and the people into supporting the Mojaheddin. They also proved to be very unreliable allies for the Soviet Union, particularly under Amin's presidency (September-December 1979). As a result of these factors, the Soviet Union saw both its short- and long-term interests threatened in Afghanistan.

The Soviet government was convinced that it was running out of internal mechanisms of control in Afghanistan. It feared that the collapse of the PDPA regime was imminent and that it would very likely be replaced by a hostile Islamic regime—the only alternative available after the Khalqi's elimination of all other alternatives (except the Parchamis who were protected by Moscow). That was what led the Kremlin to decide on an invasion. The invasion was its last option, to achieve by force what it had failed to do through political means. At the time, while there was in the Islamic world and the west (including Washington), some sympathy for the Mojaheddin, there is no shred of evidence to substantiate the Soviet claim that the Mojaheddin, or as they are called, 'imperialist-backed bandits', were receiving substantial material support from sympathetic circles, least of all the Carter Administration which was keen to pursue a policy of understanding and accommodation with the Soviet Union. The Afghan resistance stemmed largely from the distinctive nature of the Afghan people. They are individualistic, with a complex ethnic, tribal structure and socially pluralistic. At the same time, they are fiercely Islamic, patriotic and proud, with limited political sophistication, and therefore capable of mounting collective ideological and physical opposition to any foreign, particularly communist, imposition. In this they are helped by their traditional skill in tribal warfare and their mastery of Afghanistan's rough and mountainous territory, whose permeable borders with the non-communist world make it extremely difficult for any central government, let alone a weak one, to impose its rule throughout the land.

The Soviet stance

The Soviet invasion was, by and large, a response to the developments inside

Afghanistan. It was to pre-empt the imminent collapse of the PDPA regime and to reassert Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Given the Kremlin's close monitoring of the progress of the Afghan crisis and the amount of time that it had to examine options available to it, it would be hazardous to assume that the Soviet decision-makers made the decision to invade either in a vacuum or on a basis of gross miscalculation of its possible implications. They made their decision, as Brezhnev put it, '. . . in full awareness of their responsibility and took all circumstances into account'[4] in order to avert 'a serious danger to the security of the Soviet Union' which had arisen on the Soviet Union's southern border'.[5]

Having committed itself further through an invasion to the survival and continuation of the PDPA regime, now under its old and favourite agent, Babrak Karmal, whom it installed on liquidating its former but unreliable ally, Amin (thus giving ascendency to the Parchamis over the Khalqis), the Soviet Union soon set out a negotiating position. Brezhnev declared that the Soviet side would be prepared to withdraw its 'limited contingent' of troops only 'with the agreement of the Afghan government'. Furthermore, this could be done only when all the 'counter-revolutionary' activities against the PDPA regime were 'completely stopped' and on the basis of 'accords between Afghanistan and its neighbours' which would be required to give 'dependable guarantees' that they would no longer support the 'counter-revolutionary gangs'.[6] In other words, he made the possible withdrawal of Soviet troops conditional upon Afghanistan's neighbours recognising the sovereignty of the PDPA regime, closing their borders to the Mojaheddin and ceasing all support for them; in effect, helping the Soviet Union to eliminate the opposition in Afghanistan and thus conceding the country to the Soviet Union for ever. This represented, as Brezhnev put it, 'the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, and we adhere to it firmly'.[7]

The Soviet 'negotiating' position was advanced in the context of the prevailing situation in Afghanistan and the Soviet need to contain it by consolidating the Karmal regime as an instrument for whatever the Soviet leadership wanted to achieve in Afghanistan (and possibly beyond). Nearly five years have passed since the start of the Soviet invasion, but the original Soviet negotiating position, as reiterated from time to time by Soviet leaders and backed by Soviet actions, has remained unchanged. The Soviet Union may, of course, at some time in the future alter its negotiating position and withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Afghanistan's neighbours, the Islamic world and the west have shown (and continue to show) a serious interest in a negotiated settlement,

[4] For the text of Brezhnev's statement, see F. Schulze, (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy Today: Reports and Commentaries From the Soviet Press*, (Columbus: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1983), pp. 97–8.

[5] Quoted in *Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life* (Oxford· The Academy of Sciences of the USSR and Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 141.

[6] L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981), p. 18.

[7] *ibid.*

[illegible] withdrawal of Soviet troops and a freely [illegible] Afghan government. But, for the time being, the position in Afghanistan remains unchanged.

The Khalqis versus the Parchamis

The PDPA regime continues to remain very narrowly based and highly fragmented. *The Parchamis are divided among themselves into several cliques, around Karmal and some of his Ministers (Ali Keshmand, Suleiman* Layeq and Abdul Majid Serbiland). *The Khalqis still feel deep hatred* for the Parchamis and intense resentment against the Soviet *Union. The* Khalqis, who are mostly Pushtun (the largest ethnic group and *historically the rival* of the second largest ethnic group, the Tajik, to which most of the Parchamis belong), feel betrayed by the Parchamis and their Soviet backers, who killed their leader, Amin, and wrested top power positions from them. They still have not forgiven either the Parchamis or the Soviet Union and, according to their ethnic code of honour (*Pushtunwali*), the only way they can settle their feud with them is through bloodshed, resulting in a decisive victory of one over another. This bloodshed has, indeed, continued unabated to the present day. The Khalqis are doing everything possible to undermine the position of the Parchamis and their Soviet patrons. The Soviet Union is showing itself incapable of putting an end to the bloodshed and of bringing about the urgently needed party unity, to which it had committed itself at the start of its invasion.

The latest manifestation of this intra-party feud was the fight in July 1984 between two of Karmal's senior Cabinet members, the Defence Minister, General Abdul Qadir, and the Communications Minister, Aslam Watanjar.[8] Qadir and Watanjar, who both played an active role in the coup of April 1978 which brought the PDPA to power and in the crisis which prompted the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, belong to rival ethnic groups and factions of the PDPA. Their growing rivalry and suspicion of one another finally came to a head in the wake of the heavy Soviet losses in the 1984 spring offensives against the Mojaheddin commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and his force in the strategic Panjshir valley. Karmal and the Soviet command, possibly at Watanjar's instigation, demoted Qadir to a less important position. In an incident typical of PDPA rule, Qadir shot Watanjar, wounding him seriously. Qadir's own fate is not known.

The Mojaheddin challenge

Thus intra-party fighting, which has not allowed the PDPA to develop anything beyond a frail power structure, has been compounded further by the Mojaheddin's deep penetration of the Karmal administration at all levels and their growing popularity and fighting strength. The Mojaheddin's agents have succeeded in occupying influential administrative, military and security positions. This enables them to frustrate the government's administrative and security efforts. They have been able, for example, to secure

[8] *The Times*, 11 July 1984.

the release from the maximum security Puli-Charki concentration camp (just outside Kabul) of hundreds of the Mojaheddin and their sympathisers, many of whom are now in Peshawar and other parts of the world. They have also managed to give adequate advance warning to the Mojaheddin units of planned Soviet assaults and operations.[9] This was illustrated by the advance information that Commander Massoud received about the last Soviet assault, the biggest of its kind since December 1979. The information enabled Massoud to evacuate most of his fighters and the valley dwellers, and to make sufficient tactical preparation to minimise his own casualties but maximise the Soviet ones. As a result, despite their initial claim of victory, the Soviet troops reportedly lost about 2,000 men as against some 300 Mojaheddin killed, without achieving full control over the entire valley to the present day.[10]

This degree of the Mojaheddin's active influence within the Karmal administration helps to build up public support for them and to increase their fighting capability. Undeniably, the Mojaheddin have been very divided, and poorly armed, trained and coordinated. Their leaders, most of whom have their headquarters in border towns in Pakistan, are locked in continuing rivalry on both personal and ideological grounds. This, however, has not seriously prevented the Mojaheddin military units inside Afghanistan from achieving today a level of popularity and resistance which few analysts and observers of Afghan politics and society could have foreseen at the beginning of the Soviet invasion. They claim to have more than 100,000 armed men and to control most of the countryside and small-medium size towns, with access to and operational capacity within the major cities. Kandahar and Herat, the second and third largest cities of Afghanistan, have frequently changed hands, but Kabul, the capital, has also proved vulnerable to the Mojaheddin's operations. At the moment, the Karmal government and Soviet troops control the first and second checkpoints in and immediately out of the conurbation of Kabul, but most of the remaining checkpoints on different routes to the frontier with Pakistan are under the control of the Mojaheddin.[11] Kabul itself is a city offering little to its citizens, where insecurity is pervasive and tangible. Karmal and his colleagues cannot trust one another and must be on their guard even within the Cabinet room. The members of the ruling party, the PDPA, cannot rely on each other's support even in moments of urgent need. Contrary to inflated official claims, the PDPA still does not contain more than 3,000 committed members, and its leadership is vulnerable to Mojaheddin attacks, as shown by the reported recent assassination of the Finance Minister, Abdul Wakil, as well as of numerous others.[12] The Soviet authorities have not been able to make even their embassy building and residential compounds immune from the Mojaheddin's periodic attacks.[13] The Karmal regime exercises control over no more than 30,000 troops, whose propensity to defect to the Mojaheddin has been often noted.[14] Given that the Karmal regime's shaky

[9] Private sources. [10] *ibid.*; *The New York Times*, 28 May 1984.
[11] Private sources. [12] *ibid*; *The Times*, 11 July 1984.
[13] Private sources; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 3225, July 1983.
[14] Private sources; also see *International Herald Tribune*, 24 January 1984.

authority is limited to Kabul and a few other major cities, from which most males of military age have fled, it simply lacks a pool on which to draw to replenish its troop numbers.

This is not to suggest that the Mojaheddin have gained military supremacy over the Soviet forces and that Afghanistan has become as much of a drain on the Soviet Union as Vietnam had become for the Americans. But the Mojaheddin have made enough gains to demonstrate that they spearhead a credible popular national struggle, keeping the Soviet forces in a considerable degree of disarray and making their Afghan adventure very costly. The estimated cost of the war for the Soviet Union is running, on average, at 300–400 casualties a month and $15 million a day.[15]

There are several important factors which account for the growing strength of the Mojaheddin. They are: first, the nature of the Afghan people who are fiercely Islamic and patriotic; second, their belief that they have already lost so much that they can scarcely lose any more by supporting the Mojaheddin in defence of their religion, honour and land as a prelude to gaining Islamic martyrdom in the world hereafter; third, the fact that the Mojaheddin field commanders—who are very remote from their leadership headquarters, have considerable independence, and are not as politicised and divided as their leaders in Pakistan—have been able to cooperate with one another; and fourth, the global and regional circumstances, which have caused a great deal of uncertainty for Moscow but have favoured the Mojaheddin by permitting them uninhibited crossings (especially into Pakistan) and ensuring for them notable amounts of ideological and material support, including some arms from the regional Islamic states, China and the west (mainly the United States). It must, however, be stressed that the last factor has been of secondary importance in relation to the others, for two main reasons. First, the Mojaheddin have met their arms need mostly from what they have salvaged from Soviet and Afghan troops, and what they have themselves produced locally. Second, the nature of the Afghan resistance is such that it could continue even without external assistance. The limited supply of mainly light foreign arms (including those whose delivery has been coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since the last year of the Carter Administration in accordance with Washington's stance in opposition to the Soviet invasion)[16] has been important. It has helped the resistance forces to reduce their casualties and has inhibited the Soviet forces and their surrogates from operating unhindered and cheaply against the strongly hostile Afghan population.

Ultimately, it is the popular nature of the resistance which has prevented the Soviet forces from achieving even their basic objective of securing a viable PDPA bridgehead government, with an adequate administrative and military apparatus. It is also because of this that the Soviet Union, now deeply involved

[15] *Radio Liberty Research*, 3 July 1984; P. Allan and A. A. Stahel, 'Tribal Warfare Against A Colonial Power: Analysing the War in Afghanistan', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 1983), p. 610; private sources.

[16] C. Bernstein, 'Arms for Afghanistan', *The New Republic*, 18 July 1981; *Time*, 11 June 1984.

in Afghanistan and with both prestige and major interests at stake, is not yet in a position even to contemplate seriously the possibility of a negotiated settlement. It is well aware that any agreement involving the withdrawal of Soviet troops would result immediately in the collapse of Karmal's skeleton administration and its probable replacement by an Islamic regime and, therefore, in the defeat of the objectives for which the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the first place. No wonder that it has remained firm in its insistence on the legitimacy of the Karmal government as a non-negotiable matter and in its refusal to commit itself to a definite withdrawal timetable. It is this insistence, not the demand for 'dependable (regional and international) guarantees'—something which Afghanistan's neighbours and the west have pledged to offer upon Soviet withdrawal—that brought the 'Geneva talks' to a dead end in 1983. This may remain so for the foreseeable future, even with the renewal of the talks.

The Soviet case for negotiation

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has a good reason to be interested in a negotiation process, which could in itself serve its interests. Such a process could achieve a number of goals. It could help the Soviet side to buy more time for itself and the beleaguered Karmal government; to play down its political and military setbacks and to intensify its military operations, which started with the spring offensives of 1984; to cause more confusion and dissension within the Mojaheddin; to reduce the regional and, for that matter, international criticism of continuing Soviet presence and the brutal manner in which Soviet forces conduct their operations, including blanket bombing of towns, villages and field crops; to regionalise the Afghan crisis; and, more important, to neutralise Pakistan's support for the Mojaheddin, in particular, and to forestall any major increase in outside assistance to them.

Such a process would also provide the Soviet side with the breathing space to allow certain possible changes in regional-global politics which could result in a more favourable 'correlation of forces', and help it to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union may hope that such changes will occur, above all, in Pakistan and Iran as well as in the American-Soviet relationship. In Pakistan, it is clear that the martial law rule of General Zia-ul-Haq is beset by considerable popular discontent and growing political opposition. To Moscow's advantage, the principal opposition group is the centre-left Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which has, among other issues, drawn on 'the burden of three million Afghan refugees' and Washington's support for the Zia regime to make the latter the focus of popular discontent. It has promised that in the event of its coming to power it would recognise the Karmal regime, close down the Mojaheddin's headquarters in Pakistan and return the refugees to Afghanistan as a way of reaching an accommodation with Moscow over the Afghan crisis.[17] The Soviet Union would indeed be very keen to see this happen and it is hardly surprising that it has been quite active in supporting the

[17] See A. Saikal, 'The Pakistan unrest and the Afghanistan problem', *The World Today*, March 1984, p. 106.

PPP. Similarly, in Iran, where the Khomeini regime has so far supported the Mojaheddin cause and denounced both Washington and Moscow in almost equal terms, possible changes appearing on the horizon could favour the Soviet side. Such changes have lately been signalled by a growing split within the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP) between the hard and soft-line clerics, with the soft-liners favouring an end to the costly war with Iraq and to Iran's global isolation and a more pragmatic approach to Iran's relationship with the Soviet Union and the west. This split may come to a head particularly after Khomeini's death. It is just possible that the soft-liners, under the powerful leadership of the Majlis Speaker, Rafsanjani, may gain the upper hand.[10] Moscow may find such a change quite pleasing.

Furthermore, the Soviet government is aware that the Reagan Administration has come under increasing pressure from peace campaigners and others (including some of the American allies) who advocate a policy of 'realistic accommodation' with the Soviet Union as the best way to relax the current international tensions and to serve the west's interests in the long run. It would be naive of the Soviet leadership if it did not do everything necessary to maximise this pressure and did not count on possible accommodating changes in Washington's behaviour irrespective of who is in the White House in the coming years.

What the west can do

Should the Soviet Union succeed in strengthening its position in Afghanistan, the world would face its most difficult problem there yet. Not only would Afghanistan be lost to the Soviet Union and the threat of Soviet expansion become greater in the region, but the Soviet forces would find themselves much freer to 'pacify' the staunchly anti-communist, anti-Soviet Afghans, causing far more casualties for the Afghan people than anyone could estimate. Given the depth of Soviet involvement in and intransigence over Afghanistan and the level of the suffering and resistance of the Afghan people, there are no present grounds for a viable negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis. Only generous assistance to the Afghan resistance could pave the way for that. As the Afghan campaign became more and more costly for the Soviet Union, it would be essential for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Afghanistan's neighbours to seek to initiate a process of negotiation, in which representatives of all concerned Afghan parties (including the Mojaheddin groups) could participate with the aim of reaching a settlement. The process may be long and agonising as well as costly for the UN, which would need to station a substantial administrative and peacekeeping force for a period of two to five years in place of the Soviet troops so that a national government could come into existence in Afghanistan. This may be a high cost for the world community to pay, but it would be far less than the losses which it would incur if it let Afghanistan go to the Soviet Union for ever.

It could be argued that a substantial increase in outside aid to the Afghan

10 See Rafsanjani's interview in *Kayhan Hawayie*, 25 July 1984 (in Persian).

resistance might induce the Soviet Union to escalate its troop deployment and the war in Afghanistan. This is a possibility, but a remote one, for it would also mean a higher drain on Soviet resources to an extent that the Kremlin might not find acceptable in relation either to its national or global position. The Kremlin leadership may appear to be stubborn and monolithic, but it is also an ageing and conservatively inclined group, which may prefer pragmatism and stability to costly adventurism and ideological glorification.

In conclusion, negotiation can only produce a positive outcome to a crisis where both sides are prepared to make genuine concessions. There is no indication that the Soviet Union has any incentive from the costs which it currently bears to make such concessions. In this author's view, more aid to the Mojaheddin may provide such an incentive. Abandoning the Afghan resistance would not make life easier for the Afghans. All it would do would be to make it easier for the Soviet Union to absorb Afghanistan.

Book note

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING

By Indar Jit Rikhye (London: C. Hurst & Co., for the International Peace Academy), 258 pages, £12.95.

GENERAL Rikhye writes of what he knows. His personal experience of peacekeeping operations by international forces serving under the United Nations flag has been unsurpassed in its scope and variety. Between 1957, when he went to Sinai with the Indian battalion of the first UN Emergency Force (Unef-1), and 1969, when he retired from the post of military adviser to the UN Secretary-General, he was actively involved in the operations in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire), and in New Guinea, Yemen and Cyprus. During his service with the UN he also took part in exploratory missions to Cuba, the Dominican Republic and other flashpoint areas.

The International Peace Academy, which was largely his creation and which he has headed since his retirement, is no mere talk-shop. It provides, among other things, training courses to which more than 100 governments have sent soldiers and diplomats so that they can learn from the hard-won experience of others in their professions who have wrestled with the task of international peacekeeping 'in the field'. The IPA thus fills a gap which the UN itself has been prevented from filling, mainly by Soviet suspicions.

As the Academy's very active president, General Rikhye has closely followed all the developments in peacekeeping since his own service as a soldier ended. In this book, he reviews not only the UN operations but also the rele-

vant activities of other organisations—such as the Arab states' mustering of a 4,200-strong force to shield Kuwait when it was threatened by Iraq, or the provision of a five-nation Commonwealth monitoring force at the time of Zimbabwe's swift transition in 1980 from a state of civil war to elections and internationally recognised independence.

Unlike the books about peacekeeping produced by academic researchers, which tend to smell of the lamp, this one bears a professional soldier's stamp. As a former commander of UN troops, General Rikhye understands the challenges faced by soldiers who often have to risk their lives, not in battle against their own country's enemies, but in maintaining or restoring peace between antagonists who are apt to turn their weapons against the peacekeepers.

His criticisms and recommendations are largely concerned with what could be done to make the peacekeeping soldier's task less difficult; one of his chapter headings is 'Management: the essence', which shows what he thinks. He is realistic about the factors that complicate planning and procedures when troops from several different countries have to share a delicate task, when international disputation makes it hard to give the soldiers precise orders, when a fast-changing situation may necessitate improvisations (and the improvisers always have to be careful not to exceed the limited authority they have been given). But General Rikhye sees, and sets out, a number of things that can be done to remedy existing weaknesses in the system.

This is not, however, just a nuts-and-bolts book. General Rikhye is well aware of the political difficulties that surround both the general concept of peacekeeping by international forces and each of the specific cases in which it has been applied. He devotes one useful chapter to the long and intricate negotiations carried on since 1965 in the 33-nation Committee on Peacekeeping set up by the UN Assembly. He spells out clearly the political conditions that are essential for the launching and effectiveness of these international operations—and explains, with sometimes painful honesty, how in several notorious cases those conditions have not been met.

His comments on these cases will not make pleasant reading for some of the interested parties. But that is the way it is for the peacekeeper, whose relationships with his 'clients' resemble, in many ways, those of a dentist. It is not his job to assure them that, if they go on behaving as before, all will be well. He has to tell them that a nasty problem must be attended to before it gets even worse—even though they are not likely to enjoy the treatment. And in the end most of us, after trying not even to think about the dentist for a long time, go back to him—grumbling, apprehensive, touchy, but ultimately recognising that we need his experienced services if catastrophe is to be averted.

ANDREW BOYD*

*Mr Boyd, a leader-writer and specialist correspondent on *The Economist*, is a leading expert on the United Nations and the author of *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg*, a history of the UN Security Council, and of other books and studies on various aspects of international affairs.

Notes of the month

INDIA WITHOUT INDIRA

TRIBUTES to Mrs Indira Gandhi, assassinated on 31 October by Sikh members of her own bodyguard, have been in marked contrast to the censure she has received from liberal opinion both inside and outside India over the past decade. British newspapers, for instance, have consistently interpreted India's recent troubles—from communal massacres in Assam and sectarian terror in Punjab to the destabilisation of state governments in Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh—as the direct outcome of Mrs Gandhi's excessive over-centralisation of power, her manipulation of factional conflicts, and her stubborn refusal to reach sensible accommodations with the centrifugal forces of region, language and religion. In the wake of her assassination, many of these critics have discovered the other side of the coin: Mrs Gandhi's indispensable position as prime guarantor and upholder of strong, stable central government in a state whose very existence has always been suspected in the west of being built on illusory foundations.

Undoubtedly, as the fulsomeness of international condolences testified, Mrs Gandhi's assassination marks the end of an era. For 18 years, she dominated the politics of the subcontinent, reshaped its boundaries and charted an aggressively independent course for her country between east and west. With some reason, foreign governments are uncertain of the direction India without Indira will take. But within India itself, some of Mrs Gandhi's domestic legacies have long been taking shape. The fashionable question in the latter years of her father's life was, 'After Nehru, who?' At least since Mrs Gandhi's return to power in 1980, the more relevant question has been, 'After Indira, what?' Implicit in the difference between those two questions is the assumption that, whatever the scale of Mrs Gandhi's contribution to India, she has presided over the decay of a system of government which she inherited intact from her father. Further evidence of the system's bankruptcy can be seen in the automatic induction of her relatively inexperienced son, who only four years ago was flying Boeing 737s for Indian Airlines, as captain of the ship of state.

Mr Rajiv Gandhi, who so far has acted with reassuring composure and firmness, inherits from his mother, along with supreme executive power, a number of intractable problems. Having contained the unnerving mob violence which erupted for the first time ever against the Sikh community after the assassination, his most immediate concern is the general election which is to be held on 24 December. He looks set to lead the ruling Congress-I Party back to the kind of solid majority in Parliament which party strategists were doubting was possible before Mrs Gandhi's death.

For the time being, until he has gathered in the sympathy vote, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's party needs him. After five more years of Congress dominance have

been assured, however, he is bound to find his authority coming under more serious challenge than it has so far. Mrs Gandhi systematically nipped in the bud all potential rivalry to herself. Chief ministers of states ruled by the party carrying her name, the Congress Indira, were arbitrarily appointed one day and unceremoniously deposed the next. Never much concerned with party-building, Mrs Gandhi manipulated party appointments and neglected inner-party democracy, apparently unconcerned by the resulting unbridled factionalism which has tarnished the party's image and hampered the effectiveness of Congress-run state governments throughout the country.

In contrast, Rajiv Gandhi has spent his short political apprenticeship immersed in the problems of party organisation. His aim has been to rebuild Congress-I as a cadre-based party, using modern management methods and relying on organisations like the party's youth wing to collect data on the performance of local leaders. He almost certainly intends to bring some of his aides—who mainly represent the urban elite and managerial class— into positions of elected responsibility at the forthcoming polls. Now that she has gone, some former Congress leaders who broke with Mrs Gandhi in the second half of the 1970s may also have hopes of returning to the fold and establishing their influence within it. But, members of both these groups will inevitably come into conflict with the so-called 'loyalists', many of whom have inherited through family or caste (or have constructed for themselves) substantial local support. Rajiv Gandhi has the temporary advantage of being the dispenser of party tickets. But after the elections, there is no guarantee that his writ will run smoothly throughout the party. The alleged involvement of Congress men in the anti-Sikh violence which followed Mrs Gandhi's murder is only one of several recent signs that the party has resisted Rajiv's attempts as General Secretary to impose greater discipline upon it.

As well as the problem of matching his mother's personal hold over an otherwise anarchic party, Rajiv Gandhi faces the question of how to deal with states where linguistic, regional or religious aspirations have been successfully articulated and translated into political power by opponents of the Congress-I. The challenge of regional and parochial forces, backed by 'outside forces', to the integrity of India had already been identified by Congress as the major issue for the forthcoming elections before Mrs Gandhi's murder by Sikh extremists. The tough line which Rajiv publicly advocated in Punjab, and the part he is reputed to have played this year in the controversial dismissal of two elected non-Congress state Chief Ministers in Kashmir and Andhra, suggest that his approach to the question will not be all that different from the confrontationist stance of his mother.

Yet the insistent demand of India's states for less central interference and greater control over financial resources and economic development is unlikely to die away now that Mrs Gandhi has gone. Even she, by appointing a commission to look into the whole area of centre-state relations 18 months ago, showed a certain awareness of the widespread discontent she had caused by strengthening the power of the centre at the expense of the states within

India's supposedly semi-federal Constitution. With the recent growth of regionally based parties and the corresponding decline of Congress in those areas, it is not a matter that Rajiv Gandhi will be able to put off indefinitely—though he can certainly wait until after the general elections.

What makes the conflict between the centre and the states particularly difficult for the new Prime Minister is the form it has taken in Punjab. There, for the past two years, the religious fanaticism of the few has grown in the shadow of the less extreme but still far-reaching political and economic demands of the many. Any solution to the problem (if indeed solution is possible after the damage caused to the Golden Temple in June, Mrs Gandhi's assassination and the ensuing mob onslaught against the Sikhs in general) would have to involve at least some concessions by Delhi on matters affecting its relations with Punjab state. In the present climate of mistrust, and with no sign of reasonable and responsible leadership emerging among Punjab's Sikhs, it is hard to see how Rajiv Gandhi could make any such concessions without appearing weak and raising the dreaded spectre of secessionism.

What is more, the old 'Punjab problem' has now become the 'Sikh problem', which increases the delicacy and dangers of the Prime Minister's task. Not only are there fears that he too is in danger of an assassin's bullet; but the inevitable suspicion that is bound to cling to Sikhs in general after the murder of Mrs Gandhi by two members of her trusted personal bodyguard could put additional strain on Sikh loyalties. This spells danger for national institutions, such as the army and the civil service, where Sikhs are extremely well represented. The permanent alienation of India's Sikh community is unthinkable if the country is to survive in its present shape. Forestalling that eventuality is an even more pressing problem for Rajiv Gandhi than rebuilding his mother's party or restructuring centre-state relations.

Mrs Gandhi's divide-and-rule tactics in Punjab may have unwittingly helped to create the confrontation that eventually led to her death. But she was primarily an upholder of secularism in a country where sectarian and communal passions remain fissionable material in the hands of unscrupulous power-seekers. Rajiv Gandhi has inherited his mother's mantle and, without doubt, her secular outlook. The question, though, is whether he has the capacity and the time to neutralise India's explicitly divisive forces, and to divert its potentially divisive ones into constructive cooperation with a strong centre, before he is swept away by the current.

GEORGE ARNEY*

* The author studied Indian history and politics at Cambridge and London Universities. He joined the Eastern Service of the BBC External Services after returning from India, and for the past three years has been writing commentaries mainly for the BBC Hindi, Urdu and Bengali Services.

AFTER NICARAGUA'S ELECTION

For Nicaragua's Sandinists, the presidential election on 4 November, won by *Comandante* Daniel Ortega, was free and fair; to President Reagan it was a 'farce'. It may have been neither.

The outward signs of legality were respected. There were opposition candidates. Polling stations opened, and voters were seen queuing up. There was an opposition newspaper carrying criticism of the government. When the results poured in, they were described as a 'plebiscite' for the government.

The vote reflected the support which the Sandinists have in some segments of the population, especially the impressionable and newly enfranchised young people aged 16–18 who have grown up since 1979 under a barrage of Sandinist propaganda. But thinking is conditioned throughout the world. If free elections were held in Cuba and Chile, Presidents Castro and Pinochet would probably emerge with most votes (though not perhaps a clear majority).

The Sandinists insisted throughout that they believed in 'pluralism'. They pointed to Nicaragua's two non-Sandinist trade union federations and the lively private enterprise association. The economy has a substantial private sector. The Roman Catholic Church maintains many schools throughout the country.

What matters for most Nicaraguans, however, is the political reality that is hammered home daily: that political and military power is in the hands of the nine revolutionary *comandantes*, who will not give it up without a fight. And the *comandantes* have installed a regime in which there is little distinction between the state and the ruling Sandinist Front for National Liberation (FSLN).

This identity of the party with the state is everywhere: in the Sandinist police, the Sandinist armed forces, the Sandinist television and radio news programmes, the Sandinism taught in schools and universities (together with Marxism) and, above all, in the Sandinist Defence Committees. It is these committees which supervise activities in each *barrio* (district) and distribute ration cards for rice, beans, cooking oil, soap and toilet paper. Militants of the Defence Committees got out the vote on 4 November.

If a carpenter needs wood, he joins a Sandinist carpenters' cooperative, which obtains wood from official sources. If he does not want to be a Sandinist, he has to buy wood unofficially from cooperative members—at a price. An employee of an office or a shop receives a wage fixed by the Ministry of Labour by category, regardless of how hard the employee works or how successful the employer is.

Nicaraguan farmers buy their seeds, fertiliser and insecticide from the Ministry of Agriculture, which tells them what to grow and how much to pay their workers and then buys their produce. The art of the farmer consists in getting a good deal from the ministry. Banking and foreign trade are nationalised. Non-Sandinist union leaders are allowed to try to organise workers but after they register them with the Ministry of Labour, it sends an inspector to tell

the workers they should not link up with a union tied to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but join the Sandinist one.

When children go to school, the first thing they do is sing the Sandinist anthem. Some of them come home spouting the Sandinist rhetoric that they have learned.

Catholic church leaders have fought to obtain extensions of residence permits for foreign missionaries (16 missionaries have already been expelled). The Sandinists agreed only after strong Vatican pressure to give the priests new permits—but only for three months. The implication was that further extensions depend on good behaviour.

Good behaviour means helping the Sandinists in the parishes, making the church hall available for party-sponsored activities and supporting the revolution in general. In the countryside, pressures to do this can be strong. And if the priest joins the Sandinists, he deprives his parish of its only independent non-Sandinist authority.

Bookshops, always a mirror to society, are full of Soviet, Cuban and local revolutionary volumes. The official explanation is that Nicaragua cannot afford to buy western books and that the Soviet and Cuban ones are provided free.

Opposition politicians fared badly in this atmosphere and the main opposition group, the *Coordinadora Democratica*, refused to take part in the election. The *Coordinadora* is formed by three political parties (including the Conservatives and the Social Democrats), two pro-western trade unions and the private enterprise association. It demanded an end to linkage between the FSLN and the state; an end to press censorship; freedom of association and access to the media; and an effort at national conciliation.

It held two meetings, one public and the second in a private house. Both were disrupted by Sandinist gangs whom the Minister of the Interior, *Comandante* Tomas Borge, calls *turbas divinas* (divine mobs). (In a probably unconscious echo of the 'Ministry of Love' in George Orwell's '1984', Mr Borge calls his Ministry of the Interior 'the sentinel of the people's happiness'.)

The small Liberal Party, whose presidential candidate had served as the Sandinists' Minister of Labour, pulled out of the election at the last moment on the grounds that the conditions for a free vote did not exist. (The opposition newspaper, *La Prensa*, which had been only lightly censored in the run-up to the election, was so heavily censored on the day after the Liberal Party's decision that it did not publish.)

The even smaller Conservative Party (a splinter of the much bigger Conservatives in the *Coordinadora*) convened a meeting at which its governing committee was said to be ready to pull out. Unexpectedly, some *turba*-like youths and the presidential candidate, who is close to the Sandinists, disrupted the meeting and no vote was held. Later, eight members of the 16-member committee held a meeting and voted that the party should stay in the election. The other opposition parties were a tiny left-wing Christian Party and three small Marxist-Leninist groups, including the Communist Party.

The Sandinists accused the CIA and American Embassy officials of trying to bribe opposition parties not to take part. Though this was never proved, it was certainly in the interest of the Reagan Administration that western-style parties did not give credibility to an election which the regime was bound to win.

The next stage is uncertain. Anti-Sandinist rebels are fighting in the hills and are said by the Sandinists to number between 6,000 and 15,000 men. Though many have been aided and trained by the Americans in the past, Congress has cut off any financial backing. Some of the senior men worked for the pre-1979 Somoza regime but the best-known, *Comandante* Eden Pastora, is a disillusioned Sandinist. The young men in the hills, many of whom are risking their lives, grew to adulthood under Sandinism. Financial aid is now apparently coming from private businessmen.

Immediately after the election in Nicaragua, which preceded the American one by two days, a crisis built up over American allegations, denied in Nicaragua, that the Sandinists are importing Soviet Mig-21 aircraft in crates. The dispute underlined the Sandinists dependence on the Soviet Union, which supplies its arms, many of its tractors, lorries and cars, and about 70 per cent of its oil.

The Sandinists now have several options. First, they can press on with Marxist policies and dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, as suggested by *Comandante* Bayardo Arce in a secret speech earlier this year. This will increasingly isolate them in Central America and the world. Second, they can seek conciliation with the opposition in the political parties and the Catholic Church. But this will require acceptance of the opposition demand for an open society—a demand not easy for a Marxist revolutionary regime to concede. Third, they can make conciliatory gestures while consolidating their power in the new Constituent Assembly (which was elected in the presidential poll).

The Sandinists may well adopt the third way. It is improbable that this will satisfy the *Coordinadora*, the church or the rebels. It is unlikely to convince the other Central American members of the Contadora group of mediating countries—Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico. The Contadora group is to present soon a revised version of its draft treaty for peace in Central America, which includes verified cuts in arms, troop strengths and foreign advisers and guarantees for free elections. Though the Sandinists said they would accept the previous version, the election in Nicaragua did not meet Contadora's terms, which said that all parties should compete on an equal footing. It is also far from certain that the Sandinists, and their Cuban and Russian allies, will submit to inspection, though the other Central Americans proclaim that they will. As Nicaragua is unlikely to become an open society living at peace with its neighbours and the United States, the outlook is for continued instability.

ROLAND DALLAS*

*The author, a former Reuters correspondent in Latin America and now Editor of *The Economist's Foreign Report*, has recently visited Nicaragua.

MBFR and conventional forces reductions in Europe

ABBOTT BRAYTON

CONCERN about the nuclear arms race and recent nuclear arms control efforts have captured public attention, but have obscured another important arms control issue: conventional arms reductions. Representatives of communist and non-communist states met again in Vienna in September in another attempt to break the stalemate which has prevented an agreement to reduce armed forces in Europe and to lower the risk of confrontation between the superpowers.

The fear of a nuclear holocaust has become so great that in many countries the public has almost too readily come to terms with the idea of conventional war. There are several dangers in this complacency. First, most of the $600 billion or so spent on arms each year is devoted not to nuclear, but to conventional armaments.[1] Second, major conventional arms imbalances in regions such as Europe, the Middle East or north-east Asia threaten the political balance there and could trigger conflicts among the big powers, even nuclear conflicts. Third, the daily slaughter of human beings in so-called 'low intensity' conflicts throughout the world is committed by conventional armaments.

The background

Recognising these dangers, political and military leaders of the western states initiated a process of conventional arms reductions which, quite appropriately, focused on Europe, the region with the world's highest concentration of armaments and where any armed conflict would very probably develop into a nuclear war.[2] Preliminary discussions between Nato and the Warsaw Treaty led to the opening in Vienna in October 1973 of formal arms reduction negotiations, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) conference. After more than a decade of dialogue, MBFR appears to be no closer to an agreement than when it first opened.

[1] See Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983* (Leesburg WMSE Publications, 1983).

[2] The early Nato strategy was to substitute nuclear weapons for large conventional forces to deter Soviet aggression. States were unwilling to commit the manpower and economic resources to the Cold War struggle. Technology appeared to be an inexpensive solution, based on the assumption that the west always would enjoy technological superiority. Now that the Soviet side has attained at least nuclear parity, many consider that the probability of war has increased and can be reduced only through significant Nato conventional force increases. Without this, these critics assert, the Soviet Union will be tempted to strike and the west will be forced to defend itself with nuclear weapons.

Dr Brayton is Professor of International Politics at the East Tennessee State University in Johnson City, Tennessee. He specialises in questions of European security.

This gloomy assessment, however, may not be entirely accurate. It is tr that both sides are busy increasing their military strength without regard MBFR, but official attitudes are changing. Thus, for example, the Reag Administration at first showed little enthusiasm for MBFR. This attitu reflected the American conservatives' reaction against what they saw as weakening of American defences in the 1970s and their subsequent mistrust arms control talks. But the National Security Council at its meeting in M 1983 showed a new interest in MBFR and endorsed a document for the ch. American delegate at the MBFR talks to take to Vienna.

MBFR is an important component of a wider effort to cut the costs of defen and to reduce the likelihood of war between the major blocs. This effort h not been entirely without success. In the 20 years before 1980, the Unit States underwent dramatic shifts in the allocation of governmental resour between military and non-military programmes. Despite the Vietnam co flict, the federal budget during this period virtually reversed itself on defen spending. In 1960 approximately half of all federal spending was on defen programmes and a fourth on human services programmes. By 1980, there h been a shift to an allocation of a quarter of all federal spending to defence an half on human service programmes.[3]

The superpowers have accomplished several notable arms control achiev ments during this period, despite major political confrontations and ideol gical differences. Limitations were imposed upon nuclear testing, deplo ments, and even the size of strategic arsenals. Negotiations have been takii place to reduce sharply the number of long-range and medium-range nu lear missiles. Agreements also have been negotiated to restrict the applic tion of military force in other areas, such as chemical and biological weapons through the use of confidence-building measures.

Limitations of conventional forces, however, have been less successful. Tl worldwide growth of conventional armaments has been dramatic, particula among the newly emerging nations. Statistically, Europe has not experienc a dramatic surge in conventional armaments, but this is because the area central Europe has throughout our century consistently maintained a hi level of armaments.

Since 1960 there have been modest conventional arms reductions Europe, compelled primarily by demographic and economic factors and tl absence since 1945 of significant conflicts between states. Several states ha reduced the levels of manpower in their armed forces, focusing instead on tl technology of weaponry to provide defence. This has supplemented redu tions in defence spending (as a percentage of total spending) and has help ease tensions in what has traditionally been a tinderbox political environmen

Armaments reductions by Nato alone, however, would not bring lasti peace. The greatest threat to peace has always come from systemic instabiliti

[3] See William K. Domke, Richard C. Eikenberg, Catherine M. Kelleher, 'The Illusion Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978', *Americ Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 1983, pp. 19-35.

not simply the levels of armaments. It is when states think that significant arms imbalances are occurring that they begin to behave dangerously. A more secure peace would require bilateral arms reductions by both Nato and Warsaw Pact countries, and especially in the critical central sector between the North Sea and Switzerland where contending armies have been massed since the Second World War.

The MBFR negotiations were to provide for a scaled reduction of forces in the central sector in a way that would not threaten any of the parties in the negotiations. (The parties are: the Benelux countries, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland—all within the potential treaty area—plus countries with military forces in the region, namely the United States, Canada, Britain and the Soviet Union. Indirectly, other participants are the remaining Nato and Warsaw Pact members except Portugal, Iceland and France.) Unfortunately, MBFR has been a victim of political disagreements arising out of a variety of national fears and ambitions.

The drawbacks of MBFR

If accomplished, significant bilateral conventional arms reductions in the central sector could have potentially negative effects upon both alliances. For both sides, a mismanaged reduction of conventional forces could erode public confidence in their defence against aggression and could stimulate dangerous national behaviour.

For Nato, MBFR could stimulate a weakening of political will to support the alliance, similar to corresponding attitudes among the European democracies in the 1930s. Unless Nato's shift of attitudes were matched by the Warsaw Pact, the resulting imbalance of political will could encourage the Soviet side to embark on aggressive policies which would raise, not lower, the probability of war. Similarly, MBFR could stimulate a series of substantive arms reductions by individual western nations well beyond MBFR limits, which could create a significant arms imbalance. Also, MBFR could allow the Soviet Union either to reduce its military forces and enjoy an economic pay-off, which in time would lead to a stronger and militarily more dangerous economy, or to redeploy those forces to threaten its Middle Eastern or Asian neighbours. Finally, MBFR could initially raise the costs of basing American forces in the United States—assuming they were not demobilised.

The benefits of MBFR

Conversely, MBFR promises some important positive benefits to all sides. Most important, it could help lessen east-west tensions and reduce the likelihood of war. MBFR, however, does not address the basic issues which cause those tensions and thus cannot be regarded as a harbinger of peace. East-west tensions and competition will continue regardless of the outcome of these negotiations, but they could be played out at a lower level of military activity and with a commensurate reduction in defence costs.

For the United States, MBFR offers significant advantages. It would allow

the return of some American forces from Europe which, in time, would lead to cost savings and a modest improvement in the American balance of payments. From a military perspective, it would deflect public and congressional criticism of the over-commitment of American forces to Nato so long after the end of the Second World War, and improve soldier morale. Personnel assignments to forces based in the United States would be stabilised, with commensurate improvements in training and readiness. Forces back from Europe would be available for deployment in crises outside Nato, thus enhancing American strategic flexibility.

Nato countries, especially West Germany, would see their military manpower problems eased by MBFR. Recent studies indicate that West Germany will be hard pressed to maintain a 500,000-strong active military force throughout the decade and still provide for civilian manpower needs. A similar pattern is likely in other Nato countries, including the United States. Demography is working against Nato.

An MBFR which included a strong package of confidence-building measures would further reduce political and military tensions by providing intelligence war-warning indicators.[4] The American MBFR proposal includes 10 such measures, referred to as Associated Measures.

TABLE 1: MBFR ASSOCIATED MEASURES

1. Non-indigenous powers (Canada, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union) must give prior notification of the movement of ground forces into the area of reduction (Nato Guidelines Area, or NGA for short).
2. Ground forces must enter and leave the NGA only through designated entry and exit points.
3. Each side will have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry and exit points.
4. Each side will have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspection trips into the NGA belonging to the other side.
5. There would be a periodic exchange of data on forces stationed within the NGA.
6. There would be no interference with the National Technical Means (technical intelligence means of verifying treaty compliance) of the other side.
7. A Standing Consultative Commission would oversee treaty compliance.
8. Prior notification of division size (10,000 or more personnel) movements throughout Europe, including the western part of the Soviet Union.
9. The right of either side to send observers to such movements.
10. Manpower freeze during the negotiation and implementation of MBFR.*

* Although not specified in the American July 1982 proposal, the last three measures (8–10) have been proposed at various stages of the negotiations.
Source: John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions* (Elmsford: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 135–43, 149.

Finally, MBFR addresses the fundamental human striving for peace and

[4] See Abbott A. Brayton, 'Confidence-Building Measures in European security', *The World Today*, October 1980.

security. People seek survival, security, prosperity, and other goals which are threatened by the spectre of war and an expensive arms level, if not arms race. MBFR promotes a momentum towards peace which does not threaten international stability and the balance of power. It serves quite well the motivations of survival and prosperity, while preserving legitimate security interests.

On balance, it appears that the benefits from a successful MBFR agreement far outweigh its drawbacks, especially if the latter can be minimised through good negotiation.

The Soviet view

The Soviet Union, in its view of MBFR, has well-documented goals and interests. The most important of these is the Soviet belief that it is necessary to maintain strong forces in eastern Europe to protect long-range Soviet security and 'historical goals'. Soviet conventional force superiority[5] was established at great cost with the aim of influencing German behaviour and of maintaining a hegemonic relationship over the eastern European states. Soviet actions since 1945 show no sign of a willingness to forfeit that advantage or its military power base in eastern Europe. Soviet demographic problems alone will not compel force reductions, but a limited, balanced reduction could be acceptable. Any western proposal that threatened the Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe or made German reunification more likely would probably be rejected immediately.

The German issue is of far greater importance to the east than to the west. The Warsaw Pact probably does not want a total removal of Nato (especially American) forces from West Germany, unless West German force levels are strictly limited. To the Soviet Union, a small Nato presence provides insurance against a revival of German nationalism, and many smaller European countries agree. If Soviet conduct since the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki is anything to go by, the Soviet Union will not offer serious guarantees of good behaviour in return for MBFR. MBFR is not as important as CSCE, and even CSCE pledges have been violated. The Soviet leadership simply does not believe in 'linkage'; it symbolises a loss of sovereignty and unacceptable restrictions upon its national policy.

Since, in the Soviet view, Nato is largely under American control, MBFR is seen in Moscow as a means of eroding American influence in Europe and of weakening the cohesion of Nato. It can be expected that Moscow will take full advantage of MBFR, to try to reduce Nato force levels (especially of American and West German armies), and to boost east-west trade. This frightens some conservative political elements in the United States and causes them to oppose MBFR in any form. They have a point, in that an agreement which moved Soviet forces a few hundred miles eastward, while Nato forces were demobilised or moved several thousand miles westward, would be an unbalanced

[5] Soviet conventional force superiority is documented and analysed in *The Military Balance: 1982–83* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982). See the article entitled 'The East–West Conventional Balance in Europe', pp. 129–33.

agreement. MBFR, however, need not have this outcome. A better, mor balanced reduction can be negotiated which would benefit all sides. Signifi cant conceptual barriers exist, however, which must be overcome.

Conceptual barriers to negotiation

First, participants must accept symmetrical arms reductions in principl as a means of lessening international tensions and of reducing the costs of de fence. The conservative rejection of symmetrical arms reductions is shown b the Reagan Administration's campaign rhetoric; its nomination of Kennetl Adelman as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; its obs truction of arms control efforts; and its original appointment of a non-caree ambassador, Richard F. Staar, as head of the MBFR negotiation team. Com plete lack of progress in the talks during Staar's two-year tenure mirrored hi cavalier attitude toward MBFR, which offended other western negotiatin teams. Staar has been replaced with a career diplomat, Ambassador Morto Abramowitz.

Second, the actual agreement when implemented must be sound in practic and not lead to a reduction of western security. This means that it must be sym *metrical in application*. Should an MBFR treaty stampede the western nation into unilateral arms reduction beyond the treaty limits, cause the dismantlin of redeployed American forces in violation of political agreements, or lead t new international instabilities as a result of Soviet military moves against non European neighbours, then the treaty would not help but hinder the peac process. The delicate political balance with treaty opponents that will be re quired to secure ratification would be destroyed, probably never again to be re established in our time. The public would be reluctant to support future arm reduction treaties if it were to be demonstrated that its security had beer threatened or damaged by an earlier treaty. Protecting the political psyche throughout the peace process is more important than any single step in tha process.

The specifics of negotiation

MBFR does not apply to all of the Nato and Warsaw Pact states, but only to the central sector, which is referred to in the negotiations as the Nato Guidelines Area (NGA). This takes in on the western side West Germany and the Benelux countries. On the eastern side, the NGA includes East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. One controversial point is France, no longer a member of the Nato military framework. Almost 50,000 French troops are based in southwest Germany under a bilateral agreement, but are not under the operational control of Nato military commanders. Should French forces be included in MBFR? The basis of the answer to that question is 'will French forces fight alongside Nato from the beginning of a Warsaw Pact attack?' That answer cannot be provided with certainty, and any response would depend largely on the mood of the French President and the French people at the time of the attack.

If France were to fight alongside Nato, its troops could easily be reinforced by a similar-size force just west of the Rhine. Other French forces also could join the battle, or stay out altogether. It is easy to understand the concern of the Soviet Union at the prospect of a modern 100,000-strong (or even larger) French Army, which regularly trains with Nato, joining the battle. Naturally, the Soviet side wants France included in MBFR; France refuses, although Nato may allow about 50,000 French troops to be included in Nato totals.

Nato ground forces (including the French troops in West Germany) have 788,700 people. Warsaw Pact ground forces number 962,500.[6] Nato air forces total 210,465, while Warsaw Pact air forces have 225,000. The Soviet side disputes these figures, claiming that the Warsaw Pact has far fewer troops within the NGA than Nato estimates. Nato stands by its estimate.

TABLE II: NGA ACTIVE MANPOWER LEVELS

	Ground	*Air*	*Divisions**
WEST			
Belgium	68,700	20,500	2
Britain	55,000	10,300	4
Canada	4,500	765	⅓
West Germany	335,500	105,900	12
Luxembourg	700	0	—
Netherlands	67,000	19,000	2
USA	208,800	54,000	5
France (troops in West Germany)	48,500	0	3
	788,700	210,465	28⅓
EAST			
Czechoslovakia	142,500	54,000	10
East Germany	113,000	38,000	6
Poland	207,000	88,000	15
Soviet Union	500,000	45,000	26
	962,500	225,000	57

*Divisions vary widely in size and capability.
Source: IISS, *The Military Balance: 1982–83.*

1. Comparing just the numbers of ground forces within the NGA, including the French forces in West Germany, gives the result:
   Nato = 788,700 Warsaw Pact = 962,500 Ratio = 1:1·22
2. Comparing the numbers of air forces within the NGA:
   Nato = 210,465 Warsaw Pact = 225,000 Ratio = 1:1·07
3. Comparing the numbers of non-indigenous[7] ground forces in NGA; including the French forces in West Germany:
   Nato = 316,800 Warsaw Pact = 500,000 Ratio = 1:1·58

[6] Nato figures do not include the Allied garrison force in Berlin, which consists of 3,100 British, ,700 French, and 4,300 American troops.

[7] Non-indigenous forces are Britain, Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. Assuming that, man-for-man, Soviet and East German forces have higher combat capability (HICAP) than other Warsaw Pact forces, and assuming that, for Nato, the Americans, British, Canadian, and West German Field Army forces (Bundeswehr minus the Territorial Army) are HICAP forces:
   Nato = 533,300 Warsaw Pact = 613,000 Ratio = 1:1·15
   Other Nato = 255,800 Other Warsaw Pact = 434,500 Ratio = 1:1·7

Using just the above ratios, it would be fairly easy to propose force reductions which would give the appearance of symmetry. Unfortunately, there are major complicating factors: geography, mobilisation capacity and the organisation for combat.

Geography favours the Warsaw Pact, for any withdrawal of non-indigenous forces involves a longer distance for Nato—4,000 or more miles to the United States across water, which would complicate a defensive redeployment back to the Central Sector in an emergency. For Warsaw Pact forces, a redeployment requires a short ground movement by Soviet forces, only 500 miles from the Soviet western military districts to the Elbe River.

The mobilisation issue severely complicates this assessment. According to a 1982 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the mobilisation forces (active and reserve) available for a European conflict to Nato are: 10,095,000 men and 152⅓ combat divisions; to the Warsaw Pact: 11,959,000 men and 175⅔ combat divisions. These are very rough estimates at best, for other sources list the Soviet reserve forces alone at well over 50 million men. How many actually could be mobilised, deployed, utilised, and sustained in battle is a question on which there is no agreement among western sources.

Like their active counterparts, eastern mobilisation forces possess a high concentration of combat units and equipment, but few logistics units. Thus they have a strong assault, but limited sustaining capability. Western mobilisation forces, conversely, are more balanced between combat and supporting units. Eastern forces also employ substantial non-uniformed civilian support forces (far more than the west), which are not included in the above totals.

There are other factors complicating the mobilisation issue:

(1) the substantial American contribution to Nato mobilisation forces is 4,000 miles from Europe and may be used for contingencies outside Europe;
(2) a large part of the Nato forces are those from Mediterranean countries which cannot be sent to the Central Sector;
(3) large portions of the total Nato force are naval and air units which cannot influence the ground campaign in the Central Sector;
(4) the Soviet Union may be required to use forces on a non-European front.

In general, the attacker has the advantage of being able to choose the place of the attack and attain an overwhelming mass of force at that point.

Thus, the mobilisation issue is beyond the scope of an MBFR agreement at this time. The initial MBFR negotiations have, quite correctly, focused on

active force reductions, while retaining awareness of the mobilisation factors.

The organisation for combat further complicates symmetry. Warsaw Pact forces on the central front are organised into 57 active divisions with a large offensive capability and an equipment concentration per man of two to three times that of Nato. Nato in the central front has only 28 active divisions with a sizeable logistical system. To retain symmetry, therefore, a mutual reduction of forces must address the manpower ratio plus equipment, organisation and mobilisation co isiderations—not an easy task.

After the early MBFR negotiations failed to achieve an immediate agreement on force reductions, negotiators proposed a two-phase reduction. The west proposed a Phase I reduction of 30,000 Soviet troops in three divisions, to be matched by an American reduction of 13,000 troops, two-thirds of which would be in unspecified units. The east countered with a similar Phase I proposal for themselves, but matched by a withdrawal of 14,000 American troops in 2–3 brigades, 1000 nuclear warheads,[a] 54 F-4 fighter jets, and 36 Pershing IA launchers (out of 108 total).

Both sides agreed to a Phase II reduction to a collective common ceiling of 700,000 ground troops and a combined air-ground ceiling of 900,000. The problem here is one of data: the east claims to have at least 160,000 fewer troops within the NGA than Nato sources say it has. The east claims that both sides are approximately equal in strength and that a common reduction of 11–13 per cent will reduce everyone to the Phase II manpower goals. To accept the east's proposal (and data) would leave it with a greater force advantage over Nato than it now enjoys. To accept the west's proposal (and data) would strip the Warsaw Pact of its present advantage. Naturally, neither side will accept the other's proposal.

Thus, there would be a slight advantage to the west under the western Phase I proposal, where Soviet withdrawals would exceed American withdrawals by a ratio of 2·3 to 1, not counting other Soviet demands. This advantage would be negated by the Phase II proposal, however, where an equal reduction by all sides would more seriously affect the west (accepting western force estimates) than the east. This would be particularly serious, since American and West German HICAP forces would bear a heavy portion of the force reduction. Compounding the eastern advantage would be the geographic factor plus the Warsaw Pact's massive mobilisation capability (including easy reinforcement from the Soviet Union). A reduction of West German forces would require a demobilisation of that portion of Nato's critical HICAP forces—they could not be redeployed. Soviet forces being reduced, however, could be deployed rather than demobilised. An agreement must address this issue to avoid a serious force imbalance.

Summary and proposals

The west's uncompromising (and probably correct) insistence upon the use

[a] In 1979, President Carter withdrew 1,000 obsolete nuclear warheads from Europe at the time of a Soviet withdrawal of one tank division.

of western military data plus the Reagan Administration's goal of a collective common ceiling have proved unacceptable to the east and have blocked any hope for an early agreement. At the same time, public concentration on nuclear issues has reduced interest in MBFR negotiations. Despite these impediments, MBFR appears to be an important goal for both sides, in view of the changing demographic situation, defence budgets and the risks of war. Some rational proposals to shift the western negotiating strategy could include the following:

1. The United States must make MBFR a serious, high-priority negotiation, as it was in two previous Administrations, and support the new, professional delegation in working with other western delegations in Vienna.
2. The United States should drop its insistence on a collective common ceiling and work instead for fair, symmetrical reductions based upon balanced reductions within existing ratios. The east has not accepted parity, but has accepted only manpower reductions which are based upon its own version of the data. The east now possesses a manpower and equipment advantage which it will not give up. Reductions can take place which will maintain the existing symmetry, yet reduce threats and costs. For example, the following force reduction ratios would be symmetrical:
    - Nato: Warsaw Pact ground forces—1:1½ (provided that Warsaw Pact forces are withdrawn by divisions, 2–3 Warsaw Pact divisions for each Nato division).
    - HICAP Nato: HICAP Warsaw Pact Ground Forces—1:1¼ (provided that West German demobilisations are matched by HICAP Warsaw Pact demobilisations, and not merely force relocations).
    - Nato: Warsaw Pact Air Forces—1:1·1
    - American: Soviet Forces—1:2·5
3. Since nobody can predict future French behaviour in a crisis, it seems fair to include the French forces stationed in West Germany, but no others.
4. Mobilisation capabilities are too complicated to address at this stage of negotiation. This issue should be postponed until later negotiations, after the first stages of an agreement have been implemented. The west must be sensitive, however, to mobilisation considerations.
5. To preserve legitimate security concerns, agreements should be phased by stages, with assessment and new negotiations following each stage. Not every issue can be resolved in a single package. A phased set of agreements will allow disengagement to begin soon and develop momentum, with the more difficult issues resolved over time.
6. Early agreements should include as many confidence-building measures as possible, to reduce further the risk of war.
7. If MBFR fails, the west should move the negotiations to other arms control fora and continue negotiations.

Both east and west have proposed manpower reductions. While the pro-

posals are still at variance, they are not so far apart as to render MBFR hopeless. If parity is impossible, symmetry can preserve the existing relationship at reduced force levels. Verification is important: without adequate verification measures, mutual suspicions of cheating could swiftly lead to war.

Europe is experiencing severe political pressures and strains within both alliances. This is the right time to begin serious negotiations and compromises to reduce defence costs and defuse the threat of war.

France: the resurgence of the Far Right

JONATHAN MARCUS

FRENCH political life has passed through a turbulent summer. In the wake of the European Parliament elections in June, which registered a major defeat for the governing majority of the Socialists and Communists, came a crescendo of protest against government policies, particularly against the proposed reform of the private schools system. President Mitterrand sought to out-manoeuvre his opponents by withdrawing the controversial private education Bill and seeking a referendum to revise the Constitution in order that such matters could be put to the people. In the event, the President could not circumvent Senate opposition to his proposal and plans for a referendum were shelved. The government of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy resigned, giving way to a new administration headed by Laurent Fabius. The Communists, mindful of their own electoral decline and critical of the government's economic policies,[1] refused to participate in the new Cabinet. The new Socialist government has adopted a more 'centrist' approach to the economy, emphasising reduction in state expenditure and the modernisation of industry.

Thus, French politics has once more shifted gear. The government no longer retains the support of a majority of public opinion and must seek to broaden its appeal if the Left is to conserve its parliamentary majority at the next legislative election which is due in 1986. The opposition parties, confident of victory, are already debating whether they might be able to co-exist with a Socialist President.

One of the more disquieting aspects of the changing political mood has been the electoral rise of the Far Right. Mobilising support around the themes

[1] For background, see Jonathan Marcus, 'The French Communist Party between government and opposition', *The World Today*, March 1984.

The author, a journalist who specialises in contemporary west European politics, has contributed several articles on France to *The World Today*.

of immigration and 'insecurity', the extreme Right, in the shape of the *Front National* of Jean-Marie Le Pen, obtained some 11 per cent of the poll at the European elections. That was the highest score obtained by the Far Right in a national contest since 1945.[2] The resurgence of the Far Right is influencing the terms and the tone of political debate well beyond its own constituency.[3]

The extreme Right is not a newcomer to the French political scene. The political history of France has often been marked by this anti-democratic, nationalist, xenophobic, often also anti-semitic political strand. It stretches from the anti-Dreyfusards at the turn of the century, through the Fascist Leagues of the 1930s, to the 1940–4 Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain.[4]

However, in the wake of the Second World War, with the bitter memories of defeat and occupation still fresh, the Far Right largely disappeared from mainstream French politics. Under the strong, conservative presidential regime of the Fifth Republic the marginalisation of the extreme Right was completed.[5] The Far Right was reduced to a few small groupings and shifting coteries of individuals. The figure of Le Pen is present throughout the post-war history of the Far Right. He was a deputy of the populist Poujadist movement during the 1950s and a fanatical supporter of *Algerie-Française* movement which wanted to keep Algeria as part of France. He volunteered to serve as a parachutist in the Algerian war. He supported Maître Tixier-Vignancour, the Far Right candidate, in 1965. Le Pen founded the *Front National* in 1972 and stood for the presidency in 1974, obtaining a derisory 0·76 per cent of the vote.

The electoral rise of the Far Right has been rapid, from the largely personal success of Le Pen at the municipal elections of March 1983, to the good showing of the *Front National* at the European Parliament elections in June this year. At the municipal elections last year, Le Pen, who stood in the 20th *arrondissement* of Paris, a largely working-class area with a large immigrant population, obtained just over 11 per cent of the poll. This surprise result enabled Le Pen's list, *Paris aux Parisiens*, to go through to the second ballot. Le Pen was hoping for a deal with the Gaullist Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, which would have enabled the Far Right to obtain representation on the Paris City Council. However, the Gaullist leader refused to countenance the inclusion of Le Pen and his supporters on the joint opposition list for the second ballot. Le Pen, whose score at the second round dropped to 8·5 per cent, had to content himself with the post of a local ward councillor.

The scene for the next surge of support for the Far Right was the town of Dreux, some 55 miles west of Paris. The result of the municipal election which

[2] In 1965, the right-wing list of Maître Tixier-Vignancour won 5·28 per cent. At the 1979 European elections, Tixier-Vignancour obtained only 1·3 per cent.

[3] The best reference work to appear on the *Front National* is the compilation of press articles and commentaries by Edwy Plenel and Alain Rollat, *L'effet Le Pen* (Paris: La Découverte/Le Monde, 1984).

[4] See J. S. McClelland, *The French Right* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970) and Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite Révolutionnaire 1885–1914* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978).

[5] For a brief survey of the extreme right during the post-war years, see J. R. Frears, *Political Parties and Elections in the French Fifth Republic* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1977).

had produced a narrow victory for the outgoing Socialist mayor, Françoise Gaspard, was annulled owing to irregularities in the counting of the ballot papers. The election campaign had been bitter, with immigration a prominent theme. Indeed, the opposition list had included nine representatives of the *Front National*, among them the party's Secretary-General, Jean-Pierre Stirbois, who is noted for his inflammatory statements about immigrants.[6] At the first ballot of the new elections, the *Front National* stood alone, obtaining nearly 17 per cent of the vote. An alliance was hastily concluded for the second round between the representatives of the conservative opposition list and the *Front National*. Jean-Pierre Stirbois occupied the fourth position on the united opposition list for the second ballot. On 11 September 1983, the opposition took control of Dreux, with four representatives of the *Front National* gaining seats on the town council.

Further by-elections indicated that the resurgence of the Far Right might be more than just a localised phenomenon.[7] However, Le Pen and his supporters were looking to the European Parliament elections, conducted on the basis of proportional representation, for a true indication of the strength of their growing national constituency. On 17 July, the *Front National* obtained 11·1 per cent of the national vote in metropolitan France, sending 10 members to the European Parliament.

The vote for the *Front National* was highest in the eastern half of France, notably in the Ile-de-France (14·5 per cent), and the regions of Alsace (13·8 per cent), Languedoc-Roussillon (13·2 per cent), Provence-Cote d'Azur (19 per cent) and Corsica (13·2 per cent). The support for the *Front National* seemed to be largely confined to urban areas and was often linked to the presence of a large immigrant population, strongest in areas where the *colons* from Algeria had been resettled.[8]

Last August, elections were held for the Regional Assembly in Corsica, again under a system of proportional representation. The *Front National* won 9·2 per cent of the vote, taking six of the 61 seats in the Assembly. Whilst this was less than the 13 per cent the Far Right had obtained in Corsica a few weeks earlier at the European elections, it was enough to give the *Front National* a role in electing the President of the new Assembly. Once again, the conservatives chose to align themselves with the extreme Right.

Who actually votes for Le Pen? Opinion poll data provide some interesting pointers.[9] Compared with the electorate of the opposition as a whole, that of the Far Right is younger, contains a greater proportion of men and is more

[6] For example, in October 1982, Jean-Pierre Stirbois declared: 'Immigrants from beyond the Mediterranean, get back to your shacks!' *Le Monde*, 15 March 1983.

[7] At another re-run of a municipal contest held at Aulnay-sous-Bois in November 1983, the *Front National* obtained 9·3 per cent of all votes cast. In December 1983 at the by-election in Morbihan for a National Assembly seat, Le Pen, standing in his native area, won 12 per cent of the first ballot votes.

[8] See Gerard Le Gall, 'Une élection sans enjeu, avec conséquences', *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, May–June 1984, pp. 9–47.

[9] See the SOFRES/TF 1 poll published in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 22 June 1984, pp. 23–5.

populist in character than that of the broader opposition. The Far Right attracts a smaller proportion of practising Catholics. In terms of self-classification, on a left-right axis, only some 50 per cent of the sample described themselves as 'extreme Right', with 15 per cent placing themselves in the 'centre' and 27 per cent as simply on the 'right'. This suggests that we are *not necessarily witnessing an expansion in support for* the Far Right, but rather that the *Front National* appears to be able to appeal beyond the traditional frontiers of the extreme Right.

The twin themes of immigration and 'insecurity' occupy a central position in the rhetoric of the *Front National*. The party's outlook on immigration is summed up by its slogan for the municipal elections last year—*Deux millions de chômeurs ce sont deux millions d'immigrés de trop. La France et les français d'abord* (Two million unemployed is two million immigrants too many. Priority for France and the French.) The large immigrant population in France is portrayed as being parasitic, grabbing unemployment and welfare benefits. The message is that the tide of immigration, especially from North Africa, must be reversed.

Le Pen plays up the threat of a vast wave of Islamic Arab influence penetrating and colonising France from the third world. The French must be considered first in their own land. Hospital facilities, schools, council housing and family benefits should all be denied to those who are not French. There should be a clampdown on illegal immigration and all those already in the country should be 'repatriated', with only a minority getting any financial assistance. Le Pen contends that he is not waging a war against immigrants, but against the immigration policies pursued by governments of all political hues. The discourse of the *Front National* President operates at a number of levels. His respectable face is reserved for television interviews, where he denies absolutely that he is either a racist or an anti-semite.[10] When questioned about the more forthright statements of some of his colleagues, Le Pen denies responsibility, claiming that there is free expression within his party. He responds to critics who accuse him of anti-semitism by claiming that Jews are the same as all other citizens, raising the old canard that the Jewish community seeks some special form of protection or privilege. He argued, for example, that he would not refrain from criticism of Madame Simone Veil, leader of the opposition's list at the European elections, just because of her Jewish origins. Despite the strenuous attempts of Le Pen to moderate his tone when speaking in civilised company, his mask is often transparent and the implications of his rhetoric are clear.

Yet, the Far Right is able to capitalise upon the theme of 'insecurity', presently a major concern in French society. 'Insecurity' is a catch-all concept; a short-hand term for the fear and uncertainty prompted by economic recession and social change. It embraces fears of juvenile delinquency, growing street crime, unemployment and racial tensions. Discontent with government policy feeds this mood of unease which pre-dates the arrival of the Left to

[10] See the report of a television interview with Le Pen, *Le Monde*, 15 February 1984.

power in 1981. In the early 1980s, both the Communist Party and the mainstream conservative parties of the opposition have attempted to gain electoral advantage by capitalising on anti-immigrant feeling. However, neither can compete with Le Pen's clarity of purpose. The *Front National* discounts the restraints and realities that intrude on other parties, advocating a politics of action. Its remedy is simple: 'insecurity' can be solved, immigrants must be despatched elsewhere.

This widespread feeling of insecurity, combined with mounting economic problems, places the government in a dilemma. The new Prime Minister, Laurent Fabius, recently acknowledged the genuine feeling of insecurity in urban areas, but emphasised that the Far Right was providing 'false answers to real problems'. Whilst many opposition leaders have trumpeted the theme of 'insecurity' in a vain attempt to outbid the rhetoric of Le Pen, the government has attempted to tighten up controls on further immigration, to establish schemes to prevent juvenile delinquency in poorer areas, and also to provide resources to help with the *insertion* of the vast majority of immigrant families who will remain in France.[11] The opposition and the extreme Right have regarded the government as being lax on immigration, pointing to the amnesty for illegal immigrants that was offered when the Left came to power in 1981. However, if this was true, it lasted only briefly. Since then strict measures have been taken by the government.

As well as controls, and funds for *insertion* programmes, the government's policy has a third aspect—aid for those immigrants who wish to return home. This is particularly applicable to workers in the more troubled areas of the French economy, such as the car industry, where immigrants form as much as 16 per cent of the workforce.[12] However, such measures can clearly not apply to second generation families for whom France is now 'home'.

The policies of the *Front National* in other areas represent a predictable basket of measures, such as the restoration of the death penalty and the reimposition of the ban on abortion; a variety of policies aimed at enhancing family life and increasing the birth-rate; ballots to be held before strikes and a major programme of de-nationalisation of state industries. In the defence field, Le Pen favours a nation-wide civil defence programme, the reintegration of French forces into Nato and the development of a largely professional army. In foreign policy (as in domestic politics), Le Pen displays a strident anti-communism.

[11] *Insertion* does not mean integration or assimilation but rather a recognition of cultural diversity. The government's policies seem well-intentioned, but officials accept that there is a limit to what legislation can do. The situation is not favourable at present, with society so sensitive to the immigration issue. An opinion poll last year showed that 51 per cent of the sample saw the best solution to unemployment as being the despatch of immigrant workers 'back from where they came', *Le Monde*, 9 September 1983. The only real solution to racial tensions is economic recovery and education. The government's measures are unlikely to convince the average Frenchman in the present climate of opinion.

[12] For background, see 'Les immigrés et la crise de l'emploi', Dossier, *Le Monde*, 1 February 1984. Also 'Le poid des travailleurs immigrés dans l'économie', 26 June 1984.

The response of the two mainstream forces of the opposition, the neo-Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) and the federation called *Union pour la Democratie Française* (UDF), to the resurgence of the Far Right, has been, to say the least, ambivalent. So has that of the third, smaller grouping, the *Centre National des Indépendents et Paysans* (CNIP), which has served as a conduit to respectability for various Far Right figures. The general tone of the opposition parties' attacks on the government has contributed to the atmosphere in which the *Front National* has prospered. The rise of the extreme Right, which is biting into the support of the mainstream opposition parties, and particularly that of the RPR, poses tactical problems which have become more serious during the past year. The problem is how to channel the electoral support for the Far Right back into the political mainstream. Indeed, there are indications that the *Front National* is not only taking votes from the opposition parties, but that it is also winning over a number of their grass-roots activists. While these defections are often due in part to local rivalries both within and between the UDF and RPR, there is a feeling among the activists that the Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac, in particular, is not forceful enough in his condemnation of the government. The role of the 'strong man' of the opposition has passed to Le Pen.

Consequently, Jacques Chirac and other conservative politicians have also rallied to the themes of immigration and insecurity. Speaking in his capacity as the Mayor of Paris, Chirac said recently that he would not let Paris become like the Chicago of the 1930s and called for immigration controls to be tightened. Chirac has disavowed the notion of a national electoral arrangement between RPR and the *Front National*, and refused any collaboration in Paris during the 1983 municipal contest. But he has been more ambivalent about local electoral arrangements, such as at Dreux or more recently in Corsica. Chirac said that he regarded a vote for a local slate of candidates containing representatives of the Far Right as less dangerous than a vote for the government, which at that time included four Communist Ministers.

The former Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, has conceded the statements of Le Pen's lieutenants might be unacceptable, but has also expressed his astonishment at people trying to make a bogey out of Le Pen. Barre is preoccupied with those who have voted for Le Pen out of a sense of exasperation. This is a common theme amongst opposition leaders, who regard political extremism as the fault of the left-wing government. Some voices have been raised within the opposition, warning against any flirtation with the *Front National*. For example, Simone Veil has condemned the electoral alliance at Dreux out of hand and urged voters to abstain. However, such voices have been in the minority; ambivalence in many cases has shaded into political expediency.

Will the surge in support for the Far Right recede as rapidly as it has arisen? Some commentators have likened *'L'effet Le Pen'* to the meteoric rise and equally rapid decline of the populist Poujadist movement of the 1950s. However, there are important differences in the two movements' basis of sup-

port and the context in which they each appeared.[13] The *Front National* claims to be organising nation-wide and hopes to field candidates in all the constituencies which will be contested at the next round of local elections in March 1985. It should be noted that the spectacular rise of the Far Right in the June elections for the European Parliament came in an electoral contest where the focus was upon national issues but where there was very little actually at stake. Thus, there may well have been an element of protest in the Far Right vote. With the Communist Party now out of government, one cause for disenchantment may be removed.

Nevertheless, the success of the Far Right shows that right-wing extremism has not gone away during the Fifth Republic. Right-wingers were either marginalised or had to compromise their views and enter one of the mainstream conservative parties. They may now be emerging as the right-wing tide rises.

A key factor in the success of Le Pen's movement has been the way in which his extremist message has been made the centrepiece of political discourse. The themes of Le Pen have been taken up by the major parties of the opposition. Le Pen had two aims. In the first place, he wished to bring the *Front National* into the mainstream of French political life and to give its message an aura of respectability. This he has in part achieved. His second aim was to make the *Front National* an essential component of any future right-wing parliamentary majority in the wake of the 1986 elections. His success in this venture will depend largely on the type of voting system employed at the next legislative elections. The Socialists have stated that they intend to bring in a form of proportional representation. This is opposed by the UDF and RPR, but welcomed by Le Pen.[14]

The resurgence of the *Front National* poses problems for all the political families in France. Le Pen has sent a tremor through the political system. If the Far Right is to consolidate its position, it may well depend more on the reaction of other political forces than on the activities of Le Pen himself. As Bernard Stasi, a centrist deputy in the UDF who has been critical of links between the opposition and the *Front National*, has recently noted, the rise of Le Pen is linked less to the quality of his proposals than to the unacceptable silence of those who face him. At the other extreme, there is also the danger of giving him too much publicity and attention.[15] Stasi pleads for a measured, and above all responsible, attitude by mainstream politicians to the rise of the Far Right. Will his plea be heeded?

[13] On this point, see the article by Edwy Plenel, 'Les droites et les dynamismes sociaux', *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, July–August 1984, pp. 49–58.

[14] On the possible impact of changes in the electoral system, see 'Could PR save France's Socialists?', *The Economist*, November 3 1984.

[15] See the article by Bernard Stasi, 'La France de l'enfermement', *Le Monde*, 20 October 1984.

Bhutan steps out

S. D. MUNI

THE growing bitterness of political and religious conflicts in India, which culminated in the assassination on 31 October of the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi (see first Note of the month), has revived world interest in—and concern for—the whole of the sub-continent. One of its least well known corners is Bhutan, the remote Himalayan kingdom situated between India and China. Bhutan has been closely bound to India, but in the past year and a half it has embarked on several regional initiatives which may have important consequences for its future relationship with India.[1]

New regional initiatives

The first of these initiatives occurred in June 1983 when 'non-resident' diplomatic relations were established with Nepal. The Ambassadors of the two countries in India were concurrently accredited to each other. While presenting his credentials in Kathmandu in August 1983, the Bhutanese Ambassador significantly remarked that 'non-resident' diplomatic relations were 'for the present' only and that the two kingdoms were determined 'to expand mutually beneficial cooperation'.

Bhutan has close identity with Nepal because of its large Nepalese population and landlocked location between India and China. Religious, cultural and political relations of long standing have existed between the two countries. However, soon after the establishment of the present Bhutanese monarchy in 1907 and as a result of the Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of January 1910, these traditional relations were severed. The withdrawal of the British from the Indian subcontinent, the fall of the Ranas in Nepal and the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949 did not alter this situation. After the assumption of power by King Jigme Singye Wangchuk in Bhutan in July 1972, the Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering, said in November 1972 that Bhutan was not interested in having diplomatic relations with other countries except India and Bangladesh.

The first clear indication of change in this respect came when in August 1978 the then Trade and Industry Secretary of Bhutan, Om Pradhan, paid an informal visit to Nepal to explore the prospects for Bhutanese export of surplus agricultural products. The visit was returned by Nepal's Foreign Secretary in 1980. Talks for the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations were initiated in November 1981 during Bhutanese Foreign Minister's visit to Nepal.

Bhutan's participation in the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) represents its next regional initiative. Bhutan did not count for much in the

[1] For earlier background, see T. K. Roy Choudhury, 'The India–Bhutan relationship: some new trends', *The World Today*, December, 1981.

Dr Muni, who holds the title of Associate Professor (South Asia) at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, is at present with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.

establishment of the SARC, whose principal creators were Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. But once SARC officially began to exist in April 1981, Bhutan readily involved itself in its activities, particularly in the fields of health (fight against leprosy), agriculture (potato cultivation) and postal services. On the controversial question of pace and level of institutionalisation of the SARC, Bhutan has favoured gradual progress and studiously avoided political controversies at SARC deliberations.

The third foreign policy initiative was taken in February 1984 in relation to Bangladesh. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk visited Bangladesh in that month. During this visit, a Protocol on expansion and regulation of trade and an Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation were concluded between the two countries. A Treaty of Trade and Transit concluded in September 1980 became operative with the signing of the Protocol.

A major hurdle in effecting the trade relations between Bhutan and Bangladesh was the absence of transit arrangements for such trade through Indian territory. This hurdle was removed by the Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding in relation to the Indo-Bhutanese Trade and Transit Treaty of 1972. This Memorandum was signed on 30 January 1984 in New Delhi where the King had come as the chief guest to the Republic Day celebrations. The King went to Bangladesh after this visit.

The most important of Bhutan's regional initiatives was in relation to China. The first meeting of the two countries' officials took place in Beijing between 17 and 20 April on the question of boundary settlement between them. The question of the boundary first became an issue between Bhutan and China in 1959. While pursuing its policy of integrating Tibet with the mainland, China in July 1959 seized control of the Bhutanese-administered enclaves in western Tibet in the vicinity of Mount Kailash and Gartok regions. A Chinese map in 1961 showed parts of eastern, northern and western Bhutan as Chinese. Since the mid-1960s, there have been a number of Chinese encroachments on Bhutanese territory. The method used was for armed Chinese graziers regularly to come inside unpatrolled Bhutanese areas and then make permanent settlements and claim such areas as theirs. The Chinese have succeeded in capturing strategic locations in a systematic way. The most extensive encroachments took place in 1967, 1979 and 1983.

Both India and Bhutan made strong protests against the Chinese encroachments and faulty maps. China's standard reply to India since 1958 had been that it does not recognise India's right (under Article II of the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty) to negotiate on behalf of Bhutan. Instead, China insisted on dealing with Bhutan directly. Until 1981, India had refused to agree to that. The dropping of Indian reservations on this issue came as a result of the process of Sino-Indian normalisation on the one hand and Bhutan's growing anxieties about the ultimate Chinese aims on the other.

India surveyed Bhutan's border with the Tibet region of China and helped the country establish its own Survey Department in 1972. The establishment of a Boundary Commission followed in 1981, which, on the basis of survey

reports and all available historical documents, formulated definite Bhutanese claims about its boundary with Tibet (China). Once India had signalled its approval for Bhutan's direct talks with China on the settlement of the boundary question, Bhutan established informal contacts with the Chinese. A diplomatic note to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi in March 1981 was followed by informal contacts in New York and New Delhi. The first formal meeting took place in Beijing.

Bhutan's objectives

These regional and other international initiatives have been inspired by a combination of fears and aspirations. Bhutan fears that its territorial integrity may be violated and is anxious to preserve its internal stability and political independence. At the same time it wants more direct participation in international affairs and speedier economic development.

China is seen as a possible threat to Bhutan's territorial integrity. Bhutan's border with India is clearly identified and demarcated. While signing the Treaty of 1949, India had returned about 32 square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri to Bhutan to accommodate its claims. China, on the other hand, after the victory of the Communist revolution described Bhutan in 1950 as one of the five fingers of its Tibetan palm. In 1959, as already mentioned, Bhutanese enclaves were seized by China. Then came the encroachments by the graziers.

The Bhutanese seriously feared a Chinese military intervention at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Chinese warnings to India during the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan produced more worries. In 1971, Bhutan even asked for the stationing of Indian troops on its territory. India refused. The main Indian consideration was not to do anything that could be used by China to justify diversionary moves in the north-east. India also feared that the despatch of its troops to Bhutan would make it open to accusations of hegemonism and expansionism.

Bhutan's objective in opening talks with China on the boundary issue is, therefore, to resolve the question once and for all. The opening of the talks in no way removed Bhutan's anxieties in this regard. It is virtually certain that the Chinese will not press their earlier claim on the eastern and northern sectors of the Bhutanese boundary. On the western sector, however, there are three claims lines. One is Bhutan's, maintained since 1956–58 and supported by its historical documents, traditional practices and recent surveys. The other is China's, based on Chinese maps and earlier claims but inside Bhutan's Ha, Dukye and Bumthang areas close to the Chumbi Valley. The third is in between the two, still inside Bhutanese territory but marking the physical presence of the Chinese, secured through numerous and periodic encroachments.

The Bhutanese suspect that China will refuse to accept the Bhutanese claim line and will bargain toughly over its two claim lines. This will be to eliminate the strategic advantage that India and Bhutan enjoy over China in the Chumbi

Valley and to gain strategic heights within Bhutan. That is why the Chinese, while formulating the basic criteria for settlement of boundary, have added the principle of 'existing reality' (to justify their physical presence) to those of 'watershed' and 'traditional practices' (of grazing rights and collection of local taxes). The Bhutanese side has not accepted the principle of 'existing reality' which is likely to become the main point of contention at the next round of talks to be held in Thimpu, Bhutan's capital, in the near future.

The Chinese negotiation tactic towards Bhutan seems to be—as at similar talks with Pakistan, Burma and Nepal—first physically to consolidate their position (even by laying down roads and other infrastructure) at strategic points and then to show generosity in less important areas. The Chinese are also likely to prolong the negotiations so as to extract other concessions from Bhutan in the meantime on such matters as the establishment of diplomatic, trade and cultural relations. China's long-term objective is to balance India's presence in this strategically sensitive country.

Internal tensions

Bhutan's internal political life may appear placid and stable on the surface. In fact, it is often fraught with bitter conflicts. There have been strong family rivalries between the ruling clans of the Wangchuks and the Dorjis. The previous King faced coup and assassination attempts. His Prime Minister, Jigme Dorji, was assassinated in 1964. A pro-Chinese lobby, strongly opposed to the late King's attempts to keep Bhutan close to India, was suspected of being involved. The leaders of this lobby, Tashi Dorji and Lhendup Dorji, sister and brother of the present Queen Mother, escaped to Kathmandu, along with top Bhutanese military leaders. The present King has rehabilitated these opponents of his father in the interests of restoring family harmony. But he, too, had to face an abortive attempt on his life at the time of his coronation in 1974. This time, a group of Tibetan refugees settled in Bhutan and related to the late King's lover, Yangki, were suspected of being behind the attempt. This was a plausible theory in view of extensive family and cultural connections between Tibetans and the Bhutanese ruling circles. The attempt led the King to curb the activities of some 4,000-odd Tibetan refugees in Bhutan.

These developments demonstrate that palace politics and family conflicts among the Bhutanese ruling groups are mixed up with the questions of Bhutan's policy towards Tibetan refugees, China and India. The present King has handled these complex issues very deftly. His concern for family harmony and stable palace politics is likely to have a significant bearing on his foreign policy moves towards China, India and other countries.

There is another emerging dimension of the Bhutanese internal situation which is influencing relations with India and other countries. The Bhutanese society is made up of two dominant ethnic groups; the ruling Drukpas, who are of Tibetan origin, and the Nepalis of Indo-Nepali origin. The growing size of the Nepali population (estimated at anything from 30 to 52 per cent of Bhutan's total population) is viewed by the Drukpas as a threat. It is easy to

see why. The Nepalis are better educated, politically more conscious, more exposed to modernisation influences in India and more articulate than their Drukpa counterparts. But they also claim to be discriminated against when it comes to appointments in the higher echelons of the army, the state administration, the judiciary and in the senior political posts. The King is sensitive to their grievances and is trying to accommodate them here and there, but without bringing into question the continuing hegemony of the Drukpas. The Bhutanese government has recently initiated moves to register Bhutanese citizens of Nepali origin and restrict further entry of the Nepalis into Bhutan.

Bhutan's rulers entertain the suspicion that the Nepalis may try to undermine the dominance of the Drukpas and become a threat to the monarchy, and, that they may do so with external support, particularly from India. In 1948, the alienated Nepalis and dissident Drukpas had formed, with Indian backing, a political party called Bhutan State Congress. This party had operated using Indian territory as its base. Its activities, however, ceased by the end of the 1950s. All organised political activity has been banned in Bhutan since 1964. But this issue remains potentially most worrying for the King, not least because of the political turbulence in neighbouring Sikkim between 1973 and 1975.

Bhutan's foreign policy initiatives aimed at increasing its international contacts may be seen as one of the safeguards against the possibility of external interference in its domestic situation. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Nepal was significant in this respect. A gradual increase in diplomatic and cultural contacts with Nepal and its monarchy are seen as likely to induce greater respect for the Bhutanese King and traditional institutions among the Nepalis of Bhutan. It remains to be seen whether this assumption of the Bhutanese rulers will prove realistic. It should be borne in mind that the Bhutanese of Nepali origin are fully exposed to radical ideas of the adjoining Indian provinces of Assam and West Bengal including Naxalbari (which was, at one time, a hub of left-wing extremist activity). Also, strong anti-monarchist stimuli come even from Nepal. If the Nepalese monarchy could really inspire reverence for monarchical rule and the traditional political outlook, there would be no democratic and communist groups in Nepal itself.

Striving for greater independence

The regional initiatives of Bhutan also reflect its strong desire to project itself as an independent, sovereign nation on the world scene. Though culturally and ethnically Bhutan is distinct from India, its independence and sovereignty in the field of foreign relations are circumscribed under the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949. Article II of the Treaty says:

> 'The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.'

In addition to this, Article VI also restricts Bhutan to import arms only by 'assistance and approval of Government of India'.

Bhutan has repeatedly expressed its desire to revise this Treaty. The last time this happened was in September 1979, when the King stopped off in Bombay on his way back from the Havana Non-Aligned Summit. However, without making the revision of the Treaty a major controversial issue between the two countries, Bhutan has tactfully rendered the restraining Article II ineffective by taking foreign policy initiatives without seeking, or abiding by, the 'advice of the Government of India'. The Bhutanese interpretation of this clause is that it is not binding and that Bhutan is free to accept or reject the Indian 'advice'. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk was earlier this year reported to have said about the Treaty provisions:

> 'Technicalities are not important. Friendship, trust and confidence are much more important than anything on paper.'

Bhutan's divergence from India in foreign policy became evident soon after its admission to the United Nations in 1971. Some sources claim that even its recognition of, and establishment of diplomatic relations with, Bangladesh in 1971–2 were done without seeking India's approval. In the United Nations, Bhutan has voted independently and not always with India, particularly since 1973. At the 1979 Havana Non-Aligned Summit, Bhutan took a position on the Kampuchean issue which was contrary to India's. And on the Afghanistan question, Bhutan has strongly objected to the presence of Soviet troops since the December 1979 invasion. Bhutan's Foreign Minister, Dawa Tsering, described the country's recent regional initiatives as part of the 'process of breaking the political and psychological barriers erected by many countries of the region'.

No less important than the projection of identity is the question of ensuring rapid development for Bhutan. For this, international economic support and expansion of trade are vital aspects. The expansion of trade has been an important objective behind Bhutan's relations with Nepal and Bangladesh; the latter may provide an additional transit route for the landlocked kingdom.

This will be of great significance to Bhutan because it has a trade deficit with India. Bhutan's dollar earnings from tourism are, at approximately $1·3 million a year, very small. The need for hard currency is felt more by Bhutan's better-off whose requirements for consumer items like oil, oil products and luxury goods is growing. This social group also controls the production of timber, industrial minerals and agricultural products and livestock for which there is virtually no internal market. Some of the members of the ruling family have developed strong commercial contacts in Kathmandu, Singapore and Hong Kong, and thus work as a powerful pressure group behind Bhutan's trade and diplomatic diversification moves.

Bhutan's regional initiatives represent a distinctly new element in its foreign policy. Is Bhutan emulating the Nepalese model? Some in India reject this interpretation, but they may be in for a disappointment. Bhutan may be

playing its foreign policy cards towards India a bit more softly and tactfully than Nepal. But there should be no illusion about the direction and thrust of its assertive stance.

Bhutan is a traditional society undergoing a slow process of change and modernisation. The King's role will be crucial in this process and he seems well equipped to handle it. His foreign policy moves seem to be an apt response to pressing political and economic challenges.

Southern Sudan: a growing conflict

ANDREW MAWSON

OVER the past year and a half, President Gaafar Nimeiri has drawn considerable international attention to his country through his attempt to lead the Sudanese state to an Islamic path. This controversial policy, combined with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, is leading to growing unrest. In response, the government declared a nation-wide state of emergency in May. The unrest is particularly apparent in the southern Sudan,[1] where support is spreading for a revolutionary movement calling itself the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), which is led by Colonel Dr John Garang de Mabior.

For southerners, the Islamic orientation of the government in Khartoum is of major concern because it appears to threaten their rights as non-Muslims. In September 1983, Nimeiri introduced Sharia (Islamic) law—although this has not been implemented in the south as yet. Earlier this year measures were introduced to bring Sudanese commerce in line with Islamic principles. Proposals are being drawn up to Islamise the banking system. Nimeiri has adopted the title of Imam and instituted oath-takings to ensure loyalty to him as an Islamic leader. And in July he put proposals to Islamise the Constitution before the Peoples' Assembly in Khartoum. But, for many southerners, the Islamic measures introduced since 1983 are merely the culmination of a political process that has gone on for some time.

The background

A certain amount of history is required to put this process in its appropriate context. The colonial policy of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium left the southern Sudan underdeveloped even by the standards of other peripheral areas of the country. Educational standards were low, and few southerners were employed in responsible positions in the administration. Economic

[1] The southern Sudan comprises approximately one third of the area of the Sudan. Southerners make up a similar proportion of the population, and are predominantly non-Muslim.

The author is currently working towards a Ph.D. in anthropology at the African Studies Centre in Cambridge. He has recently spent two years in the Nilotic part of southern Sudan and has previously worked as an archaeologist in Eastern Equatoria and South Kordofan.

development had similarly been neglected. At the time of independence in 1956, northern Sudanese took over the major responsibility for civil administration and internal security. Southern opposition to the Khartoum administration, fears of being policed by northern soldiers and policemen, and concern over Islamic economic and cultural domination led to a long and bloody civil war in which around half a million people lost their lives, and a similar number fled to neighbouring countries.

In 1972 the bulk of the Anya-Nya guerrilla movement, influenced by the Equatorian rebel leader, Joseph Lagu, gave up its fight in return for the autonomy of the southern region within the Sudan. An agreement, signed in Addis Ababa, enshrined southerners' rights to their own assembly and government. Anya-Nya guerrillas were absorbed into the police force, the prisons service, the armed forces and the wildlife department. It was agreed that there should be an even balance between northern and southern troops in garrisons in the Southern Region, at least in the few years following 1972, and that southern troops would be exempt from rotation to the north. In southern eyes, the 1972 Agreement became the cornerstone of Sudanese national unity.

The peoples of the south were worn out by 17 years of war and welcomed the chance to lead their lives within an autonomous region rather than continuing a stalemated struggle. But despite efforts to weld a united Sudan, the bitterness felt by southerners over the ravages the area suffered during the war has only partly been assuaged by the development and rehabilitation effort since 1972. The lack of confidence in Khartoum that led to the war has remained close to the surface, and over the past few years a number of issues and decisions have renewed southern suspicions that Khartoum is not committed to equality between the north and the south.

The economic grievances

Of central importance is the economic situation in the southern Sudan. Southerners claim that they have been neglected economically by the central government. Since 1972, the percentage of the national budget allocated to the government of the Southern Region has never been paid in full. Government-sponsored development work in the south has proved a disappointment, with inadequate finance for virtually all projects. Trade has remained mostly in the hands of northern Sudanese, and in 1982 Khartoum removed the right of the regional government to grant licences for cross-border trade. This deprived the southern government of revenue and penalised the smaller, mainly southern, trader who could not afford to travel to Khartoum to obtain a licence in favour of the larger (usually Arab) trader who could. Economic stagnation, particularly acute in Nilotic areas, has produced a pool of unemployed young men with little in the way of future prospects.[2]

Southern claims tend to ignore the parlous state of the national eco-

[2] In this article 'Nilotic' is used to denote the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk, the peoples who make up the bulk of the population of the regions of Bahr el Ghazal in the north-west of the southern Sudan, and Upper Nile in the north-east, and the political groupings mainly based on these peoples.

nomy—in 1983 the Sudan had a debt burden of $8·2 billion with a servicing ratio of 17 per cent, kept artificially low by rescheduling. To the southerners, the programmes in the south that are receiving large-scale financial backing, notably the Jonglei canal and the oil exploration programme, appear to be designed primarily to benefit the north.

This is particularly true of the costly Jonglei canal scheme to divert part of the White Nile flow away from the Sudd marshes. The prime beneficiaries will be the arid northern Sudan and Egypt. Further, it is feared that the alteration of the flooding pattern of the Sudd, which will result from the completion of the canal, may alter the cattle-carrying capacity of the area and possibly create social and economic difficulties for Nilotic pastoralists.

A more ambiguous, but more significant issue, is the discovery of oil in and around the marshlands of Upper Nile in the southern Sudan. Exploration has been taking place in other parts of the country, notably in South Kordofan, but the major finds so far are from the Bentiu District of Upper Nile.

The Sudanese oil reserves, estimated at 5 billion barrels, are vital to the economic future of the country. Southerners feel that their region should receive more direct benefit from the oil revenues which come from their area; it seems that, instead, these revenues will be poured into the bottomless pit of the national foreign debt. On the discovery of oil, they demanded that a refinery should be built at Bentiu in the oilfields to stimulate the economic potential of their region. The central government in Khartoum proposed the alternative site of Kosti, which is outside the Southern Region, but finally decided to pump the oil unrefined to Port Sudan. Whatever the economic rationale behind this decision, southerners have interpreted it as a political act, a statement of lack of trust in the south, and as an attempt to deprive the region of a valuable industrial investment.

This impression was strongly reinforced by Nimeiri's announcement on 12 June this year of the intention to create Unity Region, which would put the oilfields of Bentiu District under the direct control of Khartoum. In southern, particularly Nilotic, minds there is a connection between this act and the persistent refusal of Khartoum to respond to the people in the neighbouring Abyei District in South Kordofan who have requested a plebiscite to determine their regional affiliation—which they claim is their right under the Addis Ababa Agreement. There have been a series of violent incidents against Dinkas in Aybei; local people have interpreted these acts as attempts to drive them out, to keep their potentially oil-rich area from falling into the hands of the south.

The discovery of oil has transformed the southern Sudan from one of the least productive parts of the country to a major potential source of foreign revenue. This is a major upset in terms of the distribution of economic power in the Sudan. Action by the SPLA resulted in the suspension of both the Jonglei and the oil programmes earlier this year, and this is a severe blow for Nimeiri. Their success in Upper Nile alone has established the SPLA as the most significant force in southern Sudanese politics, which Nimeiri, or any

regime in Khartoum, will have to come to terms with in order to re-open the oil programme.

The re-division issue

Nimeiri's political instinct has always been to split opposition groupings whenever possible. Indeed, it can be argued that the recent re-orientation of the regime towards Islam was an attempt to fragment the Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful opposition to Nimeiri in the north, by stealing its Islamic thunder at a time when Nimeiri's regime was coming under strong criticism for its lack of economic and political direction.

The southerners have always viewed any political move that appears to bring the Sudan closer towards the Arab world with grave suspicion. An example is the riot in Rumbek which greeted the signature of the Nile Valley Integration Charter agreed between Egypt and the Sudan in October 1982. Thus, for Nimeiri to have a freer hand to deal with political problems in the north, a politically weakened south would be a great advantage.

Starting in 1980, calls for the re-division of the south came from the Equatorian followers of Joseph Lagu, who had just been defeated by the Dinka leader, Abel Alier, in elections for the presidency of the Southern Region's High Executive Council. The Equatorians accused the Dinkas of being over-represented in government, of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The Dinkas and their allies countered by arguing that re-division would destroy the political strength of the south. The argument paralysed the South's government and resulted in its dismissal by Nimeiri and replacement by an interim military government headed by Major-General Gasmallah Abdalla Rassas. In the elections of May 1982, Lagu's protegé, Joseph James Tombura, came to power, allied with a Dinka faction from Lakes Province that had a long-standing rivalry with Alier going back to the last civil war.

It is claimed that, shortly after the election, Lagu and Tombura went to Khartoum and once again proposed re-division to Nimeiri. In January 1983, however, the regional congress of the Sudan Socialist Union voted against re-division.[3] The Equatorians attempted to blur the report of this vote to the national congress to read as if re-division was approved. When southern delegates became aware of this, uproar ensued. However, the very deep divisions among southerners and the strong support of the Regional Government, encouraged Nimeiri to decree the creation of the three new southern regions of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria in May 1983.

Whilst the re-division debate was taking place, in late 1982, the Khartoum government decided to send a number of southern army detachments to the north. The departing troops were to be replaced by northerners. Several detachments refused to go and a trickle of desertions started, mainly among Nilotic troops. As the military authorities asserted themselves during late 1982

[3] The Sudan Socialist Union is the Sudan's sole legal political party, founded by Nimeiri in 1972 in an attempt to neutralise factional disputes which had bedevilled Sudanese politics since independence.

and early 1983, disobedience flared into outright mutiny in 10 or so garrisons throughout the Southern Region. Many of the mutineers fled to the bush with their arms to join the rebels. It was after these desertions that the SPLA was set up as a structured organisation. The most important reason for these mutinies was the general direction of political events in the south—in particular, the defeat of the Nilotics in the elections of May 1982 and the subsequent impending introduction of re-division.

The Addis Ababa Agreement had provided that there should be a balance between southern and northern troops within garrisons in the south, at least for the few years following the signing of the Agreement. It was only in late 1982 that Khartoum began to upset this balance, and in the context of the re-division issue the timing of the redeployments took on great significance.

Re-division itself is regarded by its critics as a breach of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Because of the manner of its introduction—by decree—it is regarded as unconstitutional and as part of the divide-and-rule strategy by Khartoum. The Equatorians were accused of playing into Nimeiri's hands for their own parochial concerns.

However, re-division was very popular in Equatoria. Nilotics were sent back to their own areas, and Equatoria was left with a greater proportion of foreign development aid than the other regions by virtue of Juba's role as an entrepôt. Indeed a number of Nilotics were also prepared to serve within the new administrations, because they thought that Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile would benefit from a more equitable division of government resources.

However, the immediate practical effect of re-division was the paralysis of the administration in the south. Inter-regional squabbles occurred over the division of government assets and the provision of facilities for the assemblies and ministries of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. As time passed, it became apparent in Equatoria that economic difficulties have origins somewhat deeper than Nilotic mismanagement. Although there is still much anti-Nilotic sentiment, the euphoria at apparently out-manœuvring the Dinkas had already begun to wear off, even before the introduction of Islamic law in September 1983.

Islamisation and the south

The introduction of Islamic law by presidential decree fulfilled the gloomiest predictions of re-division's opponents. Islamisation is a very emotive affair in all parts of the non-Muslim south. It is seen as a symbol of the events that followed independence in 1956 and led to the last civil war.

As yet, Islamic law has not been implemented in the south, and Nimeiri has stated on a number of occasions that it will not be applied to non-Muslims. However, the fact remains that several non-Muslims have received punishments under Islamic law in Khartoum. And Nimeiri's advisers have indicated that it is their aim to see Islamic law implemented over the entire country.

Southern fears have mounted throughout this year as it has become obvious that Nimeiri is interested in much more than a mere façade of Islamisation.

The declaration of the state of emergency led to tensions in Juba as troops mounted searches for hoarded goods and imposed restrictions on movements to and from the town. Fears grew throughout the south when the measures were introduced. However, in most areas the authorities implemented the procedures with care and circumspection, aware of how the situation could be rendered worse by apparent government provocation. Of the various recent measures introduced since 1983, the recent proposals to Islamise the Constitution are of the greatest consequence.

Southerners are aghast at the proposed amendments. They argue that these will remove the constitutional guarantee of self-government for the southern Sudan will discriminate against them on religious grounds by making a thorough knowledge of Islam a necessary qualification for participation in the political process at a senior level, and will make the implementation of Islamic law in the south irresistible.

In June the two former presidents of the now defunct Southern Region High Executive Council, the longstanding rivals, Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier, united to warn Nimeiri that in the eyes of southerners the proposed constitutional changes threatened Sudanese unity by nullifying the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. After that, all three southern Regional Assemblies sent strong protests to Khartoum outlining their refusal to accept a Constitution based on Islam.

The proposals were put before the Peoples' Assembly in July. An overwhelming majority of members signed a petition organised by southerners calling for more time to discuss the proposals. Nimeiri accepted the petition and then suspended the Assembly. Unfortunately, southerners do not believe that this is the last of the matter. Nimeiri has used his autocratic power of decree with increasing frequency over the past two years, often ignoring the opinions of his ministers and by-passing the regional and national assemblies. He now appears to rely heavily on a small circle of advisers, some of whom are Sufi mystics. It is widely expected that it is only a matter of time before an Islamic state is decreed. For southerners the powerlessness of the democratic political establishment, both in Khartoum and the regional governments of the south, is becoming painfully clear.

In September Nimeiri attempted to defuse the situation in the south by offering to go back on re-division if the southerners can demonstrate that they can cooperate together. Made last year, such an offer might have been enough to prevent the conflict in parts of the Nilotic Sudan from intensifying and spreading. It is possible that it is now too late. Re-division may have been the catalyst for revolt, but Islamisation is an even bigger issue for most southerners. Nilotics, in particular, express the belief that regional autonomy has proved an inadequate way of protecting southern Sudanese rights, and that a return to the pre-1982 situation is no solution, especially with the current President still in power. Few people have faith left in Nimeiri.

During the last war southern secession was a major issue. However, the SPLA claim to be non-secessionist, and say they are aiming to effect a socialist

revolution in the entire Sudan that will bring southerners into a more important role at a national level. Feelers have been put out to northern opposition elements—it is claimed that there have been exploratory talks between the SPLA and representatives of the imprisoned Sadiq el Mahdi, the leader of the powerful Ansar sect of the western Sudan.[4] So far, however, non-southern involvement appears to be restricted to the defection of a western Sudanese officer, Colonel Yacoub Ismael, and his detachment to the rebels.

The international dimension

The Sudan is of immense strategic significance in north-east Africa. It shares borders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central Africa, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, and has a stretch of Red Sea coast opposite Saudi Arabia. This gives any conflict within the country international importance.

It will be very difficult, even impossible, for the army to defeat the rebels by purely military means. The SPLA is fighting on its home territory, many of its members are experienced guerrillas from the last war, and the dense bush of the southern Sudan is well suited to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. This view is shared by many Sudanese army officers, who feel that they have little chance of success unless the rebel supply routes and sanctuary in Ethiopia are removed. The SPLA depends upon support from Ethiopia, and, although this has not been proven, it is likely that Libya is also giving them assistance. Whoever is in power in Khartoum, if he wishes to end the war will either have to come to terms with the SPLA or, if his goal is the defeat of the rebels, the Ethiopians. This would mean the end of tacit Sudanese support for Eritrean, Tigrean and Oromo dissidents in Ethiopia.

Ethiopian (and probable Libyan) support for the rebels, together with the rebels' socialist ideology, has led Nimeiri to claim that the SPLA is a communist organisation, part of a Marxist conspiracy to destabilise the Sudan. Such statements have tended to coincide with negotiations with the United States for further supplies of arms. In reality, the internal causes of the growing conflict in the south are clear, and for most rebels the issues at stake concern southern rights, not ideologies.

As Nimeiri's economic problems have grown, his foreign policy has become more and more oriented towards the United States and Egypt. A regime in Khartoum broadly in line with Qaddafi's or Mengistu's world views, or even a state of political anarchy in the Sudan, would represent a fundamental change in the balance of power in this part of Africa. It would have implications for the situation in Chad, would put pressure on Ethiopian dissidents, would surround Egypt with hostile territory, and would be a major setback to American strategic interests in the Middle East.

The situation in the south is one of several issues that are building up into a

[4] The Ansar sect are the followers of the Mahdi, and are mainly to be found in the western Sudan. Over recent years the sect, and its associated political party, the Umma, which espouses a nationalistic Islamic-oriented brand of politics, have become split between rival leaders belonging to different families. Currently the best known and probably most significant figure is Sadiq el Mahdi, the urbane Oxford-educated grandson of great Muhamed Ahmed el Mahdi.

major crisis in the Sudan. Nimeiri's foreign allies are becoming increasingly disturbed by the direction of events. The United States is continuing to supply the country with arms and economic assistance, but does not seem to be happy in finding itself the main pillar of a fundamentalist regime which appears set on a path that may well lead to political upheaval.

It seems that the only avenues out of the current economic and political crisis involve Nimeiri's replacement, either through a coup or his resignation. But there are no obvious alternative candidates for the presidency with a wide enough support to prevent the multitude of disparate forces that make up the Sudanese political scene from coming into potentially violent confrontation with one another. Further, whoever took over would be faced by the appalling economic problems of the Sudan, which can only be overcome by re-establishing national unity. This is the historical problem confronting anyone in power in Khartoum, and one which, until the last year and a half, Nimeiri had handled better than any of his predecessors.

An opposition political alliance, calling itself the Allied Front of Sudanese National Forces, was formed in May. But its members, who range across the political spectrum from the Sudanese Communist Party through the nationalist Islamic-oriented Umma Party to the moderate right-wing Union Democratic Party, agree about very little save their common dislike of Nimeiri. All these groups have been fragmented by Nimeiri's political manoeuvring over the past 16 years, and their impact on recent events appears to have been minimal. Nimeiri's divide-and-rule style of politics appears to be paying dividends. Recently the state of emergency has been lifted, suggesting that now Nimeiri feels more confident. However, reports from the north indicate that many of the powers vested in the army remain de facto in force. But how long the current situation can last is uncertain. As in so many other African countries, the final answer appears to rest with the army.

Uganda: a postscript

A CORRESPONDENT

THE decline of democracy and respect for human rights that began during the latter years of the first Milton Obote regime in Uganda (1962–71) and accelerated under General Amin's military government (1971–79) and has continued unabated since Obote's return to power in the disputed 1980 election. Since I last wrote,[1] the most publicised development has been the American

[1] See A Correspondent, 'Uganda: "The Pearl of Africa" loses its lustre', *The World Today*, May 1984.

The author, who contributed an article on Uganda to the May issue of *The World Today* to which this is a follow-up, has recently spent four years in the country.

government's dramatic public criticism of the human rights situation in Uganda. This article seeks to examine the nature of that American initiative, and the response which it has evoked from other governments, notably those of Uganda and Britain. It also contains a necessarily brief update of Ugandan developments since the spring of this year.[2]

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) figures for 1984 indicate the continued presence in Zaire and Sudan of 240,000 refugees from the West Nile district of north-west Uganda. This was a massive exodus which coincided with Ugandan army (UNLA) activities in West Nile, mainly between 1980 and 1983. Independent observers from UN agencies privately calculate that perhaps 50,000 refugees have so far repatriated to West Nile.[3] But Ugandan government spokesmen have recently claimed that 300,000 (or even 400,000) have returned.[4] The government has called for $17·1 million worth of aid to assist with resettlement and rehabilitation. It is certainly true that Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) government has made some genuine efforts to encourage repatriation—notably by appointing strong army commanders and district commissioners to the regional centres of Arua and Moyo. But such inflated estimates of refugee figures are hardly likely to increase international confidence in Kampala's integrity. Such incidents as the murder of returnee Alhaj Jabiri, a prominent Muslim chief, by the UNLA, have also led many to question the avowed UPC policy of 'reconciliation and no revenge'.

In 1982 and 1983, more than 100,000 members of the Banyarwanda and Bahima—the majority of them Ugandan citizens—were forced to flee their homes in south-western Uganda by UPC officials and youth-wingers operating together with members of the paramilitary Special Force. Over 40,000 of them fled to Rwanda before the Rwandese authorities closed the border. A UNHCR-sponsored team from the Ugandan Ministry of Justice subsequently conducted a census of those in the Rwandese refugee camps in a bid to determine nationalities. More than a year later, the census findings have still not been released, and a UNHCR official has conceded that Kampala is 'sitting on the results'. The Rwandese, sensitive to the pressures caused by the highest population density in Africa, seem to be hoping that the refugees can be encouraged to drift quietly back to Uganda, or else over into Tanzania. The Tanzanians have, meanwhile, threatened to repatriate forcibly 10,000 alleged Ugandan Banyarwanda from the Kagera salient adjoining the common border.

In the Luwero district of Buganda, the camps for 'displaced persons' were

[2] Interested readers may also wish to refer to the Minority Rights Group (MRG) report to be published in mid-December. Its title is 'Uganda and Southern Sudan' and it is available direct from MRG at 20 Craven Street, London WC2. The report's price is £1·80.

[3] For a general discussion of problems involved in refugee repatriation, see Robert Gorman, 'Refugee repatriation in Africa', *The World Today*, October 1984.

[4] The figure appears in Uganda's submission to the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), held in Geneva in July 1984; the 400,000 figure is quoted in a letter to *The Times* by Shafiq Arein, Ugandan High Commissioner in London, published on 28 August 1984.

isbanded by the UNLA in early 1984. Only three 'transit camps' remain, 'ith an official total of some 2,500 inhabitants. The remaining 140,000 camp ımates have been encouraged to return to their homes, despite the fact that ıere is still general insecurity in the area. Repeated UNLA offensives against ıe National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni have met with ıinimal success: the guerrillas still move about freely, and have shown ıemselves capable of striking as far afield as Masindi and Hoima in Bunyoro, nd Masaka in southern Buganda. In the process, they have seized large quanties of army weapons, and cash from local banks. Luwero is now effecvely a 'closed area'. Aid agency personnel are restricted to movement along ıe peripheries of the district, partly owing to justifiable fear of NRA attacks, nd partly because of the government's sensitivity to 'leaks' about the condion of the local population of 750,000. Given the national army's record of ıwlessness and indiscipline, there is considerable concern about the fate of ıese people.

In the Karamoja region of north-western Uganda, between 30,000 and 0,000 people have been displaced in the wake of joint operations by Ugandan ıd Kenyan military units. These occurred in response to cattle-raids on eighbouring districts by Karamojong warriors. The displaced people are from ıe agricultural areas of southern Karamoja and are highly unlikely to have een involved in cattle-rustling. However, they usually provide food for a :gion that is notoriously susceptible to drought and famine. Their absence 'om active production is bound to affect the area's food supply. Meanwhile, ıe soldiers in the regional capital of Moroto are reportedly busy trucking .aramojong cattle down to Kampala.

Recent reports from Uganda indicate that insecurity and repression by the rmy and government are not restricted to these four regions, but continue to e widespread throughout the country. Two thirds of those who are now in olice cells and prisons are believed to be political detainees. Figures for those el !. inside army barracks like Makindye and in other secret interrogation nd torture centres are not available, because the government does not adıit to such people's existence. A documentary shown recently on British :levision featured a dumping ground for mangled and tortured bodies which ad been found not half a mile from Makindye. Such places are far from nique.

Some weeks ago President Obote addressed his supporters with the words:

> 'We have the policy of reconciliation under way; the policy of no revenge is in place, and we support the best policy of all in saying that if you want to change us, vote us out. There is a policy of freedom in Uganda.'[5]

He does indeed seem to be keen to proceed with the scheduled 1985 elecons, to extract a fresh mandate from the voters. The opposition Democratic arty (DP) was allowed to hold its annual delegates conference in January 984, but afterwards, according to the DP publicity secretary, several elegates and supporters were 'arrested, intimidated and killed'.[6] In such a

Daily Telegraph, 27 August 1984.

6 *Munnansi* (Kampala), 19 April 1984.

climate of political violence, many Ugandans fear that the 1985 elections would be no more 'free and fair' than those of 1980.

Those sympathetic to the Obote regime point to the recent 350 per cent across-the-board wage increases; the two over-subscribed British trade missions visiting Uganda in November; and the contracts for road construction, spare parts, buses and poultry schemes reported in the pages of African commercial magazines. Others, more critically disposed, point to a joint letter to Obote from the four leaders of the country's Christian and Muslim communities. The letter said: 'The Uganda you lead is bleeding to death.' It received no response. Cardinal Nsubuga's repeated calls for a round-table conference in a neutral country, to be attended by government, opposition and resistance representatives, are firmly dismissed by President Obote as 'an insult to the Ugandan people'.[7]

In early August the United States rather unexpectedly spoke out. There was a day of congressional hearings on Uganda's human rights record. Elliot Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, described the Ugandan situation as 'horrendous'. Senior aid officials spoke of conditions that were 'worse . . . than they were under Idi Amin'.[8] There was talk of 100,000 to 200,000 people having been killed in the past four years; of an army which was murdering, or intentionally starving to death, thousands of people in the 'Luwero Triangle'. The initiative was flawed, however, by its lack of substantive evidence. The comparison of nastiness between the two regimes would have been more compelling had some official statistics been appended. (The number of registered Ugandan refugees, for instance, never exceeded 10,000 under Amin; at the moment there are more than 250,000.) On the other hand, the unverifiable estimate for those killed since 1981 did little more, with its several zeroes, than guarantee media coverage, and prompt a grudging rejoinder from Kampala that 'about 15,000' had been killed by both sides since 1980. Nevertheless, the substance, if not the presentation, of the American critique was welcomed in many quarters.

But not in Whitehall. According to press reports, a special British investigation had found 'no evidence . . . to support the (American) report' and 'dismissed . . . as an exaggeration' the American figures for those killed.[9] Some weeks later, however, the Foreign Office claimed it had been misquoted. Malcolm Rifkind, the Minister of State with responsibility for African affairs, said: 'Our view of conditions does not differ significantly from that of the Americans.'[10] It was hinted that Britain merely preferred a quieter approach. But by October, this claim was once again belied by another government Minister, Lord Trefgarne, who said this in the course of answering a question in the House of Lords on Ugandan human rights violations:

> 'We take the view that across the country there has been some improvement in recent years, and I believe that that can to some extent be ascribed to the work done by our military training team. . .'[11]

[7] *Africa Now*, November 1983. [8] *Washington Post*, 6 August 1984.
[9] *The Times*, 15 August 1984. [10] *ibid.*, 26 September 1984. [11] *Hansard*, 16 October 1984.

It seems Britain's approach to Uganda's human rights record is typified more by the signing of trade deals and memoranda of understanding, than by any real attempt to bring pressure to bear. Commercial interests, Uganda's membership of the Commonwealth and its strategic importance in the East African region are all factors that contribute to Whitehall's non-committal stance.

The Ugandan government, meanwhile, was predictably incensed by the American criticisms. An American military attaché was banned from entering Uganda; an American military training programme for UNLA officers was cancelled; and the reports were described as 'nowhere near the truth . . . and deliberately calculated to malign the government and innocent people of Uganda'.[12] The Russians entered the debate: Tass condemned the American claims as a 'new gross falsification'. In September, the Americans decided to mend some fences, with conciliatory visits to Kampala by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, and by Abrams's immediate boss, James Thyden, who said he 'would play a positive and constructive role and not that of a critic'.[13]

Where does all this leave the human rights situation in Uganda? The hope that an improvement might result from American initiatives has now waned. Britain, the dominant foreign influence, seems to be content to pretend not to see the situation for what it really is. President Obote and the UPC appear to have weathered the immediate storm, and are adopting an even more intransigent line. Typical of this was the appointment in August of Brigadier Smith Opon-Acak, a Lango from Obote's home district, to the post of chief-of-staff, vacant since Oyite-Ojok's death in December 1983. A thoughtful initiative at next year's Commonwealth Conference could help avert the very real threat of escalating violence in the run-up to the proposed elections, but the Ugandans suffering under the present situation are pessimistic about the prospects.

[12] *Daily Telegraph*, 9 August 1984. [13] *Africa Economic Digest*, 28 September 1984.

CHATHAM HOUSE PAPERS

Chatham House Papers provide full and up-to-date information on major issues of foreign policy, together with expert analysis. They are recognized as valuable and authoritative guides to some of the most important policy debates of the day.

Fourth Series (Nos. 19–24): *Subscription – £22 ($40)*
Individual copies – £4.95 ($10)

19. **Stuart Harris and Brian Bridges: European Interests in ASEAN**
'This useful little volume . . . The tone is sober, straightforward and eminently sensible.'—*Asian Affairs*

20. **David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg: Defence and Public Opinion**
'. . . another good monograph in the increasingly useful series of Chatham House Papers.'—*Journal of Strategic Studies*

21. **Michael Brech and Margaret Sharp: Inward Investment: Policy Options for the United Kingdom**
'. . . a sensible, well written and well informed publication which should appear on relevant reading lists.'—*Political Studies*

22. **Paul Preston and Denis Smyth: Spain, the EEC and NATO** *(July 1984)*

23. **William Wallace: Britain's Bilateral Links Within Western Europe** *(September 1984)*

24. **Trevor Taylor: European Defence Cooperation** *(November 1984)*

Orders may be placed through bookshops or with:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, Broadway House, Newtown Road, Henley-on Thames, Oxon RG91EN
or (for North America) 9 Park Street, Boston, MA 02108
For individual copies please add 10% postage and packing

Further information about current and forthcoming titles is available from Routledge & Kegan Paul or from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE

PRINTED BY POPPER & COMPANY LTD. WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE